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Abstract
Toward the end of the 19th century, the Hindu monk and reformer Swami Vivekananda
claimed that modern science was inevitably converging towards Advaita Veda¯nta, an
important philosophico-religious system in Hinduism. In the decades that followed,
in the midst of the revolution occasioned by the emergence of Einstein’s relativity
and quantum physics, a growing number of authors claimed to discover striking “par-
allels” between Advaita Veda¯nta and modern physics. Such claims of convergence
have continued to the present day, especially in relation to quantum physics. In this
dissertation, an attempt is made to critically examine such claims by engaging a de-
tailed comparative analysis of two concepts: a¯ka¯s´a in Advaita Veda¯nta and vacuum
in quantum physics. What is examined is the claim that both concepts would refer
to the same reality — an enduring, subtle and all-pervading physical substratum out
of which the constituents of the world come into existence and to which they ulti-
mately return. Based on this study, the dissertation argues that comparisons relying
on conceptual affinities alone generally fall short of establishing a productive dia-
logue between Advaita Veda¯nta and modern physics. Another approach is to bring
into focus the epistemological limits respectively encountered by these systems when
attempting to define the content of “reality-in-itself” or “ultimate reality.” Emphasis
is given to epistemology and the problem of reality in Advaita Veda¯nta, and scientific
realism and philosophical implications of nonseparability in quantum physics.
Keywords: Dialogue; Natural Sciences; Eastern Spiritual Traditions; Advaita Veda¯n-
ta; Modern Physics; Philosophy of science; a¯ka¯s´a; Vacuum; Reality; Epistemology.
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Re´sume´
Vers la fin du 19e`me sie`cle, le moine et re´formateur hindou Swami Vivekananda
affirma que la science moderne convergeait vers l’Advaita Veda¯nta, un important
courant philosophique et religieux de l’hindouisme. Au cours des de´cennies suiv-
antes, suite aux apports scientifiques re´volutionnaires de la the´orie de la relativite´
d’Einstein et de la physique quantique, un nombre croissant d’auteurs soutenaient que
d’importants “paralle`les” pouvaient eˆtre trace´s entre l’Advaita Veda¯nta et la physique
moderne. Encore aujourd’hui, de tels rapprochements sont faits, particulie`rement en
relation avec la physique quantique. Cette the`se examine de manie`re critique ces
rapprochements a` travers l’e´tude comparative de´taille´e de deux concepts: le concept
d’a¯ka¯s´a dans l’Advaita Veda¯nta et celui de vide en physique quantique. L’e´nonce´ ex-
amine´ est celui selon lequel ces deux concepts pointeraient vers une meˆme re´alite´: un
substratum omnipre´sent et subtil duquel e´mergent et auquel retournent ultimement
les divers constituants de l’univers. Sur la base de cette e´tude comparative, la the`se
argumente que des comparaisons de nature conceptuelle favorisent rarement la mise
en place d’un ve´ritable dialogue entre l’Advaita Veda¯nta et la physique moderne. Une
autre voie d’approche serait de prendre en conside´ration les limites e´piste´mologiques
respectivement rencontre´es par ces disciplines dans leur approche du “re´el-en-soi” ou
de la “re´alite´ ultime.” Une attention particulie`re sera porte´e sur l’e´piste´mologie et le
proble`me de la nature de la re´alite´ dans l’Advaita Veda¯nta, ainsi que sur le re´alisme
scientifique et les implications philosophiques de la non-se´parabilite´ en physique quan-
tique.
Mots-cle´s: Dialogue; Sciences naturelles; Traditions spirituelles orientales; Advaita
Veda¯nta; Physique moderne; Philosophie des sciences; a¯ka¯s´a; Vide; Re´alite´; E´piste´mo-
logie.
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Preface
Questions regarding the mystery of the world and its meaning have always fascinated
me since my early days. I remember putting down some of my thoughts at the age of
thirteen on Big Bang and black holes in a “book” which I called The Universe: This
Misunderstood Soul. It was during my Bachelor in Physics (Laval University, 2000-
03) that my interest for Eastern spiritual traditions, and especially Advaita Veda¯nta,
took shape. After my Masters in Science (McGill University, 2003-05), I decided to go
into interdisciplinary studies and started in 2005 a Ph.D. in Religious Studies at the
University of Montreal. It is with my main advisor, Prof. Trichur S. Rukmani, that I
read my first books and articles on Indian philosophy and had my first course on this
topic at Concordia University. I then started learning Sanskrit at McGill University
for two years (2003-05) before being awarded a one year doctoral fellowship by the
Indo-Canadian Shastri Institute (Alberta, Canada) to study Indian philosophy and
Sanskrit in India under the guidance of a traditional teacher (guru) in the Advaita
Veda¯nta tradition, Prof. K. Ramasubramanian. With him, I had the chance to study
primary texts in Advaita Veda¯nta, and to get a glimpse of the vastness and richness
of Hindu culture and religion. Himself a Ph.D. in Physics, Prof. Ramasubramanian
was of real help in shaping my ideas at the intersection of modern science and Advaita
Veda¯nta. The present dissertation is the outcome of my five-year doctoral research,
and in a sense a fulfillment of my continuous questioning about the universe and its
ultimate significance.
1Chapter 1
Introduction
Prior to the Scientific Revolution in the 16th century, questions about the nature,
meaning and origin of the universe and life used to be the near-exclusive province
of religion and natural philosophy. But soon modern science also proved to be an
effective way of engaging life’s deepest questions. Physics perhaps more than other
natural sciences, has played a significant role in that regard. The basic goal of modern
physics is to provide a description of the basic structures and processses at work in
the physical world in terms of theories and mathematical models that can be used to
generate empirically testable predictions. Since at least the late eighteenth century,
much progress has been made by physicists in understanding a wide range of physical
phenomena. The complex physics underlying electricity, magnetism and light has
been elucidated. Fundamental concepts such as mass, forces, energy, atoms and
fields have been introduced. In 1900, the study of heat radiation led Max Planck to
lay down the foundations of quantum theory, a revolutionary theory describing the
behavior of matter and energy at the atomic and subatomic levels. In 1905, Albert
Einstein challenged two centuries of scientific belief by welding together space, time,
energy and matter in his special theory of relativity. A decade later, his insights
resulted in the first comprehensive theory of gravitation since Newton, a theory that
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would open the way to the field of modern scientific cosmology and shed light on the
origin, development and structure of the universe. Since then, several other theories
and ideas have emerged at the forefront of physics — quantum field theory, chaos
theory, quantum cosmology, superstring theory and other approaches to the so-called
Theory of Everything. These new approaches have deepened but also challenged our
understanding of the physical world.
Since its beginnings, physics has been concerned with questions of a philosophical
nature. Basically, metaphysical assumptions are constitutive of the conceptions of
the physical world derived from physical theories.1 This is perhaps more true today
than ever before. Topics that were traditionally reserved exclusively to metaphysics
— such as causation, determinism, laws of nature, the nature of space, time, matter
and to some extent even the nature of consciousness — have become commonplace
in theoretical physics and philosophy of physics. To the extent that it is concerned
with the natural world, metaphysics as a branch of philosophy cannot but reflect on
physics itself. As Tim Maudlin says: “Physical theories provide us with the best
handle we have on what there is, and the philosopher’s proper task is the interpre-
tation and elucidation of those theories.”2 In other words, philosophers can no more
ground their systems solely on their own thinking but must also take into account
knowledge coming from natural sciences. In the view of leading quantum physicist
Bernard d’Espagnat, “any tentative philosophical approach to a world-view should
1As explained by the philosopher of science Tian Yu Cao: “. . . a conception of the physical
world involves a model of the constitution and workings of nature, and includes assumptions about
the mechanisms for fundamental interactions among the ultimate constituents of matter, and an
interpretation of the nature of space and time. That is, the conception involves what philosophers
usually call metaphysical assumptions. . .Metaphysical considerations are of crucial importance for
path-breaking physicists in their investigations. One reason for this is that these considerations
constitute essential ingredients of their conceptual frameworks.” See: Cao, Conceptual Developments
of 20th Century Field Theories, xiii.
2Maudlin, The Metaphysics Within Physics, 1.
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take information coming from contemporary physics into account quite seriously.”3
It is obvious that philosophers, even while reflecting on general matters not related
to nature, often rely on concepts and notions pertaining to classical physics such as
locality, distinguishability, continuity, and absolute space and time. Most of these
notions, however, are either no more valid or have a restricted domain of validity in
today’s physics.
Naturally, the findings of contemporary science have also challenged religious ac-
counts of nature and existence in many ways. With the increasing importance of
science and technology in modern society and the accompanying change in how one
views nature, the credibility of some central religious beliefs has been also seriously
questioned. The challenge posed to religion is twofold: epistemologically, modern sci-
ence has provided us with remarkable predictive models and methods whose efficiency
has been confirmed with the development of powerful new technologies; ontologically,
modern science has yielded knowledge of many previously inaccessible domains of
nature, sometimes with characteristics radically different from those assumed by reli-
gion.4 Further, since views of nature influence the way we treat nature and ourselves,
science has also affected human values and goals as understood and framed by reli-
gion. Consequently, there has been an enormous interest in what might be called the
dialogue between science and religion. How should we view science, religion and their
relationship in modern society? What is the place of religion in an age of science?
Such and similar questions have been debated by scientists, philosophers, theologians
and scholars of all cultures and denominations particularly in the last decades. For
historical reasons, however, most scholarly discussions on this topic have been focus-
ing on themes pertaining to Western religious traditions (especially Christian) such
as world creation, faith, theism and divine agency. Less studied in academic circles
has been the encounter between modern science and Eastern spiritual traditions.5 It
3d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, 1.
4Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues, xiii-xiv.
5In this dissertation, we will use the term “Eastern spiritual traditions” to refer to the various
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is with a segment of this particular encounter that this dissertation is concerned.
The encounter between modern science and Eastern thought is not a recent phe-
nomenon. Already in the Enlightenment period some scholars were noting the “sci-
entific” and rationalist character of the Confucian ethics, and claims of compatibility
between science and Buddhism were made by European intellectuals during the 19th
century.6 Such claims have persisted well into the 20th century and have continued
to the present day, including in relation to other schools as well, such as Taoism and
Veda¯nta in Hinduism. In the last century in particular, several influential thinkers,
including some world-renowned scientists, have found in the natural philosophies of
China and India elements that seem compatible with modern science. But this en-
counter has not always been warmly welcomed by Western scholars. As John James
Clarke explains:
The latter [Eastern spiritual traditions] have often been perceived in the
West as displaying an endemic mystical bent and a pervasive irrationalist
tendency, and their role within Western orientalist discourse has some-
times appeared to be to act precisely as a counterweight to Western sci-
entism and positivism.7
For this reason, several scholars have been reluctant to tackle the debate between
science and religion from the angle of Eastern traditions. However, the perception
of East as being essentially “mystical” and “irrational,” often contrasted with West
perceived as scientific, analytical and rational, is based on many prejudices. Recent
scholarship has shown how such stereotypes, essentialising East and West into two
simple and contrastive categories, have served many agendas in the West from reli-
gious, political to intellectual propaganda.8 Many scholars still ignore or simply refuse
to acknowledge the richness and depth of Eastern thought and thereby fail to under-
religious, cultural and intellectual traditions of India and China in general (esp. Hinduism, Buddhism
and Taoism).
6Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought, 165.
7ibid.
8See: Said, Orientalism; Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding; Clarke, op.cit.
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stand its important role in the development of the Western intellectual tradition. Not
only are there strong rational, logical and empiricist elements in Eastern traditions,
but throughout the modern period from the time of the Renaissance onwards, the
East has exercised a significant influence on Western cultural and intellectual life.9
On the other hand, claims of compatibility between modern science and “Eastern
mysticism” have sometimes functioned as apologetics and as a means for criticizing
the strong positivistic bent of Western scientific tradition, or to dismantle central
beliefs pertaining to the Judeo-Christian tradition. They have also been used to im-
prove the image of science and scientists as a counterpoint to anti-science movements,
or as a means for advocates of diverse religions to justify and promote their own ways
of believing and behaving. Apologetics, either for science or religion, underlies several
recent writings relating to modern science and Eastern thought.10 There is also the
question whether it is historically and conceptually relevant to put modern science
and Eastern traditions on a par. After all, one may argue, the “Scientific Revolu-
tion” took place in the West and not in the East. It might then be more appropriate
to approach the science-religion debate by considering Western religions only. We
cannot hold this position for several reasons. Firstly, there is the obvious fact that
historically the development of modern science has been inextricably linked to non-
Western cultures: to the Islamic and before it the Greek, Indian, ancient Iranian as
well as Mesopotamian and Egyptian cultures.11 Merely equating modern science with
“Western science” and then setting the latter in opposition to Eastern thought is in-
correct. Secondly, Eastern spiritual traditions are concerned with natural philosophy
far more than Western religions. In Taoism, Buddhism and Hinduism, cosmological
speculations about the origin, evolution and constitution of the universe are often
9Clarke, op.cit., 5.
10See: Restivo, The Social Relations of Physics, Mysticism, and Mathematics: Studies in Social
Structure, Interests and Ideas ; Nanda, Prophets Facing Backward: Postmodernism, Science, and
Hindu Nationalism; Drees, Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates.
11Nasr, The Need for a Sacred Science, 72.
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closely intertwined with metaphysical inquiries into the meaning of human life and
transcendence. Given that modern science itself developed out of natural philoso-
phy, significant points of comparison could emerge while exploring Eastern spiritual
traditions. Thirdly, there are currently several books and articles written on the sub-
ject that advocate either an over-simplified or misunderstood picture of the dialogue
between modern science and Eastern thought. In view of all this, it is historically
relevant to address these issues with careful scrutiny.
It seems imperative to further critical reflections on the ways modern science and
Eastern thought can interact meaningfully. Such reflections would allow us to clarify
the claims of compatibility raised in both scientific and religious literature, while si-
multaneously contributing to the broader science-religion debate with new theoretical
approaches, methods and categories of thought. For instance one could address mod-
ern science using a different philosophical paradigm. Since its beginnings, philosophy
of science has been embedded mostly in Western philosophical methods and categories
of understanding. A consideration of Eastern thought, especially its philosophical fea-
tures, could therefore provide alternative tools, concepts and methods with which to
reflect on science and broaden our understanding of the kinds of premises about na-
ture, human existence and reality that are characteristic of the Western tradition. In
his book Oriental Enlightenment, Clarke aptly demonstrates how Eastern thought,
throughout history, has often been
an instrument of serious self-questioning and self-renewal, whether for
good or ill, an external reference point from which to direct the light of
critical inquiry into Western traditions and belief systems, and with which
to inspire new possibilities.12
Hence, the general idea in the encounter with Eastern ways of thinking would not be
to adopt wholesale ideas and principles from the East and deny contributions from the
Western intellectual tradition. The underlying motivation could rather be to engage
12Clarke, op.cit., 6.
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in a dialogue with Eastern thought as a way to critically reflect on the Western
tradition itself. Through comparison and fertile cross-referencing, one can rethink
Western assumptions by placing them in a wider context and actually gain a greater
understanding of the various ways in which humankind reflect about the world. Such
a comparative approach appears to be desirable and academically relevant. In this
dissertation, we therefore use comparative philosophy as a method and apply it to
two other philosophical enterprises: philosophy of science and philosophy of religion.
Strictly speaking, comparative philosophy is not an independent discipline or a
philosophy in itself but a comparison of existing philosophies. In his Methodologies
of Comparative Philosophy, Robert. W. Smid defines comparative philosophy as
an attempt to move across the boundaries of otherwise distinct philo-
sophical traditions — especially insofar as these traditions are divided by
significant historical and cultural distance — thus enabling a comparison
of what lies on either side of the boundary.13
A direct by-product of comparative philosophy would then be, as Raimundo Panikkar
puts it, to make “us acutely aware that we cannot do philosophy in a vacuum or only
‘among ourselves.”14 In a continuous and open-ended fashion, comparative philosophy
aims to learn from the views of others in contrasting them with one’s own views.
Paradoxically, it also ends up radically criticizing the comparative enterprise itself.
Thus, an informed usage of comparative analysis involves hermeneutical reflexiveness
as well, that is, a reflexive and self-critical understanding of the nature and validity
of the comparative process. What is often lacking in comparisons involving modern
science and Eastern thought is precisely a clarification of the problems that are likely
to arise in approaching distinct philosophical traditions. Discussing the study of
Eastern philosophy from a Western perspective, Hans-Georg Gadamer noted in a
paper published in 1949:
13Smid, Methodologies of Comparative Philosophy: The Pragmatist and Process Traditions, 2.
14Panikkar, R., “What Is Comparative Philosophy Comparing?” In: Larson and Deutsch (eds.),
Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy
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Although in the meantime the research in Eastern philosophy has made
further advances, we believe today that we are further removed from its
philosophical understanding. The sharpening of our historical awareness
has rendered the translations or adaptations of the texts. . . fundamentally
problematic. . .We cannot speak of an appropriation of these things by
the Occidental philosophy. What can be considered established is only
the negative insight that our own basic concepts, which were coined by
the Greeks, alter the essence of what is foreign.15
Gadamer refers here to the importance of developing awareness of our own perspec-
tives and presuppositions in the act of comparison itself. In other words, under-
standing the “other” does not mean thinking or seeing like the “other” but recog-
nizing “otherness” while being aware of one’s own biases and prejudices. One way
of addressing this problem is to promote active academic collaboration and personal
encounter between scholars from foreign traditions. During my doctoral project, I
have myself undergone this process by spending more than one year in India studying
under the guidance of a traditional teacher. Through him, I became acquainted with
primary texts and methods in classical Indian philosophy and became familiar with
Indian culture and religion. My in-depth interaction with Indian thought and praxis
demonstrated for me the benefits of cross-cultural understanding and its usefulness
in interdisciplinary studies.
The comparative enterprise is not a universalist project. In the context of a
East-West dialogue, universalism has been defined “as the search for a single world
philosophy, one which brings together and synthesises the diverse philosophical tra-
ditions of East and West.”16 In this view, the comparative approach would aim to
specify basic assumptions, concepts, doctrines and ideas that these traditions hold
in common, in order to forge a global philosophy or a “universal categorial structure
that would be common to the philosophical texts of diverse cultures.”17 However, the
problem arises as to how to translate one conceptual structure in terms of another
15Quoted from: Halbfass, India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding, 164.
16Clarke, op.cit., 119.
17ibid., 121.
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without favoring a particular conceptual framework. In his Introduction to Compara-
tive Philosophy, Ulrich Libbrecht notes that comparison at the level of concepts and
ideas (what he calls surface structures) is necessarily based on criteria that refer to
pre-established conceptual frameworks. But there is no philosophical reason why a
particular framework should be favored against another. Libbrecht suggests to sit-
uate the comparative enterprise at the level of deep structures. In his view, deep
structures are ideally paradigm-free and stand out from all the existing cultures and
philosophies.18 The main task of comparative philosophy would not be to invent a
new philosophy but to identify those deep structures and ask how they can be de-
scribed. Though utopic in some ways, the thought and vision of Libbrecht has helped
me in framing academic discussions in this dissertation.
Scope of the dissertation
This dissertation is a critical study of the current dialogue between the system of Ad-
vaita Veda¯nta in Hinduism and one of the most fundamental developments in modern
physics, namely quantum physics. The Veda¯nta tradition has been recognized as an
important and perhaps the most well-known tradition of theological and philosophical
thinking in India. It has exerted a strong influence on all Indian religious traditions
throughout history and still continues to attract a significant following all over the
world. Under Veda¯nta there are a number of sub-schools, among which the most
influential is arguably the non-dualistic school of Advaita Veda¯nta, primarily asso-
ciated with the name of S´an˙kara, a philosopher and theologian who lived in India
probably around the 8th century CE. As a theological system, Advaita Veda¯nta relies
on the exegetical interpretation of a number of Upanis.ads and other texts which are
18Libbrecht, Within the Four Seas: Introduction to Comparative Philosophy, 87-89. According to
Libbrecht, a deep structure that is fundamentally paradigm-free and universal could be “energy”
(e.g., Greek energeia: that which lies in works; Chinese ch’i : that which fills the entire universe).
See: ibid., 92.
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foundational to this tradition. The ultimate aim of the Advaita Veda¯nta system is
the attainment of spiritual liberation, which is conceived to arise with the knowl-
edge of one’s own real nature. The term advaita means “non-dual” and refers to the
absolute monist stance of the school. Thus, Advaita Veda¯nta holds that all distinc-
tions are ultimately unreal and that there exists only one Reality, called Brahman,
whose nature is pure consciousness. Liberation, therefore, comes with the realization
that our innermost self is non-different from the one, all-comprehending and spiritual
Brahman.
Toward the end of the 19th century, the Hindu monk Swami Vivekananda claimed
that modern physics was inevitably converging towards Advaita Veda¯nta. In the fol-
lowing decades, in the midst of the revolution occasioned by the emergence of Ein-
stein’s relativity theory and quantum physics, a growing number of authors claimed to
discover striking “parallels” between the worldviews of Veda¯nta and modern physics,
especially quantum physics. Such claims of convergence have continued to the present
day, not without being severely criticized by some other scholars. For Meera Nanda,
for instance, the parallels drawn between physics and Veda¯nta amount to nothing
but pure apologetics for Hinduism. In her book Prophets Facing Backward: Post-
modernism, Science, and Hindu Nationalism, she declares that parallels are
. . .most radical declarations that respect neither the integrity of physics
nor the authenticity of mysticism that is the heart of Veda¯nta: physics is
turned into mysticism and Veda¯nta is made to sound as if it were chiefly
concerned with understanding the material world, which it never was.19
Nanda refers here to declarations made by representatives of the Hindutva ideology
in India who would invoke convergence between Veda¯nta and natural sciences so as
to promote the superiority of Hinduism over other religions. The intent behind such
declarations is not a genuine encounter of Veda¯ntic thought and modern science but
the creation of “a science of nature that does not contradict the sacred teachings of
19Nanda, Prophets Facing Backward: Postmodernism, Science, and Hindu Nationalism, 108.
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the Vedas.”20
That apologetics forms an important aspect of “science and religion” has been
aptly demonstrated by Willem B. Drees in his recent book Religion and Science in
Context: A Guide to the Debates. Drees describes how the encounter between science
and religion is not always done for its own sake but often serves as apologetics for
either science or religion, or as ammunition in the competition for authority within
religious traditions.21 The case discussed by Nanda goes in that sense as advocates
of a specific religion here seek authority over other religions by having science on
their side. But apologetics and competition between religious communities is not the
whole story in the encounter between science and religion. One could also engage the
dialogue, says Drees, for challenging nonsense and the pursuit of truth. He mentions
the need both in the academic and public spheres to distinguish science from pseudo-
science, and genuine spirituality from superstition. He is concerned about “promoting
quality” and “avoiding multiplication of nonsense” in reflections on science, religion
and their relationship.22
The purpose of this dissertation is not an attempt to discover the findings of
modern physics in Veda¯nta or to show how modern physics is deeply “spiritual.”
Rather, the first objective of this dissertation is to provide a critical and philosophical
examination of some claims of convergence recently made between quantum physics
and Advaita Veda¯nta. As the field is vast, we have narrowed the detailed comparison
to two specific concepts whose affinities have already been noticed by some authors:
a¯ka¯s´a (often translated as “space”) in Advaita Veda¯nta and vacuum in quantum
physics. What will be examined is the conceptual claim that both terms would refer
to the same reality — an enduring, subtle and all-pervading physical substratum
out of which the constituents of the world come into existence and to which they
20Nanda, M., “Vedic Science and Hindu Nationalism: Arguments against a Premature Synthesis
of Religion and Science.” In: Bagir (ed.), Science and Religion in a Post-colonial World, 27.
21Drees, Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates, 11.
22ibid., 39.
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ultimately return. Such a claim is paradigmatic of what we often find in parallelist
literature. The other reason for working out this specific parallel is because of the
assumption that a genuine dialogue between physics and Advaita Veda¯nta is possible
and worth engaging. Unlike other concepts, a¯ka¯s´a and quantum vacuum have been
chosen as relevant for engaging in philosophical reflections on the nature of reality.
The second objective of this dissertation is precisely to attempt a reconstruction of
the encounter between modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta along those lines.
In the last decades, modern physics has given new shape to philosophical ideas
on the nature of matter, physical interaction, determinism and measurement. More
significant is the fact that based on recent insights in quantum physics, some philoso-
phers have been reinvestigating the old problem of realism in science and the nature
of scientific knowledge as well. Ongoing reflections have been taking place on the
inherent epistemological limitations of science in attempting to define the content
of reality, and incidentally on the nature and relevance of the concept of “reality”
in science. The nature of reality as a whole, and the role of reason and perception
in disclosing knowledge of the “ultimate reality” (or Brahman) are also important
issues in Advaita Veda¯nta. In such a context, a dialogue with Advaita Veda¯nta could
provide alternative tools, concepts and methods from which to reflect on or approach
the broader problem of reality in philosophy of physics. In turn, current knowledge
in philosophy of physics could contribute significantly to adapt Advaita Veda¯nta to
recent discoveries in science, and perhaps raise issues that could be relevant for both
its theology and spirituality in the modern era. In contrast with Nanda and others,
our approach to the encounter between modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta is thus
philosophical at the expense of socio-cultural and historical. Philosophical concepts
and ideas are given more emphasis than human intentions, attitudes and contexts.
Though one can hardly neglect human context in a cultural-historical sense, we take
for granted that there is something worthwhile in exploring how both traditions can
meet in philosophical terms.
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Methodology and outline of the dissertation
In this dissertation, comparative philosophy is the general methodological framework
in which the proposed philosophical reconstruction is developed. As outlined earlier,
the very nature of comparative philosophy is about comparing existing philosophies;
the two distinct philosophical traditions considered here are philosophy of religion on
the one hand, and philosophy of physics on the other hand. The task of philosophy of
religion is to provide a philosophical examination of the central themes and concepts
involved in religious traditions. It is applied here to Advaita Veda¯nta in order to ar-
ticulate its main philosophical concepts and doctrines, and particularly to situate the
concept of a¯ka¯s´a within a coherent philosophical framework. Philosophy of physics
is a branch of philosophy reflecting on basic metaphysical and epistemological ques-
tions posed by physics. It is here applied to quantum physics in a way to understand
some of its major philosophical implications, and particularly to address how philoso-
phers today conceive the nature of quantum vacuum. As far as the issue of “reality”
in philosophy of physics is concerned, emphasis is laid on the views of the French
theoretical physicist and philosopher of science Bernard d’Espagnat. D’Espagnat is
widely recognized as a leading authority in the field of interpretation of quantum
physics and particularly renown for his works on realism in physics. His recent book
On Physics and Philosophy was described by the physicist Roland Omne`s as “surely
the most complete book to have been written on this subject [philosophy of quantum
physics] and one likely to last a long time. . . ”23 While presenting his views, however,
it will be relevant to consider the views of two other French philosophers of science,
Michel Bitbol and Herve´ Zwirn, who also bring light to the problem of “reality” in
philosophy of physics.
The dissertation is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, as just presented,
introduced the topic of the dissertation, its context, scope, methodology and objec-
23Quoted from the backcover of Bernard d’Espagnat’s book On Physics and Philosophy.
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tives. In Chapter 2, we introduce in a critical manner the kinds of “parallels” drawn
between Advaita Veda¯nta and quantum physics. Theoretical issues such as the role
of the observer in measurement, holism and the ground of existence are examined.
We also look into the various problems that are likely to arise when bringing together
ideas from different disciplines (a practice that will be called “parallelism”), and dis-
cuss the different ways in which the relation between science and religion has been
understood. In Chapters 3 and 4, we study in detail the two concepts under scrutiny
in our comparative analysis: vacuum in quantum physics (Chap. 3) and a¯ka¯s´a in
Advaita Veda¯nta (Chap. 4). In Chapter 3, we first introduce briefly the diverse con-
ceptions of vacuum in the Western world from Antiquity to the modern period. The
rest of the chapter is concerned with philosophical issues in quantum physics, and
particularly with the assessment of quantum vacuum in philosophy of physics. In
Chapter 4, we investigate the concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Hindu philosophical thought from
the Upanis.adic to the classical period with a focus on S´an˙kara’s Advaita Veda¯nta.
Advaita Veda¯nta has been approached from a philosophical standpoint along with
references to primary texts wherever necessary. In the first part of Chapter 5, we
engage in a detailed comparative analysis of quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a and draw
some general conclusions about the nature and relevance of conceptual parallels. In
the second part, we lay the basis for a philosophical reconstruction of the dialogue be-
tween modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. Emphasis is given to epistemology and
the problem of reality in Advaita Veda¯nta, and scientific realism and philosophical
implications of nonseparability in quantum physics.
Chapter 2
Eastern Spiritual Traditions and
Quantum Physics
A large number of books and articles relating modern physics and Eastern spiritual
traditions were published in the last four decades.1 The pioneer work in this domain
is often quoted as Fritjof Capra’s The Tao of Physics, a best-seller published in 1975
that has since been translated in 20 languages and is available today in more than
40 editions.2 Capra’s attempts to blend modern physics with Eastern thought was
soon followed by many authors — scientists, laymen, media people, New Age follow-
ers, spiritual teachers as well as religious devotees from various Eastern traditions.3
1Some authors drawing parallels between these disciplines commonly use the term “Eastern
mysticism” to denote the Eastern spiritual traditions. For the sake of convenience, this expression
will often be used in this chapter. It must be noted, however, that this is an inadequate expression.
Though mystical practice and contemplation play a crucial role in traditions like Taoism, Buddhism,
Jainism and Hinduism, each tradition also includes religious features like rituals, beliefs, devotional
exercises, etc., as well as doctrinal and philosophical features.
2Capra, The Tao of Physics: An Exploration of the Parallels Between Modern Physics and East-
ern Mysticism.
3To mention a few: Le Shan, The Medium, the Mystic and the Physicist ; Zukav, The Dancing
Wu-Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics ; Talbot, Mysticism and the New Physics ; de
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Overall, much work has been done examining the relationship between modern sci-
ence and elements of Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism.4 Meetings between respected
scientists and Eastern spiritual teachers have become more frequent, and a course
about the “Tao of Physics” was even taught at the University of Toronto5. Various
movements, research centers and foundations have emerged as an attempt to recon-
cile modern science with Eastern spiritual traditions, and an increasing number of
international conferences have been held on the subject around the world.
Often referred to as “quantum mysticism,”6 the practice that likens quantum
physics principles and Eastern spiritual ideas was popularized in the 1970s with
Capra’s book and further revived by a number of authors. A movie, What the Bleep
Do We know!?, was even produced on the subject in 2004. This film blends Eastern
and New Age ideas with notions of quantum physics to illustrate that the material
world is a form of consciousness and that human beings “create” their own reality.7
Riencourt, The Eye of Shiva: Eastern Mysticism and the New Physics ; Weber, Dialogues with
Scientists and Sages ; Zohar, The Quantum Self: Human Nature and Consciousness Defined by the
New Physics ; McFarlane, Einstein and Buddha: The Parallel Sayings; Clarke, Ways of Knowing:
Science and Mysticism Today.
4In particular, the relation between Buddhism and modern science has been discussed widely
in the recent years. Buddhism would share several features with modern science: a shifting from
beliefs and tradition, a commitment to understand all phenomena in a dispassionate and objective
manner, an interest in human psychology and so forth. See: Jacobson, Buddhism and the Con-
temporary World: Change and Self-Correction; Hayward, Shifting Worlds, Changing Minds: Where
the Sciences and Buddhism Meet ; Wallace (ed.), Buddhism and Science: Breaking New Ground ;
Houshmand and Zajonc, The New Physics and Cosmology: Dialogues with the Dalai Lama; Ricard
and Thuan, The Quantum and the Lotus ; Lopez Jr., Buddhism and Science: A Guide for the Per-
plexed. Similarly, the organicist worldview found in Taoism — in which natural phenomena are seen
as parts of a living organism rather than parts of a mechanical process — has been compared with
some insights in modern science. See: Needham, Science and Civilization in China.
5Harrison, “Teaching the Tao of Physics.”
6Wertheim, “Quantum Mysticism.”
7The movie was successful and a second, substantially changed, extended DVD version was
released in 2006: What the Bleep!?: Down the Rabbit Hole. However, the movie has been severely
CHAPTER 2. EASTERN SPIRITUAL TRADITIONS AND QUANTUM PHYSICS 17
Among the proponents of such ideas, many would draw their inspiration from famous
physicists such as Niels Bohr, Erwin Schro¨dinger, Werner Heisenberg and Robert A.
Oppenheimer, who all showed some interest for Eastern thought. Bohr was espe-
cially interested in Taoist philosophy, so much so that he chose the Taoist yin-yang
symbol for his coat of arms. Heisenberg, famous for his uncertainty principle, visited
Rabindranath Tagore in India in the 1930s. He later acknowledged that the deep dis-
cussions he had with him on Indian philosophy stimulated his own ideas in physics.8
As for Oppenheimer, he was known for being well-versed in Indian philosophy (he
especially appreciated the Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯) and familiar with the Sanskrit language.
Schro¨dinger stands as a particular case as he was probably (among the mentioned
physicists) the most familiar with Indian philosophy. He knew quite well the writings
of Arthur Schopenhauer — who was himself deeply involved in the philosophy of the
Upanis.ads and Buddhism — and the works of German orientalists like Paul Deussen,
Richard Garbe, Max Mu¨ller and others. He was especially attracted by the Hindu
system known as Advaita Veda¯nta, which he described as a “foundation for his life
and work.”9 In 1925, he published a book called Meine Weltansicht (My View of
the World), in which he suggests that Advaita Veda¯nta may provide an adequate
metaphysical grounding and religious framework to modern Western civilisation. In-
terestingly, Schro¨dinger wrote that intensely personal account of his philosophy of
life just before his revolutionary paper on what would later be called the Schro¨dinger
equation, such that the “time of introspection recorded inMeine Weltansicht was also
the time during which his psychological resources were subconsciously marshalled for
the creation of a new world of physics in the papers of 1926.”10 However, Schro¨dinger
is not the only figure evoking a rapprochement between Advaita Veda¯nta and modern
criticized for misrepresenting science. See: Shermer, “Quantum Quackery”; Kuttner and Rosenblum,
“Teaching Physics Mysteries Versus Pseudoscience”; Wertheim, “Quantum Mysticism.”
8Wilber (ed.), The Holographic Paradigm and Other Paradoxes: Exploring the Leading Edges of
Science, 218.
9Moore, Schro¨dinger: Life and Thought, 173.
10ibid., 168.
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science. A few decades earlier, the Hindu monk reformer Swami Vivekananda claimed
at the Chicago’s Parliament of Religions in 1893 that in his opinion the latest discov-
eries of science seemed like “echoes” from the “high spiritual flights of the Veda¯nta
philosophy.”11 After coming back from the West, he claimed that:
It seems to us, and to all who care to know, that the conclusions of modern
science are the very conclusions the Veda¯nta reached ages ago; only, in
modern science they are written in the language of matter.12
Although neither quantum physics nor Einstein’s relativity were yet invented at that
time, the vision of Vivekananda certainly inspired future generations of scholars and
scientists to work towards the reconciliation of modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta.
A large number of books on the relationship between Advaita Veda¯nta and modern
physics continues to be published to this day.13
In this chapter, we will be dealing especially with parallels between Advaita
Veda¯nta and quantum physics. Our aim is not to argue in detail about the va-
lidity of such parallels but to offer a critical introduction to their content and nature.
We have centered our discussion around two specific theoretical issues: 1. the role
of the observer in measurement, and the correlative assertion that consciousness (or
11Quoted from: The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (Vol.1), Addresses at the Parliament
of Religions, “Paper on Hinduism.”
12Quoted from: The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda (Vol.3), Lectures from Colombo
to Almora, “The Mission of Veda¯nta.” Vivekananda was confident that Advaita philosophy and
discoveries of modern science would one day be in perfect agreement with each other. Apparently,
he was himself working on such a problem: “I am working a good deal now upon the cosmology
and eschatology of the Veda¯nta. I clearly see their perfect unison with modern science, and the
elucidation of the one will be followed by that of the other.” Quoted from: The Complete Works of
Swami Vivekananda (Vol.5).
13Most Advaita scholars interested in this topic are attached to the Ramakrishna Mission, founded
by Swami Vivekananda in 1897. For instance: Jitatma¯nanda, Modern Physics and Veda¯nta;
Mukhya¯nanda, Veda¯nta in the Context of Modern Science. A large number of books have also
been published by scientists and scholars attracted to the thought of Veda¯nta: Dobson, Advaita
Veda¯nta and Modern Science; Goswami, Self-aware Universe: How Consciousness Creates the Mate-
rial World ; Panda, The Vibrating Universe; Panda, Ma¯ya¯ in Physics ; Chandrasekharayya, Veda¯nta
and Modern Physics.
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mind) should be fundamental to our description of reality. In the view of some au-
thors, quantum physics would advance that there is no separation between subject
and object, that reality is essentially of the nature of consciousness, and that human
consciousness “creates” physical reality; 2. holism in quantum physics, i.e., the idea
that the physical universe is an undivided whole in which everything is interconnected.
These two ideas are recurrent in parallels made with Advaita Veda¯nta as this system
considers the plurality of empirical phenomena to be the expression of a unitive and
underlying principle of existence and consciousness called Brahman. However, claims
of convergence or compatibility between modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta have
given rise to a number of criticisms from scientists and academics. We have included
some of them in our discussion as well as a reflection on the potential pitfalls related
to the practice of “parallelism” as such. This introduction will thus serve to pro-
vide some methodological basis for and to put into context the comparative study
undertaken in this dissertation.
2.1 Nature of the Parallels
The advent of quantum physics at the beginning of the 20th century radically changed
the conception of the physical world which was prevailing in science at that time. Prior
to that, and for about three centuries, classical physics constituted the foundation for
science as a whole.14 Classical physics worldview was simple, coherent and agreed with
common sense. It made three major assumptions about the universe: 1. realism: the
universe embedded in space and time exists apart from the observer; 2. determinism:
knowing the initial state of a physical system, it is possible to know with certainty
14Classical physics is a term used to denote the different branches of physics before the formulation
of relativity and quantum physics. It usually includes Newtonian mechanics, Boltzmann’s thermody-
namics as well as Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism. Sometimes, it also includes special and/or
general theories of relativity and chaos theory (nonlinear dynamics).
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any future state of this system; 3. reductionism: a complex system is nothing but
the sum of its parts and its behavior can be known from the behavior of its parts.15
The classical universe was a huge clockwork mechanism in which physical bodies
moved with respect to each other according to precise natural laws. Matter, absolute
space and time, and forces between bodies were the basic ingredients of the classical
ontology; its epistemology was guided by the principle that an objective representation
of the outside world is possible.
Quantum physics put into question these three major assumptions. In only three
decades, starting with the pathbreaking work of Max Planck and Niels Bohr, quantum
physics shattered the classical picture of the world, revealing classes of phenomena
that classical physics could not : 1. the fact that certain physical quantities (ex:
energy) are “quantized” in small discrete units; 2. the wave-particle dualism, or the
fact that elementary particles behave like particles and waves; 3. the fact, stated in
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, that it is physically impossible to know both the
position and momentum of a particle at the same time, implying indeterminism; and
4. nonseparability, i.e., the phenomenon by which the states of two or more quantum
objects are entangled together so that the state of one object is related to the other
in some way, whether or not the objects are spatially distant. In contrast with clas-
sical physics, quantum physics pays special attention to the process of measurement.
Because it deals with small systems (e.g., atoms), interaction between observer and
observed system obtains a fundamental importance in this theory. On this basis,
some have alleged that classical realism does not hold anymore because of the promi-
nent role played by the observer. Others have merged this idea with nonseparability,
making the universe an undivided whole in which the observer and the observed are
underlain by the same reality, that is, consciousness. Since such ideas are commonly
found in Eastern spiritual traditions, it is no surprise that some parallels between the
disciplines have been drawn.
15Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues, 165.
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2.1.1 The Role of the Observer
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle stands as a central feature in quantum physics. The
impossibility of knowing with certainty both the position and momentum of a particle
at the same time shakes the foundation of classical determinism, which affirms that
we can predict a system’s future state given a set of initial positions and momenta.16
Because of the extreme smallness of an atomic system, no observation can be made
without considerably affecting the system. However, this has been interpreted in
different ways by scientists and philosophers of science. For some, the uncertainty in
knowing the precise state of an atomic system merely indicates our own incapacity;
we will eventually discover exact laws to construe exact knowledge of the system.
But for most scientists uncertainty stands as an objective feature of nature itself. A
possible implication of this view might be that no “independent” reality exists, that
is, no reality independent of our measurement. The observer always interferes with
the observed system and this very interference prevents him from knowing reality as
it is. What quantum physics calls “objective reality” cannot be independent from
the observer.
Some authors have argued that this view is in agreement with Eastern philoso-
phies that postulate an intimate relationship between the observer and the observed.
According to Capra, for instance, Heisenberg’s principle shows that “there are no ob-
jective properties of nature independent of the human observer,” an insight he sees as
“one of the main parallels to mystical knowledge.”17 The observer-participant “is an
idea well known to any student of mysticism.”18 In Mysticism and the New Physics,
16The principle can also be extended to other “conjugate variables” such as energy and time.
17Quoted from: Wilber (ed.), The Holographic Paradigm and Other Paradoxes: Exploring the
Leading Edges of Science, 228.
18Nonetheless, Capra is aware that mysticism goes much farther than quantum physics in denying
all differences between observer and observed whereas in quantum physics, the observer and the
observed are still distinguished from each other. See: Capra, The Tao of Physics: An Exploration
of the Parallels Between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism, 141-42.
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Talbot infers from Heisenberg’s principle that the conscious observer influences quan-
tum phenomena. He describes the quantum world as “omnijective,” i.e., inextricably
connected with the subjective consciousness of the scientist.19 For Jitatma¯nanda,
this discovery links “modern physics directly to the mystical traditions of Veda¯nta
philosophy.”20 However, if Heisenberg’s principle indeed highlights the primary role
played by observation in quantum experiments, it does not claim anything about the
observer himself influencing the observed system, or the subject-object duality being
“transcended,” as in some Eastern spiritual traditions. Strictly speaking, the inter-
ference is not between the conscious observer and the object, but between the object
and the measuring device. This inevitable interaction is not new: whether classical
or quantum, any experiment involves a form of manipulation. Quantum physics does
not abolish the division between subject and object. Louis de Broglie, Nobel laureate
for his formulation of wave mechanics, declared:
[It has been said that] quantum physics reduces or blurs the dividing region
between the subjective and the objective, but there is. . . some misuse of
language here. For in reality the means of observation clearly belong to the
objective side; and the fact that their reactions on the parts of the external
world which we desire to study cannot be disregarded in microphysics
neither abolishes, nor even diminishes, the traditional distinction between
subject and object.21
It is significant that though a profound admirer of Eastern thought, Schro¨dinger
was against the view that the subject correlates with the observed system in the
measurement process:
It is maintained that recent discoveries in physics have pushed forward to
the mysterious boundary between the subject and the object. [. . . ] We
are given to understand that we never observe an object without its being
modified or tinged by our own activity in observing it [. . . ] Still I would
not like to call this a direct influence of the subject on the object. For the
subject, if anything, is that thing that senses and thinks. Sensations and
19Talbot, Mysticism and the New Physics, 1-2.
20Jitatma¯nanda, Modern Physics and Veda¯nta, 52.
21de Broglie, Matter and Light, 252.
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thoughts do not belong to the “world of energy.” They cannot produce
any change in the world of energy [. . . ]22
Nonetheless, the dividing line between subject and object has unquestionably shifted
with quantum physics. Whereas the classical physics “subject” includes both the
observer (mind, body, sense-organs) and the measuring device, quantum physics as-
signs the measuring device, sense-organs, etc. — i.e., everything except what “senses
and thinks” — to the objective domain. Chandrasekharayya points out that in this
sense, quantum physics is seemingly moving closer to the conception of the subject
advocated in Advaita Veda¯nta. According to S´an˙kara, the major exponent of this
philosophy, the external world (i.e., the “non-Self”) includes the environment and
the human body, senses as well as the instruments of “inner perception” (mind and
other cognitive faculties). What remains as the subject (i.e., the “Self”) is only the
witnessing consciousness.23
Perhaps more conspicuous are the parallels involving the “measurement prob-
lem” in quantum physics, also called “the wavefunction collapse.” Essentially, the
wavefunction contains information about all the possible outcomes in a quantum ex-
periment. Mathematically, it is expressed in terms of a “superposition of states,” each
state representing an alternative outcome. What is called the “wavefunction collapse”
is the process by which a wavefunction, initially in a superposed state, appears to “col-
lapse” to a single state (the one measured) following the measurement. The problem
here is to understand the process by which this “collapse” occurs. The answer to this
problem partly depends on the meaning we ascribe to the wavefunction. For some,
the wavefunction has no physical or ontological significance: it simply encodes what
we know about the physical system. Thus, the collapse expresses the fact that the
observer has acquired additional information about the system during measurement.
Others take the wavefunction to be physically real, and for them the collapse is a real
22Schro¨dinger, Mind and Matter, 49-50.
23Chandrasekharayya, Veda¯nta and Modern Physics, 330-32.
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process: there must be a physical mechanism at the origin of the collapse. In this line
of thinking, some distinguished scientists, like John von Neumann and later Eugene
Wigner, proposed that the mechanism at the origin of the collapse is consciousness
itself. Quantum results are fixed only when they enter somebody’s consciousness.
Von Neumann argued that a system’s initial state of superposition is transferred to
the measuring device during measurement. When measured by another system, the
superposition is also transferred to this system and so forth. This is called the von
Neumann’s Chain. In 1939, Von Neumann, together with London and Bauer, sug-
gested that since nothing can measure consciousness, the transfer would be stopped
by a conscious observer.24 Decades later, Eugene Wigner invoked similar arguments
to explain how measurement takes place in quantum mechanical experiments. He
maintained that unless a deeper study of consciousness was undertaken, solving the
theoretical problems related to quantum physics would hardly be possible.25
The main problem with this interpretation is that, in practice, the outcome of
a quantum experiment is the same for different observers. If the collapse to a spe-
cific state was caused by individual consciousness alone, how could the same state be
measured by several individuals? Another renowned physicist, John A. Wheeler, pro-
posed that the wavefunction collapse does not occur through individual consciousness
but through intersubjective agreement between observers. What is crucial is not the
observer’s consciousness but the communication between the individuals involved. In
his view, we are not only observers but participators as well in the evolution of the
universe:
. . . The vital act is the act of participation. “Participator” is the incon-
trovertible new concept given by quantum mechanics. It strikes down the
term “observer” of classical theory, the man who stands behind the thick
glass wall and watches what goes on without taking part. It can’t be done,
quantum mechanics says.26
24Von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Theory; London and Bauer, La the´orie
de l’observation en me´canique quantique.
25Wigner, Symmetries and Reflections.
26Wheeler, Thorne and Misner, Gravitation, 1273.
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The participation of the observer entails that we can no longer uphold the view of
a world that exists out there, independently of a community of observers. Yet, it
does not mean that consciousness has a direct influence on atomic phenomena, as
claimed by Wigner and others. Wheeler himself declared that “consciousness. . . has
nothing whatsoever to do with the quantum process.”27 Since Wheeler, however,
some physicists have furthered interpretations of quantum physics in which matter is
either conceived to interact with or be an expression of consciousness.28
Some authors have eagerly put forward consciousness-based interpretations to sup-
port their claim that quantum physics converges towards Eastern spiritual teachings.
For instance, in Mysticism and the New Physics, Talbot maintains that “Wheeler’s
suggestion of the term ‘participator’ demonstrates the mystical nature of the new
physics.”29 Zukav sees in Wheeler’s above quotation an echo of the language used
by Eastern mystics.30 In Ma¯ya¯ in Physics, Panda claims that the Advaita Veda¯nta
concept of “illusion” (ma¯ya¯) — whose function is to explain the manifold and non-
sentient character of phenomena — is “hidden in the concept of participation of the
quantum physicist.”31 Jitatma¯nanda affirms that Wigner’s explanation as to the
role of consciousness in quantum experiments “brings modern physics almost at the
door of Veda¯nta.”32 In the present context, it is worth mentioning Amit Goswami’s
27Quoted from: Stenger, The Unconscious Quantum: Metaphysics in Modern Physics and Cosmol-
ogy, 97. Ken Wilber notices that Wheeler considered “physics/mysticism attempts as “moonshine,”
“pathological science” and “charlatanism.” (Wilber (ed.), op.cit., 185) However, if Wheeler was
indeed against any form of easy parallelism, he seemed to take ancient philosophies as important
sources of inspiration in science, as it appears from the letter he wrote to Swami Jitatma¯nanda
(available in Jitatma¯nanda’s book Modern Physics and Veda¯nta).
28See: Stapp, Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics; Stapp, Mindful Universe: Quantum Me-
chanics and the Participating Observer ; Wolf, Mind into Matter: A New Alchemy of Science and
Spirit ; Wolf, The Spiritual Universe: One Physicist’s Vision of Spirit, Soul, Matter, and Self.
29Talbot, op.cit., 12, 25.
30Zukav, The Dancing Wu-Li Masters: An Overview of the New Physics, 54.
31Panda, Ma¯ya¯ in Physics, 307.
32Jitatma¯nanda, op.cit, 43.
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views on the interpretation of quantum physics. In his book The Self-Aware Uni-
verse, Goswami suggests that the well-known paradoxes of quantum physics would
find a satisfactory resolution only if we interpret consciousness in the non-dual sense
of Advaita Veda¯nta.33 Like von Neumann and Wigner, Goswami also believes that
consciousness is responsible for collapsing the wavefunction. But in contrast with
them, he is against any form of “psychokinesis,” i.e., any kind of human conscious-
ness application upon matter. In his view, the different outcomes of an experiment
would exist as “waves of possibility” within a kind of transcendent consciousness. The
process of collapse occurs when consciousness recognizes and then chooses one of the
possibilities, which then becomes the “observed event.”34 His notion of consciousness
is not limited to the individual but extends to that of a transcendent and unitive
consciousness of which individual consciousness is only a partial manifestation.
However, from a scientific perspective there are serious problems with Goswami’s
interpretation.35 Firstly, it is impossible to prove wrong his hypothesis of a conscious-
ness transcendent to matter and mind: there is simply no way to measure or quantify
such consciousness. Further, Goswami’s thesis does not conclusively explain how this
transcendent consciousness actually effects the collapse. Secondly, whether human
consciousness alone has the ability to collapse the wavefunction or if any other form
of consciousness has also this ability remains to be explicated. In the case where hu-
man consciousness alone could collapse the wavefunction, without someone to make
it collapse, the world would have remained in a state of superposition for ages; unless
atoms had the ability to collapse their own wavefunction with their own “conscious-
ness,” which is hardly admissible. Thirdly, the transcendental realm beyond space
and time hypothetically contains the various possible outcomes encoded within the
33Goswami, The Self-Aware Universe: How Consciousness Creates the Material World. See also:
Science and Spirituality: A Quantum Integration; Quantum Creativity; God Is Not Dead: What
Quantum Physics Tells Us About Our Origins and How We Should Live.
34Goswami, “Physics Within Nondual Consciousness,” 537.
35See: Novella, “Quantum Confusion: Does Modern Physics Support the Psychics?”; Stenger,
“Quantum Quackery”; Shermer, “Quantum Quackery.”
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wavefunction. Yet, wavefunction in quantum physics is typically a function of space
and time, and thus part of the phenomenal realm. Finally, consciousness is equated
in Advaita Veda¯nta with Brahman, the all-comprehending reality. But the latter is
by definition the subject sui generis, pure consciousnes; to describe it using concep-
tual categories is necessarily to make it an object of knowledge. Strictly speaking, to
associate Brahman, or non-dual consciousness, with elements of a physical theory is
to make a category mistake, to bring the non-conceptual into the conceptual domain.
Evidently, relying on consciousness to resolve paradoxes of quantum physics brings
in multiple problems. For the renowned philosopher of science Karl R. Popper,
“the intrusion [of consciousness] into the probabilistic theory of quantum mechanics
seems. . . to be based on bad philosophy and on a few very simple mistakes.”36 It might
be that the subjective nature of consciousness is incompatible with the mathematical
formalism and experimental requirements of quantum physics. In its primary sense,
consciousness might have more affinities with the domain of metaphysics than that of
physics as such. Let us also recall that consciousness-based interpretations assume the
wavefunction has a physical significance. But there are other viable interpretations of
quantum physics that give a different meaning to the wavefunction and its collapse.37
However, those claiming convergence between quantum physics and Eastern spiritual
36Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics, 86.
37In David Bohm’s pilot wave model, the wavefunction does not contain all the information about
the system since there exist “hidden variables” (position, momentum, etc.) which dictate how
the particles move in reality. There is no collapse here and the wavefunction remains in a state
of superposition even after measurement. In Everett’s multi-world interpretation, there is also
no collapse of the wavefunction: the initial superposed state is considered to split into different
macroscopic world-lines (or “universes”) mutually independent from each other. More recently,
the phenomenon of decoherence has been invoked to explain how wavefunction apparently collapses
during measurement. The idea here is that the superposed nature of a quantum state is “leaked”
into the macroscopic environment so that the superposition exists but is no more measurable. In
all these interpretations, there is no need for introducing the notion of consciousness to explain the
real or apparent collapse of the wavefunction.
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traditions barely address these interpretive issues. Not only do they overlook argu-
ments raised by physicists and philosophers of science against consciousness-based
interpretations, but they also virtually ignore the theoretical complexity underlying
the physics. In addition, in most cases (except perhaps in Goswami’s case), when
scientists discuss consciousness, they refer to something considerably different from
the inner form of consciousness of Eastern spiritual traditions. Whereas in science it
denotes awareness of external things and events, the spiritual traditions are especially
concerned with introspective states of meditation.38
In sharp contrast with classical physics, quantum physics emphasizes the role of
interaction in quantum experiments. The observer’s inevitable influence on the ob-
served system revealed in Heisenberg’s principle has convinced most physicists of the
inherent impossibility of knowing reality “as it is.” In the view of British physi-
cist Arthur Eddington, for instance, the most significant philosophical contribution
of quantum physics is to show that “physical science is concerned with a world of
shadows” and not with a real physical world.39 Does this imply the end of realism in
science? Should it be concluded that science deals with an illusory world, an arbitrary
projection of the human mind? In Chapter 5, we will discuss an alternative version
of scientific realism that keeps with the notion of a mind-independent reality while
taking into account the most recent insights in quantum physics. In this context, the
nature and implications of consciousness in relation to the empirical world stand as
important issues. Consciousness may still have an important, though more subtle,
role to play in contemporary interpretations of quantum physics.
38Scerri, “Eastern Mysticism and the Alleged Parallels with Physics,” 690.
39Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, 282.
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2.1.2 Holism in Quantum Physics
Another topic that has generated much discussion and lent itself to analogies with
Eastern spiritual traditions relates to the connections underlying the physical world
described in quantum physics. Most Eastern schools of thought (as well as Western
mysticism) teach the existence of a ground of being underlying the phenomenal world,
an undifferentiated oneness experienced in the depth of contemplative meditation.
Similarly, we are told, quantum physics shows the unity and interconnectedness of
all events at the atomic level. Classical reductionism must be replaced by a holistic
worldview in which the undivided whole is the fundamental reality. In this view,
elementary particles are not the fundamental blocks of the physical world; they are
simply epiphenomena of the whole. This worldview grew in importance with the
development of quantum field theory — the application of quantum physics principles
to classical field theory — in which the central element is the “quantum field” and not
the particle. In particular, nonseparability in quantum physics has also challenged
the idea that “quantum objects” are individualized and localized entities in space and
time. We now discuss this important phenomenon.
Also called “quantum entanglement,” nonseparability was revealed in a series of
rigorous experiments aiming to test predictions made in a theorem formulated by
John Bell in 1964. This theorem was itself a response to questions raised by the
famous EPR (“Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen”) thought experiment proposed by Albert
Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen in 1935. The EPR experiment raised
an argument against the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics, which is
historically the first general attempt to understand the atomic world represented
by quantum physics. The interpretation, supported by Bohr, Heisenberg, Born and
others, posits among other things that we cannot report the state of an atomic system
before measurement. Prior to measurement, the system consists of different quantum
states in superposition, and it is meaningless to speak about any property of the
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system as if it were real and uniquely defined. A physical property gains physical
reality through the collapse of the wavefunction only after measurement. In other
words, the conception of a world independent of our observation must be abandoned.
The EPR thought experiment sought to challenge this view and prove that quantum
physics is an incomplete physical theory.40 Einstein and his collaborators believed
that physical theory should describe nature as it is and not, as Bohr maintained,
what we can say about nature: there must be a one-to-one correspondence between
every element of a physical theory and elements of the physical reality described. The
EPR experiment was an attempt to show that it is possible to know with certainty the
value of a physical property without measuring it. In this case, the property would
be precisely defined before measurement and known at the moment of measurement.
In one version of the experiment, a source breaks down in two particles that fly off
in opposite directions. Initially, the system has a total “spin” equal to zero, so that
the sum of the spins of each particle after disintegration remains equal to zero even
when particles are far removed from each other.41 If a detector is placed on the flight
path of the first particle and measures a certain spin component, we can conclude that
the same spin component for the second particle will have the opposite value, without
having to interact with the second particle. However, if the spin of the second particle
is defined only after measurement of the first particle, we must conclude instantaneous
transmission of information between particles, thus contradicting the basic principle
of the theory of relativity. To avoid the contradiction, one must presume the spin of
40Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be
Considered Complete?” For more detailed descriptions of the EPR thought experiment, see: Pagels,
The Cosmic Code: Quantum Physics as the Language of Nature; Selleri, Quantum Mechanics Versus
Local Realism: The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox.
41To give an intuitive representation of the spin of a particle, we can think of a ball rotating on
itself. The spin would be the equivalent of the kinetic momentum of rotation, i.e., a vector with a
length proportional to the angular velocity of rotation and having the same direction than the axis
of rotation. However, the spin is fundamentally a quantum property since it is quantized, i.e., it can
only take some precise and discrete values.
CHAPTER 2. EASTERN SPIRITUAL TRADITIONS AND QUANTUM PHYSICS 31
the second particle (called a “hidden variable” because it is described by quantum
physics) well-defined in flight. Quantum physics is unable to define such a state, thus
we must accept that quantum physics is an incomplete theory. Einstein, Podolsky
and Rosen based their arguments on two main assumptions: 1. classical realism, i.e.,
particles possess well-defined properties independently of observation; and 2. locality,
i.e., as relativity prescribes, there can be no transmission of information between two
systems faster than the speed of light.
Three decades later, in 1965, Bell formulated a theoretical inequality to test the
above assumptions against the predictions of quantum physics.42 Between 1980-82,
Alain Aspect and collaborators performed the required experiments and showed that
some of them violated Bell’s inequality, indicating that quantum physics was right
and that one of Einstein’s assumptions was wrong.43 In 1997, a group of physicists
in Geneva obtained the same results with photons distanced more than 10 kilometers
apart.44 Violation of Bell’s inequality implies that if classical realism is maintained
— i.e., quantum physics is incomplete and a yet unknown “hidden-variable” theory
exists — the assumption of locality cannot hold true. In other words, no classically
realistic local theory can ever reproduce all of the predictions of quantum physics.
In this situation, two different options can be drawn: either, like Bohr, we give up
classical realism and keep locality; or, like David Bohm later proposed, we hold to
realism and give up locality.
Most physicists have since followed Bohr and abandoned the idea that atomic
systems have well-defined properties before measurement. It is meaningless to speak
about the quantum world in realistic terms, independently of the observer. In the
EPR experiment, the distant particles must be regarded as a single system prior to
measurement. Though apart from each other, they form an inseparable whole and
42Bell, “On the Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics.”
43Aspect et al., “Experimental Tests of Realistic Local Theories via Bell’s Theorem”; “Experi-
mental Test of Bell’s Inequalities Using Time-Varying Analyzers.”
44Tittel et al., “Violation of Bell Inequalities by Photons More than 10km apart.”
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possess no individuality of their own: they are “nonseparable” or “entangled” to-
gether. At measurement, we acquire knowledge about the state of one of the particles
and deduce that of the other particle: the initial “entangled” wavefunction collapses
to individual wavefunctions. At this moment, each particle somehow “acquires” an
individuality. But this is a matter of inference only because another observer could
not reach this conclusion unless he is aware of the results of the measurement. In
other words, the collapse does not represent objective reality but the observer’s knowl-
edge of reality, which brings us back to Bohr and his view of quantum physics as an
interpretation rather than a description of nature.
If a majority of physicists have tended to favour Bohr’s interpretation, a few
have argued that nonseparability can still admit a realism different from classical
realism. Among others, the physicist and philosopher of science Bernard d’Espagnat
has proposed such a view:
The violation of separability seems to imply that in some sense all these
objects constitute an indivisible whole. Perhaps in such a world the con-
cept of an independently existing reality can retain some meaning, but it
will be an altered and one remote from everyday experience.45
Unlike Bohr, d’Espagnat does not totally reject realism in his interpretation of quan-
tum physics. In his view, nonseparability reveals the existence of an underlying
reality though not real in the classical sense — i.e., something that can be measured
or accommodated within the reductionist approach of classical physics. Such reality
would not be embedded in space and time, and would remain beyond the domain
of scientific investigation. Unlike Einstein’s, this version of realism does not take a
one-to-one correspondence between physical theory and reality for granted. We will
come back in Chapter 5 on d’Espagnat’s arguments in favour of such kind of scientific
realism in quantum physics.
Other physicists have tried to address nonseparability by defending classical re-
45D’Espagnat, “The Quantum Theory and Reality.” Quoted from: Scerri, op.cit., 690.
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alism at the expense of locality. Louis de Broglie was the first with his 1927 “pilot
wave theory.” Like Einstein, de Broglie firmly believed in an independent reality
constituted of entities with well-defined properties. As against Bohr, he believed the
wavefunction had a physical significance: it was not simply a mathematical tool for
calculating probabilities, but a real entity that was guiding or piloting the movement
of the particle. This was a realistic model because it assumed both wave and particle
as entities that exist independent of the observer, with well-defined properties before
measurement. De Broglie’s model was the first attempt towards a hidden variable
theory of quantum physics. But the theory generated several problems and was aban-
doned till the 1950s when David Bohm took it up and developed it further. In Bohm’s
model, as in the Copenhagen interpretation, the wavefunction defines the probability
of finding the particle in a given state. But the model also introduces the notion
of quantum potential, a mathematical function similar to that of de Broglie’s “pilot
wave.” This potential is a function filling all spacetime that encodes information
about distant particles and events; the trajectory (position and momentum) of each
particle can thus be derived from this quantum potential.
Bohm’s theory features an implicate realm or implicate order — a medium through
which the particles communicate instantaneously with each other.46 Underlying the
explicate realm of separate things is an undivided implicate order available to each
and every explicate part. Things and events seem separate in space and time, but
they actually are deeply interconnected for they emerge from the same implicate
order. In this view, physical reality is deeply nonlocal because it allows for the
existence of instantaneous causal relations between physically separated entities. Yet,
no superluminal transfer of information is necessary since no event actually interacts
with another event within the explicit realm. In this manner, it is possible to explain
how measuring the spin of one particle can “affect” the spin of the other without
46Bohm, “A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of Hidden Variables”;
Bohm, Wholeness and the Implicate Order ; Bohm and Hiley, The Undivided Universe: An Ontolog-
ical Interpretation of Quantum Theory.
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contradicting the theory of relativity. Bohm’s interpretation of quantum physics
thus reveals a holistic, mutually interpenetrating and interacting view of the world.
However, the whole model relies on the implicate realm existence which is not testable,
and therefore the model’s validity is impossible to test.47 Worth noting is that while
d’Espagnat argues for realism, he does not connect the “underlying reality” with the
physical theory elements like Bohm does with his “quantum potential” but considers
it to be essentially “non-conceptualizable.”
The holistic worldview of Bohm’s interpretation has encouraged many parallels
with Eastern thought in literature. For instance, Capra declares in The Tao of Physics
that the basic oneness of the universe — referred to as Brahman in Hinduism, Dhar-
makaya in Buddhism and Tao in Taoism — “is not only the central characteristic of
the mystical experience, but is also one of the most important revelations of modern
physics.”48 In his view, Bohm’s interpretation suggests that the universe should not
be regarded as “a collection of physical objects, but rather as a complicated web of
relations between the various parts of a unified whole.” This view, he says, is quite
similar to the experience “Eastern mystics” have described through the ages.49 Ac-
cording to Zukav, “all Eastern religions are compatible in a very fundamental way
with Bohm’s physics and philosophy. All of them are based upon the experience of
a pure, undifferentiated reality which is that-which-is.”50 Similarly, Zohar has linked
the emergence of Bohm’s interpretation to “the general revival of Eastern mysticism
and its emphasis on the oneness of all things.”51
Others have combined Bohm’s hypothesis with the idea that consciousness plays
a prominent role in quantum physics, and thereby proposed that the universe is
47Kafatos and Nadeau, The Conscious Universe: Parts and Wholes in Modern Physical Theory,
136.
48Capra, op.cit., 132.
49ibid., 138.
50Zukav, op.cit., 326.
51Zohar, The Quantum Self: Human Nature and Consciousness Defined by the New Physics, 74.
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an undivided whole in which the observer and the observed are underlain by the
same reality, i.e., consciousness. An example of such would be Goswami’s interpreta-
tion with its non-dual unitive consciousness as the underlying ground for the whole
phenomenal world. In Mysticism and the New Physics, Michael Talbot depends on
Bohm’s model for a “holographic model of consciousness” that posits consciousness
as a “field” whose vibration leads to the organization of matter. This way of re-
lating consciousness to matter elucidates the relationship between the observer and
the observed. In Talbot’s words, the holographic model of consciousness is perhaps
“the closest physics can come to mysticism without the two losing their identities.”52
Similar remarks have also been made in the context of the Advaita Veda¯nta tradi-
tion. For instance, Jitatma¯nanda claims that Bohm’s implicate order is identical to
Brahman, pure consciousness, “the substratum of all things, living and nonliving,
described in the Upanishad.”53 Panda also correlates the Veda¯ntic Brahman to the
implicate order in Bohm’s model.54
However, as far as Bohm is concerned, he was clearly opposed to the introduction
of mind or consciousness into the formalism of quantum physics.55 He aimed to
describe the implicate order “without bringing in the observer in any fundamental
role.” In his view, “the introduction of the conscious mind into physics. . . is motivated
by certain quite general considerations that have little to do with quantum mechanics
itself.”56 Despite his interest in Eastern spirituality, Bohm remained a realist and
52Talbot, op.cit., 41-42. See also: Talbot, The Holographic Universe.
53Jitatma¯nanda, op.cit., 144.
54Panda, Ma¯ya¯ in Physics, 320.
55It is well known that Bohm was greatly interested in Eastern thought. We may notice his
long-term collaboration with Indian spiritual teacher Jiddu Krishnamurti, with whom he had deep
discussions about the nature of the mind. But Bohm never argued for any kind of convergence
between his interpretation of quantum physics and Eastern thought. See: Krishnamurti and Bohm,
The Wholeness of Life; The Ending of Time; The Future of Humanity: A Conversation; Limits of
Thought: Discussions.
56Quoted from: Wilber (ed.), The Holographic Paradigm and Other Paradoxes: Exploring the
Leading Edges of Science, 168.
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refused to take the world as a creation of the mind or consciousness:
It is difficult to believe that the evolution of the universe before the appear-
ance of human beings depended fundamentally on the human mind. . .Of
course, one could avoid this difficulty by assuming a universal mind. But
if we know little about the human mind, we know a great deal less about
a universal mind. Such an assumption replaces one mystery by an even
greater one.57
Bohm’s interpretation suggests that the external world rests upon a subtle and all-
pervading implicate realm of which matter is only an aspect. But this implicate realm
implies nothing mystical or transcendental; it remains a description of the realm of
matter and energy. As Wilber puts it:
In fact, the implicate realm does not transcend matter — it subscends
matter and expresses a coherence, unity and wholeness of the entire phys-
ical plane. . . It does indeed go beyond explicate matter, but in a sub-
scending or underlying manner, not a transcending one. As a matter of
fact, the concept explicitly excludes any higher realms such as mind and
consciousness.58
It is true that quantum physics provides a more holistic picture of the world than
classical physics. As discussed earlier, it also pinpoints the crucial importance played
by the observer in quantum experiments. But what the equations of quantum physics
describe is still part of the physical world, and is not something spiritual or mental
in nature. Quantum physics does not address biological or mental phenomena, even
less pure consciousness. What it does reveal is the basic interconnectedness of the
physical world, not the pervasiveness of consciousness. Furthermore, the wholeness
described in quantum physics is highly structured, subject to strict constraints and
symmetry principles, whereas the unity of consciousness experienced by the mystic
is usually one in which all distinctions are obliterated.59 Thus, it seems irrelevant to
57Quoted from: Stenger, The Unconscious Quantum: Metaphysics in Modern Physics and Cos-
mology, 124.
58Wilber (ed.), op.cit.
59Barbour, op.cit., 189.
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identify the implicate order with the Brahman of the Upanis.ads (which is identical
to pure consciousness) or for that matter, any kind of transcendental state of being.
2.1.3 A¯ka¯s´a, Fields and Quantum Vacuum
An issue closely connected to holism relates to the fundamental ground of existence.
As far as physics is concerned, quantum field theory (QFT) is at stake here. His-
torically, QFT originated in the late 1920s with the need for a quantum theory of
the classical electromagnetic field. Since the concept of “field” implies a continuous
ontology — the field being an entity extending throughout the whole of space —
QFT worldview has been said to bear affinity with Eastern traditions that affirm
the holistic nature of reality. Further, concepts of “quantum field” and “quantum
vacuum” in QFT have something to do with the fundamental “stuff” of the world,
i.e., with the idea of a primary substance underlying the physical world. Some au-
thors have claimed convergence on these issues between QFT and Advaita Veda¯nta.
In particular, similarities have been noted between quantum field and vacuum, and
concepts of Advaita Veda¯nta such as a¯ka¯s´a, Brahman and avyakta. Since these are
the parallels that motivated this comparative study, they deserve a special attention
here. However, we shall postpone a critique of these approaches to Chapter 5.
Underlying QFT is the basic idea that each individual particle is the quantum of
a peculiar kind of field, called a quantum field : the photon is the quantum of the
electromagnetic quantum field; the electron of the electronic field, and so on. In this
theory, particles have no independent existence apart from their associated field. The
quantum field is the “basic stuff” from which particles are created and to which they
return at the end of their short existence, the basis of all particles and of their mutual
interactions.60 As Weinberg said, “the essential reality [in QFT] is a set of fields
60As we shall see in Chapter 3, there is a good deal of discussion in literature as to what is the basic
ontology of QFT. Several physicists and philosophers of science have opted for a “field ontology,” in
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subject to the rules of special relativity and quantum mechanics; all else is derived
as a consequence of the quantum dynamics of those fields.”61 Therefore, the quanta
associated with the quantum field are not “classical particles” because they do not
possess any permanent existence or individuality; they are epiphenomena of the field
itself. Consequently, there can be no “empty space” separating “particles”: the whole
physical world is composed of quantum fields interacting with each other in such a
way that it leaves no space in the universe where there is no field.
What about the vacuum state in QFT? Referred to as “quantum vacuum,” this
state has a specific meaning in QFT: it is the fundamental state of a quantum field
characterized by a null number of particles. However, quantum vacuum differs consid-
erably from the ideal vacuum of classical physics, which is absolutely empty. Accord-
ing to Heisenberg’s principle, a minimal energy associated with the quantum vacuum
exists. Einstein’s law of equivalence between mass and energy says that this energy
can be transformed into particles with a very short lifetime, called virtual particles.62
An unlimited number of these particles continuously come into being and vanish again
into the vacuum. Hence, the quantum vacuum is no empty space but a potentially
rich and dynamic medium with a very significant role in the microscopic world. An-
other central feature of this concept is its encompassing and holistic character. At
the origin of all particles, and by extension presumably of all molecules as well as
more evolved forms of life, the vacuum removes the dichotomy between living and
which the field stands as the basic entity and the particles as mere epiphenomena of the field. Others
have argued in favour of a “particle ontology,” which makes particles the only real existents and the
field an abstract and useful mathematical object with no physical reality of its own. There also exist
other ontologies which shall be briefly mentioned later. In general, those who make parallels with
Eastern thought emphasize the field ontology when discussing quantum field theory. Accordingly,
we will take this ontology for granted in the following discussion.
61Quoted from: Pagels, The Cosmic Code: Quantum Physics as the Language of Nature, 239.
62Such transient particles cannot be recorded using any instrument but their existence can be
inferred from physical effects such as Lamb and Casimir effects. Please refer to Chapter 3 for a more
detailed description of these effects.
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non-living things in the universe. In some sense, it highlights the oneness and inter-
connectedness of the total physical world.63 Further, unlike Bohm’s implicate order,
the existence of the quantum vacuum has been assessed in several experiments. We
will come back in great detail on this concept in Chapter 3.
It has been said that the worldview derived from QFT, with its emphasis on the
“field” as the basic stuff of the universe, has much more in common with Eastern spir-
itual traditions than the Newtonian conception of an independent space populated
by distinct entities interacting with each other.64 According to Capra, “the concep-
tion of physical things and phenomena as transient manifestations of an underlying
fundamental entity is not only a basic element of quantum field theory, but also a
basic element of the Eastern world view.”65 Capra, like a few others,66 compares the
concept of quantum field with insights pertaining to Eastern mysticism. In his view,
the intuition behind the physicist’s quantum field “is closely paralleled by that of
the Eastern mystic who interprets his or her experience of the world in terms of an
ultimate underlying reality.”67 Capra concedes that the mystic’s fundamental reality,
which is beyond all concepts, cannot be identified with the physicist’s quantum field,
a well-defined physical concept. Two radically different levels of reality are in opposi-
tion here, and we can hardly imagine how they can possibly be compared in terms of
experience or intuition. He is however less careful when he equates the ultimate real-
ity of Eastern traditions — such as the Brahman of the Hindus, the Dharmakaya of
the Buddhists and the Tao of Taoists — with the “unified field” of modern physics.68
63Sreekantan, The Quest for Ultimate Reality, 255.
64Jones, Science and Mysticism: A Comparative Study of Western Natural Science, Therava¯da
Buddhism and Advaita Veda¯nta, 185.
65Capra, op.cit., 211.
66For instance, Lynne McTaggart and Deepak Chopra have brought in this concept to explain
how mind and matter are interrelated together in the human being. See: McTaggart and Chopra in
the bibliography.
67Capra, op.cit., 211.
68ibid. The term “unified field theory” was coined by Einstein while he was working towards the
unification of his general theory of relativity with electromagnetism. Modern unified field theories
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Here also, two different levels of reality are involved, and a direct comparison seems
inappropriate. As Richard H. Jones notices, it is incorrect to equate the unified field
with Brahman, which is not an extended and structured field embedded in the space-
time continuum (as the unified field) but pure consciousness “beyond” space, time
and even mind.69
In The Tao of Physics, Capra makes other comparisons of that kind. Discussing
the dynamic nature of the quantum vacuum, he compares it to Shiva’s cosmic dance of
creation and destruction in Hinduism.70 He also compares the potential and creative
nature of the vacuum to the “Void of Eastern mysticism”:
Here then, is the closest parallel to the Void of Eastern mysticism in
modern physics. Like the Eastern Void, the “physical vacuum” — as it is
called in field theory — is not a state of mere nothingness, but contains
the potentiality for all forms of the particle world. These forms, in turn,
are not independent physical entities but merely transient manifestations
of the underlying Void.71
Capra neither mentions what exactly is the “Eastern Void” nor states explicitly the
Eastern tradition he is referring to. But he must be alluding to the Buddhist tradition
since he quotes from a Buddhist su¯tra (“Form is emptiness, and emptiness is indeed
form”) — which also serves the same purpose in Zukav’s Dancing Wu-Li Masters.72
The 14th and current Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, also spoke of the “unmistakable
resonance between the notion of emptiness and the new [quantum] physics.”73
Anyhow, Capra remains vague as to what he means by “Eastern mysticism,” and
this creates a problem because the Eastern concepts he refers to are not always found
attempt to bring the four fundamental forces of the universe — strong nuclear, electromagnetic,
weak nuclear, gravitational — into a single framework. Until now, there exists no unified field
theory accepted by all of the scientific community.
69Jones, op.cit., 203-04.
70Capra, op.cit., 242.
71ibid., 222.
72Zukav, op.cit., 258.
73Gyatso, The Universe in a Single Atom: The Convergence of Science and Spirituality, 50.
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in all Eastern spiritual traditions. For instance, there is no equivalent for “Eastern
Void” in the Hindu tradition of Advaita Veda¯nta. Rather than emptiness or void, this
school favours an all-pervasive “plenum” called a¯ka¯s´a, from which the entire universe
would have originated. As we shall see, a¯ka¯s´a plays a crucial role in Advaita cosmol-
ogy because it is the first physical element (bhu¯ta) created and also the primordial
source for the other physical elements. In his book Ma¯ya¯ in Physics, Panda remarks
that this concept resembles in many ways the quantum vacuum described in QFT.
Both concepts relate to a substantial and non-perceivable medium with the capacity
to produce the various physical constituents of the world.74 Though vacuum cannot
be perceived, its existence can be inferred from the perceivable particles it generates.
Similarly, a¯ka¯s´a is too subtle to be actually perceived, yet it is inferred from the
elements it gives rise to. Both concepts represent, in their respective framework, the
one fundamental entity that explains and underlies the appearance of the multifari-
ous world. Thus, modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta have in common a monistic
approach, which seeks to explain the many in terms of the one.75
In the West, the Hungarian philosopher of science and systems theorist Ervin
La´szlo´ also noted such similarities. In Science and the Akashic Field: An Integral
Theory of Everything, published in 2004, he posits the existence of an all-pervasive
“information field” that would inform every part of the universe, from particles and
cells to galaxies and human consciousness. La´szlo´ relates this information field to
the quantum vacuum of QFT. More than a huge reservoir of energy, the vacuum is
primarily a subtle and all-pervasive medium that contains information about each
and every part of the universe, past and future. In several of his books, La´szlo´ refers
to the information field (or vacuum) as the A-field or akashic field because, in his
view, it has much in common with the ancient Hindu concept of a¯ka¯s´a. In Science
and the Reenchantment of the Cosmos, he says:
74Panda, op.cit., 160-61.
75ibid., 313.
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The latest cosmologies re-discover the cyclically self-renewing universe,
a cosmos that takes off from, and returns to, an enduring fundamental
medium. The ancient Hindu cosmology can be restated in contemporary
scientific terms simply by substituting “quantum vacuum” for a¯ka¯s´a.76
La´szlo´ observes that under the guise of quantum vacuum, modern physics has “redis-
covered” the idea of an all-pervasive and substantial medium from which the whole
physical world emerges and to which it ultimately returns. However, as he points
out, the concept of a substance permeating the whole universe is not new in science.
Before Einstein’s theory of relativity, space was presumably filled with a hypothetical
substance called luminiferous ether, whose function was to allow the propagation of
light, believed impossible in empty space.77 It is noteworthy that the famous inventor
and electrical engineer Nikola Tesla (1856-1943), probably under the inspiration of
Vivekananda (whom he had met at the Chicago’s Parliament of Religions in 1893),
compared the Hindu a¯ka¯s´a to the luminiferous ether of classical physics. As for
Vivekananda, he referred to matter and energy (or force) as equivalent to the Hindu
concepts of a¯ka¯s´a and pra¯n. a, respectively.
78 The concept of a¯ka¯s´a has since been
paralleled with other concepts of physics, such as gravity and spacetime continuum.79
Following on the same lines, the Veda¯ntic concept of avyakta (or avya¯kr. ta) has
been compared to the concept of quantum field. The term avyakta in Advaita Veda¯nta
denotes the primal and unmanifest state preceding the emergence of the universe
76La´szlo´, Science and the Reenchantment of the Cosmos: The Rise of the Integral Vision of Reality,
89-90.
77The concept of a luminiferous ether was first proposed by Young and Fresnel in the early 1800s
to explain the transmission of light waves in space. Ether was conceived as an elastic and invisible
fluid permeating all space. Later, physicists like Faraday, Thompson and Maxwell thought that the
ether was the seat of electromagnetic phenomena. The negative results obtained in the Michelson-
Morley experiment led Einstein to reject ether in his special theory of relativity in 1905. For more
details, please refer to Chapter 3.
78Jitatma¯nanda, op.cit., 69.
79Dobson, Advaita Veda¯nta and Modern Science; Chapple and Tucker, Hinduism and Ecology:
The Intersection of Earth, Sky, and Water, 30; Lalye, The Pan˜ca-mahabhu¯tas, in: Vatsyayan (ed.),
Prakr. ti: The Integral Vision (Vol.4), 108; Panda, The Vibrating Universe, 71.
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(including a¯ka¯s´a) in the evolutionary scheme of creation. In Veda¯nta and Modern
Physics, Chandrasekharayya holds that since avyakta’s function in Advaita cosmol-
ogy is to manifest the various “names and forms” (na¯ma-ru¯pa) of the perceptible
universe, it shares common features with the quantum field, which has the potential
for manifesting the various kinds of particles in observed universe.80 In particular, he
compares the uncertainty typical of the atomic world to the ephemeral nature of names
and forms as understood from the standpoint of Advaita. Similarly, Jitatma¯nanda
sees in Wheeler’s quantum foam (which, according to him, describes what would re-
semble the spacetime geometry at the quantum scale) a modern physics translation
of the Advaita idea of the “manifestation of all names and forms in the entity called
Brahman.”81 Since quanta have no independent existence, no reality apart from the
field, the world of particles can be considered unreal (with respect to the field) just
like the whole phenomenal world characterized by names and forms in Advaita (with
respect to Brahman). Such analogies may be superficial ontologically speaking, but
they reflect an awareness of the ephemeral and relative nature of physical phenomena
in both disciplines.
In this section, we have seen how violation of Bell’s inequality led some physicists
to propose the existence of a physical medium interconnecting particles with each
other in order to maintain classical realism. QFT has also revealed the holistic char-
acter of atomic and subatomic phenomena through concepts like quantum field and
quantum vacuum. Some authors have inferred from these results that everything is
interconnected at every level of physical reality, from matter to consciousness. Others
have noted profound similarities between concepts of QFT and holistic ideas pertain-
ing to Eastern spiritual traditions. We have seen how problematic such parallels could
be. However, as far as the Advaita Veda¯nta tradition is concerned, there seems to be
an interesting point of contact with modern physics on the question of reality. To-
day, if most physicists contend with Bohr that classical realism must be abandoned in
80Chandrasekharayya, op.cit., 408-09.
81Jitatma¯nanda, op.cit., 32.
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quantum physics, some have argued that a different form of realism can be reasonably
maintained. As noted earlier, Bernard d’Espagnat believes that Bell’s experiments
suggest the existence of an underlying reality, an “indivisible whole,” whose nature is
far remote from everyday experience. Unlike Bohm’s implicate order, this underlying
reality could never be disclosed through scientific investigation. The Advaita Veda¯nta
tradition seems to have come up with similar insights when it claims that the exis-
tence of Brahman, the “non-dual reality,” comprehends and sustains all reality and
being and yet remains beyond the scope of empirical knowledge. We shall come back
to this important issue in Chapter 5.
2.2 Hopes and Pitfalls of Parallelism
So far, we have examined the nature and content of the parallels generally drawn
between quantum physics and Eastern spiritual traditions. The rest of this chapter
tries to analyse the problems that are likely to arise when one examines parallel ideas
from different disciplines. This practice, referred to as “parallelism” by the sociologist
Sal Restivo, has attracted the attention of an increasing number of people in recent
years. Authors from various backgrounds — from New Age authors and Eastern
scholars to scientists and laymen interested in science and religion — have made
personal contribution to this field. However, few scholars, and even less parallelists,
have reflected critically on the practice of parallelism as such. Yet, such an analysis is
methodologically essential to obviate the common problems tied to this enterprise. In
the following, issues such as contextuality, ideology and lack of precision and method
in drawing parallels will be briefly discussed. More generally, we will try to understand
what is meant by the claim that physics “returns to” or “converges towards” Eastern
mysticism. Do such claims signify that there are profound affinities between the
scientific and mystical worldviews? How do people interested in parallel ideas and
other scholars understand the relation between modern physics and Eastern spiritual
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traditions, Advaita Veda¯nta in particular?
2.2.1 Parallelism in Practice
In this dissertation, we use the word “parallelism” specifically to denote the practice of
drawing parallels between claims of modern physics and Eastern spiritual traditions.
Restivo describes parallelism on the basis of two arguments raised by Capra in The
Tao of Physics : 1. “a consistent view of the world is beginning to emerge from modern
physics which is harmonious with Eastern wisdoms”; and 2. “Eastern mysticism
provides a consistent and beautiful philosophical framework which can accommodate
our most advanced theories of the physical world.”82 Thus, parallelist claims are
basically rhetorical statements employed to emphasize either affinities, harmony or
identity between the worldview of modern physics and that of Eastern mysticism. The
underlying argument is usually the following: if claims about the nature of reality are
similar, it implies that their conceptual content is similar, and that the experience
of reality is also similar among physicists and mystics. Thus, at a basic level the
practice of parallelism involves comparison, translation and communication.
In his extensive study on the subject, Restivo identifies a series of potential prob-
lems related to the practice of parallelism:83
1. Contextuality : When no contextual data is provided to justify the comparison of
a particular text or passage to another, misinterpretations can easily occur. For
instance, it is a mistake to conclude from Schro¨dinger’s quotations on Advaita
Veda¯nta that he sought a convergence between both disciplines. In fact, as we
shall see below, Schro¨dinger was against any convergence between science and
mysticism (or religion);
2. Comparison and translation: It is difficult to compare statements that are de-
rived from the specialized language of physics (mathematical formalism, ab-
stract concepts) and from meditative insights by mystics. No conceptual anal-
82Restivo, The Social Relations of Physics, Mysticism, and Mathematics: Studies in Social Struc-
ture, Interets and Ideas, 22.
83ibid., 23-26.
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ogy can really explain a quantum field to someone who is not familiar with
mathematics, as no words can fully express the essence of a mystical experience.
Other difficulties lie in translating original texts from a particular Eastern tra-
dition into modern languages, and also in comparing claims made at different
times, sometimes centuries apart;
3. Contamination: Prior to drawing parallels, modern mystics may already be
aware of modern physics concepts. Conversely, physicists may also be familiar
with the ideas and concepts of Eastern spiritual traditions. For instance, the
new generations of scholars have a science tainted understanding of Advaita and
they customarily borrow English terms from natural sciences — such as force,
energy, etc. — for the translation of Sanskrit texts;
4. Language: If common language is well established in science as a medium of
communication, it is not the case in mysticism where its function is totally
different. In science, language is more or less taken to refer to “physical reality”
as such, whereas in mysticism it is an imperfect (though necessary) medium for
communicating a hardly describable mystical experience to others. The different
functions of language render difficult a comparison in terms of concepts and
ideas;
5. Experience: Without any experience or knowledge in physics or mysticism, it
is even more difficult to translate a certain experience/concept/idea in simple
words, or simply to talk meaningfully about these subjects.84
To these pitfalls, Restivo also adds ideology. As a sociologist, he understands science
as an inherently sociocultural activity and adopts a similar position when discussing
parallelism. In his view, the practice of parallelism would be an intellectual strategy
intended to promote a certain ideology. Restivo quotes Capra who says that his “book
aims at improving the image of science by showing that there is an essential harmony
between the spirit of Eastern wisdom and Western science.”85 Here, mysticism is
used as apologetics for science. Going back to the 1960s, indeed, many young peo-
ple disillusioned with the whole ethos of science and technology, became interested
in Eastern mystical and philosophical thought. Capra’s message was that modern
science (especially physics) contains a beauty and a mystery just as liberating as
84Lack of knowledge can sometimes result in funny statements. For example, Michael Talbot,
in Mysticism and the New Physics (p.84): “. . . the fact that the names of the mathematician who
first theorized that space and time are a continuum, Hermann Minkowski, and the greatest of the
historical Brahmin sages, Advaita, are interchangeable, demonstrates once again the confluence of
mysticism and the new physics.” No doubt, Advaita is not the name of a Brahmin sage but that of
a major philosophical school of Hinduism.
85Capra, op.cit., 25.
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Eastern mysticism. In this case, Restivo says, parallelism “function[s] as a defensive
justification for and explanation of the scientific approach, and a device for improving
and supporting the image of science and scientists.”86 Willem B. Drees also agrees
that parallels between religious convictions and scientific insights can be useful for
making science acceptable to a certain audience. This is the case with Capra who, by
conveying the message that modern physics presents a worldview similar to Eastern
traditions, “contributed substantially to the acceptance of physics among advocates
of an alternative lifestyle.”87
Parallelism can also work the other way around and promote religious views. In
Prophets Facing Backward, Meera Nanda shows how today some Hindu nationalists
use modern science to promote the supremacy of the Hindu Vedic tradition.88 In
the last few years, a number of Indian and Western scholars have claimed that Vedic
literature contains much material that is “scientific” in nature. Political leaders and
other Hindu nationalists have followed and pleaded that the most sacred texts of
Hinduism like the Vedas and the Upanis.ads are, in fact, scientific treatises that de-
scribe in holistic manner proper to Hinduism the findings of modern science. Unlike
modern science with its reductionist and empirical approach to reality, the so-called
“Vedic science” endorses a holistic approach that encompasses the whole of reality.
While modern science does not recognize the existence of other levels of consciousness
beyond sense-perception and logical reasoning, Vedic science includes this dimension
of reality based on the contemplative experience of mystics through the ages. De-
spite these obvious differences, proponents of Vedic science uphold that traditional
Vedic knowledge systems are of the same nature as modern science. In Nanda’s view,
the hidden agenda is to place the Hindu Vedic tradition on an equal footing with
modern science without having to submit its basic tenets to scientific knowledge and
86Restivo, op.cit., 39.
87Drees, Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates, 17.
88Nanda, Prophets Facing Backward: Postmodernism, Science, and Hindu Nationalism.
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experimental verification.89
There certainly is more to parallelism than a mere disinterested quest for knowl-
edge, and a variety of complex factors — ranging from ideological, cultural to political
and historical — are closely tied to this enterprise. In fact, claims of parallels be-
tween Eastern thought and modern science cannot be understood apart from the
East-West’s historical relationship over the last few centuries. In his book Oriental-
ism, Edward Said demonstrates how Western study of Eastern thought and culture,
or “orientalism,” has been intimately related to the West’s own political, commercial
and colonial interests in Asia.90 In his view, the “Orient” construed by Western schol-
ars is a Western construction, a “system of ideological fictions” aimed to reinforce and
justify Western power over the East.91 Though this claim can be nuanced in different
ways, it can hardly be denied that underlying the Western intellectual approach to
Eastern thought is an important element of power. Thus it would be wrong to only
see an objective pursuit of knowledge in orientalism. This phenomenon has also its
counterpart in the East. In the context of parallelism, Richard H. Jones notices how
Eastern thinkers can sometimes put Western thought on a pedestal to justify their
own views, and how problematic such attempt can be:
[When making parallels] it could be that Western thought is unconsciously
or consciously being taken as the supreme standard, with a corresponding
lack of sensitivity to other interests: Asian thought must be shown to
be positivistic in a time when positivism was in vogue, or existential for
those who value existentialism. . .Or it must share our moral values, if not
our beliefs. The various traditions cannot stand on their own terms but
must be related to a Western standard. The danger here is in distorting
the fundamental nature of these traditions in order to fulfill this demand
rather than in understanding them in their own milieu.92
89ibid., 110.
90See: Said, Orientalism. However, this book is mostly concerned with Western study of the
Islamic world of the Middle East, and not with Hinduism, Buddhism and other Eastern spiritual
traditions of East and South Asia. But there is no reason to believe that Said’s arguments cannot
be extended to those traditions as well.
91Quoted from: Clarke, op.cit., 8.
92Jones, op.cit., 172-73.
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Jones also identifies other difficulties related to the practice of parallelism. For in-
stance, parallelists often overlook the diversity among and within Eastern schools of
thought, and disregard the fact that each school has its own historical and inter-
pretive issues.93 As a consequence, parallels remain at a superficial level not taking
into account the complexity behind the different Eastern traditions. Similarly, when
discussing quantum physics, parallelists rarely address the different interpretations
that exist in literature. In Modern Physics and Veda¯nta, Jitatma¯nanda refers in-
distinctly to Copenhagen and Everett’s multiworld interpretations, without taking
note of their basic differences. A related issue is that parallelists, especially those
from the spiritual or religious side, often quote scientists with enormous respect as if
they had discovered an unshakable truth. Any scientific theory presented becomes a
ready-made worldview.94 Not surprisingly, then, some parallelists barely consider the
scientific arguments raised against the theory or interpretation they promote. This
attitude perhaps reflects a purely religious background, or an unfamiliarity with the
process of scientific progress. Anyhow, these problems are reminders that a certain
expertise in the compared disciplines, as well as a fair knowledge of their historical
and theoretical issues, are indispensable.
Eric Scerri considers a major problem that “parallelists seem to imply not mere
analogies, but a meaningful identity between the findings of physics and Eastern
mysticism.”95 Claims that disregard the richness and complexity of both disciplines,
and especially their differences in terms of aims and methods are indeed improper.
Barbour complains that Capra says little about differences in the goals and methods
of physics and mysticism. In Barbour’s view, the intent behind mysticism is not
only to expound a metaphysical system but to transform one’s personal life and
guide one toward enlightenment. In contrast, science is about explaining the physical
world around us, not about living a better and wiser life.96 Considering that the
93ibid., 171.
94ibid.
95Scerri, “Eastern Mysticism and the Alleged Parallels with Physics,” 691.
96Barbour, op.cit., 189-90. In Clarke’s view, however, such criticism misses the central point in
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two disciplines also involve different methods or means of knowledge, it is highly
improbable that their claims about reality will be identical in terms of content. The
terms may be the same (notwithstanding the translation issue) but the concepts they
stand for disagree.
Another problem in pushing parallelism to its extreme is the confusion between
the ephemeral nature of scientific discoveries and the perennial truths of mysticism.
Scientific discoveries ceaselessly change and alter; it is inadequate to make them
equivalent with the “timeless” truths conveyed by mysticism. As Jeremy Bernstein
said: “If I were an Eastern mystic the last thing in the world that I would want would
be a reconciliation with modern science.” In his opinion, since “the most valuable
commodity that we have in science is doubt. . . ,” “to hitch a religious philosophy to
a contemporary science is a sure route to its obsolescence.”97 Conversely, to elevate
a scientific theory to the rank of a metaphysical system takes us beyond the realm of
science. We have seen such an example with Goswami’s interpretation of quantum
physics. Although metaphysical assumptions intervene in the scientific theoretical
process, the practice of physics must be kept within the defined boundaries of scientific
epistemology. Otherwise, there is no way to differentiate between pseudo-science and
scientific facts.
All things considered, is it even meaningful to draw parallels between modern
physics and Eastern spiritual traditions? Certainly, one cannot overlook the ideo-
logical, cultural and political factors involved in those parallels. In particular, the
colonial history linking Western countries with Asia over the last centuries, and the
immense impact it had on their mutual cultural and intellectual exchanges, is a most
important factor to consider. However, as Clarke rightly points out, power consti-
Capra’s argument. Capra is not really concerned with a synthesis of these disciplines (which would
indeed require a serious consideration of their differences) but with demonstrating, by using Eastern
concepts and ideas, how some deep-rooted philosophical beliefs in Western philosophy are now at
odds with modern physics. See: Clarke, op.cit., 171.
97Bernstein, “A Cosmic Flow,” 6-8.
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tutes only one of the numerous factors in the East-West equation.98 Regardless of
the numerous problems related to the practice, consistent parallelism might have the
capacity to elucidate aspects and presuppositions not immediately perceived from the
perspective of a single culture or discipline. As physicist Werner Heisenberg noted:
It is probably true quite generally that in the history of human thinking
the most fruitful developments frequently take place at those points where
two different lines of thought meet. These lines may have their roots in
quite different parts of human culture, in different times or different cul-
tural environments or different religious traditions; hence if they actually
meet, that is, if they are at least so much related to each other that a real
interaction can take place, then one may hope that new and interesting
developments will follow.99
In such a spirit, this dissertation brings two major traditions of knowledge together —
modern physics and the Advaita Veda¯nta system in Hinduism — so that they share
their common wisdom. We now examine how parallelists and other scholars have
been perceiving and articulating the interaction between these systems, and more
generally between science and religion.
2.2.2 Convergence, Conflict or Independence?
The interaction between science and religion is complex and involves multiple inter-
twined issues. How should we think about science, religion and their relationship in
modern society? Are these enterprises compatible or at odds with each other? Do
they converge toward the same worldview or are they concerned with different realms
98Clarke, op.cit., 27. Clarke adopts a more liberal approach to orientalism than Said. He is
himself clear on this point when he says that if “Said is right in his claim that no human knowledge
is apolitical, the association of orientalism with colonising power can represent only one part of the
story.” In history, interest for Eastern thought has often taken place outside the colonial context. A
clear example is Germany that had no colonial interests in India or China but whose scholars have
played a central role in orientalist studies from the early 19th century. See: Clarke, ibid., 26-27.
99ibid., 187.
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of reality? Answers to those questions necessarily vary in accordance with the con-
texts and assumptions shaping the questions, and the criteria used to answer them.100
In the following, we propose only a broad list of the most common stances found in
literature pertaining to the interaction between science and religion:101
1. Conflict : Either the claims of religion or the claims of science are true. Among
the proponents of this view, we may think of those scientists who look upon
religion as pure superstition and to religious fundamentalists who adopt a lit-
eral interpretation of scriptures, denying validity to any scientific theory that
contradicts scriptural statements;
2. Independence: Scientific and religious claims refer to separate and independent
realms. Science deals with the empirical constitution of the physical world, and
religion deals with ethical and spiritual values. Thus, their respective claims
can be “true” without conflicting with each other. If science and religion both
say something meaningful about reality, their respective contributions cannot
be integrated under a common worldview;
3. Complementarity : The idea is that science and religion each reveals something
of reality that the other cannot. But unlike the previous stance, where science
and religion deal with different and independent domains, here both approach
the same domain in different (and mutually exclusive) ways. Both have an
equal cognitive value and benefit from each other in order to provide a more
complete picture of reality. This is a common stance among parallelists (like
Capra for instance) who maintain that Eastern mysticism and modern physics
are complementary approaches to the same reality;
4. Convergence: Closely related to the previous one, and perhaps less specific, this
position maintains that science and religion are converging towards the same
total worldview. This stance is often based on the observation that science and
religion exhibit concepts that are similar or that function in a similar manner.
What science discovers supports religion, and what religion claims does not con-
tradict scientific theories. For instance, evolution theory serves to accommodate
the idea of an “intelligent design”; the Big Bang model suggests the presence
of a Creator or some creative intelligence; etc.
100Drees, Religion and Science in Context: A Guide to the Debates, 1.
101This list is based on Wilber (1998, 2000), Barbour (1997) and Jones (1986). Barbour and Wilber
discuss the relationship between science and religion in general. By “religion,” they mean Western
monotheistic religions as well as Eastern spiritual traditions like Hinduism and Buddhism. Jones
focuses on specific schools within Hinduism and Buddhism, namely Advaita Veda¯nta and Therava¯da
Buddhism. In our classification, we use the word “religion” to denote Western religions as well as
Eastern spiritual traditions.
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The position where science denies religion, or vice-versa, has been and is still main-
tained by several authors, scientists and religious fundamentalists (Sigmund Freud,
Karl Marx, Richard Dawkins, Francis Crick, etc.). Most often, conflicts arise when
scientific and religious claims both overlap and differ. In many cases, what religion
says about the nature and origin of the universe differs considerably from what science
tells us about the world. The current debate between creationists and evolutionists
is a patent example. However, a growing number of scholars and religious figures are
now working towards reconciliation. Science and religion are omnipresent forces in
today’s world. While religions create value and meaning for billions of people, science
is our most powerful tool to discover truth about the natural world in which we live.
For this reason, it is highly desirable that science and religion peacefully co-exist.
One way of looking upon co-existence is to assume that science and religion deal
with two independent realms: science deals with nature whereas religion is concerned
with human ethical and spiritual values. A clear representative of this view is the
paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould who argued that science and religion are non-
overlapping magisteria.102 What science reveals about the natural world has nothing
to do with what humans may think or feel about themselves, or envisage as the most
ethical way of behaving in society. However, Wilber explains that if we take this
distinction for granted, we necessarily create a rigid and arbitrary dualism between
nature and human.103 On one side, there would be the natural world disclosed by
science, and on the other side, the human values advanced by religion. In his view,
this is not a tenable position. A human is not just an ethical and spiritual being but
also a product of nature with a physical body and sensations. Science has revealed,
though not fully explained, the intimate connection between inner life and physical
constitution: our thoughts and feelings have physical correlates in the human body
and brain. Conversely, an individual’s values have a direct influence on the envi-
102Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life.
103Wilber, A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spiri-
tuality, 63.
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ronment as they dictate his behavior towards nature and other human beings. The
distinction between human and nature is not so clear-cut, and the same is true with
science and religion. Thus, it is difficult to agree with Gould when he says that science
and religion are two different and nonoverlapping domains.
Desirous to overcome this dualism, some have proposed that science and religion
are in fact complementary (and thus mutually exclusive) ways of looking upon the
same reality. With respect to Eastern mysticism, Capra stands as the main proponent
of the complementary view with many followers in his steps. In Capra’s view, Eastern
mysticism is in harmony with modern physics because it provides “a consistent and
beautiful philosophical framework which can accommodate our most advanced theo-
ries of the physical world.”104 Basically, he believes that modern physics and Eastern
mysticism are converging towards the same worldview through different approaches
related to the different ways in which the human mind apprehends the world:
I see science and mysticism as two complementary manifestations of the
human mind; of its rational and intuitive faculties. The modern physicist
experiences the world through an extreme specialization of the rational
mind; the mystic through an extreme specialization of the intuitive mind.
The two approaches are entirely different and involve far more than a
certain view of the physical world. However, they are complementary, as
we have learned to say in physics. Neither is comprehended in the other,
nor can either of them be reduced to the other, but both of them are
necessary, supplementing one another for a fuller understanding of the
world.105
If the physicist has recourse to rationality to inquire into the nature of the physical
world, the mystic is concerned with an intuitive apprehension of reality. Yet, the
physicist and the mystic essentially arrive at the same worldview: both see the world
as a unified whole in which everything is interconnected. However, modern physics
and mysticism propound different versions of interconnectedness. Whereas mysticism
perceives it in the everyday world (trees, mountains, etc.) at the macroscopic level,
modern physics makes it only a feature of the microscopic realm.106 From the view-
104Capra, op.cit., 12.
105ibid., 306.
106Jones, op.cit., 202.
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point of physics, macroscopic objects are separate from each other and it would be
wrong to say, at least in regard to this aspect, that mystics and physicists converge
towards the same worldview. Moreover, as noted earlier, the wholeness described in
physics is concerned with the physical world only whereas that of mysticism is one in
which all distinctions, including that between object and subject, are obliterated.
In the above quotation, Capra mentions complementarity as a theme also dear to
physicists. One special feature of atoms (and light) is that in some experiments they
behave like particles, and in others like waves. According to Bohr, this suggests that
we can only talk about an atomic system in relation to an experimental setup. What
we actually observe in nature is dependent upon the type of experiment we choose to
perform. In quantum physics, we can either choose wave or particle models, never
both together. The wave and particle models are two mutually exclusive approaches,
but taken together they give a fuller picture of quantum reality. Capra and others
have extended Bohr’s Complementarity principle to the relation between science and
Eastern mysticism. In this view, the two mutually exclusive approaches are, on the
one hand, the ordinary dualistic or rational viewpoint of science (based on concep-
tual models and observational data) and, on the other, the non-dualistic or intuitive
viewpoint of mysticism (based on non-conceptual and contemplative experiences).
A problem here is that no rigid boundary exists between these two modes of
knowing. Thinking in dualistic terms is not only specific to science but common to
many other approaches of reality including mystical experiences. It is reasonable to
assume that there exists a variety of mystical experiences still having some conceptual
or sensory content. Moreover, the scientific approach is not only “rational”: intuition
and imagination are also known to play an important role in the development of
science, especially in theoretical physics where creativity and abstraction are crucial
for the formulation of new theories.107 Science and mysticism are not different enough
in terms of knowing to be considered mutually exclusive approaches. Barbour agrees
107See, for instance: Holton, The Scientific Imagination.
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with the application of complementarity to other fields than physics, but with some
caution. Models are complementary when they refer to the same entity and are of
the same logical type. But these conditions, he says, do not apply to science and
religion that operate in different contexts with different purposes. Barbour notices
that complementarity may sometimes serve to circumvent inconsistencies between
different models, thus creating obstacles to the search of a more unifying model.108
It could be that some parallelists have brought up complementarity — consciously
or not — as a way to overlook basic differences between modern science and Eastern
mysticism.
It is worth noting that the founders of quantum physics and other great the-
oretical physicists opposed the view of a physics that complemented or supported
mysticism, and vice-versa. In Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s
Great Physicists, Wilber gathered the writings of various physicists on the nature and
relation of science and religion (especially mysticism). He points out that though these
physicists were all interested in mysticism in one way or another, they were virtually
unanimous in declaring that modern physics offers no positive support whatsoever
for mysticism.109 As mentioned earlier, Schro¨dinger, though deeply committed to
Advaita Veda¯nta in his own life, dismissed the idea that quantum physics reveals
or supports a mystical worldview. Physical science is concerned with the physical
world only, and cannot provide any significant knowledge about mind, consciousness
or God:
The world of science lacks, or is deprived of, everything that has a meaning
only in relation to the consciously contemplating, perceiving, and feeling
subject. . . All this is not only absent but it cannot, from the purely scien-
tific point of view, be inserted organically. If one tries to put it in or on,. . . ,
it will not fit. . . No personal god can form part of a world-model that has
only become accessible at the cost of removing everything personal from
it.110
108Barbour, When Science Meets Religion, 77.
109Wilber (ed.), Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists, 5.
110Quoted from: Wilber (ed.), ibid., 89.
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Schro¨dinger believed that to derive mysticism from the data of physics is to misun-
derstand the role and nature of both. In Science, Theory, and Man, he said:
Physics has nothing to do with it [mysticism]. Physics takes its start from
everyday experience, which it continues by more subtle means. It remains
akin to it, does not transcend it generically, it cannot enter into another
realm.111
Other great physicists shared the same view. Einstein, quite known for having said
that “science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind,” still found
reprehensible the attempts to apply axioms of physical science to human life.112 Ed-
dington, famous for one of the earliest experimental confirmations of relativity, was
“wholly opposed” to any attempt to “prove” religion on the grounds of modern
physics.113 According to Planck, the father of quantum physics, science and reli-
gion deal with two different orders of reality that can neither conflict nor accord.
He thought that attempts to unify these domains were “founded on a misunder-
standing, or, more precisely, on a confusion of the images of religion with scientific
statements.”114 It proves problematic that those viewpoints are rarely taken into
consideration by those who make parallels and quote quantum physicists to support
their own views.
In Science and Mysticism, Jones challenges the complementary view on another
basis. He objects that complementary viewpoints are assumed to have an equal
cognitive value. Yet, from the standpoint of mysticism, the mystical experience or
worldview has more cognitive significance than that of science.115 According to the
Vedic science proponents, modern science is a “lower” kind of knowledge because it
is concerned with matter only whereas Vedic science encompasses consciousness also.
Hence, Vedic science is a “better, a more whole natural science that will cure the
111Schro¨dinger, Science, Theory, and Man, 204.
112Wilber (ed.), op.cit., 5.
113Eddington, New Pathways in Science, 307-08.
114Quoted from: Heisenberg, Physics and Beyond, 82-83.
115Jones, op.cit., 177.
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reductionism and matter-spirit dualism of Western science.”116 A similar position has
been held by scholars interested in the relation between modern physics and Advaita
Veda¯nta. In Veda¯nta in the Context of Modern Science, Swami Mukhya¯nanda says:
Strange as it may seem, many of the conclusions of modern science are cor-
roborating those of ancient Veda¯nta, though they follow different methods
[. . . ] Both science and philosophy [Veda¯nta] gather facts, analyse experi-
ence, systematize knowledge, and try to find a unity which is the source
and explanation of all this diversified phenomena. They do it in their
own way, with this difference that whereas science so far has restricted
its field to the external phenomena, and mostly to the inanimate part of
it, Veda¯nta understood long ago the fact that partial data will give only
partial truth and we must study experience as a whole, both external and
internal, including the investigator — man himself [. . . ]117
In Mukhya¯nanda’s view, Advaita Veda¯nta approaches reality in a more encompassing
manner than science because it investigates man’s deepest consciousness. From the
Advaita’s perspective, science makes an ontological mistake from the very start: it
takes the world of becoming, i.e., the realm of space and time, as real. According
to Advaita, this is a false belief arising from one’s ignorance (avidya¯) of the non-
dual and eternal nature of reality (Brahman). Under the spell of ma¯ya¯ (broadly,
“illusion”), science cannot transcend the realm of change to realize what is “beyond”
change. As Schro¨dinger noticed, science cannot really transcend the realm of everyday
experience, which it carries with more subtle means of observation. Of course, science
has full authority in its own domain — that of sense-experience and logical reasoning
— but is limited as far as the transcendental domain is concerned. Since Advaita is
concerned with this “ultimate knowledge” (para¯vidya¯), it has greater cognitive value
than modern science. Thus, this view differs from a complementary approach in which
Advaita and science would have the same cognitive value. Yet, it seems to have a
more balanced approach as far as it accepts that there are epistemological differences
between physics and Advaita.
116Nanda, op.cit., 66.
117Mukhya¯nanda, Veda¯nta in the Context of Modern Science, 10.
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Other Indian scholars have discussed the relation between modern physics and
Advaita Veda¯nta, but their approach appears deficient in many ways. In Modern
Physics and Veda¯nta, Jitatma¯nanda traces a great number of parallels between mod-
ern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta, but does not pay the least attention to epistemo-
logical and methodological issues. The approach taken by Chandrasekharayya in his
book Veda¯nta and Modern Physics is no more satisfying. Although he seems to be
quite familiar with Advaita and certain Sanskrit texts, his presentation of modern
physics lacks in details. His comparisons between concepts of Advaita and modern
physics are often superficial, such as when he compares the concept of prakr.ti with
that of “field” in physics.118 In Panda’s works such as Ma¯ya¯ in Physics and the The
Vibrating Universe, we find a pretty good introduction to physics and modern science
in general. The problem here lies in his giving too much importance to Advaita in
the physical realm. In his view, “all modern theories of science can be assimilated
by Advaita Veda¯nta.”119 The latter encompasses all the phenomena described by
modern physics, from the Big Bang to the formation of particles. However, Advaita
Veda¯nta does not explain how particles interact with each other, how gravity behaves,
etc. Clearly, “encompassing” in a metaphysical sense does not mean “explaining” in
a physical sense, a criticism that applies to Mukhya¯nanda’s approach as well.
It is then clear that all these approaches, including that of Mukhya¯nanda, fail to
satisfy in the end. In practice, as noticed earlier, modern physics and Advaita overlap
with each other in terms of method and content. Intuition and reasoning play an
important role in both enterprises, though in different ways and degrees. Both give
a description of the physical world (ex: Advaita develops its own cosmology) and
are concerned with the fundamental nature of reality (ex: quantum physics questions
the status of empirical reality). Therefore, to confine each discipline within its own
domain, making Advaita “encompass” physics, is not enough. To look upon physics
as complementing or supporting mysticism seems inappropriate as well. Is it not
118Chandrasekharayya, op.cit., 59-62.
119Panda, op.cit., 440.
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possible, then, to think of an approach that would reconcile modern physics with
Advaita yet take into account their differences as well? Jones, Wilber and Barbour
have come up with different models as an attempt to integrate science and religion
in such a way. In Chapter 5, we will partly rely on those models to propose a more
consistent model for a dialogue between modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. In
order to lay the basis of this model, however, it is first necessary to undertake the
comparative analysis of the concepts of quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a, both of which
have been brought into parallel by some authors.
61
Chapter 3
The Vacuum in Modern Science
Since Antiquity, the notion of vacuum has engaged the attention of many scientists
and philosophers in the West. As a subject of philosophical enquiry, it appears quite
early in Greek philosophy in the works of Aristotle and atomists like Leucippus,
Democritus and Epicurus. Early Greek speculations about vacuum are essentially
concerned with questions of an ontological nature: is vacuum, like atomists maintain,
the passive receptacle of material bodies, something immutable on which is played
the physical world drama? Or is it an entity actively participating and subject to
phenomenal changes taking place in the universe? Such questions and others have
remained subjects of vivid debates over the millennia. In the early modern period, the
concept of vacuum started to attract the attention of scientists both as a theoretical
and experimental object. Since then, it has featured in various theories concerned
with the nature of the physical world and has contributed significantly to the scientific
elaboration of a coherent picture of the universe. In particular, the formulation of
Einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum physics in the 20th century has had an
important impact on our understanding of the vacuum. From the mere conception of
vacuum as a spatial region empty of matter, physicists have ended up with the view
that it is something substantial and deeply involved in the functioning and evolution
of the universe.
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The historical evolution of the scientific concept of vacuum has been semantically
rich and complex. Given the variety of scientific theories proposed to explain the
physical world, different views of the vacuum have been advanced. With Newton,
the vacuum is more or less identified with absolute space: it is a passive and ideal
container in which bodies move about with respect to each other. As against that,
vacuum appears in the various ether theories of classical physics as an all-filling and
subtle substance involved in the transmission of light and electromagnetic waves.
In the early 20th century, ether theories were rejected and replaced with a more
consistent theory: Einstein’s special theory of relativity. Here, light is again conceived
to travel in empty space but in contrast with the Newtonian absolute space, Einstein’s
space is interpreted as a relative quantity intertwined with the notion of time. Vacuum
loses its substantiality and becomes identified with the spacetime continuum devoid
of matter. In its general version, relativity theory explains gravity in terms of the
geometrical structure of spacetime, so that vacuum obtains here an ontological status
closely connected with the gravitational field. More recent developments in quantum
theory have looked upon the “quantum vacuum” as some kind of substratum from
which constituents of matter emerge and return to. The phrase avatars du vide
(vacuum avatars) has been coined by Lachie`ze-Rey to highlight the various ways in
which the concept of vacuum has been approached in the history of science.1
We come across a number of studies in the last decades which attempt to under-
stand better the philosophical status of vacuum in relativity and quantum physics,
the two pillars of today’s theoretical physics. In this chapter, we are concerned with
the philosophical underpinnings of vacuum in contemporary physics with a focus on
the perspectives taken in philosophy of quantum physics. But it will be appropriate
to first assess the historical development of the vacuum conceptions prior to contem-
porary physics. Following Paty, it is useful to think of this development in terms of
four periods:2
1Lachie`ze-Rey, Les avatars du vide, 6.
2Paty, M., “Le vide mate´riel, ou la matie`re cre´e l’espace.” In: Gunzig and Diner (eds.), Le vide:
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1. From Antiquity to Renaissance: a period of philosophical speculations about
vacuum, concerned mainly with ontological arguments;
2. From Renaissance to 17th century: empirical evidence for the physical existence
of vacuum and its integration in Galilean/Newtonian mechanics and Newton’s
gravitation theory;
3. From 17th century to 1900s: reflections on vacuum as an “etheric” medium and
rejection of ether theories with Einstein’s special theory of relativity (1905);
4. From 20th century onwards: formulation of general theory of relativity and
quantum physics (including QFT), in which the vacuum is endowed with some
substantiality.
The first part of this chapter is mainly concerned with the first three periods and
partially with the fourth period. To begin with, we will briefly review conceptions
of vacuum held by the early Greek philosophers like Milesian and atomist philoso-
phers, Pythagoras and Aristotle. This is followed by a discussion on the early modern
conceptions of vacuum held by natural scientists like Galileo Galilei, Descartes and
Newton. In this period, the vacuum becomes the object of scientific enquiry. Ex-
periments are first conducted that will significantly contribute to understand the
vacuum in physical terms. The next section deals with ether conceptions ranging
from Aristotle’s aither to ether scientific theories formulated between the 17th and
19th centuries, and extends the discussion to the concept of field in physics. The last
section discusses the vacuum concept from the perspective of Einstein’s special and
general theories of relativity. The second part of the chapter will be devoted to the
notion of vacuum as understood from the perspective of quantum physics.
3.1 The Vacuum: From the Milesians to Einstein
The current scientific outlook can hardly be assessed without considering early philo-
sophical speculations on the themes of space and natural elements. Notwithstanding
univers du tout et du rien, 22.
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contributions from other cultures, we cannot underestimate the impact of early Greek
natural philosophers in this regard. It is well known that the Greek philosophical tra-
dition has in many ways paved the way for the emergence of modern science in the
West. The imprint of Euclid’s geometry, Aristotle’s natural philosophy and Epicurus’s
atomistic materialism on the development of scientific thought cannot be underesti-
mated. Early modern period’s essential concepts like atoms and ether can be traced
back to the Greek constitution of the physical world. John Burnet, a well-known
writer on Greek philosophy, described scientific enquiry as “thinking about the world
in the Greek way.”3 Whether this statement is true or not can certainly be debated,
yet it remains clear that speculations of early Greek philosophers have had a major
impact on the Western scientific tradition in general.
3.1.1 Greek Speculations About Vacuum
At the center of most ancient natural philosophies lies the question of the origin and
constitution of the universe: how did the world come into existence? Was it created
from a sort of nothingness or does it originate from a basic substance or principle
that still underlies its existence? In the view of pre-Socratic philosophers, the whole
physical world originates from and is ultimately constituted by a unique substance.
Thales of Miletus, considered to be the earliest Greek natural philosopher, believes
that the universe is born from water and that all things are essentially manifestations
of water. In his cosmology, there is no such thing as empty space or vacuum since wa-
ter pervades everything. His successors also deny the existence of empty space though
they differ as to the nature of the one substance underlying natural phenomena. For
Anaximander, who was Thales’s follower, water could not be the primary substance
of the world if it also involves the creation of fire, its antithesis.4 In his view, natural
3Quoted from: Schro¨dinger, Nature and the Greeks, 20.
4This argument appears in Aristotle’s Physics (204 b 24 ff ). See: Lloyd, Early Greek Science:
Thales to Aristotle, 20.
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elements being subject to change, they cannot constitute a stable foundation for the
changing physical world. Rather, the universe has its source in an endless principle
(apeiron), not subject to change, indefinable and beyond the range of perception.
Anaximenes, student of Anaximander, agrees with his teacher that the source of all
things (arche) has to be endless, yet considers air as the most basic element due to
its infinite extension.5
Underlying the cosmological views of these three philosophers (Milesian school,
6th century BCE) is the denial of empty space in favour of a substance or principle un-
derlying physical phenomena. In contrast with them, Pythagoras (6th century BCE)
recognizes the existence of empty space. As is well known, the Pythagoreans locate
the principle of all things in numbers. According to Aristotle (4th century BCE),
they consider all things “to be modeled on numbers, and numbers to be first in all of
nature [so that] they held the elements of numbers to be the elements of everything
there is.”6 Interestingly, they probably are the first sources of the West to reflect on
the relationship between numbers and space.7 In their view, every object or body
located in space can be described with numbers; conversely, in Pythagorean philoso-
phy, numbers are endowed with a certain spatiality.8 For instance, the Pythagoreans
use numbers to enumerate the points along a straight line: each point is simply as-
sociated with a specific integer number. However, since there is no way to number
all the points on a straight line — there being an infinity of such points —, there
must remain a finite distance between the points. The Pythagoreans identify those
spatial vacancies or interspaces with empty space itself. Eventually, the identification
5With Anaximenes, we seem to return to Thales’s cosmological conception with the difference that
water is replaced by air. However, unlike Thales, Anaximenes provides a more detailed explanation
of how things develop from the primary substance (air) by having recourse to phenomena like
rarefaction, condensation, etc. See: ibid., 22.
6Metaphysics (1.5, 985b23-986aI). Quoted from: Furley, The Greek Cosmologists: The Formation
of the Atomic Theory and its Earliest Critics (Vol.1), 51.
7Genz, Nothingness: The Science of Empty Space, 67.
8Jammer, Concepts of Space: The History of Theories of Space in Physics, 7.
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between empty space and physical media like air or ether bestows empty space with
a physical connotation. Therefore, in the Pythagorean view empty space more or less
merges with matter.9
The school of atomism (5th century BCE) also accepts the existence of empty
space but, in contrast with Pythagoreanism, conceives it as an entity distinct and
somehow opposed to matter.10 Unlike Parmenides who denies fundamental reality to
change, atomists give a crucial place to natural changes in their philosophy. Change
results from the motion of discrete units of matter called “atoms,” which compose
every physical body. The various properties of matter can in turn be explained
through the various ways of combining atoms together. Atoms are eternal (i.e., neither
created nor destroyed), infinite in number and also differ in shapes. In this system, the
presence of empty space accounts for the motion of atoms. For atomists, as Jammer
explains, the existence of empty space is “a logical conclusion of the assumption of
the atomistic structure of reality.”11 It is an infinite receptacle in which the bodies,
themselves composed of atoms, are allowed to move freely with respect to each other.12
Here empty space is as real as matter but complementary to it and bounded by it.13
On the other side of the spectrum, Aristotle is a strong advocate of a view that
negates the existence of empty space. In the history of Greek philosophy, says Fur-
ley, Aristotle was “an extremist in his refusal to accept the existence of void in the
9ibid.
10The doctrine of atomism was formulated by Leucippus around the 5th century BCE and then
systematized by his student Democritus, and later Epicurus and Lucretius.
11Jammer, op.cit., 9.
12Jammer explains that according to Democritus, space is infinite because there is an infinite
number of atoms residing in it. It is believed that in order to explain the variety of physical
properties and forms, one has to admit the existence of an infinity of atoms. Though indivisible,
these atoms have a finite extension so that an infinite space is required to contain them. Later,
Lucretius tried to prove the infinity of space by invoking the image of a man placed at the boundary
of space who would try to stretch out his hand. See: ibid., 8; 11.
13ibid., 9.
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universe.”14 Though he accepts the existence of elements, Aristotle does not believe
they constitute a reasonable foundation for the physical world. The real nature or
essence of a thing is to be found not in its constituting elements but in its “form” or
logos, which is not derived from nor reducible to elements.15 Rather than composed of
indivisible and separate atoms, the world of Aristotle is endowed with continuity: the
whole universe is a plenum continuously filled with substance. The atomistic thesis is
rejected altogether with its notion of empty space. Also, in Aristotle’s cosmological
system, every element has a natural tendency to return to its original place, i.e., either
upward (air, fire) or downward (earth, water). This occurence is dependent on the
assumption that the universe is finite and has a center that marks directions. Space
must then carry some qualitative information about the direction in which bodies
naturally move. Therefore, such a thing as pure empty space cannot exist.
3.1.2 Vacuum as a Physical Entity
During the Middle Ages, the Islamic world became acquainted with the Greek philoso-
phers and especially Aristotle, who is referred to as al-failasu¯f, the philosopher par
excellence.16 Between the 10th and 12th centuries, through the translated works of Ibn
S¯ına¯ (Avicenne), Mo¯ıse Ben Maimoun (Ma¨ımonide) and Ibn Ruchd (Averroe`s), the
philosophy of Aristotle regains immense popularity in the Western world, especially
within European Christendom. At the turn of the 13th century, the Scholastics are
busy reformulating Aristotle’s thought in accordance with Christian dogma. Among
them, Roger Bacon, Albert le Grand and Robert Grosseteste agree with Aristotle
that empty space does not exist. The arguments provided are mainly theological: in
order to ensure the Christian teaching of an omnipresent God (i.e., present in every
14Furley, The Greek Cosmologists: The Formation of the Atomic Theory and its Earliest Critics,
189.
15ibid., 179.
16ibid., 60.
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point of space), the existence of vacuum has to be denied. In 1277, however, the
bishop of Paris, E´tienne Tempier, denounced this argument against the omnipotence
of God: if God is really omnipotent, He could actuate the world into empty space if
He so desired. But the Aristotelian worldview, and particularly its teaching about the
non-existence of vacuum, had already acquired great importance within the Chris-
tian world. Less than a century later, in 1325, the Church revoked the decree of
Tempier and declared valid the teachings of Aristotle. An influentiel philosopher and
theologian in the tradition of scholasticism, Thomas Aquinas never endorsed the idea
that empty space does not exist. It is noteworthy that on this point, Aquinas was
departing from Aristotle whose teachings had exerted a profound influence on his own
philosophy.17
In the early modern period, the Scientific Revolution led to significant changes
in the Aristotelian worldview. Doctrines prevailing during the Middle Ages were
now questioned and gradually replaced with emerging scientific ideas. Reflections
about the universe no more centered on theological and ontological arguments but
now focused on considerations of a physical nature. During this period, a major
shift took place with regard to our understanding of vacuum. In line with the earlier
insights of the Greek atomists, the idea of a vacuum with a physical existence of its
own gains popularity again. The beginning of this new era in physical sciences is
usually associated with the publication of Newton’s Philosophiae Naturalis Principia
Mathematica in 1687. With Newton, the vacuum truly becomes an object of physical
investigation. Prior to him, however, a number of natural philosophers had already
defended the physical character of vacuum on the basis of empirical arguments. Along
with Francesco Patrizi and Giordano Bruno, Galileo Galilei is among the first to
uphold, against Aristotle, that the vacuum exists. He is most famous for maintaining
that nature abhors vacuum (horror vacui). In his view, water in a container could not
be pumped beyond a certain level because the laws of nature prevent the formation of
17For a more detailed discussion about medieval conceptions of vacuum, the reader may refer
to: Grant, Much Ado About Nothing: Theories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the
Scientific Revolution.
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Figure 3.1: The experiment made by Torricelli. Gaspar Schott, Technica curiosa, sive, Mirabilia
artis, Wu¨rzburg 1664. Source: Institute and Museum of History of Science, Florence, Italy (Source:
http://www.imss.fi.it/vuoto/eesper2.html).
vacuum. Vacuum, for Galilei, is a physical milieu without resistance where all bodies,
independently of their weight, fall at the same rate.18
On the basis of Galileo’s analysis, other natural philosophers set off to create
vacuum in experiments. It is one of his students, Evangelista Torricelli, who in 1644
first showed that the vacuum exists, by producing a region devoid of air in a tube
filled with mercury. This experiment not only demonstrated beyond doubt that the
principle of horror vacui is incorrect, but also that vacuum is simple to create. Such
an insight, says Genz, truly “initiated a new era in the experimental and theoretical
research on the vacuum.”19 In the following years, the more refined experiments of
Blaise Pascal and Otto von Guericke also confirmed the existence of physical vacuum.
Descartes, however, did not agree with these conclusions. In his view, Torricelli’s
airless space is filled with a fine form of matter, an idea that would find its way
18Lachie`ze-Rey, op.cit., 22.
19Genz, op.cit., 102.
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in later ether theories. Space is not the passive container of bodies but is itself a
body exhibiting extension like other bodies; and what possesses extension must be a
substance.20 For Descartes, empty space is akin to matter yet in a subtle or dilute
form. Pierre Gassendi, a contemporary of Descartes, criticized this idea. A firm
believer in ancient atomist conceptions — of which he is a foremost revivalist within
the Church — Gassendi requires that empty space be the locus and the condition
of atoms’ motion. In his view, Torricelli’s experiment constituted clear evidence of
vacuum’s physical reality.
In his celebrated Principia, Isaac Newton brings in the concept of absolute space as
a universal frame of reference or backdrop setting for physical phenomena. Absolute
space is immutable, homogeneous, infinite and uninfluenced by the physical changes
taking place in it. Newton distinguishes this notion from that of relative space:
Absolute space in its own nature, without relation to anything external,
remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable
dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine
by its position to bodies; and which is commonly taken for immovable
space. . . 21
If relative space is defined via the relative positions of bodies with respect to each
other, absolute space has no relation whatsoever with the bodies it contains. The
former space is apparent, common and relative; the latter is absolute, true and math-
ematical.22 In Newton’s view, absolute space is an essential requisite for the first law
of motion: it stands as a reference system for bodies that are at rest or move in a uni-
form fashion.23 However, in Newton’s mechanics, there is no way to distinguish states
of rest from states of uniform motion in absolute space: they are all equivalent.24 His
20Paty, op.cit., 27.
21Principia, p.6. Quoted from: Jammer, op.cit., 97.
22Paty, op.cit., 30.
23Newton’s first law of motion states that every physical body remains in a state of rest or of
straight uniform motion unless it is compelled to change by external forces.
24Unless there is a centrifugal force acting upon bodies, it is impossible to distinguish rest from
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concept of absolute space is in result severely criticized by contemporaries such as
Huygens, Leibniz and Berkeley.25 It was left to Einstein who will later confirm, at
the turn of the 20th century, the relative nature of space and put an end to the long
reign of Newton’s absolute space in physics.
Newton usually makes a clear distinction between physical and metaphysical mat-
ters in his works, yet his conception of space constitutes an exception. Jammer
mentions that in his later years Newton became acquainted with Jewish cabalistic
teachings and neo-Platonic thought (he was deeply influenced by his neo-Platonic
predecessor, Henry More), which in turn had an important impact on his concep-
tion of space.26 He sometimes considered absolute space as an emanation of God
(sensorium dei) in the sense that it derives its existence from that of God or the
first-existing being.27 At other times, he conceived it as an attribute of God given its
presumed eternality and omnipresence. In the second edition (1713) of his Principia,
Newton declares:
[God] governs all things, and knows all things that are or can be done.
uniform motion. Thus, Newton associates the existence of absolute space to accelerated or non-
uniform motions. In his experience of the “rotating bucket,” he tries to demonstrate that the
rotational (and accelarated) motion cannot be defined with respect to surrounding bodies but only
with reference to absolute space.
25Disalle explains: “For Leibniz and others, to say that “space is absolute” is to say that space is
a substance, and thereby to attribute a distinct identity to each point of space. But if the locations
of all things in space were shifted any distance in any direction, no real difference would be made;
therefore, space cannot be absolute.” See: Disalle, R., “Newton’s philosophical analysis of space
and time.” In: Cohen and Smith (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Newton, 39-40.
26Jammer, op.cit., 108.
27As Newton wrote: “Space is an affection of a being just as a being. No being exists or can exist
that does not have relation in some way to space. God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere,
and a body in the space that it fills; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere is not. And
hence it follows that space is an emanative effect of the first-existing being, for if I posit any being
whatever I posit space.” Quoted from: Stein, H., “Newton’s metaphysics.” In: Cohen and Smith
(eds.), op.cit., 267-68.
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He is not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite; he is not duration
or space, but he endures and is present. He endures for ever, and is
everywhere present; and by existing always and everywhere, he constitutes
duration and space.28
Such alliance between God and space may have served in Newton’s thought as theolog-
ical justification for the foundations of mechanics and mathematical physics.29 For
Newton absolute space is primarily a mathematical entity and mathematical laws
somehow reflect God’s perfection in this world. The postulation of absolute space
in Newton’s system, says Baker, suggests “the construction of mathematical enti-
ties which might be approached as limits of perfection on the description of physical
facts.”30 Thus, absolute space is endowed with attributes reflecting cosmic perfec-
tion — eternity, infinity, immutability. As we shall see, the concept of a¯ka¯s´a was
also subject to similar philosophical and theological considerations centuries earlier
in S´an˙kara’s Advaita Veda¯nta philosophy.
3.1.3 Vacuum as a Medium
The question as to how physical actions like electricity, magnetism, light, heat and
gravity are apparently transmitted at a distance was central at the time of Newton.
The search for an efficient cause of actions at a distance was indeed a by-product of the
then prevalent mechanical worldview, which sought to explain physical phenomena
in terms of motion of material bodies. According to Cao, the mechanical explanation
ultimately required “identifying permanent substances that underlay mechanisms,
with which the cause was effectively transmitted, step by step, to the effect.”31 Thus,
to explain action at a distance, several theories were formulated that involved different
kinds of substances, from optical and gravitational ethers to various intangible fluids
28Principia, p.544. Quoted from: Jammer, op.cit., 111.
29ibid., 113.
30Baker, An Historical and Critical Examination of English Space and Time Theories, 30.
31Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 27.
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permeating matter and space. Though he believed in the existence of empty space,
Newton was among the first to propose an elaborate theory of ether. In his later
years, he introduced the idea of an ethereal milieu to explain the transmission of
gravity between material bodies. This medium was conceived as a subtle and spatially
extended entity permeating space as well as bodies. Though not perceivable, it had
the capacity to transmit forces from a point to the other, thus providing a viable
mechanism to explain gravitational attraction between bodies. In introducing this
gravitational ether, Newton was in fact following a long tradition of thinking going
back to the Renaissance, medieval and Greek classical thinkers.
In ancient Greek philosophy, aither is associated with the upper part of the world
beyond earth and sky. A purer kind of air, brilliant, filling all cosmos, it is also akin to
human beings’ souls.32 In Aristotle’s cosmology, aither features as an element beside
the four elements — earth, water, fire and air — introduced earlier by Empedocles.
Thus, aither is often referred to as the fifth element or quinta essentia.33 The nature
32Cantor and Hodge (eds.), Conceptions of Ether: Studies in the History of Ether Theories (1740-
1900), 3.
33The fifth element was probably introduced in the Empedoclean list of four elements by the
fifth-century Pythagorean Philolaus. In Pythagoreanism, the doctrine of five elements is connected
with the doctrine of five cosmic solids: tetrahedron is associated with fire, octahedron with air,
icosahedron with water, cube with earth and dodecahedron with aither (or the universe). In the
Heres, Philolaus mentions aither to be the “purest of essences” and relates it to man’s immortal
soul whose nature is intellectual and celestial, in contrast with other four elements which constitute
man’s physical body. Before Aristotle, Plato also maintained a similar doctrine of elements. In the
Timaeus, the four visible and concrete elements are associated with the four cosmic solids whereas
the fifth element is also connected to the dodecahedron and to the notion of an all-containing space.
In many places, Plato associates the aither with higher regions of the sky, or the heavenly world.
Imperceptible, indestructible and formless, the aither is beyond any comparison with the sensible
world; rather, it is the “support” on which the sensible things, which are reflections in the physical
world of the intelligible world of Forms or Ideas, are imprinted and without which they would not
exist or become. See: McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek
and Indian Philosophies, 308; Coomaraswamy, A.K., “The Concept of “Ether” in Greek and Indian
cosmology.” In: Strom (ed.), Guardians of the Sun-Door: Late Iconographic Essays and Drawings
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of this element contrasts radically with that of others. Though it has the ability to
change location, it cannot change in quality or quantity or simply merge with other
elements. Why aither possesses the ability to move can be explained in terms of its
connection with the circular motion of heavens in Aristotle’s system: this element
could only be attributed such motion since the other four elements could only move
up and down, in straight line towards the centre or periphery of the spherical cosmos.
In the first book of De Caelo, Aristotle explicitly assigns the aither to the outer
circumference of his spherical universe and makes it the substance of which stars are
made. In the same line of thinking, the Stoics (from the school of Stoicism founded by
Zeno of Citium, 3rd century BCE) consider the world filled with an elastic substance
called pneuma, a mixture of fire and air which they sometimes equate with aither.
But if Aristotle’s aither is somewhat passive, the pneuma of Stoics is active within
all matter and gives cohesion (hexis) to the physical world. Moreover, Stoics do not
believe in a finite world: the universe has no limits, no edge. In their view, pneuma
keeps the world together and prevents it from diffusing into infinite space.34
Like the first reflections about vacuum, early conceptions of aither were mostly
concerned with ontological questions. Acceptance of aither in cosmology was often
a matter of belief and supposition. For instance, Aristotle’s introduction of aither is
mainly an attempt to justify the existence and function of heavens within his own
cosmology. However, the ways in which such an entity gets actually involved with
the empirical world are not specified. Only with natural scientists like Descartes and
others in the 16th century is the concept of aither given a more physical interpretation.
The relevance of Rene´ Descartes in the development of early scientific ether theories
of Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, 71-82.
34According to Stoics, pneuma is endowed with “tension” (tonos), which refers to the inherent
capacity to transfer effects from a point to the next. In this sense, as Genz notices, the theory
of pneuma anticipates aspects of modern field theories: each point in space is assigned a specific
quantity and interacts with every other neighbouring point. Not surprising then that Stoics describe
sound in terms of vibrations (of air), the latter concept being also an important feature of modern
field theories. See: Genz, op.cit., 82-83.
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cannot be underestimated. As discussed earlier, Descartes’ worldview presumes the
existence of a world filled with substance, without any void. In his own Principia
Philosophiae, Descartes identifies extension with matter and claims that extension
is divisible without limit: there is no such thing as indivisible atoms. Empty space
has no meaning for him: there is no space without bodies, and no bodies without
space. Space is not the container of bodies, but a body itself and thus has extension.
Therefore, space is synonymous, in his opinion, with a dilute form of matter which he
calls “subtle matter” (matie`re subtile). He applies this notion to explain phenomena
involving apparent action at a distance such as magnetism, gravity and so on. For
instance, he explains magnetism with the presence of subtle matter within and around
the magnet: subtle matter rarefies the air between magnet and iron so that both
substances draw nearer with the pressure of external air. There is no action at a
distance but a step-by-step transmission by contact through air particles.
Newton disagreed with Descartes’ idea that spatial extension is a substance. Ac-
cording to him, space holds a higher ontological status: it is not a substance but the
very condition of all substantial beings, even of God.35 But he followed Descartes
in his effort to explain physical action at a distance in terms of local motions and
contacts. His introduction of ether as a causal explanation of gravity is in that di-
rection. For Newton, gravitation is a force acting at a distance between every pair
of material particles in the universe, proportionally to their mass and decreasing in-
versely proportional to the square of their distance. To explain this mutual action
at a distance, he introduced the concept of a gravitational ether, a rarefied medium
composed of hard, minute and impenetrable particles with the property of repelling
each other as well as particles of gross matter. Apparent attraction at a distance
between material bodies was then explained in terms of the repulsion forces exerted
by the ether particles on ponderable bodies.36 However, this theory did not abolish
the problem of action at a distance. Transmission of gravity is explained in terms of
forces between ether particles, yet these forces also imply action at a distance. A new
35Cantor and Hodge (eds.), op.cit., 13.
36Cao, op.cit., 27.
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ontological basis was thus needed to account for the transmission of physical actions
in space.
At the time of Newton, a controversy arose regarding the nature of light, ques-
tioning whether it is a wave or a current of particles. Newton himself believed that
light was corpuscular in nature because it spread along straight lines and reflected
off surfaces. Yet, Newton’s theory hardly accounted for well-known phenomena of
refraction and diffraction. In his Opticks (1704), Newton tried to explain these phe-
nomena with the existence of an ethereal medium transmitting vibrations faster than
the speed of light. Prior to Newton, Christiaan Huygens had posited that light is
made up of waves vibrating up and down perpendicular to the direction of propaga-
tion. Almost a century later, Thomas Young’s interference experiments would show
that light interfers just like sound waves, thus vindicating Huygens’ wave theory. But
like sound, light also requires a propagation medium. Thus, Young proposed that
light waves travel in space in some kind of elastic fluid called luminiferous ether. In
1816, Auguste Fresnel refined this hypothesis, making ether an elastic solid to allow
transverse vibrations. Light as a transverse wave rather than a longitudinal wave,
better explains phenomena like birefringence and diffraction. But it is still difficult
to explain how ether could be transparent to all material bodies while remaining
solid. Despite serious conceptual and theoretical problems and the repeated failure
of experimentalists to detect its existence, the idea of ether persisted well into the
twentieth century.37
Unlike Newton’s ether whose mechanism is based on motion of particles and forces,
luminiferous ether involves a step-by-step transmission of light through the undula-
37For a more detailed study of luminiferous ether theories, the reader may refer to: Cantor and
Hodge (eds.), op.cit.; Doran, “Origins and Consolidation of Field Theory in 19th Century Britain:
From the Mechanical to the Electromagnetic View of Nature”; Hirosige, “The Ether Problem, the
Mechanistic Worldview, and the Origins of the Theory of Relativity”; Whittaker, A History of the
Theories of Aether and Electricity.
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tory motions of a continuous medium. A new concept ontologically different from
both matter and ether was slowly making its way into physics that seemed to better
explain how physical forces are transmitted throughout space: the field concept. The
rise of field theories in the late 19th century is the outcome of two main developments
in physics: first, as just noted, the emergence of luminiferous ether as ontological
basis for explaining optical phenomena; and second, the insights of Faraday, Maxwell
and others into the phenomena of magnetism and electricity.38 Around the 1840s,
as a result of his experimental studies on electricity and magnetism, Michael Fara-
day made the hypothesis that space devoid of matter is capable of physical action.
He suggested the existence of “lines of force” emanating from charged bodies and
magnets; distributed throughout space, these lines of force explain how magnetic and
electrical forces continuously transmit from one region to the other. However, if for
Faraday lines of force have an independent physical reality, it is not clear whether
they are states of space or states of an ether similar to that of Young and Fresnel.
A major turn took place when James Clerk Maxwell introduced the field concept
as a substitute for Faraday’s lines of force. In his theory of electromagnetism (1864),
electricity and magnetism become two different manifestations of a single entity: the
electromagnetic field. By definition, the field consists of a set of physical quanti-
ties (mass, velocity, direction, etc.) defined at every point of space (or spacetime).
For instance, the gravitational field determines the gravitational force acting on any
particle at every point in space, and it receives contributions from all the material
particles at every other point. In contrast to mechanistic conceptions where particles
interact at a distance in empty space, the concept of field involves fullness of space
and instantaneous transmission. The idea that field pervades all space is consistent
with Maxwell’s discovery that electromagnetic waves (or light waves) travel in space
at a finite speed, the speed of light. However, though the electromagnetic field has a
physical reality of its own it remains in Maxwell’s thought a disturbance of a more fun-
38Cao, op.cit., 30.
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damental ethereal medium. The idea of ether underlying optical phenomena persists.
But with the forthcoming works of Hertz, Wien, Thompson, Larmor and Lorentz,
the ether gradually loses all its mechanical properties. In Lorentz’s electromagnetic
theory of electron, for instance, matter is given all electromagnetic properties (mass,
charge, etc.) and ether is divested of all its physical properties except that of being
at rest. Ether is fully demechanized and separated from matter. As such, it played
the same role as absolute space in Newton’s mechanics because it had no mechanical
properties of its own. Meanwhile, the idea of a field as an entity in its own right was
growing. All-pervading, non-mechanical and distinct from both matter and ether, the
field paved the way for a new ontology in physics: the field ontology.39
3.1.4 Vacuum in the Theory of Relativity
We have seen how, from Newton to Lorentz, ether is progressively divested of its
mechanical properties and replaced by the concept of field to explain apparent action
at a distance. In this new picture, the vacuum is not filled with material ether
but with the non-mechanical and all-pervading electromagnetic field. However, the
dualism remains between the field and the ether-as-absolute space in Lorentz’s theory.
Another step had to be taken to divest ether from its last physical property: its
absolute immobility. In 1887, Michelson and Morley conducted an experiment to
detect the existence of the luminiferous ether. Considering that the moving Earth
is not at rest with respect to ether — since ether is equated with absolute space —
the flow of ether across the Earth should hypothetically produce a detectable “ether
wind.” Analyzing the return speed of light in different directions at different times of
the year, it should be possible to detect a difference in the speeds measured depending
whether light travels with the “ether wind” or against it. Detecting such difference
39Ontology in a physical theory relates to a certain picture or representation of the world, and
can serve as a foundation on which a theory is based. For more details on ontology in the context
of physical theories, see section 3.2.3.
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would confirm that Earth is moving relatively to the ether. But the experiment
showed that light had the same velocity whatever Earth’s direction. In 1905, Albert
Einstein’s special theory of relativity provided the explanation for this phenomenon.
According to Einstein, no definite state of motion or rest can be assigned to the ether:
light travels in vacuum at a constant speed whatever the velocity of the observer. The
ether hypothesis is simply irrelevant. What needs to change is the way we conceive
the space and time coordinates of an event, which now depend on the velocity of the
observer.
Unlike Newton’s space and time centuries before, in Einstein’s theory space and
time are no more absolute entities: they are dependent on the motion of the observer,
and as Minkowski would later show, they are different components of a single entity:
the spacetime continuum. Thus, the vacuum of relativity cannot be equated with an
absolute space of the Newtonian kind; it has no substantiality; it is a state of zero
energy, zero momentum, zero charge, etc. Its role is purely geometrical as the locus
where the observer defines his own reference system, that is, his own spacetime. As a
consequence, it is spacetime, not field, that represents the main entity in this theory.
Like in Lorentz’s theory, the electromagnetic field is left without material medium
to support it; but in Einstein’s theory it remains supported by spacetime.40 It must
be noted that the redefinition of space and time has several other counter-intuitive
consequences, all of which have been empirically proved to date: 1. relativity of
simultaneity : two simultaneous events for some observer could not be so for another
observer; 2. time dilation: an observer may find that another’s clock is ticking more
40Cao, op.cit., 45. As Einstein himself explains: “Here also [in special relativity], natural laws
claim validity only when an inertial system is taken as the basis of spacetime description. The
principle of inertia and the principle of the constancy of the velocity of light are valid only with
respect to an inertial system. The field-laws also can claim to have a meaning and validity only in
regard to inertial systems. Thus, as in classical mechanics, space [i.e., spacetime] is here also an
independent component in the representation of physical reality. If we imagine matter and field to
be removed, inertial-space or, more accurately, this space together with the associated time remains
behind.” See: Einstein, Relativity: The Special and the General Theory, 150.
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slowly than his own; 3. length contraction: a measured length may be found to be
shorter than that measured by another observer; and 4. mass-energy equivalence
(E = mc2): the mass of a body is a measure of its energy content.
A decade after the formulation of this theory, Einstein came out with a generalized
version: the general theory of relativity. In this theory, spacetime obtains a rather
different ontological status. If in special relativity, the principle of relativity is only
valid for inertial frames of reference, it is extended to all arbitrary (i.e., inertial and
non-inertial or accelerated) frames of reference in general relativity. Pivotal here is
the principle of equivalence stating equivalence between inertial and gravitational
masses. In short, it tells that accelerated or non-inertial states of motion cannot be
discerned from states of rest in a gravitational field. As a result, the inertial frame
of reference loses its objective significance. Laws of physics remain the same whether
they are tested in an accelerated system or in a gravitational field. In this generalized
form, the principle of relativity thus applies to any motion whatever the system of
reference. With the principle of equivalence as its foundational basis, the general
theory of relativity offered a radically new way of looking at the nature of gravitation
and its relation to space, time and matter. Gravitation is explained in terms of change
in the spacetime geometry: matter generates its own gravitational field by modifying
the geometry of spacetime, and conversely spacetime acts upon matter by guiding
its motion in the form of gravitational interaction. This relation is clearly expressed
in the Einstein field equations where the geometrical structure of spacetime (i.e., its
curvature or “metric”) is related to the gravitational field and the content in matter
and radiation present in a specific region of spacetime.
The interpretation of general relativity in terms of its ontology is controversial as
it depends upon the selected basic entity — matter, spacetime or gravitational field.
Gravity is no more a physical action propagating in empty space as in Newton’s theory
but a feature of spacetime itself. Gravitational field, matter and spacetime geometry
become intimately connected. In the course of his research, Einstein adopted three
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main stances with regard to the basic ontology of general theory of relativity:41
1. Matter ontology : Under the influence of Ernest Mach, Einstein first consid-
ered ponderable bodies to determine the field and the geometrical structures
of spacetime. But this view was soon rejected with the discovery of vacuum
solutions to the Einstein field equations;
2. Geometrical ontology : In this view, the geometrical structures of spacetime are
physically real and gravitational fields are reducible to them. Here, ontological
dualism between matter and field is maintained;
3. Field ontology : This view, adopted by Einstein in his later years, posits the
primacy of fields over spacetime structures: spacetime is seen as a structural
quality of the field. It is a monistic view because the field determines both the
behavior of spacetime and matter.
It is important to note that there is no definite agreement between philosophers of
physics as to which ontology is the most consistent. Nevertheless, if we agree with
the late Einstein, there is no such thing as empty space according to general theory
of relativity. Whereas in special relativity spacetime has an existence independent
from both matter and field — which implies that pure empty space has a meaning —
in general relativity spacetime is inseparable from the substantial field. As Einstein
explains, space (or spacetime) no more exists on its own but only as a structural
quality of the field. Such commitment has enormous implications as to how we
conceive the state of vacuum:
I wish to show that spacetime is not necessarily something to which one
can ascribe a separate existence, independently of the actual objects of
physical reality. Physical objects are not in space, but these objects are
spatially extended. In this way the concept ‘empty space’ loses its mean-
ing.42
In a sense, we are back to the conception of an ethereal substance filling the
vacuum. Although there is a wide belief that ether theories did not survive after
1905, in reality several such theories seeking compatibility with relativity theory have
41Cao, op.cit., 16; 101.
42Quoted from: Cao, op.cit., 95.
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been proposed.43 In an address delivered at the University of Leyden in 1920, Einstein
conceded that a certain kind of ether may play a role in relativity theory:
More careful reflection teaches us, however, that the special theory of
relativity does not compel us to deny ether. We may assume the existence
of an ether; only we must give up ascribing a definite state of motion to it,
i.e., we must by abstraction take from it the last mechanical characteristic
which Lorentz had still left it. . . To deny the ether is ultimately to assume
that empty space has no physical qualities whatever. The fundamental
facts of mechanics do not harmonize with this view. . .What is essential
is merely that besides observable objects, another thing, which is not
perceptible, must be looked upon as real, to enable acceleration or rotation
to be looked upon as something real.44
Decades after Einstein, the interpretation of vacuum as a medium filled with substance
remains important in the philosophy of physics. As we shall see, the worldview
emerging with quantum field theory also leads to similar considerations.
3.2 Vacuum in Quantum Field Theory
Quantum field theory (QFT) is the mathematical and conceptual framework used for
describing the atomic and subatomic constituents of the physical world and the laws
that govern their interactions. Developed in the late 1920s, this theory results from
the union of quantum mechanics and special theory of relativity, and particularly
from the problem of formulating a quantum mechanical theory of the electromag-
netic field.45 After a period of decline in the 1930-40s, the theory rose in prominence
again in the 1940-50s when a first consistent QFT of the electromagnetic field was
43Cantor and Hodge (eds.), op.cit., 53.
44Einstein, Sidelights on Relativity, 13-17. At the end of his lecture, Einstein insisted: “According
to the general theory of relativity space without ether is unthinkable; for in such space there not
only would be no propagation of light, but also no possibility of existence for standards of space and
time (measuring-rods and clocks), nor therefore any spacetime intervals in the physical sense.”
45We use the term “quantum mechanics” to denote the developments in quantum theory before
the emergence of QFT in the late 1920s. The more generic term “quantum physics” is used to denote
quantum mechanics, QFT and other developments in this direction.
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proposed.46 In the early 1970s, the bases of the “standard model” of elementary
particle physics were established, which is currently the best theory we have to de-
scribe the building blocks of the universe (protons, neutrons, quarks, etc.) and their
interactions. QFT has also played an important role in condensed matter physics and
modern cosmology where it has “deeply penetrated into the current conception and
imagination of the origin and evolution of the universe.”47 QFT is today recognized
as the most fundamental theory of physics as well as the most successful one for it
has vindicated the most accurate predictions in the history of physics. Of particular
interest here is the fact that it has questioned again and from a different perspective
the nature of the vacuum.
The aim of this section is to investigate the philosophical underpinnings of vacuum
in QFT. In contrast with quantum mechanics, the philosophical significance of QFT
has been largely ignored by philosophers of science up to early 1980s. QFT as an
object of philosophical reflection only began to receive wider attention in the late
1980s. Since then, quite a few papers and books have been published on topics ranging
from methodology to semantics and ontology.48 As far as ontology is concerned, the
main concern has been in investigating the status of entities and processes pertaining
to the theoretical framework of QFT: quantum fields, vacuum, particles, quantum
fluctuations, interaction, etc.49 This specific topic will be addressed in the third part
46One of the major problems in QFT, noted for the first time in the early 1930s, was the presence
of infinities in several kinds of calculations: self-energy of the electron, polarization of the vacuum,
scattering of electrons by electric fields of atoms, etc. A method to overcome divergences in calcula-
tions, called “renormalization,” was developed in the 1940s by Schwinger, Feynman and Tomonaga,
for which they received in 1965 the Nobel Prize in Physics. On this basis, a first satisfactory quantum
theory of electrons, positrons and electromagnetic field was formulated: quantum electrodynamics.
47Cao, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Field Theory, 1.
48The main books dealing with philosophical aspects of QFT are: Brown and Harre, Philosophical
Foundations of Quantum Field Theory; Auyang, How is Quantum Field Theory Possible? ; Teller,
An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory; Cao, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum
Field Theory; Kuhlmann, Lyre and Wayne (eds.), Ontological Aspects of Quantum Field Theory.
49Some physicists and philosophers have put into question the relevance of ontology in physics.
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of this section. But before that, the quantum mechanical problem of wave-particle
duality and the interpretation of the wavefunction will be discussed in sections 3.2.1
and 3.2.2, respectively. The reason for this arrangement is because these problems
are foundational, both logically and historically, to ontological issues in QFT. In the
last discussion, we will discuss the nature of quantum vacuum and examine some of
the problems faced by philosophers of physics while addressing its status in QFT.
3.2.1 The Wave-Particle Duality
The essence of quantum physics lies in the recognition that atomic structures and
processes present an essential discontinuity at their core. In the previous chapter,
we addressed some of the major principles of quantum physics, among which were
quantization of energy (and of other specific physical properties) and also Heisen-
berg’s uncertainty principle. We also discussed the measurement problem and the
phenomenon of nonseparability in order to bring in some of the parallels made in
available literature between quantum physics and Eastern spiritual traditions. In
the following pages, we briefly introduce the quantum mechanical problem of wave-
particle duality. This topic is particularly relevant here since QFT overcomes this
problem by removing the dichotomy between classical concepts of discrete particle
and continuous field; thus, this discussion has also an import with regard to the topic
of ontology in QFT. Historically, wave-particle duality stems out from the debate,
mentioned earlier, over the nature of light dating back to the 1600s. At that time,
In their view, such philosophical considerations have no empirical relevance and cannot help in
investigating the fundamental aspects of nature. However, if ontology cannot contribute empirically
to physics, it can be of heuristic value when a theory is being developed. Ontology helps in providing
useful conceptual tools for addressing ontological questions in physics and also in suggesting new
orientations for the further development of a theory. This is particularly relevant when the findings of
physics do not fit into our common representation of the world. See: Cao, Conceptual Developments
of 20th Century Field Theories, 10. See also: Kuhlmann, Lyre and Wayne (eds.), Ontological Aspects
of Quantum Field Theory, 2-5.
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competing theories of light were being proposed by Huygens and Newton: light is
either constituted of waves (Huygens) or made up of particles of matter (Newton).
The debate settled for a while with Young’s interference experiments that vindicated
Huygens’ wave theory of light, until it came back to the fore with the works of Max
Planck in the early 1900s.
In 1900, Planck solved the problem of black body radiation by showing that the
laws of heat radiation required an element of discontinuity.50 He proposed that the
material of the black body consisted of a collection of small “vibrating oscillators”
interacting with radiation only with certain states of vibration. The energy of a
vibrating oscillator is quantized — that is, it is an integral multiple of an energy
quantum, hν, where h is the Planck’s constant and ν the frequency of the oscillator.
In 1905, the same year his celebrated paper on special relativity appeared, Einstein
applied Planck’s idea of quantization to radiation itself by proposing that radiation
comes in bundles of energy, called photons, each having an energy proportional to the
radiation frequency. Thus, light consists of a finite number of energy quanta that can
be produced or absorbed only as units.51 According to Einstein, the electromagnetic
field is conceived as a collection of particles: particles are the only reality, and the
apparent fields can be reduced to interactions between particles.52 But a few years
later, he acknowledged the physical reality of the field as well, raising for the first time
50A black body is a theoretical object that absorbs all electromagnetic radiation that falls on it.
Therefore it reflects or transmits no radiation and appears perfectly black when it is cold. However,
when heated a black body will emit radiations of different wavelengths. According to the classical
theory, an ideal black body at thermal equilibrium will emit radiation at infinite power. This is
called the “ultraviolet catastrophe” because the problem occurs in the short wavelength region of
the electromagnetic spectrum. The problem was solved when Planck redefined the law of black-body
radiation.
51This hypothesis came as an explanation for the photoelectric effect in which individual electrons
are ejected from a certain material (for instance, a metal plate) after they have absorbed energy from
light projected on the material. The effect could be accounted for if we assumed that light consists
of individual quanta having the sufficient energy (or frequency) to hit and then eject electrons.
52Cao, op.cit., 130.
CHAPTER 3. THE VACUUM IN MODERN SCIENCE 86
the idea of what was later called the wave-particle duality. In 1913, Niels Bohr relied
on the ideas of Planck and Einstein to establish his theory of the atomic spectra.
In his model, electrons are supposed to exist in distinct states with certain definite
energies. When an electron jumps from an orbit to another, it either emits or absorbs
a photon with a frequency equal to the difference of the energies of the initial and
final atomic states.
In 1923, Arthur Compton performed a X-ray scattering experiment that showed
that photons actually carry momentum and energy when colliding with electrons, thus
confirming Einstein’s hypothesis about light quanta. After this experiment, Einstein
said that “there are therefore two theories of light, both indispensable, and with-
out any logical connection”: the corpuscular view underlying processes of interaction
between light and matter, and the undulatory view known for long to explain phe-
nomena like interference and diffraction.53 The same year, the idea of wave-particle
duality was applied to matter by Louis de Broglie. In the same way as light mani-
fests particle-like properties, particles must also manifest wave-like properties. Any
moving particle or object must be accompanied by a matter wave, whose frequency
ν and wavelength λ are related to the particle’s energy E and momentum p in the
following manner:
E = hν p = h/λ,
where h is the Planck’s constant. In 1927, the Davisson-Germer experiment was
conducted to test de Broglie’s hypothesis; it did that with success by diffracting
electrons in a crystal lattice. The wave-particle duality was no more confined to light
but to all particles and material objects.
In 1925, Erwin Schro¨dinger relied on de Broglie’s idea to establish the basis of
wave mechanics. Assuming the reality of matter waves, he ascribed to each particle
a mathematical function called wavefunction. The wavefunction is solution to the
Schro¨dinger equation, which describes how the matter wave associated with the par-
53ibid., 132.
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ticle (or a group of particles) propagates itself. A year later, Max Born proposed that
this very wavefunction should not be conceived as a “real” entity but as a mathe-
matical tool whose function is only to calculate the probability of finding a particle
within a certain region. Unlike Schro¨dinger, Born assumed the reality of particles
rather than waves. Together with Werner Heisenberg and Pascual Jordan, Born also
contributed to develop the fundamentals of matrix mechanics, whose objective was
to describe how quantum jumps occur in atoms by expressing properties of particles
in terms of matrices evolving in time. Though wave and matrix mechanics emphasize
different aspects of matter — the wave and particle aspects, respectively — Paul
Adrien Maurice Dirac soon showed that both were valid and alternative frameworks
for describing atomic phenomena.54 Commenting on these theories, Jammer said that
“it is hard to find in the history of physics two theories designed to cover the same
range of experience which differ more radically than these two.”55 This equivalence
implies that matter and waves both exhibit wave and corpuscular properties. Such
feature is indeed counter-intuitive for it is difficult to conceive how a particle located
in space and time, for instance, can at the same time be spread out in space like a
wave.
The wave-particle duality is revealed clearly in the famous double-slit experiment.
In this experiment, a coherent light source (or any source of particles) illuminates
a plate with two parallel openings and behind which there is a screen detecting the
impact of photons. When both slits are open, a typical wave interference pattern made
of bright and dark bands appears on the screen. Though, at the screen, light seems
to be absorbed as though it were made of discrete particles, we observe a pattern that
reveals the wave aspect of light. Even more strange is the fact that the same pattern
is observed when the experiment is conducted with photons arriving one at a time
on the screen. Though we would expect the single photon to go either through one
slit or the other, the resulting interference pattern suggests that it goes through both
54Dirac, The Principles of Quantum Mechanics.
55Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics, 271.
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Figure 3.2: The double-slit experiment (Source: http://stephenwhitt.wordpress.com/2008/12/17/the-
experiment-with-two-holes/).
slits at the same time. Here, the wave aspect of the photon is clearly in evidence. But
when we try to observe the particle-like properties of the photon by detecting which
slit it passed through, the interference pattern gets destroyed. Therefore, both wave
and particle aspects cannot be revealed simultaneously in a single measurement: we
either observe the interference pattern (the wave aspect) without knowing by which
slit the particle has passed through; or we locate where the particle has gone but
destroy its wavelike properties.
In 1927, Bohr introduced the principle of complementarity as an explanation for
the wave-particle duality. Wave and particle aspects are neither contradictory nor
paradoxical but complementary aspects of the same reality: both are necessary to
give a total picture of reality and yet they are mutually exclusive to each other. As it
appears from the double-slit experiment, we cannot observe both aspects together in
a single experiment but only one at a time. As a result, it seems that what quantum
mechanics describes should depend on the choice of the experiment. At the Interna-
tional Physics Congress held in 1927 in Italy, Bohr maintained that complementarity
. . . implies the impossibility of any sharp separation between the behaviour
of atomic objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments
which serve to define the conditions under which the phenomena ap-
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pear. . . Consequently, evidence obtained under different experimental con-
ditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but must be
regarded as complementary in the sense that only the totality of the phe-
nomena exhausts the possible information about the objects.56
Complementarity thus has a paramount epistemological implication: it is impossi-
ble to conceive properties of quantum objects independently of the interactions that
manifest those properties. Notwithstanding such issues, however, from a theoretical
viewpoint the problem remains as to which entity — particle or wave — should be
considered most fundamental in quantum mechanics. In other words, what is the
basic or fundamental ontology in this theory? Are matter and light fundamentally
undulatory phenomena as suggested by Schro¨dinger’s formalism? Or are they better
understood in terms of particles, like Born’s interpretation of the wavefunction sug-
gests? As one scholar explains, “the conceptually incoherent fusion of a mathematical
structure based on a field [or wave] ontology and a physical interpretation based on a
particle ontology makes it extremely difficult to find a coherent ontology, in terms of
classical particles or fields, for this theory.”57 As we shall see, it is only with further
developments in QFT that this conceptual problem will find a consistent solution.
Meanwhile, the problem of interpreting the wavefunction must be examined.
3.2.2 Interpretations of the Wavefunction
If many physicists consider ontological questions and issues of interpretation to be
irrelevant to physics, many others believe in the value of interpreting properly the
conceptual content of a physical theory. Interpretation in physics has been described
as “the process of deriving, from the formal principles of a theory a logical repre-
sentation of observable reality in a form that is compatible with common sense and
which may be communicated in ordinary language; it must also conveniently describe
56Quoted from: Smith, Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, 250.
57Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 18.
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the experiments that are performed in practice.”58 It seems especially relevant in
quantum physics, given the fact that this theory radically puts into question some of
the fundamental principles of classical physics. The main problems that face inter-
pretations in quantum physics are: 1. the measurement problem; 2. nonseparability;
3. the intrinsically probabilistic character of quantum physics (contrasting with the
deterministic nature of classical physics); 4. the completeness of quantum mechanics,
i.e., whether this theory accounts for every element of physical reality or not; and
5. the nature of the wavefunction.59 With reference to the last issue, the main de-
bate has been whether wavefunction has some physical existence of its own or if it is
merely a tool for calculating probabilities. Accordingly, we find two main trends of
interpretation adopted by the founders of quantum physics: a realistic one in which
wavefunction obtains a concrete and physical status, and a probabilistic one in which
it has only a statistical function.
De Broglie and Schro¨dinger may be said to have held a realistic interpretation
of the wavefunction in contrast with Born, who maintained a more probabilistic ap-
proach. More than others, being the father of wave mechanics, Schro¨dinger was
a radical advocate of a field ontology in quantum mechanics.60 As noted earlier, de
Broglie’s innovative idea had been to associate a matter wave to each moving material
58Omnes, Quantum Philosophy: Understanding and Interpreting Contemporary Science, 285.
59Several books have been written on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, to which the
reader may refer for further details: Jammer, The Conceptual Development of Quantum Mechanics,
The Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics; d’Espagnat, Veiled Reality: An Analysis of Quantum Me-
chanical Concepts, On Physics and Philosophy; Omnes, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,
Understanding Quantum Mechanics ; Bitbol, Me´canique quantique: une introduction philosophique,
L’aveuglante proximite´ du re´el: anti-re´alisme et quasi-re´alisme en physique.
60A realistic interpretation of the wavefunction usually implies a field ontology rather than a
particle ontology. The field is distinct from the discrete, individual and impenetrable particle by its
continuity, extension and the superimposability of its different portions. This is however true only of
“classical” field ontologies (like Schro¨dinger’s) and not of quantum field ontologies in which the field
displays some form of discreteness (see 3.2.3). See: Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century
Field Theories, 13.
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particle. Schro¨dinger relied on such an idea to elaborate his wave mechanics. In de
Broglie’s theory, matter wave is conceived as a system of plane waves where each indi-
vidual wave has the same mathematical form as ordinary light wave. For Schro¨dinger,
this implied that de Broglie waves were as real and substantial as ordinary light waves.
Accordingly, he also considered his wavefunction as a substantial entity endowed with
continuous density of energy and momentum. In his view, not the particle but the
wave represented by the wavefunction had to be taken as the ontological support of
atomic processes. Schro¨dinger even tried to establish the whole quantum mechanics
on this very basis, thinking that “a classical wave picture based upon continuous mat-
ter waves would provide the most satisfactory foundation for atomic physics.”61 He
was radically against the idea that particles were the irreducible entities of quantum
mechanics. Since quantum particles are neither individual, identifiable nor permanent
objects like classical particles, it is innapropriate to maintain that quantum mechanics
implies a particle ontology.62
De Broglie only partly agreed with this view. Like Schro¨dinger, he believed that
matter wave was constituted of a sum of individual waves, each of which is real,
three-dimensional and substantial. But he also conceded reality to particles as entities
subsidiary to waves. In the 1950s, de Broglie proposed an interpretation of quantum
mechanics based on the idea that both particle and wave have reality.63 In his view,
61Moore, Schro¨dinger: Life and Thought, 208. Moore has suggested that Schro¨dinger’s commit-
ment to Veda¯ntic views may have had some impact on his radical advocacy of a wave ontology in
quantum mechanics: “It would be simplistic to suggest that there is a direct causal link between his
religious beliefs and his discoveries in theoretical physics, yet the unity and continuity of Veda¯nta
are reflected in the unity and continuity of wave mechanics. In 1925, the world view of physics was
a model of the universe as a great machine composed of separable interacting material particles.
During the next few years, Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg and their followers created a universe based
on superimposed inseparable waves of probability amplitudes. This new view would be entirely
consistent with the vedantic concept of the All in One.” See: ibid., 173.
62Cao, op.cit., 147.
63De Broglie gives an account of this “double-solution” theory in the following book: Non-linear
Wave Mechanics: A Causal Interpretation, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1960. It was first published in
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the particle was intricately related to the wave as an energy concentration located in
a singularity region of its non-linear part; the non-linear wave was in turn conceived
to be guided by an extended linear wave.64 Thus, though de Broglie held a realistic
interpretation of the wavefunction, he may be said to have maintained a field-particle
ontology in quantum mechanics. However, Schro¨dinger and de Broglie both agreed
there were problems inherent to a purely realistic interpretation of wavefunction.
First, as Schro¨dinger himself noticed, “the ψ-function [i.e., wavefunction] itself cannot
and may not be interpreted directly in terms of three-dimensional space. . . because it is
in general a function in (3n-dimensional) configuration space, not real space.”65 Thus,
the wavefunction describing a system of particles necessarily requires a mathematical
space with more than three dimensions, implying that the wavefunction has a non-
physical meaning. It was also hard to reconcile the particle aspect of quanta with the
fact that a wave tends to dissipate in the long run.66 Given these difficulties, some
other physicists argued in favour of an ontology based on the concept of particle.
The main representative of a particle ontology in quantum mechanics was Max
Born. In line with Schro¨dinger and de Broglie, he recognized the crucial importance
of the wavefunction in describing the state of an atomic system. But unlike them,
he interpreted it in purely probabilistic terms. Mathematically, the wavefunction
gives the probability of finding the particle in a certain state, the probability being
proportional to the square of the modulus of the wavefunction.67 It has no proper
physical meaning: no energy, no momentum or any connection whatsoever with the
French: Une tentative d’interpre´tation causale et non line´aire de la me´canique ondulatoire: la the´orie
de la double solution, Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1956. This model was refined by David Bohm in his
“pilot wave model,” which is still considered as a consistent interpretation of quantum mechanics.
64Cao, op.cit.
65Schro¨dinger, “Quantisierung, Vierte Mitteilung.”
66Cao, op.cit., 148.
67The square modulus of a complex quantity z (like the wavefunction) is equal to |z|2 = zz, where
z is the complex conjugate of z (if z = x + iy, then z = x − iy). The probability dP of finding a
particle in a small volume dV in the vicinity of a point x is thus given by dP = |ψ(x)|2dV , where
ψ(x) is the wavefunction.
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motion of particles. In Born’s view, the main role is played by the particle, though
he was aware that quantum particles differ from individual and well-defined particles
of classical physics. Also, he still granted some reality to the probability wave insofar
as it allows to predict physically observable results. For these reasons, it may be said
that Born maintained an ontology somewhere between the non-classical particle and
the wave.68 One problem with this interpretation, however, is that it hardly accounts
for the double-slit experiment in which particles seem to interfere with themselves.
To account for such phenomenon, the wavefunction cannot only point to something
real but must itself be a physically real entity. However, Born’s introduction of prob-
abilities within the framework of quantum mechanics has significant epistemological
implications. Whereas classical probabilities merely express our lack of information
about a given system, quantum probabilities assume that the precise knowledge of an
atomic system cannot in principle be obtained.69 Against quantum indeterminism,
Einstein would later declare in a letter to Born that surely “God does not play dice
with the universe.”70
A third and alternative interpretation of the wavefunction was also proposed by
Heisenberg. Since the probability wave propagates in space and time according to
Schro¨dinger’s equation, wavefunction has some objectivity and cannot be a mere
mathematical device. On the other hand, referring to its statistical meaning, wave-
function is subjective insofar as it represents incomplete knowledge about an atomic
event. Therefore, wavefunction describes statistical propensities or possibilities that
are actualized during the process of measurement, that is, when there is interaction
between the atomic system and the measuring device. As such, says Heisenberg,
it has a “certain intermediate layer of reality, halfway between the massive reality
of matter and the intellectual reality of the idea.”71 Compared to Born’s, this in-
68Cao, op.cit., 150.
69Omnes, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, 10-11.
70Einstein and Born, The Born-Einstein Letters: Friendship, Politics and Physics in Uncertain
Times. Letter from December 4, 1926.
71Heisenberg, On Modern Physics, 9-10. However, it is clear for Heisenberg that this reasoning
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terpretation is more realistic because it gives some physicality to the wavefunction
itself. Nevertheless, as Cao points out, it remains unclear in which sense exactly
it is real. For instance, is the wavefunction of a single electron — which lives in a
three-dimensional configurational space — as real and substantial as the radiation
wave of ordinary light? Or does it represent some form of potentiality, thus having
partial physical reality? Overall, then, there seems to be no consistent or at least
definite ontology in quantum mechanics. But with the works that followed by Dirac,
Jordan, Pauli and others, a new ontology soon made its appearance that shed new
light on this problem: the quantum field ontology.
3.2.3 Ontology in Quantum Field Theory
Philosophically speaking, the aim of ontology is to get a coherent picture of the most
general features, entities and structures of being. When applied to physical theories,
ontology is concerned with the worldview supposed or derived from the conceptual
structure of a given theory. What are the fundamental things in this physical world
and how do they relate to each other? Are there some permanent features in nature
or is everything a matter of change? In particular, one is interested in determining
the basic ontology of a theory. Philosopher of science T.Y. Cao has defined it “as an
irreducible conceptual element in the logical construction of reality [that] is concerned
with a real existence, that is, with an autonomous existence without reference to any-
thing external.”72 In general, as noted already, basic ontologies range from substances
applies to the physical world only and not to the psychological act of observation. Quantum theory
certainly does not involve “genuine subjective features” in the sense of introducing the mind of the
physicist as part of the atomic event. See: Hickey’s History of the Twentieth-Century Philosophy of
Science (2005) on the web: http://www.philsci.com/book4-2.htm.
72Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 10. It is to be noted that a
realistic position with respect to theroretical entities is assumed here. In contrast with the instru-
mentalist, the realist assumes that some theoretical concepts represent physical reality while others
have only a conventional role in the theory. This is a position commonly taken by philosophers of
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like particles, fields, etc., to more abstract entities such as spacetime, mathematical
relations, forces, processes, etc. Among the various candidates for the basic ontology
of QFT, particle and field ontologies are particularly emphasized given their logical
and historical connection with earlier considerations on wave-particle duality. We
discuss these ontologies in more detail below, referring mostly to the views of philoso-
pher of science T.Y. Cao. A number of other alternative ontologies have also been
proposed, which shall however remain outside the scope of this discussion.73
QFT primarily consists in the application of principles of quantum mechanics to
fields as opposed to particles only in quantum mechanics. In 1926, Born, Heisenberg
and Jordan were the first to apply to the electromagnetic field the mathematical
methods used by Planck in the blackbody radiation problem.74 They treated the field
as an oscillator and showed that the energy of each mode of oscillation is quantized
— that is, the only allowed values were integral multiples of Planck’s quantum hν.
The physical interpretation was the following: the lowest state of energy corresponds
to the radiation-free empty space with zero energy; the second state has energy hν,
and corresponds to the state of a single photon with that energy; the next state has
energy 2hν, and corresponds to a state containing two photons with that energy;
and so on.75 This was a first step towards interpreting photons as quanta of the
electromagnetic field. In his seminal paper of 1927, Dirac successfully applied this
procedure to solve the problem of spontaneous emission of radiation from atoms.76
In particular, this problem involved the creation of “particles” during the process, a
physics who are especially concerned with the world picture suggested by the conceptual structure
of a theory. The determination of the basic ontology of a given theory has a most important role
for the realist. See: Cao, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Field Theory, 1-6.
73Beside particle and field ontologies, one finds set theory, process, fact, event, trope, possible
worlds, factored ontologies, etc. An overview of these ontologies is available in: Kuhlmann, Lyre
and Wayne (eds.), Ontological Aspects of Quantum Field Theory.
74Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan, “Zur Quantenmechanik II.”
75Weinberg, “The Search for Unity: Notes for a History of Quantum Field Theory,” 22.
76Dirac, “The Quantum Theory of Emission and Absorption of Radiation.”
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feature left unexplained in quantum mechanics: before emission, the system consisted
of a single excited atom whereas after emission, it consisted of an atom in a lower
state of energy plus one photon. It was then crucial to address this issue because
if “quantum mechanics could not deal with processes of creation and destruction, it
could not be an all-embracing physical theory.”77
Without entering into the complex details of Dirac’s paper, it is relevant to look
at the ontological status of field and particles in Dirac’s understanding. In 1927,
the year when Bohr proposed his complementary principle, the wave-particle duality
was at the forefront of reflections in quantum physics. What entity prevailed over
the other? Is the field (or wave aspect) more fundamental than the particle, with
the latter being a manifestation of the field? Or is the particle more important, and
the field a mathematical abstraction without any physical meaning? According to
Weinberg, Dirac’s ontology embodies a clear dualism between particles and fields:
. . . the world [in Dirac’s view] was still conceived to be composed of two
very different ingredients — particles and fields — which were both de-
scribed in terms of quantum mechanics, but in very different ways. Ma-
terial particles like electrons and protons were conceived to be eternal;
to describe the physical state of a system, one had to describe the prob-
abilities for finding each particle in any given region of space or range
of velocities. On the other hand, photons were supposed to be merely
a manifestation of an underlying reality, the quantized electromagnetic
field, and could be freely created and destroyed.78
In Weinberg’s view, Dirac’s photons are not permanent particles but quanta of the
electromagnetic field. However, Cao has recently argued that Dirac seemed to inter-
pret the quantized electromagnetic field in terms of independent and permanent light
quanta carrying energy and momentum, rather than quanta that “could be freely
created and destroyed.” According to Dirac, indeed, the creation and annihilation of
quanta in atomic processes is merely the appearance of their jump from or into the
77Weinberg, op.cit.
78Weinberg, op.cit.
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zero state of energy.79 In this sense, Dirac was an advocate of a particle ontology in
QFT. But in Cao’s view, he was conceptually wrong in taking such position. What
is really quantized in Dirac’s paper is the continuous electromagnetic field, which
logically presupposes field as a substance. The derived quanta of energy in fact pre-
suppose the existence of the field as the basic ontology: they can be created and
destroyed as opposed to the permanently existing field. Therefore, argues Cao, the
field and not the permanent particle was the basic ontology in early QFT, though
Dirac interpreted things differently.80 In any case, the dualism remained at that time
between fields on the one hand, and particles like electrons and protons on the other
hand. It is only with the 1928 paper of Jordan and Wigner that a “way was found
out of this distasteful dualism toward a truly unified view of nature.”81
In this paper, Jordan and Wigner generalize Dirac’s quantization of the electro-
magnetic field to material or “fermionic” fields.82 It is a standard view in QFT that
there exists one fermionic field for each type of elementary particle: an electronic field
for the electron, a quark field for each quark, and so on. Jordan and Wigner showed
79In his 1927 paper, Dirac explains: “The light-quantum has the peculiarity that it apparently
ceases to exist when it is in one of its stationary states, namely, the zero state, in which its momen-
tum, and therefore also its energy, are zero. When a light-quantum is absorbed it can be considered
into this zero state, and when one is emitted it can be considered to jump from the zero state to one
in which it is physically in evidence, so that it appears to have been created.” Quoted from: Cao,
Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 162.
80For the detailed discussion, see: Cao, ibid., 160-67.
81Weinberg, op.cit.
82In particle physics, fermions are particles associated with ordinary matter as opposed to bosons
whose role is to mediate the four fundamental forces of nature: strong, weak, electromagnetic and
gravitational (see next footnote). According to the standard model, there are 24 fermions: six quarks
(up, down, strange, charm, bottom and top), six leptons (electron, electron neutrino, muon, muon
neutrino, tauon and tauon neutrino) and their respective antiparticles. Protons and neutrons are no
more elementary particles as we used to believe since they are composed of quarks. At present, the
most fundamental constituents of matter are the quarks and leptons. Unlike bosons, fermions obey
Pauli’s Exclusion Principle: only one fermion can occupy a given quantum state whereas several
bosons can occupy the same state.
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that fermions like electrons, quarks, etc., are quanta of their respective fermionic field
just in the same way as photons are quanta of the electromagnetic field. In other
words, fermions are no more permanent and real particles (as Dirac believed for in-
stance) but quanta or excitations of underlying permanent fields. Moreover, just as
photons are created when an atom changes its quantum state, material particles can
be created out of excitations of their respective fields. An important difference, how-
ever, between fermions and photons is that photons are also “carriers” of the field.
In QFT, interactions between fields are mediated through the exchange of “carriers”
associated with these fields. These carriers are the photons for electromagnetism, the
“colored” gluons for the strong-binding force, the intermediate bosons for the weak
force, and the gravitons for gravity.83 It is worth noting that among these carriers,
gravitons still have a hypothetical status. Attempts to extend the standard model
to include gravitons have run into serious difficulties so far. In fact, one of the ma-
jor challenges in theoretical physics today is to combine general relativity — which
rightly describes gravitational interaction — with quantum theory into a single “uni-
fied” theory. Although several “quantum gravity” theories have been proposed in the
recent years, such as string theory and other so-called “theories of everything,” there
is still no complete and consistent quantum theory of gravity upto now.84
83In physics, four fundamental interactions or forces explain the ways in which particles interact
with each other: 1. electromagnetism, which mediates interactions of particles with electrical charge;
2. the strong interaction, which is the force that keeps protons and neutrons bound together; 3. the
weak interaction, that acts on the scale of the atomic nucleus and causes phenomena such as beta
decay; 4. gravity, the attractive force that draws masses toward each other.
84Primarily, the problem of quantum gravity appears because we want a single theory unifying
self-consistently all the forces of nature. But it also arises from the fact that both quantum physics
and general relativity call for unification with the other theory. Indeed, each theory is confronted
with a problem of infinities that may be solved by taking into account effects of the other theory.
On the one hand, equations of general relativity break down for singularities, i.e., extremely small
regions of spacetime in which the density of matter and the strength of the gravitational field become
quickly infinite (like in black holes and at the moment of Big Bang). In quantum theory, infinities
appear when trying to apply quantum mechanics to describe fields. Since a field has a value at every
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The worldview emerging with QFT has radically changed our conception of par-
ticles, forces and fields. In contrast with previous mechanistic conceptions, ordi-
nary matter is now conceived in terms of impermanent quanta of more fundamental
fermionic fields. Also, there is no more action at a distance as forces are mediated
through interacting fields and their respective carriers. For instance, charged particles
do not interact at a distance via their respective classical electromagnetic fields, but
by exchanging photons continually between them. Both field and particle aspects are
intertwined with each other in this theory. Despite the fact that field obtains a more
prominent status in QFT than in quantum mechanics, the question remains whether
particles or fields should be given priority in understanding QFT. Historically, Dirac,
the middle Heisenberg, Feynman and Wheeler seem to have opted in favour of a parti-
cle ontology, whereas Pauli, the early and later Heisenberg, Tomonaga and Schwinger
have given prominence to fields.85
Today, the controversy still persists but with additional arguments that clarify the
issue. According to some, QFT entails a particle ontology insofar as only particles,
and not fields (except classical fields), are empirically observable. The field is here
relegated “to the status of a convention, a device for generating particles and medi-
ating their interactions.”86 However, important arguments have been raised against
such interpretation:
1. In contrast with classical particles, quantum particles lack identity and spa-
tial localizability. For assessing the notion of quanta in QFT, a radically new
conceptual framework is required;
2. The Unruh effect has put into question the very notion of particle: a uniformly
accelerating observer (or detector) feels himself immersed in a thermal bath of
particles in the vacuum state. Thus, the notion of particle seems to depend
point of space, it means that there is an infinite number of variables to consider. Since each variable
inevitably fluctuates (according to Heisenberg’s principle), there is an infinite number of variables
that fluctuate. The equations of quantum theory cannot deal properly with these infinities. See:
Smolin, The Trouble with Physics, 5-6.
85Landsman, “Local Quantum Physics,” 512.
86Cao, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Field Theory, 8.
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both on the nature of the detector and its state of motion, and not to be an
objective feature of the theory;
3. Most important, if field quanta can be empirically registered yet they do not
exhaust the physical content of the field. In particular, the various effects related
to vacuum cannot be accounted for because vacuum is interpreted as a state of
nothingness in this ontology (see next section).
Given the potential threats to a particle interpretation of QFT, others have opted
for a field-based ontology. According to Cao, quantum field is the best candidate for
being the basic ontology of QFT. In this view, particles have no longer an eternal
and independent existence but are epiphenomena of the substantial quantum field.
Though having an objective existence, quanta are not primitive entities but are sub-
ordinate to the fields: they manifest or characterize the various excited states of the
field. In Cao’s words, the particle functions as a “phenomenological indicator for
the complicated structural features of the primary field manifested in various situa-
tions.”87 However, it is important to understand that the quantum field is different
from the continuous field of classical physics. Not only is it able to “generate” sub-
stantial particles, but it has also no continuity being quantal in nature. Moreover,
in contrast with classical fields, the field values attached to spacetime points have
no direct physical significance in the case of quantum fields; also, these values are
not definite given the inherently probabilistic nature of the theory.88 Therefore, the
quantum field ontology differs from classical particle and field ontologies. Yet, it
synthesizes them both for it treats wavelike (or fieldlike) and corpuscular aspects of
radiation as different manifestations of the same fundamental entity — the quantum
field.
In early quantum mechanics, wave and corpuscular aspects are complementary yet
exclusive to each other. In QFT, however, elementary particles are capable of being
created and absorbed like quanta of the wave fields, and conversely fields exhibit their
87Cao, “Structural Realism and the Interpretation of Quantum Field Theory,” 19.
88For more details on the differences between classical and quantum fields, see chapter 5 in: Teller,
An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory.
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discrete existence by allowing the creation of particles. By bridging the dichotomy
between the continuous field and the discrete particle, QFT thus offers a consistent
solution to the riddle of wave-particle duality and possibly the first glimpses of a truly
unified view of nature. According to Weinberg, QFT embodies a monistic conception
of the material world with the field at its center:
Thus, the inhabitants of the universe were conceived [in QFT] to be a
set of fields — an electron field, a proton field, an electromagnetic field
— and particles were reduced in status to mere epiphenomena. In its
essentials, this point of view has survived to the present day, and forms
the central dogma of QFT: the essential reality is a set of fields, subject to
the rules of special relativity and quantum mechanics; all else is derived
as a consequence of the quantum dynamics of these fields.89
Such view is consistent with Weinberg’s reductionist approach to science. In his view,
the ultimate aim of science is to reduce all nature to a set of basic and simple universal
laws to which all other scientific laws would be reduced. Chemistry and physics should
be reduced to basic principles of quantum mechanics, and all properties of elementary
particles explained in terms of mathematical consequences of the standard model of
QFT. However, though it is true that QFT endorses a view that tends more toward
monism than quantum mechanics, yet it deals with a plurality of quantum fields
and is still not in a position to include gravity within its scope. More important
perhaps is that in order to maintain a consistent materialist monist position, it is also
necessary to explain mental phenomena and ultimately consciousness itself in terms
of the physical, an attempt that has met with serious difficulties upto now.90
89Weinberg, op.cit., 23
90Cao, T.Y., “Monism, But Not Through Reductionism.” In: Cohen and Tauber (eds.), Philoso-
phies of Nature: The Human Dimension, 42-46.
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3.2.4 The Quantum Vacuum
By shifting emphasis from particle to field, QFT has paved the way to a radically
new manner of conceiving the nature of vacuum. In classical physics and Einstein’s
special theory of relativity, vacuum is basically a state of nothingness: zero mass,
zero energy, zero charge, zero momentum, etc. However, quantum theory tells us
that such state can actually display non-null values for certain quantities. According
to the standard QFT point of view, the quantum vacuum is a very complicated state
of the quantum field that has the peculiar property of exhibiting fluctuations in space
even in regions considered “empty,” that is, devoid of matter and radiation. As such,
it is structurally richer and more dynamic than classical and relativistic vacuua, and
in a sense more akin to the vacuum-as-medium of classical ether theories. Insofar
as it is identified with the lowest state of energy of the quantum field, also referred
to as its ground state, vacuum obtains physicality in QFT.91 Recent investigations
of “vacuum phenomena” such as Casimir (see below) and Unruh effects have been
taken as important evidence for the substantial nature of quantum vacuum. Such
considerations have also deeply penetrated the fields of astrophysics and cosmology
given the role played by vacuum in the cosmological constant problem.92
91In fact, the quantum vacuum represents the combination of the ground states of all fields
associated to particles (electrons, quarks, photons, neutrinos, etc.). For the sake of simplicity,
we often talk about one field instead of many, and thus denote the quantum vacuum to be the
fundamental or ground state of the quantum field.
92The cosmological constant problem lies at the frontier between Einstein’s general theory of
relativity and QFT, and is now one of the most outstanding problems in theoretical physics. The
cosmological constant was originally introduced by Einstein in his equations of general relativity to
obtain a solution that would describe a static universe that neither expands nor contracts. However,
recent observations have suggested that the universe has a small but positive cosmological constant,
indicating that the expansion of the universe would be slowly accelerating. The precise causes for
this acceleration have not yet been elucidated. One of the major problems is that QFT predicts
various contributions to the vacuum energy density leading to a huge value for the cosmological
constant. See, for instance: Rugh and Zinkernagel, “The Quantum Vacuum and the Cosmological
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The first to propose a quantum mechanical model for the vacuum was Dirac. In
the late 1920s, Dirac discovered that the equations featuring in his relativistic theory
of the electron had solutions corresponding to states of negative energy. To account
for this, he introduced the idea that the vacuum state is not empty but filled with a sea
of negative energy electrons, the so-called Dirac sea. The problem was the following:
if electrons can have negative energy, as Dirac’s equations seemed to indicate, most
electrons would have negative energy, for all physical systems tend to minimize their
energy to become stable. Yet, we actually observe that most electrons have positive
energy and not the opposite. Given that electrons follow Pauli’s exclusion principle, a
vacuum filled with an infinite number of electrons with negative energy would prevent
electrons with positive energy from making transitions from positive to negative states
of energy. The sea itself would be unobservable yet a “hole” in the sea could be
observed if enough energy was given to lift up a negative energy electron into a positive
energy state: the “hole” would behave just like ordinary electrons but with opposite
electrical charge. Dirac thought at first that these “antiparticles” were protons but
it was soon discovered that they were actually anti-electrons or positrons. Thus,
Dirac’s theory implied that antiparticles could be created out of vacuum under certain
circumstances. Unlike classical and special relativistic vacuua, Dirac’s vacuum was
not truly empty but filled with substance.
From Dirac onwards, the picture gradually emerged that vacuum is filled with
frantic activity in the form of quantum fluctuations. In fact, the existence of quan-
tum fluctuations can be derived directly from Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Ac-
cording to one formulation of the principle, the number N of field quanta associated
with a given quantum field and the phase θ of the field amplitude are related like
∆N∆θ ≥ 1. It means that if N is equated to zero, that is, if there is no particle
in a given state, the field will still show certain fluctuations about its average value,
which is equal to zero. Heisenberg’s principle also holds between energy E and time
Constant Problem.”
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t, like ∆E∆t ≥ 1. This form of the principle implies that the energy of a system
that exists for only a short period of time must be correspondingly highly uncertain.
Given the equivalence between matter and energy, particles can thus be created in
a spontaneous and unpredictable fashion out of the vacuum before being reabsorbed
again very quickly.93 Though they have a concrete effect on the “real” world, these
short-lived particles are not directly observable, thus they are called virtual particles.
Virtual particles are viewed as the quanta that describe fields of force interaction, and
as such are mainly involved in interaction processes.94 Quantum fluctuations in the
form of virtual particles might also have a crucial role to play in the early development
of the universe. In 1973, Edward Tryon proposed that the whole universe could have
been created from a large-scale vacuum fluctuation.95 In the cosmological inflation
model, initially proposed by Alan Guth in 1980, vacuum fluctuations contribute to
explain the origins of the large-scale structures of the universe.96
93Weinberg, “The Search for Unity: Notes for a History of Quantum Field Theory,” 24.
94A common phenomenon is that of an electron-positron pair created out of the annihilation
of a photon; or, conversely, the creation of a photon from the annihilation of this pair. Other
pairs commonly observed in experiments are quark-antiquark pairs, muon-antimuon pairs and so
on. During their short existence, particles and antiparticles interact with each other according to
Einstein’s law of mass-energy equivalence. This process can be mapped using the so-called Feynman
diagrams (Fig. 3.3).
95Tryon, “Is the Universe a Vacuum Fluctuation?”
96According to this model, the universe would have entered a period of extremely fast expansion in
the early period of its development. Such rapid expansion would explain why the whole universe is
similarly structured over vast distances. During the inflationary period, quantum fluctuations in the
vacuum are amplified in such a way to form the seeds for the growth of structure in the universe (ex:
formation and evolution of galaxies). The first model of inflation, today named old inflation, is based
on a transition from a “false vacuum” with a high energy density, which generates an exponential
inflationary phase, into a “true vacuum” with zero energy density. The false vacuum is a metastable
state (like water under the cooling point) which in due time can give rise, through quantum tunneling,
to a true vacuum in the shape of “bubbles.” In the following years, new inflation models appeared
which relied on more complex kinds of phase transition involving thermal equilibrium. A third
generation of models, called chaotic inflation, was initiated by Andrei Linde. In these models, our
universe is conceived as one of many that grew as part of a multiverse; here, quantum fluctuations
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Figure 3.3: A Feynman diagram representing the annihilation of an electron (e−) and positron
(e+) into a photon (γ) followed by the creation of a pair electron-positron out of the same
photon. In this diagram, particles are represented by lines: the straight lines correspond
to fermions (here electrons) and the wavy lines represent bosons (here photons) (Source:
http://www.howgravityworks.org/Sub Atomic Particles.html).
Despite its remarkable insights into the nature of vacuum, Dirac’s model was re-
jected a few years after it was proposed. In 1934, Furry and Oppenheimer97 showed
that the existence of antimatter could be accounted for without introducing Dirac’s
concept of a filled vacuum, and this without any fundamental change in Dirac’s equa-
tions. The new formalism considered electrons and positrons as alternative states of
a single particle and eliminated the need for an infinite negative energy density.98 In
the same year, Pauli and Weisskopf99 proposed a quantum theory of the scalar field
that also explained the existence of antiparticles without invoking any unobservable
particles of negative energy. QFT could naturally incorporate the idea of antimatter
and rightly describe the creation and annihilation of particles and antiparticles with-
out having to posit any kind of substantial vacuum. For this reason, several scientists
have upheld a non-substantialist conception of vacuum since then. Nevertheless, the
presence of quantum fluctuations in the vacuum state remains a compelling evidence
for the physicality of vacuum. Many have argued that the so-called Casimir effect
also has this implication. This effect, initially predicted by H.B.G. Casimir in 1948,
in the empty spacetime give rise to “bubbles” of false vacuum that individually inflate into many
universes with random properties. See: Langlois, D., “Lectures on Inflation and Cosmological
Perturbations,” (2010) 13-14 (Source: http://arxiv1.library.cornell.edu/abs/1001.5259).
97Furry and Oppenheimer, “On the Theory of the Electron and the Positron.”
98Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 175.
99Weisskopf, “U¨ber der Selbstenergie des Elektrons.”
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predicts the existence of an attractive force between two electrically neutral and per-
fectly conducting parallel plates placed in a vacuum. The displacement of plates has
been interpreted to arise from the pressure exerted by surrounding electromagnetic
vacuum fluctuations, thus confirming the non-null value of the vacuum energy den-
sity. This effect was first observed in the late 1950s and has been tested on a number
of occasions since then.
However, Rugh et al. have demonstrated that the Casimir effect can be derived
from many different points of view, some of which are not based upon the notion of
a fluctuating vacuum. In the view of these authors, the Casimir effect “does not give
conclusive information about the vacuum,” nor is it “an essential demonstration of
the vacuum energy and fluctuations.”100 Other vacuum phenomena such as Lamb
shift and spontaneous emission of electromagnetic radiations from an excited atom,
have also been advanced to prove the physical reality of vacuum fluctuations and thus
of vacuum. But these effects always relate to precise material systems (ex: atoms),
and it is not clear whether what is observed is an inherent feature of the material
systems or of the vacuum itself.101 Nevertheless, if the physical existence of vacuum
cannot be easily ensured on the basis of empirical observations, its heuristic role in
explaining vacuum phenomena makes it relevant within the theoretical framework
of QFT. Saunders, for instance, finds it appropriate to interpret the vacuum as a
fluctuating system of fields insofar as it provides a reasonable explanation for the
Casimir and Unruh effects.102 According to Milonni, who is renowned for his studies
on quantum vacuum, the consensus today is that:
[. . . ] most physicists would agree on the value of a single concept [the
quantum vacuum] that provides intuitive explanations for the ‘compli-
cated and various facts of electromagnetism.’103
100Rugh et al., “The Casimir Effect and the Interpretation of the Vacuum,” 135.
101ibid., 113-14.
102Saunders, S., “Is the Zero-Point Energy Real?” In: Kuhlmann, Lyre and Wayne (eds.), Onto-
logical Aspects of Quantum Field Theory, 338.
103Milonni, The Quantum Vacuum - An Introduction to Quantum Electrodynamics, 295.
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From a different perspective, philosophers of science have argued for the phys-
icality of vacuum on the basis of their acceptance of a field ontology in QFT. In
this picture, as discussed earlier, quantum fields are substances having a real and
autonomous existence. Particles, or field quanta, are interpreted as the manifestation
of excited states of the fields; they are dependent upon the fields for their existence.
If we take fields as primary entities, then the vacuum is naturally interpreted as the
state of a substratum and thus as something substantial itself. But the substantialist
interpretation of vacuum raises questions, as Cao explains:
On the one hand, according to special relativity, the vacuum must be
a Lorentz invariant state of zero energy, zero momentum, zero angular
momentum, zero charge, zero whatever, that is, a state of nothingness.
Considering that energy and momentum have been thought to be the
essential properties of substance in modern physics and modern meta-
physics, the vacuum definitely cannot be regarded as a substance. On
the other hand, the fluctuations existing in the vacuum strongly indicated
that the vacuum must be something substantial, certainly not empty.104
What this remark suggests is that the traditional concept of substance cannot hold
anymore even though we recognize a substantial character to vacuum. A possible
solution brought out by Cao would be to redefine the concept of substance, and to
“deprive energy and momentum of being the defining properties of a substance.”105
Another alternative, more appropriate in his sense, would be to interpret the vacuum
as a kind of “pre-substance, an underlying substratum having a potential substan-
tiality.” By exciting this pre-substance with energy and other properties, substance
in the form of particles acquires physical reality. In some sense, we return here to
Dirac’s insight that vacuum is an all-pervading and potential reservoir from which
physical substance emerges. With this view in mind, many have depicted quantum
vacuum to be a modern embodiment of the Western concept of ether and Eastern con-
cept of a¯ka¯s´a, both denoting all-pervading and subtle substances underlying physical
104Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 176.
105ibid.
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phenomena.106
Another difficulty, closely connected to the problem of interpreting the formalism
of quantum physics, concerns the ontological status of vacuum in the measurement
process. As Saunders says, there is no reason “to suppose that the observed properties
of the vacuum, when correlations are set up between fields in vacuo and macroscopic
systems, are present in the absence of the establishment of such correlations.”107 As
discussed earlier, quantum physics puts into question the idea that material objects
exist with definite properties prior to measurement. The state of a system has a
different meaning in this theory than in classical physics. In the classical picture, the
state of an object is described by variables (position, velocity, etc.) conceived as in-
herent properties of the object. In contrast, the quantum state contains information
about probabilities of obtaining specific values for these variables in a given experi-
ment. Position, velocity, number of particles, etc., then have no definite value prior
to measurement. We cannot construe “quantum objects” as entities endowed with
fixed and objective properties, defined independently from the measurement process.
Consequently, the conception that vacuum has objective reality is at stake here. For
Mills, the vacuum state is not real in the classical sense for it has no meaning prior
to measurement of its properties. Yet, it is not unreal insofar as its physical existence
can be assessed through proper experiments.108
The philosopher of science Michel Bitbol would agree with this view. In some
of his works, he points out how the concept of “state” in quantum physics can be
106In his later years, Dirac himself proposed to reintroduce the notion of a non-mechanical ether
into quantum physics. As Cao notices, “Dirac’s idea of the vacuum as a kind of substratum shared
some of its characteristic features with the ether model, which explains why he returned to the idea
of an ether in his later years. . . ” See: Cao, ibid., 174. For original papers by Dirac: Dirac, “Is there
an aether?” (1951, 1952)
107Saunders, op.cit., 339.
108Mills, R., “Qu’y a-t-il la` quand il n’y a rien la`?” In: Gunzig and Diner (eds.), Le vide: univers
du tout et du rien, 301-02.
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fairly misleading, if not inadequate. In consonance with the classical worldview,
this concept involves a dichotomy between a given substratum and assumed inher-
ent properties. The “state” is real and independent, a substratum in which inhere
specific properties. According to Bitbol, the process of objectifying reality in terms
of objects and properties, or object and subject, is a de´termination cate´gorique.109
In the context of QFT, the concept of quantum state might have led to the wrong
view that there must be an entity “supporting” the qualities (supposedly) inhering
in the state. Thus, the quantum field has generally been recognized as the ontological
support of the quantum state, that is, as an entity endowed with objective reality
and distinct from the measurement process. But it is impossible to attribute objec-
tivity to the quantum field in this manner. The mathematical entity representing
the field in quantum theory is not a function of local variables but an operator, more
precisely an “observable” whose eigenvalues correspond to the possible outcomes of a
measurement. As an example, the number operator has eigenvalues corresponding to
the number of excited quanta that could be observed with a certain probability if a
specific measurement was done. In no case, then, can the quantum field (or the vac-
uum, which is a state of the field) refer to a pre-existing entity defined independently
of the experimental conditions of its measurement, or serve as an intrinsic support
for definite states of excitation.110
Nevertheless, eminent personalities like Heisenberg and Popper have interpreted
the quantum state to embody some form of potentiality.111 The quantum state would
express the propension of “something” — a substance, a pre-substance, or some
form of vacuum or ether — to give rise to phenomena under specific experimen-
tal conditions. For Bitbol, the interpretation of quantum state as propension (or a
de´termination propensive, as he calls it) is in agreement with the empirical and predic-
109Bitbol, L’aveuglante proximite´ du re´el: anti-re´alisme et quasi-re´alisme en physique, 246.
110ibid., 254.
111Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science; Popper, Quantum
Theory and the Schism in Physics.
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tive character of quantum physics: what quantum physics describes is the evolution of
a pure predictive content in terms of the potential outcomes of an experiment.112 But
like the de´termination cate´gorique, the de´termination propensive preserves the idea of
an external and independent substratum with which there is interaction during mea-
surement. The ability for manifesting phenomena must belong to some etheric object
opposing the measuring apparatus, a dichotomy that goes against the corroborated
predictions of quantum physics.113 In Popper’s sense, however, the propension im-
plies a relational situation rather than a relation between entities opposing each other.
Here, there is no reference to the propension of a specific entity to manifest itself; the
propension rather describes the ability of a certain situation to manifest itself in some
way. Teller has a similar view in mind when he says that “we should understand the
quantum state as specifying propensities for the manifestation of properties, but we
can consistently deny that there has to be anything that exemplifies the state.”114
In his pragmatic-transcendental interpretation of quantum physics, Bitbol brings
this ontological deconstruction further. In his view, quantum physics does not deal
with a pre-structured and independent reality, whether it be in the form of entities
or propensions. Distancing himself from realism, Bitbol does not invoke an abstract
metaphysics to assess the theoretical formalism of quantum physics. Nor does he con-
cede, in consonance with instrumentalist views, that quantum theory is a mere recipe
whose only purpose is to predict and manipulate quantum phenomena. The structure
or formalism of the theory is for him highly significant. What makes quantum theory
particularly significant, says Bitbol, is its ability to incorporate within its formalism
the norms related to the experimental activities it accounts for and those related to
the predictions of their results.115 Within the framework of this interpretation, a
112Bitbol, op.cit., 259.
113ibid., 260.
114Teller, An Interpretive Introduction to Quantum Field Theory, 109.
115Bitbol, L’aveuglante proximite´ du re´el: anti-re´alisme et quasi-re´alisme en physique, 269-70.
Bitbol is inspired in its interpretation of quantum physics by Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Like
Kant, he believes that physical theories are neither mere predictive recipes nor true descriptions of
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substantialist interpretation of vacuum is hardly possible. Quantum vacuum is not a
state, or a set of propensions referring to a real and independent substrate. It is more
akin, Bitbol notices, to the concept of “emptiness” (s´u¯nyata¯) defined by the Buddhist
Madhyamaka philosopher Na¯ga¯rjuna (2nd century CE). Here emptiness refers to the
“interdependent origination” of everything that exists: what emerges in dependence
with other things is precisely empty of substance, empty of any individual nature or
existence. Such vacuum, says Bitbol, has obviously “no pretention to an ontological
status.”116
Midway between naive realism and anti-realism lies Bernard d’Espagnat’s interpre-
tation of quantum physics. Like Bitbol, d’Espagnat contends that “quantum objects”
have no reality of their own independently from the measurement process. Atoms,
fields, etc., are only components of an empirical reality, that is, of a reality con-
structed through perception, reasoning and data processing. However, he differs from
Bitbol in that for him quantum theory discloses the existence of an underlying reality,
or fundamental Being “beyond” empirical phenomena. Since physico-mathematical
laws of quantum physics do not arguably depend on human observation, there must
be a reality-in-itself from which these laws originate and acquire their structure. In
other words, there is something “real” that is not reducible to our concepts, theories
and representations of reality. Such ontological or veiled reality, d’Espagnat argues,
is not directly available to scientific enquiry for it “is not knowable as such and is
extremely ‘far’ from our current set of concepts.”117 In d’Espagnat’s view, then, the
the thing-in-itself. Rather, they are justified by their aptitude to express, in Kantian terms, the
“general conditions of possibility of experience.” But to the Kantian synthetic a priori — against
which many philosophers of science have rightly argued — Bitbol substitutes a “functional a priori,”
which consists in his view in “a set of basic presuppositions linked with practical activity.” Such
a priori may change with the redefinition of experimental activities in the course of time. See:
ibid., 146-154. For more details on the pragmatic-transcendental interpretation, see also: Bitbol,
Me´canique quantique, une introduction philosophique.
116L’aveuglante proximite´ du re´el: anti-re´alisme et quasi-re´alisme en physique, 272.
117d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, 400-01.
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vacuum cannot reasonably be taken to be devoid of every ontological connotation. If
the vacuum cannot be considered a substance, or an entity pre-existing measurement,
it nonetheless mirrors (like all other “quantum objects”) aspects of a “veiled reality”
beyond the reach of perception and reasoning. We shall come back in more detail to
d’Espagnat’s views in Chapter 5.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
Throughout the history of Western thought the concept of vacuum has obtained a
variety of meanings and connotations. In ancient Greek cosmology, the existence of
empty space is closely related to speculations about the foundational principle of the
world considered as a whole. Based on the view that the world is constituted by atoms,
numbers or elements, empty space obtains a different ontological status. Primarily
speculative and metaphysical, these arguments about vacuum shift to considerations
of physical nature in the early modern period. On the basis of empirical and theo-
retical modes of investigation, modern science offers a new paradigm from which to
reflect about vacuum. History of science presents us with two seemingly opposite sets
of conceptions: some in which vacuum is envisaged as a passive entity equated with
empty space, and others where vacuum is identified with an all-pervading substratum
from which physical constituents emerge and return to. Hence vacuum denotes differ-
ent things in different theories, and each theory embodies in some sense a specific and
unique way of comprehending vacuum. For instance, the vacuum of general relativity
is not identifiable whatsoever with that of quantum theory. In quantum physics, the
vacuum has something to do with the quantum field, which differs radically from the
gravitational field of Einstein’s theory.
The interpretation of vacuum in a given theory, understood in a philosophical
sense, is not straightforward and involves several complex conceptual and theoreti-
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cal issues. In particular, the nature and function of vacuum in a definite theoretical
framework depends upon the ontological status given to other theoretical entities fea-
turing in the theory. In Einstein’s general relativity, for instance, the notion of empty
space obtains a different meaning whether we accept field or spacetime as the basic
ontology of the theory. In QFT there is ambiguity as to the status of quantum vac-
uum, as noted by Cao who described this problem as the “most profound ontological
dilemna in QFT.”118 As noted earlier, there exist several different ontological frame-
works from which to understand the formalism of QFT. A good candidate for the
basic ontology of QFT is the field ontology, according to which the quantum field is
real and fundamental whereas particles are only subsidiary aspects of the substantial
field. As a state of the quantum field, vacuum appears in this picture as a potential,
substantial and all-pervading receptacle out of which particles are generated and to
which they return at the end of their existence. A kind of subtle ether, quantum
vacuum underlies every interaction in the material world and makes manifest the po-
tentialities concealed in it. Several scientists and philosophers of science have taken
vacuum phenomena, like Casimir and Unruh effects, as important evidence in this
regard.
However, it is important to understand that a substantialist interpretation of
vacuum is by no means essential. Other relevant ontologies have been proposed to
explain QFT that do not take vacuum as a substance. Moreover, it has been shown
that vacuum phenomenon like Casimir effect does not necessarily imply a substantial-
ist stance. At a different level, the interpretation of quantum vacuum is intertwined
with the interpretation of the formalism of quantum physics, and more specifically
with the philosophical issue of realism. According to most recent interpretations,
“quantum objects” like particles, fields, etc., cannot be taken as objective entities
endowed with fixed and definite properties prior to measurement. The classically
realistic conception of the physical world as a pre-structured reality independent of
118Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 176.
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our measurement has no meaning in this theory. Accordingly, quantum vacuum can
hardly be taken as a substance in the classical sense. Some philosophers, like Bitbol,
have criticized the concept of “quantum state” and advanced an ontological decon-
struction of entities in quantum physics; here vacuum has no intrinsic existence nor
any particular substantiality. Others, like d’Espagnat, though agreeing that vacuum
is not a substance in the classical sense, have argued for a non-classical form of realism
in quantum physics. In this interpretation the vacuum, like every quantum entity,
by revealing new laws of physics, contributes to unveil aspects of a “veiled reality”
whose nature ultimately lies beyond scientific enquiry.
In contrast with other physical existents, vacuum lies at the “frontiers” of the
manifest universe: it is not directly perceivable, it is fundamental in an ontological
sense (at least in a field ontology), it is responsible for the generation and interaction
of physical constituents and has arguably a crucial role in the origin of the structure
of the universe as a whole. The vacuum also evokes the idea of unity in the current
scientific representation of the world as opposed to the diversity of physical existents
such as particles, fields, etc. If there exists a theory of quantum gravity reconciling
quantum physics with general relativity, the vacuum could embody the fundamental
state of all existing fields, gravitational and quantum. But looking at the history
of science, it is most probable that such a theory will not put an end to enquiry
in physics. It is perhaps more reasonable to believe that different and more refined
conceptions of the vacuum will be proposed in the near future.
Chapter 4
A¯ka¯s´a in Hindu Schools of
Thought
The concept of a¯ka¯s´a is deeply embedded in the ancient philosophical and spiritual
traditions of India. Initial references to the Sanskrit word a¯ka¯s´a are found in early
Vedic literature, especially in the Upanis.ads. Among the few English words used
to translate a¯ka¯s´a, those of “space” and “ether” are the most commonly accepted.1
Multi-faceted, complex and sometimes ambiguous, the concept of a¯ka¯s´a has been in-
1Chakrabarti notices that the several semantic changes this word has undergone in Indian lit-
erature all converge to mean “space.” Indeed, this term is used in most English translations of
Upanis.ads as well as several other Indian philosophical texts. However, if it is true that, at least in
early Vedic literature, the distinction between space and a¯ka¯s´a is almost non-existent, later schools
of thought clearly distinguish both concepts. For instance, Vai´ses.ika makes a clear distinction be-
tween directional space (di´s) and a¯ka¯s´a. Sometimes, a¯ka¯s´a is translated as “ether” because it is
equated with the Greek cosmological element (aither), which connotes notions of space, heaven and
celestial bodies. For the sake of simplicity, we shall use the Sanskrit word in most cases; otherwise,
the word “space” will be used. See: Chakrabarti, S.C., “A¯ka¯s´a.” In: Ba¨umer (ed.), Kala¯tattvakos´a,
103.
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vested with different layers of meaning throughout the history of Indian thought.2 In
A¯yurvedic medicine, a¯ka¯s´a is considered as one of the five dha¯tus or constitutive prin-
ciples of the human body.3 In ancient Indian mathematics, it is synonymous with the
number zero4 whereas in the va¯stu s´a¯stra (the traditional Indian art of architecture)
it conveys the idea of an “all-filling space” endowed with an inner and spiritual mean-
ing.5 However, it is certainly in the dars´anas, or classical Indian schools of thought,
that this concept has been the object of the most intense reflection, discussion and
debate among philosophers from the various schools of Hinduism, Buddhism and
Jainism.6 Since the concept of a¯ka¯s´a was approached by philosophers in keeping with
their own metaphysical outlook of the world, a variety of interpretations contributed
to refine this concept through the ages.
2However, the concept of a¯ka¯s´a has not always been restricted to the confines of Indian thought.
In the Theosophical movement for instance, the notion of “akashic records” appears extensively to
denote a non-physical “plane of existence” in which would be stored all human knowledge and the
whole history of the universe (see, for instance: Ellwood, R.S., “Theosophy.” In: Stein (ed.), The
Encyclopedia of the Paranormal, 759-66). References to this concept by scientist Nikola Tesla and
systems theorist Ervin La´szlo´ have been pointed out in section 2.1.3 of this dissertation.
3Subrarayappa, B.V., “Indian Perspectives on the Physical World.” In: Chattopadhyaya (ed.),
History of Indian Science, Philosophy, Culture in Indian Civilization, 81-86.
4Coomaraswamy, “Kha and Other Words Denoting “Zero” in Connection with the Metaphysics
of Space.”
5The historian of South asian art, Stella Kramrisch, describes in the following manner the sym-
bolic role played by a¯ka¯s´a in the architecture of Hindu temples: “Created once again, not cosmogo-
nically, though, but artistically, this creation, the edifice of the temple in the density of images
that emerge from and have their station on the bulwark of its walls - is a reiteration in its own
terms, a re-construction of the all-filling a¯ka¯s´a and of the waves of the flood prior to creation.” See:
Kramrisch, S., “Space in Indian Cosmogony and in Architecture.” In: Vatsyayan (ed.), Concepts of
Space: Ancient and Modern, 104. See also in the same volume: Ba¨umer, “From guha¯ to a¯ka¯s´a: The
Mystical Cave in the Vedic and S´aiva traditions,” 105-19.
6In this study, the expression “classical Indian schools of thought” is used to denote both the
classical “orthodox” schools of thought accepting the authority of Vedic sacred texts (i.e., Nya¯ya,
Vai´ses.ika, Sa¯m. khya, Yoga, Pu¯rva Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ and Veda¯nta) as well as the “heterodox” ones, denying
this authority (i.e., Buddhism, Jainism and Ca¯rva¯ka materialism). The expression “Hindu schools
of thought” refers only to the orthodox schools of thought.
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In classical Indian schools of thought, a¯ka¯s´a is considered as one of the five el-
ements (bhu¯ta, maha¯bhu¯ta, pan˜cabhu¯ta) constitutive of the physical world. As sug-
gested by Jhaveri,7 we may broadly divide these schools into three classes depending
on their understanding of the concept of a¯ka¯s´a. In Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika, Pu¯rva Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯
(especially the Pra¯bha¯kara school), Jainism and early Buddhism, a¯ka¯s´a is envisaged
as an independent, all-pervading and eternal entity. In Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika in particular,
it is considered as one of the five physical elements (the other being air, water, fire
and earth), that which is the substratum of the quality of sound (s´abda). In Jain phi-
losophy, a¯ka¯s´a constitutes one of the six fundamental substances (dravya) with soul
(j¯ıva), matter (pudgala), principle of motion (dharma), principle of rest (adharma)
and time (ka¯la), and as such stands apart from the other four elements. It consists
of two parts: the loka¯ka¯s´a, containing the world where souls and other substances
live, and the aloka¯ka¯s´a, the infinite and empty space beyond loka¯ka¯s´a.8 A second
conception, shared by Sa¯m. khya and the various schools of Veda¯nta, is that a¯ka¯s´a is
a physical evolute of prakr.ti or Brahman, respectively. Here a¯ka¯s´a is considered a
created element that is devoid of eternality. Yet, since Sa¯m. khya and Veda¯nta have
a different outlook on the ultimate world-principle, they disagree about the place of
this element in their scheme of cosmological evolution.
The third conception, peculiar to later Buddhist systems such as the Sautra¯ntika
school, looks upon a¯ka¯s´a as a concept that has no reality outside the mind. This
element owns no positive existence and accounts only for the “mere absence of resis-
tant matter.” (sapratighadravya¯bha¯vama¯tra)9 Like the Jains, most Buddhist thinkers
reject a¯ka¯s´a from their list of elements because of its non-substantial nature, and pre-
fer to include it in another list of six dha¯tus, together with consciousness (vijn˜a¯na).
At the end of the spectrum, we find the materialistic school of Ca¯rva¯ka that does
not recognize the existence of a¯ka¯s´a. Since a¯ka¯s´a cannot be perceived through the
7Jhaveri, “The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Philosophy.”
8ibid., 301. See also: Jaini, The Jaina Path of Purification, 127-30.
9Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter, 91.
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sense-organs, and since perception is the only means of valid knowledge (prama¯n. a)
in this school,10 the existence of this element is simply not recognized by Ca¯rva¯ka
philosophers.
Though listed as one of the five elements in most Indian schools of thought, a¯ka¯s´a
stands for more than a mere element in certain of them. The primary status granted
to a¯ka¯s´a in Sa¯m. khya and Veda¯nta, as the first evolute to appear in the cosmogonical
process, already manifests its ontological superiority. Schools like Nya¯ya and Vai´ses.ika
distinguish a¯ka¯s´a from other elements as being partless, not composed of atoms and
thus not subject to change and becoming. Back in the Upanis.ads, there are passages
where a¯ka¯s´a refers to something with no definite relation to the empirical world. In the
Taittir¯ıya Upanis.ad, air, fire, water and earth emanate in succession from a¯ka¯s´a, which
itself derives from a¯tman. Thus, it is sometimes considered the most proximate symbol
for the absolute reality (Brahman, a¯tman). In some passages, owing to its character
of omnipresence and eternality, it is meditated upon as Brahman.11 Elsewhere, it
is referred to as the inner space of one’s heart (hr.dasya¯ka¯s´a) in which abides the
“shining immortal spirit,” (purus.a) a conception similarly found in the Yogava¯sis.t.ha
and in the S´aivite tradition of Kashmir.12 Such metaphysical connotations constitute
a salient feature of a¯ka¯s´a in contrast with the other elements.
10Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, 42. It is to be noted, however, that in all
probability, Ca¯rva¯ka philosophers did not refute inference directly as a means of valid cognition.
Such view would have been difficult to maintain as they themselves used inference to “infer” that
inference is not a valid means of knowledge. See: Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, 190-91.
11Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Vol.1), 43.
12The Yogava¯sis. t.ha and its compendium Laghu-Yogava¯sis. t.ha, give great attention to the concept
of a¯ka¯s´a. In particular, it distinguishes between three kinds of a¯ka¯s´a: citta¯ka¯s´a (mental space),
cida¯ka¯s´a (consciousness-space) and bhu¯ta¯ka¯s´a (physical space). Ba¨umer notices that “a¯ka¯s´a for the
Yoga-Va¯sis. t.ha serves as the most powerful symbol for the Advaita of pure consciousness. . . ” In
Kashmir S´aivism, the concept of inner a¯ka¯s´a is also present. In Abhinavagupta’s philosophy, the
term praka¯s´a stands for the primeval and transcendent omnipresence of the “space” pertaining to
consciousness. See: Ba¨umer, B. “From guha¯ to a¯ka¯s´a: The Mystical Cave in the Vedic and S´aiva
traditions.” In: Vatsyayan (ed.), Concepts of Space: Ancient and Modern, 113; Halbfass, W., “Space
or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Thought.” In: Nair (ed.), Mind, Matter and Mystery:
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Overall, the fundamental nature of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian philosophy remains unclear.
Is it an empty space that passively contains bodies and objects or some subtle form
of materiality? Is it some sort of transcendental entity involved in the origination and
sustenance of the empirical world or an inner spiritual principle ? In this chapter, an
attempt is being made to examine the concept of a¯ka¯s´a as given in Upanis.ads and
also study some of the different interpretations of a¯ka¯s´a given in the three classical
philosophical schools of Vai´ses.ika, Sa¯m. khya and Advaita Veda¯nta. Among the Hindu
classical schools of thought, these three discuss the concept of a¯ka¯s´a in great detail.
Prominence will especially be given to Advaita Veda¯nta as it is the school with which
we are primarily concerned in our comparative study. The analysis shall remain
as close as possible to the basic Sanskrit texts and will refer to the commentaries
recognized by both scholars and traditional teachers as the most authoritative ones.
Since a¯ka¯s´a is classified as one of the five bhu¯tas (elements), it will be relevant to
first discuss the concept of bhu¯ta and its various meanings in Vedic literature and
especially in the Upanis.ads. This will be followed by a study of a¯ka¯s´a specifically in
philosophical literature.
4.1 Textual Sources in Vedic Literature
Vedic literature constitutes the earliest source of information regarding Hindu thought.
For the most part, the various philosophical ideas that were developed in the later
philosophical systems go back to the Vedas.13 These texts, as we know them, were
originally transmitted for centuries through oral transmission. The exact period dur-
ing which they were written is not known with certainty, but most scholars date this
codification to somewhere around two thousand years BCE.14 However, according to
the tradition, the message of the Vedas is authorless (apaurus.eya) and without any
Questions in Science and Philosophy, 98.
13Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, 225; Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 1.
14Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 1.
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beginning (ana¯di). It ascribes the Vedas to the inspiration of primeval sages called
r.s. is, who received the stream of Vedas ’ perennial message intact and then passed it
on to human beings. These sacred texts are called s´ruti (literally: “that which has
been heard”) and as such stand as an authoritative norm of belief and practice for
most Hindus.
There are four Vedas (R. gveda, Sa¯maveda, Yajurveda, Atharvaveda), each of them
consisting of a collection of hymns, chants and liturgical formulas (mantras) and
to which are attached prose texts describing in detail the meaning of the liturgy
(Bra¯hman. as). In addition, each Veda has its own A¯ran. yaka (literally: “forest trea-
tise”), a group of texts dedicated to the inner meaning of the sacrificial rituals de-
scribed in the Vedas. The philosophical essence of the Vedas is mostly reflected in
their concluding portions called the Upanis.ads.
15 The composition of these celebrated
works of intuitive philosophy possibly began at the end of the period aforementioned
and continued until the last few centuries BCE.16 Much of what is discussed in the
Upanis.ads constitute a reflection on the inner meaning of sacrifical Vedic ritual, which
amounts to a discussion on the nature of reality, the means for liberation from rebirth
and sufferings and the importance of self-knowledge in this endeavour. The Upanis.ads
are mainly constituted of dialogues between teachers and pupils, and cannot be taken
as systematic philosophy in the modern sense. It is, however, among the earliest ef-
15According to Hiriyanna, the word upanis.ad itself means “sitting down near” (upa ni sad) the
teacher to receive instruction, and later came to signify the secret instruction imparted at such
private settings. In the view of traditional teachers or a¯ca¯ryas such as S´an˙kara, upa and ni should
be understood as prefixes to the root sad, which means “to loosen,” “to reach” or “to destroy,”
suggesting that the knowledge conveyed in these texts is able to loosen or destroy ignorance about
true reality. This is also the view of a contemporary and respected teacher of Advaita Veda¯nta,
Swami Dayananda Saraswati, for whom the word upanis.ad refers to self-knowledge (brahmavidya¯,
a¯tmavidya¯), that knowledge which destroys the real cause of sorrow. See: Hiriyanna, Outlines of
Indian Philosophy, 49-50; Olivelle (trans.), The Early Upanis.ads, 24; Swami Dayananda Saraswati,
Exploring Vedanta, 7-10.
16Olivelle (trans.), op.cit., 12-13.
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forts to give a philosophical explanation of the world we live in. The Upanis.ads have
been at the basis of the subsequent development of philosophical reflection in India.
4.1.1 Early reflections about bhu¯tas
In Hindu philosophy, reflections about reality and truth are intermingled with the
concept of “being.” In Sanskrit, the language of Hindu sacred texts, reality and truth
are denoted by the same word — sat — which can also mean “being” as opposed to
“non-being” (asat) that is unreal.17 History shows the importance that philosophers
attached to the examination of “being” when enquiring into the true nature of the
world and beyond. What is it to be, to exist? What does it mean? In what sense are
“reality” and “being” related together in this world? Such reflections of a cosmological
nature are obtained in the Upanis.ads. One attempt is to explain the nature of the
physical world in terms of physical “elements” called bhu¯tas. The word bhu¯ta, and its
derivative maha¯bhu¯ta,18 are both derived from the verbal root bhu¯, which means “to
be” or “to become.”19 This suggests that the element is not only constitutive of the
physical world but also fully participates in its becoming.
The first references to the concept of bhu¯ta in Vedic literature are found in the
17Fowler, Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, 5.
18In literature, the word maha¯bhu¯ta is specifically used to denote the five “great elements,” (a¯ka¯s´a
air, fire, water and earth) constituting the physical world. This usage should be distinguished from
its compound form (sama¯sa), meaning the “great being.” (ex: BrU II.4.12) The word bhu¯ta is an
older less specific concept that possesses different meanings: “element,” “past,” “creature,” “living
being,” etc. See later references of P.-S. Filliozat and A.M. Ghatage.
19In Sanskrit literature, there is a rich and extensive vocabulary for the verb “to be.” Strictly
speaking, there exist two verbal roots having this meaning in Sanskrit:
√
bhu¯ and
√
as. Whereas
the root bhu¯ refers to “becoming, growing, thriving” and thus to the dynamical aspect of “being,”
the root as involves a more static and essential notion of “being.” The words bhu¯ta and sat are
respectively derived from these two roots. Together with their several nominal derivatives,
√
bhu¯
and
√
as account for most of the Indian ontological terminology. See: Halbfass, On Being and What
There Is: Classical Vai´ses. ika and the History of Indian Ontology, 22.
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R. gveda, clearly not understood there as a generic term for physical elements. In fact,
as indicated by Filliozat, many layers of meaning exist for the word bhu¯ta in literature.
As the past participle of the verb bhu¯, it can mean “past,” “produced,” “happened”;
it can also be used as a noun, masculine with the meaning of “living being, creature,”
neuter with the meaning of “well-being,” “reality” and “element,” and optionally
masculine or neuter when referring to a supernatural being.20 According to Filliozat,
“past” and “creature” are the oldest meanings attested in the R. gveda. This claim is
also supported by S.K. Lal in his short study on pan˜camaha¯bhu¯tas.21 Denoting some-
thing “past,” the word bhu¯ta often appears together with the word bhavya in the
Vedas, the latter gerundive conveying the idea of something occuring in the future,
namely something that “has to be” or “has to become.” For instance, this meaning is
present in the following verse from the R. gvedic Purus.a-su¯kta (RV X.90.2ab): “Purus.a
[cosmic being] is this all, that has been and that will be.” (purus.a evedam. sarvam.
yadbhu¯tam. yacca bhavyam) In another passage (RV X.55.2ab), we find a similar refer-
ence to the created world as something which became and will become in the future:
“That is the great, much-desired Name with which you created everything, past and
present.” (mahattanna¯ma guhyam. puruspr.g yena bhu¯tam. janayo yena bhavyam) We
also find similar instances in the Yajurveda and the Atharvaveda.22
The idea that five basic elements constitute the physical world appears towards
the end of the Vedic period. Filliozat maintains that the five elements were first
introduced in the S´a¯n˙kha¯yana A¯ran. yaka (VII.22) where, joined with other minor en-
tities, they constitute the sarvabhu¯tasam. hita¯, that is, the “combination of all created
things.”23 According to Ghatage, the earliest occurence of this concept is found in the
20Filliozat, P.-S., “Bhu¯ta-maha¯bhu¯ta.” In: Ba¨umer (ed.), Kala¯tattvakos´a, 50.
21“In the R. gveda, the term bhu¯ta has been used mainly in the sense of “past,” often in the
juxtaposition of “future.” Further, in almost all its occurences, the word means sentient or insentient
beings.” See: Lal, S.K., “Pan˜camaha¯bhu¯tas : Origin and Myths in Vedic Literature.” In: Vatsyayan
(ed.), Prakr. ti: The Integral Vision (Vol.2), 7.
22Filliozat, op.cit., 54.
23The passage goes like this: “Va¯li´sikha¯yani says: “There are five vital elements [maha¯bhu¯ta¯ni ].
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Aitareya A¯ran. yaka (III.4).
24 Some of the Upanis.ads make references to five “great”
(mahat) elements, namely earth (pr. thiv¯ı), water (a¯pa), fire (jyoti, tejas), wind or air
(va¯yu) and space (a¯ka¯s´a), but do not provide a detailed account of the nature and
function of these elements in the physical world. A more elaborate understanding will
only come later with the emergence of the classical schools of philosophy. As is the
case with most old doctrines and ideas, the evolution of the Upanis.adic conception
of elements is difficult to specify with certainty. Hiriyanna distinguishes three main
stages of thought in the Upanis.adic speculations on elements:
25
1. The ancient Vedic conception of primeval waters, out of which everything in
the world emerges;
2. The depiction of the world in terms of three elements, namely fire, water and
earth. Here is an endeavour to order elements with respect to each other, and
also to describe the mechanism by which they combine together to form the
whole world;
3. The extension to five elements with the introduction of air and a¯ka¯s´a in the list
of elements. This classification was accepted and developed by practically all
later schools of philosophy.
In the oldest Upanis.ads, a few passages recognize water as the original stuff of the
world. For instance, in BrU V.5.1: “In the beginning only the waters were here.”26
Another passage from Cha¯ndogya Upanis.ad claims that water dwells in all created
things: “All these are simply specific forms of water — earth, intermediate region,
sky, hills, gods, humans, domestic animals, birds, grasses, trees, and wild beasts
down to the very worms, moths, and ants; they are simply specific forms of water.”
(ChU VII.10.1) There are good reasons to believe that this conception represents an
These are earth, wind, space [a¯ka¯s´a], water and fire. These are the combinations jointly or together.
And other minute elements, which are united with the vital elements are the combination of all
created things.” ” See: Filliozat, op.cit., 65.
24Ghatage, A.M., “The Five Maha¯bhu¯tas : A Semantic Analysis.” In: Vatsyayan (ed.), Prakr. ti:
The Integral Vision (Vol.2), 89.
25Hiriyanna, op.cit., 64.
26All quotations from Upanis.ads are taken from Olivelle (1998) except those from the Maitr¯ı
Upanis.ad, which are taken from Radhakrishnan (1995[1953]).
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 124
early stage in the reflection on elements as this doctrine is also part of the Vedas.
In Hiriyanna’s view, the next stage came with the recognition of fire and earth as
other basic elements together with water. The acceptance of many elements led to
the question of their formation: how to explain the creation of a diversity of elements
and in particular their order in the cosmogonical process? In BrU I.2.2, it is said
that from the churning of water by Praja¯pati, earth arises, and that from the labour
and heat, fire arises; here, the creation of elements goes from water to earth and then
to fire. In ChU VI.2.2-4, A¯run. i teaches his son S´vetaketu about the creation of the
world. In this passage, the order of manifestation is different, fire being envisaged as
the first evolute from which came water and earth:
How can what is existent be born from what is nonexistent? On the
contrary, son, in the beginning this world was simply what is existent
— one only, without a second. And it thought to itself: ‘Let me be-
come many. Let me propagate myself.’ It emitted heat [fire]. The heat
thought to itself: ‘Let me become many. Let me propagate myself.’ It
emitted water. . . The water thought to itself: ‘Let me become many. Let
me propagate myself.’ It emitted food [earth]. (ChU VI.2.2-4)
This passage is usually considered as the authority for the threefold conception of
elements insofar as the order proposed here is maintained in later passages mentioning
the five elements. The sixth section of this Upanis.ad features other important ideas
regarding the nature of elements. It contains the first mention of a qualitative dis-
tinction between subtle (su¯ks.ma) and gross (sthu¯la) elements, a distinction accepted
and developed in later schools such as Sa¯m. khya and Veda¯nta. Beside the three gross
elements (earth, water, fire), the existence of three corresponding “subtle” elements is
assumed. Since gross elements are always found to co-exist in nature, it is suggested
that there exists also a “pure” or “subtle” state — that is, a state not perceivable
through sense-organs — in which the elements are unmixed and independent from
each other. This section also includes the first mention of the dynamic process of
“admixture,” called trivr. tkaran. a, by which subtle elements are combined together to
produce gross elements. In ChU VI.3-4, we are told that gross elements are triply
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mixed from the three primeval essences of fire (tejas), water (ap) and earth (anna).
Each gross element consists in the admixture of these three subtle elements.27 This
theory was quite influential in later systematic philosophy as S´an˙kara comments upon
it in BSB II.4.20-22. Despite the speculative nature of these ideas, the emergence of
the trivr. tkaran. a process in Indian philosophy, together with the underlying distinction
between subtle and gross elements, represent a major advance in the philosophical
understanding of elements as entities partaking of a world infused with change and
transformation.
The introduction of more abstract concepts such as space and air into the list
of elements represents a further stage in the Upanis.adic cosmological speculations.
According to Halbfass, the oldest extant list of five elements is found in the Aitareya
Upanis.ad (AU III.3): “It is Brahman; it is Indra; it is Praja¯pati; it is all the gods.
It is these five immense beings [maha¯bhu¯ta¯ni ] — earth, wind, space, the waters,
and the lights; it is these beings, as well as those that are some sort of mixture of
trivial beings [. . . ]”28 But the most significant passage in this regard is found in the
Taittir¯ıya Upanis.ad :
27The passage goes as follow: “Then that same deity thought to itself: ‘Come now, why don’t
I establish the distinctions of name and appearance by entering these three deities [fire, water and
earth] here with this living self (a¯tman), and make each of them threefold.” We are then told that
each gross element possesses three colours, the red corresponding to fire, the white to water and the
black to earth. Therefore, each gross element consists in an admixture of the three subtle elements
(the three deities in question). It is worth noting that these three colours are mentioned in the
S´veta¯s´vatara Upanis.ad (IV.5): “One unborn male, burning with passion, covers one unborn female
colored red, white, and black, and giving birth to numerous offspring with the same colors as hers,
while another unborn male leaves her as soon as she has finished enjoying the pleasures.” Several
scholars have interpreted the female as the prakr. ti of Sa¯m. khya and the three colours as the three
gun. as. The two unborn-males may be said to refer to the attached and the non-attached purus.as.
Thus it has been suggested that the Sa¯m. khya doctrine of gun. as may originate from the threefold
classification of elements in the Upanis.ads. See: Sen Gupta, The Evolution of the Sa¯m˙khya School
of Thought, 57-58.
28Halbfass, “Space or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Thought,” 85.
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From this very self (a¯tman) did space come into being; from space, air;
from air, fire; from fire, the waters; from the waters, the earth [. . . ] (TU
II.1.1)
In contrast with AU III.3, the elements in the TU are presented as successive ema-
nations from each other, all ultimately emerging from the absolute reality (Brahman,
a¯tman). Besides, in this passage the five elements are described in a dynamic per-
spective rather than as static elements. One should note that there is no trace, either
in the Taittir¯ıya or in other available Upanis.ads, of a model of admixture of the five
elements. However, such a mechanism comes into being in later Veda¯nta schools of
philosophy (see section 4.3.2). Called pan˜c¯ıkaran. a, this mechanism is the only model
along with trivr. tkaran. a explaining how gross elements are produced from subtle ele-
ments.29 Though not prominent in the Upanis.ads, the list of five elements is prevalent
in later Indian thought, corroborating Hiriyanna’s claim that the fivefold classication
of elements constitutes the latest stage of reflection on elements in the Upanis.ads.
30
Most scholars connect this doctrine to the all-pervasive idea that human beings have
five sense-organs and that each sense-organ perceives one quality. For each quality
perceived by a sense-organ, there is one and only one corresponding element in which
that quality resides: sound (s´abda) in a¯ka¯s´a, touch (spars´a) in air, colour (ru¯pa) in
fire, taste (rasa) in water and odour (gandha) in earth.31 That is, each of the five
elements has its own distinctive quality.
29Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Vol.2), 74.
30For instance, the doctrine of five elements is clearly maintained in the Maha¯bha¯rata (c. 400
BCE-c. 400 CE). In a dialogue between Bhr.gu and Bharadva¯ja, the elements are correlated with
the five sense-organs and their respective qualities. The Sa¯m. khya, Veda¯nta, Pura¯n. as, A¯yurveda and
the Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika system, all recognize the existence of five elements. See: Halbfass, op.cit., 86.
31As Hiriyanna says: “this [fivefold] classification [of elements], which has been accepted by nearly
all the later Indian philosophers, it is obvious, corresponds to the fivefold scheme of the organs of
sense — those of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell, and should have been suggested by it.”
(Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, 24) According to Halbfass, it is most probable
that this correlation between elements and sense-organs already played an implicit role before the
introduction of a¯ka¯s´a in the list of elements (Halbfass, op.cit, 86).
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We find in TU II.1.1 the same order for the evolution of elements as ChU VI.2.2-
4, except that two elements — a¯ka¯s´a and air — are now added to the list. In the
Taittir¯ıya, a¯ka¯s´a is considered to be the first created element and fire the third, while
in the Cha¯ndogya fire is envisaged as the first created element. Historically, this
may not create a problem if we accept that the Taittir¯ıya was composed after the
Cha¯ndogya, but scholars do not agree about which one comes first. This problem has
important cosmological and metaphysical implications, and raises a few questions such
as: 1. whether space and air can be considered elements or not; 2. which element was
first created and 3. what is the accepted order of elements in the process of evolution.
More importantly for us, it brings into question the ontological status given to a¯ka¯s´a.
If we accept the account given in the Taittir¯ıya, a¯ka¯s´a must be considered a created
element insofar as it is produced from Brahman. On the other hand, if we accept the
account given in the Cha¯ndogya, one must accept that a¯ka¯s´a is not created at all but
is eternal like Brahman. These issues are discussed thoroughly by S´an˙kara in BSB
II.3.1-7, and will be examined in detail in section 4.3.3 of this dissertation.
These two accounts of creation of the elements also raise questions of philosophical
and theological import, i.e., what is the relationship between the empirical world and
its cause? In the Upanis.ads, both a¯tman (TU II.1.1) and sat (ChU VI.2.2-4) are
identical with Brahman, the underlying principle of existence, one, permanent and
changeless.32 If the empirical world emanates from Brahman, does it mean that the
32In the Upanis.ads, Brahman is the ultimate reality, one, unseen and all-pervasive, and its iden-
tification with a¯tman, the inmost essence of one’s self, constitutes the essential teaching of the
Upanis.ads according to the Advaita Veda¯nta perspective (with which we are concerned in this
study). As regards the notion of sat, the existent, it is recognized as an essential aspect of the
nature of Brahman. As Hiriyanna explains: “The spiritual and unitary character of this absolute
reality [Brahman, a¯tman] is very well expressed by the classical phrase saccida¯nanda. As a single
term defining its nature, it is met with only in the later Upanis.ads; but its three elements — sat, cit
and a¯nanda — are used of Brahman, singly and in pairs, even in the earliest of them. Sat, which
means “being” points to the positive character of Brahman distiguishing it from all non-being.” See:
Hiriyanna, ibid., 22.
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latter undergoes a change in the process? This would be contradictory to the concept
of an unchangeable and permanent cause of the world mentioned in the Upanis.ads. On
the other hand, if we consider that the finite world exists separately from Brahman,
it entails that Brahman is limited in nature, which is also not acceptable. Then, does
it follow that the world is none other than Brahman itself? If so, what ontological
status should be given to the manifold nature of the world given that Brahman is
said to be one? Are the various elements real or simply an apparent manifestation of
Brahman? If the reality of the world is taken for granted, how does one explain the
transition from Brahman, one without a second, to the manifold world? Of course,
the assessment of a¯ka¯s´a in a given philosophical system — especially if it admits
a¯ka¯s´a as the first created element — will depend largely upon the kinds of answers
given to the above questions.
However, the Upanis.ads to these questions do not provide a clear and definite
answer. In this context, one should recall the distinction made in these texts be-
tween the cosmic (sagun. a, saprapan˜ca, savi´ses.a) Brahman and the acosmic (nirgun. a,
nis.prapan˜ca, nirvi´ses.a) Brahman, i.e., Brahman with qualities and Brahman without
qualities, respectively. Whereas the former Brahman, being all-comprehensive, gives
rise to the world, maintains it and reabsorbs it, the latter Brahman is beyond the
grasp of human experience, all-exclusive and can only be described through negation
as neti neti, “not this, not this.”33 There are several passages in the Upanis.ads that
teach that the world is but an appearance of nirgun. a Brahman, that empirical phe-
nomena are not real in an absolute sense. There are other passages that grant reality
to the world, while maintaining an intimate relationship between the latter and sagun. a
Brahman. In fact, determination of the relative importance of these two conceptions
of Brahman is one of the most difficult problems connected with the Upanis.ads.
34
The major problem for Veda¯nta philosophers interpreting the Upanis.ads has been
precisely how to reconcile and harmonize statements that were apparently not com-
33Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, 27-28.
34Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, 61.
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patible with each other. Accordingly, we find a rich variety of theories of creation
and metaphysical descriptions of the nature of Brahman in Veda¯nta literature.
4.1.2 A¯ka¯s´a in the Upanis.ads
Ancient Vedic literature has an extensive vocabulary to describe the notion of unob-
structed space. According to Halbfass, the word loka, usually translated as “world,”
has the meaning of a “room to exist freely and without hindrance and obstruction.”35
Vedic words for “atmosphere” and “sky,” such as kha, vyoman, and antariks.a, also
convey the sense of “opening,” “openness” and “free space.”36 Although the word
a¯ka¯s´a itself does not occur in the Rg.veda, its meaning in post-Rg.vedic literature
closely resembles concepts like those mentioned above.37 In the Bra¯hman. as and
A¯ran. yakas, a¯ka¯s´a is associated with the notions of “free space” and “opening.” For
instance, in AitBr III.42, the Vasus come to Agni and request him: a¯ka¯s´am. nah. kuru,
“make room for us,” in order for them to pass through the “opening” to the world of
heaven. The same sense is conveyed in the S´atapatha Bra¯hman. a (III.3.2.19): mad-
hye ’n˙gulija¯ka¯s´am. karoti, “he then makes a finger-hole in the middle.” A¯ka¯s´a is also
often used in the sense of “sky,” “atmosphere,” etc. Closely related to antariks.a,
the intermediate space between heaven and earth, a¯ka¯s´a denotes the “free space” re-
sulting from the separation of heaven and earth: yo’ntaren. a¯ka¯s´a a¯s¯ıt tad antariks.am
abhavad, “the space (a¯ka¯s´a) which was betweeen them became antariks.a.” (S´Br
VII.12.23)38 Lal also suggests that the concept of dyaus in the Rg.veda — which des-
35Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vai´ses. ika and the History of Indian Ontology,
30.
36Halbfass, “Space or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Thought,” 100.
37In this regard, it is worth noting the correlation established by Coomaraswamy between a¯ka¯s´a,
kha, vyoman, antariks.a, nabha, ananta and pu¯rn. a, all used as synonyms of “zero” in mathematics.
See: Coomaraswamy, op.cit.
38Chakrabarti, op.cit., 115. According to Kramrisch, a¯ka¯s´a is the name for antariks.a itself in
post-R. gvedic literature. See: Kramrisch, op.cit., 102.
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ignates “heaven” or the uppermost vault of the sky — presents important similarities
with the Upanis.adic a¯ka¯s´a.
39 The word a¯ka¯s´a is derived from the verbal root ka¯s´ —
“to shine,” “to be visible” — with the prefix a¯, and as such it may be understood as
the “space” that allows things to be visible and to manifest themselves.40
In this rich and manifold semantic framework, the concept of a¯ka¯s´a appears in
the Upanis.ads a few centuries before the common era. In these texts, a¯ka¯s´a acquires
the status of a physical element with air, fire, water and earth, as the first element
from which the others come into existence and as responsible for the transmission
of sound. Yet, a¯ka¯s´a is also regarded as something transcending the very notion of
elements in the Upanis.ads. As Halbfass remarks, a¯ka¯s´a appears in some passages as
“the closest approximation to a¯tman/brahman, as a form of its presence, as its most
appropriate symbol, or even as a name for brahman itself.”41 Though created and
endowed with phenomenal existence, a¯ka¯s´a has close affinities with the uncreated
a¯tman or Brahman. The paradoxical nature of a¯ka¯s´a in the Upanis.ads and later
Veda¯nta is a remarkable feature of this concept in Indian philosophy.
A¯ka¯s´a as a physical element
When referring to a¯ka¯s´a as a physical element two features must be noted: 1. its
status as one of the five “great elements” (maha¯bhu¯tas) and 2. its correlation to the
quality of sound (s´abda). We find a few passages in the Upanis.ads where a¯ka¯s´a is
related to sound and the sense of hearing. A clear passage in this regard is ChU
VII.12.1: “Across space (a¯ka¯s´a) one calls out to someone, across space one hears
that call, and across space one answers back.” According to Lysenko, the status of
a¯ka¯s´a as a physical entity in the Upanis.ads arises from “its correlation with sound
39This is clearly attested in some passages such as ChU VII.12: “Space (a¯ka¯s´a) verily is greater
than fire, for in the space exist both sun and moon, lightning, stars, and fire.” See: Lal, op.cit., 14.
40Chakrabarti, op.cit., 104.
41Halbfass, op.cit., 94.
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in the role of its milieu. . . Thus it becomes a primary element (maha¯bhu¯ta) in the
cosmology of the five elements.”42 This is in agreement with the assertion, made by
most scholars, that the acceptance of five elements in the Upanis.ads corroborates
the need for substances in which the qualities perceived by the five sense-organs can
reside. However, it remains unclear whether the recognition of a¯ka¯s´a as one of the
five elements in these texts only results from its correlation with sound. After all, as
already noticed, a¯ka¯s´a was recognized as a maha¯bhu¯ta in early Vedic literature, when
the connection with sound was not yet clearly developed.
How is a¯ka¯s´a, which conveys the meaning of space in post-R. gvedic literature,
related to the quality of sound? Lysenko suggests that this correlation was probably
inherited from the ancient Vedic concept of di´s, usually associated with hearing and its
sense-organ.43 Appearing in early Vedic literature such as the Rg.veda, the concept of
di´s is in fact older than a¯ka¯s´a. In these texts, di´s features as a kind of “directional”
space, denoted by expressions such as “what is pointed at,” “region,” “quarter of
space” and most often related with the four, five, six, eight or ten cardinal points.44
The connection between di´s and the sense of hearing is mentioned in the Rg.veda and
also in some Bra¯hman. as and A¯ran. yakas.
45 Similar connection is also explicit in some
Upanis.ads, such as the Aitareya Upanis.ad :
A pair of ears was hatched; from the ears sprang hearing, and from hear-
ing, the quarters (di´sah. ). (AU I.1.4)
42Lysenko, V., “The Vai´ses.ika Notions of a¯ka¯s´a and di´s from the Perspective of Indian Ideas of
Space.” In: Franco and Preisendanz (eds.), Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass
and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, 426.
43ibid., 423.
44ibid., 421.
45In the Rg.veda (RV X.90.14), the ears of the cosmic purus.a give rise to di´sah. , “the quarters of
space.” (di´sah. s´rotra¯t) In the Taittir¯ıya Bra¯hman. a (III.10.8.6), it is said: di´so me s´rotre s´ritah. , “the
quarters abide in my hearing,” and so in the S´atapatha Bra¯hman. a (VII.5.2.20): di´so vai s´rotram,
“the quarters are indeed hearing.” Similar instances are found in the Aitareya A¯ran. yaka (II.4.1,
II.4.2). See: Chakrabarti, op.cit., 113.
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So, the fire became speech and entered the mouth; the wind became out-
breath and entered the nostrils; the sun became sight and entered the eyes;
the quarters (di´sah. ) became hearing and entered the ears. (AU I.2.4)
Conceptually, the connection between di´s and the sense of hearing probably arose
from the understanding that sound, in contrast with other qualities like colour, taste,
etc., spreads itself in all directions of space. Sound is not understood here in the
modern scientific sense of a vibratory movement of matter through a medium (gas,
liquid or solid). It is perhaps more appropriate to define sound in this context as
the “generic prototype of vibration in space,” as suggested by Rene´ Gue´non, and not
as a specific kind of vibration in a definite milieu.46 Such a view may underlie the
kind of connection made between di´s and sound in Upanis.adic texts. Because of its
“directional” character, di´s emphasizes the ear’s ability to apprehend sounds from all
directions.47
As a spatial system of cardinal points, di´s was especially indispensable in the
organization of sacrificial space, for the construction of the altar and the ritual itself.
However, in the Upanis.ads the understanding of ritual becomes more abstract and
symbolic, the emphasis being laid on the knowledge of supreme reality. As suggested
by Lysenko, a different kind of space was thus needed, “more universal and all-
embracing than that of the cardinal points,” which could account for the unitary and
46Rene´ Gue´non offers an interesting interpretation of the connection between sound and space in
Indian philosophy. According to him, sound should be understood as the generic prototype of any
vibratory movement. As such, it has to originate in space as no precise particularization takes place
in this undifferentiated milieu. In space, sound is subtle and not perceivable; it becomes “heard”
when “amplified” by a particular milieu, like air for instance. The scientific understanding of sound
as a vibratory movement in a certain milieu must then be envisaged as a “particularization” of this
initial movement by the milieu in question. The essence of sound, i.e., its vibratory quality, does
not arise in the milieu itself but in space. This is also why the sense of hearing is associated with
space and not with other elements. See: Gue´non, “Les Conditions de l’Existence Corporelle.”
47Lysenko, op.cit., 426.
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all-pervasive nature of Brahman.48 Indeed, the presence of directions in the absolute
is explicitly rejected in some Upanis.adic passages such as MtU VI.17: “For him
[Brahman], indeed, east and the other directions exist not, nor across, nor below, nor
above. Incomprehensible is that Supreme self, unlimited, unborn, not to be reasoned
about, not to be thought of, he whose self is space.” In accordance with its post-
Rg.vedic meaning of “open space,” the concept of a¯ka¯s´a was thus well designed for this
function and certainly “more suitable for the image of the supreme reality than that
of di´s.”49 Halbfass notices that “there is no comparable structure of specific directions
in a¯ka¯s´a. Its openness is thus ontologically superior, less concrete and less defined
than the structured realm of di´s. It is closer to the infinite and undifferentiated origin
of things.”50 It appears that the need for a more appropriate notion of space to depict
the ultimate reality, has played an important role in the emergence of a¯ka¯s´a as an
important concept in the Upanis.ads.
It is plausible that the correlation of a¯ka¯s´a with sound and the sense of hearing
arose during this period of transition. But given that a¯ka¯s´a and di´s are two different
kinds of space, their respective relation with sound differs in some degree. If di´s ac-
counts for the directional and isotropic nature of sound, a¯ka¯s´a stands for the dynamic
transmission of sound.51 This is obvious in ChU VII.12.1 for instance, where it is
stated that one calls and hears across space. As we shall see, this dimension of a¯ka¯s´a
becomes especially important in the later Nya¯ya and Vai´ses.ika systems which feature
an intricate analysis of sound transmission. We may now ask: why was a¯ka¯s´a added
to the Upanis.adic list of five elements (maha¯bhu¯tas) and not di´s, if such addition
was motivated solely by the need for a medium of sound, as Lysenko seems to sug-
gest? First, in contrast with a¯ka¯s´a, di´s was never envisaged as a maha¯bhu¯ta in Indian
philosophical literature, even in the later Vai´ses.ika system where a¯ka¯s´a and di´s both
48ibid., 422.
49ibid.
50Halbfass, op.cit., 98.
51Lysenko, op.cit., 426.
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stand together as substances (dravyas). Second, as noted by Halbfass, the connection
between maha¯bhu¯tas and sense-organs was already implicit before the introduction of
air and a¯ka¯s´a in the list of five elements.52 By inheriting the association with sound
and the sense of hearing from di´s during the Upanis.adic period, the concept of a¯ka¯s´a
became more suitable than di´s to be one of the great elements in the Upanis.ads.
This is reinforced by the fact that historically there was a shift in these texts from a
directional notion of space to an abstract and all-pervasive space closer to the nature
of Brahman.
It is important to understand that a¯ka¯s´a does not share affinities with the notion of
a passive empty space. In the Upanis.ads, it is envisaged as a bhu¯ta, i.e., as a “being”
participating in the manifestation and evolution of the world, a concrete existent
that is subject to change and becoming. In several passages, it is put on a par with
other elements and natural phenomena.53 As one of the five maha¯bhu¯tas, it possesses
qualities that place it on the same ontological level as other elements. Like earth,
water, etc., it is correlated with a particular sense-organ (ear) and quality (sound),
and also possesses its subtle counterpart (a¯ka¯s´a-ma¯tra¯), as pointed out in PU IV.7-8.
However, as shown in TU II.1.1, a¯ka¯s´a is distinct from other elements insofar as it is
the first element to appear in the cosmogonical process. Such a position in the list
of elements may result from its most subtle nature and from its conceptual affinities
52“We may assume that this correlation and co-ordination [between elements, the five senses and
their sensual qualities] already played an implicit role when a¯ka¯s´a or ether was added to the list of
elements.” See: Halbfass, op.cit., 86.
53For instance, we are told in ChU VII.11.1: “Heat, undoubtedly, is greater than water. So, when
that holds back the wind and heats up the space [a¯ka¯s´a], people say: ‘It’s sizzling! It’s a scorcher!
It’s going to rain.’ This passage shows that a¯ka¯s´a is subject to change and is in close relation with
other natural elements. In several other passages, a¯ka¯s´a features alongside the other four elements
either explicitly or implicitly as a maha¯bhu¯ta: ChU VII.2.1, TU II.1., AU III.1.3, PU IV.7-8, MtU
VI.4, PaU I.6, PaU III.3. We find also instances where it appears on the same level as natural
objects and phenomena, such as moon, lightning, trees, etc. See for instance: BrU III.2.13, IV.4.5;
ChU VII.2.1, VII.4.2, VII.11.1.
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 135
with Brahman itself, as we shall see later. Though the all-pervasive nature of a¯ka¯s´a
is accepted in later dars´anas, the Upanis.ads are not clear whether a¯ka¯s´a pervades or
does not pervade what it contains. There are however some passages that seem to
argue for the all-pervasiveness of a¯ka¯s´a. In ChU VII.12.1, for instance, it is stated:
“Within space (a¯ka¯s´a) one is born, and into space one is born.” Similarly, in BrU
II.5.10: “This space (a¯ka¯s´a) is the honey of all beings [bhu¯ta¯na¯m], and all beings are
the honey of this space.” Thus, a¯ka¯s´a would be connected to all beings, pervading
everything and everything being contained in it.
A¯ka¯s´a as a trans-empirical element
Although on a par with fire, air, water and earth as one of the five maha¯bhu¯tas,
a¯ka¯s´a also transcends the very definition of element in the Upanis.ads. Not only is
it the first phenomenal existent to be manifest, and thus the one from which the
rest of creation derives, it is also all-pervasive and the most subtle of elements. As
such, a¯ka¯s´a seems to partake of the nature of the Upanis.adic absolute, Brahman. In
various passages of the Upanis.ads, a¯ka¯s´a is found affiliated with Brahman, either as
its close derivative or one of its most appropriate symbol. There are also passages
where a¯ka¯s´a is related to the innermost self of man, a¯tman, which is identified with
Brahman in the Upanis.ads. Like a¯tman, a¯ka¯s´a is said to be changeless, eternal,
indivisible, invisible and omnipresent.54 At other places, a¯ka¯s´a disappears into the
imperishable, in That which cannot be described in any way, nirgun. a Brahman. A
certain semantic ambiguity is therefore attached to this word in the Upanis.ads, a
feature that also remains present in later schools of philosophy.
The relationship between a¯ka¯s´a and Brahman can be looked upon in various ways.
In its fivefold classification of elements, TU II.1.1 states the primacy of Brahman vis-
a`-vis a¯ka¯s´a, the former being recognized as the ultimate principle out of which all
54Lysenko, op.cit., 422.
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elements, including a¯ka¯s´a, emanate successively. For instance, it is said in MtU VI.4:
“The three-footed Brahman has its root above. Its branches are space (a¯ka¯s´a), wind,
fire, water, earth and the like.” This seems to suggest that elements are not created ex
nihilo from Brahman but verily emanate from it without any ontological discontinuity,
quasi organically, like branches from a tree. Even though the different schools of
thought differ as to whether the created elements are real or only apparent, it remains
true that a deep connection exists between a¯ka¯s´a, the first manifested element, and
Brahman. For instance, in MtU VI.17, we are told that “from space He [Brahman],
assuredly, awakes this world [...]” In another passage, Brahman establishes Himself
as the self of every being with a¯ka¯s´a as its source: “I was born from the womb of
space as the semen for the wife, as the radiance of the year, as the self (a¯tman) of
every being!” (KsU I.6) Of course, the Upanis.adic philosophers face here the problem
of explaining how the immutable Brahman can assume the form of a¯ka¯s´a, and then of
the whole world, without prejudice to its oneness and eternal nature. The Upanis.ads,
as we already noticed, do not offer a definite and systematic answer to this question,
leaving the door open for different kinds of interpretations.
There are several passages which apparently contradict each other as to the nature
of a¯ka¯s´a. For instance, in ChU I.9.1, it is stated: “Clearly, it is from space that all
these beings arise, and into space that they are finally absorbed; for space indeed
existed before them and in space they ultimately end.” Since all beings (bhu¯ta¯ni)
arise from space, it seems that space itself is not considered as a bhu¯ta here. In
BrU III.8.4, space appears as an atemporal entity at the origin of time: “. . . all
those things people here refer to as past, present, and future — on space, Ga¯rg¯ı,
are all these woven back and forth.” These statements, and others of the same
kind, seem to contradict what is stated in TU II.1.1, namely that a¯ka¯s´a is a created
element like others, also subject to evolution and dissolution. According to Deussen,
there would have been an older layer of Vedic-Upanis.adic thought which identified
a¯ka¯s´a with the absolute, the highest Brahman itself. This association would have
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been abandoned later, Brahman being recognized having a higher ontological status
than a¯ka¯s´a.55 Similar suggestions were also made by Erich Frauwallner.56 For an
Advaitin like S´an˙kara, the seemingly incompatible statements referring to a¯ka¯s´a in
the Upanis.ads are not contradicting each other. He provides detailed exegetical and
logical arguments showing how, depending on the context and the purport of the
section concerned, a¯ka¯s´a can be understood either as physical space or as a symbol
of Brahman (see section 4.3.3).
There are other Upanis.adic passages where a¯ka¯s´a denotes the inner realm of being.
In many of them, the outer or ordinary space is identified with the inner or spiritual
space residing inside one’s self. The “openness” of space is not only found outside
us but also within us, in the inner space of the heart (hr.dayasya¯ka¯s´ah. ). Of course,
the identification between “inner” and “outer” space is metaphorical and not literal
in any sense. The underlying meaning here is not that the external and physical
space permeates the human body from inside. According to Lysenko, these associa-
tions “should be primarily understood as referring to the series of macro-microcosmic
identifications so characteristic of the classical ritual, rather than to some more or
less independent cosmological speculation.”57 In the opinion of Halbfass, the macro-
microcosmic identifications involving a¯ka¯s´a have a profound ontological significance:
“This is not simply a case of correlation between macrocosm and microcosm. The
55Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, 111-19.
56Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy (Vol.1), 48.
57Lysenko, op.cit., 425. As a matter of fact, in the Upanis.ads, as well as in earlier Vedic literature,
we do find several connections, or “homologies,” made between inner states of being (the microcosm)
and a feature of external reality (the macrocosm). As Hiriyanna points out: “Now there was from
the time of the later Mantras and Bra¯hman.as the habit of seeking for a correspondence between
the individual and the world and trying to discover for every important feature of the one, an
appropriate counterpart in the other. It represented an effort to express the world in terms of the
individual. . . The notion of parallelism between the individual and the world runs throughout the
literature of the later Vedic period and is found in the Upanis.ads as well.” See: Hiriyanna, Outlines
of Indian Philosophy, 55.
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‘space in the heart’ is not just microcosmic space, but. . . that openness of aware-
ness, of the manifest and of pure consciousness, in which everything and anything
can appear, and which can contain the whole wide world and all entities in itself.”58
That is to say that the space within the heart is not physical and ordinary space but
the locus where a¯tman is identified with the whole universe and the “beyond.” In
his Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya (BSB I.3.14-17), S´an˙kara asks whether the “space within the
heart” must be considered as the familiar material space, or as the supreme self. As
we shall see, he arrives at the conclusion that this space can only mean the supreme
self in this context.
The concept of a¯ka¯s´a has thus several layers of meaning in the Upanis.ads, mean-
ings which can sometimes appear to be “extremely manifold, divergent, and even
contradictory.”59 In some places, it is considered one of the five basic elements consti-
tuting the world; in others, it is conceived as a close derivative of Brahman, its most
appropriate symbol, or identified with the self within the heart. In some passages
also, its existence as a physical entity seems to vanish into the imperishable, nirgun. a
Brahman, That which is beyond all names and forms. Such semantic ambivalence is
also present in philosophical schools like Vai´ses.ika, Sa¯m. khya and Advaita Veda¯nta.
We have mentioned briefly how under the lead of S´an˙kara, the Advaita school of
thought seeks to reconcile those different meanings through a proper interpretation
of the Upanis.ads. Before examining in detail the different arguments brought forth by
S´an˙kara in this regard, we first examine the views about a¯ka¯s´a found in the Vai´ses.ika
and Sa¯m. khya schools of thought.
58Halbfass, op.cit., 96-97.
59Lysenko, op.cit., 426.
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4.2 A¯ka¯s´a in the Hindu dars´anas
Around the beginning of the Common Era there appeared in India elaborate and
highly sophisticated systems of metaphysical speculations. The Sanskrit term gen-
erally used to describe these systems is dars´ana. Derived from the verbal root dr. s´,
“to see,” the term implies a “view” or “perspective” of the world. The term “phi-
losophy” has often been used to describe these systems though the term “theology”
also conveys some of their aspects.60 The dars´anas refer to orthodox (a¯stika) systems
that acknowledge the authority of the Vedas, but also to the heterodox (na¯stika)
systems of Buddhism, Jainism and Ca¯rva¯ka materialism.61 The orthodox, or Hindu
60Though there are clear differences between Indian dars´anas and Western systems of philosophy,
many scholars translate dars´ana as “system” or “school of philosophy.” According to Halbfass, for
instance, “the doctrines and systems which the Indian doxographies present under the title dars´ana,
provide clear and specific parallels to what is commonly called “philosophy” in the West: they are
theoretically oriented, systematized “world-views,” and they exclude more or less matters of religious
practice. However, we are dealing here with “philosophy” as something given by tradition, i.e., as a
certain spectrum of firmly established, fully developed doctrinal structures; we are not dealing with
“philosophy” as an open-ended process of asking questions and pursuing knowledge.” (Halbfass,
“Dars´ana, A¯nv¯ıks. ik¯ı, Philosophy.” In: Taliaferro and Griffiths (eds.), Philosophy of Religion: An
Anthology, 304-05). Similarly, for Mohanty the Indian dars´anas, “by virtue of their subject matter,
their concerns, their methodologies, belong to the same genre of enquiry as philosophy.” (Mohanty,
Essays on Indian Philosophy, 213; 329-330)
61The division between orthodoxy and heterodoxy is a fluctuating one in Indian philosophy.
Broadly speaking, there seems to be a “strict” orthodoxy, which considers the Vedas (from the
Mantras up to the Upanis.ads) as a divine revelation of truth, and a “soft” orthodoxy, which accepts
the Vedas as an inspired human creation. Hence, the kind of allegiance to the Vedas will differ
from one school to another. The various schools of Buddhism, Jainism and the Ca¯rva¯ka school
are traditionally considered as na¯stika dars´anas because they do not recognize the authority of the
Vedas. However, though different and sometimes opposed to the Upanis.ads, it is worth noting that
the teachings of Buddhism for instance present several connections with them, such as the beliefs
in the karma doctrine and in the concept of spiritual liberation. See: Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian
Philosophy, 135.
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dars´anas, are six in number: Nya¯ya, Vai´ses.ika, Sa¯m. khya, Yoga, Pu¯rva-Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ and
Uttara-Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ or Veda¯nta. Their teachings have been codified into sets of short
aphorisms called su¯tras (“threads”), which express in a condensed form the basic
tenets of the school. Since most su¯tras are difficult to comprehend without proper
explanations, several commentaries (bha¯s.yas), sub-commentaries (vr. ttis, va¯rttikas) as
well as independent works were composed to elucidate the meaning of su¯tras. Some
of them, such as S´an˙kara’s Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya for instance, eventually became more
important than the su¯tra itself.
The composition of the su¯tras, primarily deriving from an oral tradition, probably
came after the Vedic period, not earlier than 200 BCE.62 The rise of Hindu dars´anas
can be seen as the result of a massive effort at systematization in order to uphold the
Vedic tradition in face of those who rejected its authority. In response to the criticisms
of Buddhist and Jaina philosophers, it became necessary for philosophers committed
to the Vedas to re-examine the Vedic corpus of knowledge handed down to them in the
course of time. In such an atmosphere, they were led to reflect upon their own way of
obtaining valid knowledge of reality. The name prama¯n. a was given to these means of
valid knowledge, which include perception (pratyaks.a), inference (anuma¯na), analogy
(upama¯na), postulation (artha¯patti), verbal testimony (s´abda) and non-apprehension
(anupalabdhi).63 The different systems accepted all or only some of these prama¯n. as.
In addition to theories of knowledge, the teachings of dars´anas involved reflections of
62Potter (ed.), Advaita Veda¯nta up to S´am. kara and His Pupils, xi.
63The Sanskrit word prama¯n. a comes from the verbal root ma¯, “to measure,” and signifies “that
by which we measure” or “the means of measurement.” The word prama¯ denotes a true cognition
as distinct from a false one. Strictly speaking, prama¯n. a is defined as the cause (karan. a) of a prama¯:
prama¯ karan. am prama¯n. am. The word karan. a must be understood in that context as a unique cause
through the action of which a particular valid knowledge can be obtained. Hence, valid knowledge
has an episodic character in Indian philosophy: it is a happening, an event that takes place when
the right causal factors (prama¯n. as) are present. See: Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing: A Critical
Study of the Advaita Theory of Knowledge, 17-24; Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian
Theories of Knowledge, 35.
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an ontological nature, particularly focusing on the nature of body, mind and matter
and the relation between language, consciousness and being.64
The concept of dars´ana also involves important soteriological motivations. Each
dars´ana ultimately aims at spiritual liberation (moks.a, kaivalya, apavarga) through
the pursuit of right knowledge. However, it would be wrong to consider that dars´anas
are solely concerned with the “mystical” or “spiritual” element. In fact, as mentioned
earlier, the scope of dars´anas includes philosophical reflection on topics having affini-
ties with what is called logic, psychology, cosmology and theology in the West. In
this sense, it seems appropriate to situate them at the intersection of what we call
today science, philosophy and theology. It is also important to note that dars´anas
were traditionally followed as a way of life rather than solely as an intellectual pur-
suit. The followers were not only attracted by the teachings themselves but also by
the committed lifestyle of their teachers. The teachings were carefully handed down
from teacher to pupil, who most of the time lived close to each other. For this rea-
son, we cannot ascribe a dars´ana to a single individual as is the case with the major
philosophical systems in the West. Rather, each one of them has been the outcome
of a long succession of thinkers. Moreover, since it was customary for the propo-
nent of a school to consider and satisfy all possible outside objections before bringing
forth his/her own view, dars´anas have continuously been enriched by other schools
of philosophy in the course of history, including modern Western philosophy.
Since historically Hindu dars´anas have been integrating many elements from the
Upanis.ads, it is but natural to find in them similar descriptions of a¯ka¯s´a. In Ad-
vaita Veda¯nta, for instance, we find the Upanis.adic conception of a¯ka¯s´a as a “space”
providing room for self-knowledge and the manifestation of the world. Though the
Vai´ses.ika notion of physical elements as objectified, reified and clearly definable en-
tities is not found as such in the Upanis.ads, the fivefold classification of elements
is retained as well as the connection between a¯ka¯s´a and sound, which is elaborated
64Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, 225.
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further. Together with Sa¯m. khya, Vai´ses.ika probably offers the most significant philo-
sophical explanation of the doctrine of five elements and, in particular, of the role of
a¯ka¯s´a as a physical element. Also, the schools of Vai´ses.ika and Sa¯m. khya considerably
interacted with Advaita Veda¯nta in the course of time. For instance, in S´an˙kara’s
Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya (BSB II.3.1-7), we find an extensive discussion on the origin of
a¯ka¯s´a wherein S´an˙kara criticizes Vai´ses.ikas on their view that a¯ka¯s´a is an eternal
element. The integration by Sa¯m. khya of the fivefold list of elements, together with
its notion of tanma¯tras, also contributed much to Veda¯nta cosmology. In addition
to providing detailed explanations of a¯ka¯s´a as an element, an analysis of Vai´ses.ika
and Sa¯m. khya can thus serve as a good introduction to the study of a¯ka¯s´a in Advaita
Veda¯nta.
4.2.1 The Vai´ses.ika dars´ana
The Vai´ses.ika school of thought takes its name from the Sanskrit noun vi´ses.a, which
means “pertaining to individuality or particularity,”65 because this school emphasizes
“particularity” as a crucial feature of its metaphysics. The Vai´ses.ika is essentially a
philosophy of distinctions, a pluralistic worldview where all objects of the world,
including individual selves, are considered as reals independent from each other. In
contrast to the Upanis.ads, Sa¯m. khya and Veda¯nta, all of which seek to explain the
world in terms of an underlying unity, this school accounts for what is observed in an
analytic rather than a synthetic manner. In that sense, it has been characterized as
the most “scientific” of all dars´anas.66 Vai´ses.ika was probably primarily formulated in
65Lipner, Hindus: Their Religious Beliefs and Practices, 157.
66The Vai´ses.ika dars´ana is often regarded as an exemplary expression of the secular, analytical
and scientific dimension of Indian thought. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan describes the standpoint of
Vai´ses.ika as: “The Vai´ses.ika is not interested in constructing an all-embracing synthesis within whose
bounds there is room for all that is, bringing all the variety of the worlds of sense and of thought
under a single comprehensive formula. In the spirit of science, it endeavours to formulate the most
general characters of the things observed.” See: Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (Vol.2), 176.
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opposition to the Vedas and Upanis.ads, and only later did it recognize the authority
of these sacred texts, especially regarding important matters like dharma.67 By about
the seventh century CE, this school was conflated with the logical school of Nya¯ya
as both systems share a similar concern with analysis and logical reasoning. While
Nya¯ya stresses epistemological issues and the importance of methodology, Vai´ses.ika
is concerned with ontological distinctions about the nature of reality.
We have very little knowledge of the origin of Vai´ses.ika, since suggestions range
from sixth century BCE to 400 BCE, to as late as 200-400 CE.68 As with other
dars´anas, the Vai´ses.ika teachings were handed down orally until they were codified
in the form of su¯tras. The first systematic formulation of the Vai´ses.ika philosophy is
found in the Vai´ses.ikasu¯tras of Kan. a¯da, probably stemming from the first few cen-
turies before the common era.69 This collection of 370 su¯tras aims to demonstrate
how knowledge of the different world categories and of the true nature of the self
ultimately leads to moks.a. The second source of information is the independent work
of Pras´astapa¯da, called the Pada¯rthadharmasam. graha (PDS), which is a commen-
tary on the Vai´ses.ikasu¯tras. This is an important work that signifies the end of a
long period of development in the Vai´ses.ika school. According to Halfbass, the PDS
is a most significant work with regard to classical Vai´ses.ika ontology.
70 Probably
composed around the fifth century CE,71 this work extensively lists and classifies the
fundamental categories of reality (pada¯rthas), gives an account of the creation of the
world and examines the nature of inference as a valid means of knowledge.
67Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, 84.
68Fowler, Perspectives of Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, 98.
69ibid., 99.
70Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vai´ses. ika and the History of Indian Ontology,
80.
71ibid.
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Existence and function of a¯ka¯s´a
A¯ka¯s´a is understood in Vai´ses.ika through the paradigm of substance (dravya) as the
locus of particular qualities (gun. as).
72 Pras´astapa¯da defines substance as that which
is endowed with qualities (gun. as) and not located in anything else.
73 In order to
relate the substance to its qualities, the relation of “inherence” (samava¯ya) is intro-
duced by stating that each quality must inhere in a particular substance.74 Thus, the
Vai´ses.ikasu¯tra defines substance as possessing motion and qualities, and as the cause
of inherence.75 It is admitted that there are nine substances composing the physical
world: earth, water, fire, air, space (a¯ka¯s´a), direction (di´s), time (ka¯la), self (a¯tman)
and mind (manas). All these substances are essentially irreducible and indestructible
constituents of the world, being either eternal or composed of eternal atoms (an. u,
72The Vai´ses.ika school develops a pluralistic metaphysics based on the enumeration and clas-
sification of the different world constituents in terms of basic ontological units or “categories”
called pada¯rthas. The pada¯rthas are not reducible to one common ground nor do they merge to-
gether: they always remain irreducibly distinct from each other. The classical classification of cat-
egories, found in Pras´astapa¯da’s Pada¯rthadharmasam. graha, lists six fundamental pada¯rthas : sub-
stance (dravya), quality (gun. a), action (karma), universal (sa¯ma¯nya), particularity (vi´ses.a) and
inherence (samava¯ya). In later texts, the category of non-being (abha¯va) was further added.
73ato gun. avattva¯d ana¯s´ritatva¯c ca dravyam (PDS, p.58). See: Ganganatha (trans.),
Pada¯rthadharmasam. graha of Pras´astapa¯da with the Nya¯yakandal¯ı of S´r¯ıdhara, 130.
74By definition, samava¯ya is the constitutive or inherent relation that exists between the cause
and its effect, the whole and its parts, the universal and its particulars. The effect is always related
to a cause because they are naturally related through samava¯ya. The same relation holds between
substance and qualities: qualities cannot exist without a substance and a substance cannot be
known unless we apprehend it through its qualities. If a table is red, it is because the quality “red”
inheres in the substance “table.” However, the proponents of Vai´ses.ika attribute a special status
to the substance for they believe that in essence, substances are devoid of qualities and are thus
more fundamental than qualities. The substance, being the “possessor” of qualities, always remains
an independent category underlying all other categories. See: Fowler, Perspectives of Reality: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Hinduism, 108.
75kriya¯vad gun. avat samava¯yika¯ran. am iti dravyalaks. an. am (VS I.1.14). Translation taken from:
Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vai´ses. ika and the History of Indian Ontology, 92.
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parama¯n. u).
76 The first four “elemental” substances (maha¯bhu¯tas), namely earth,
water, fire and air, occur in two forms: eternal (nitya) in the form of atoms and
non-eternal (anitya) in the form of objects made of atoms. Each maha¯bhu¯ta is asso-
ciated with a specific quality (vi´ses.agun. a) perceptible to one of the five sense-organs:
earth with smell, water with taste, fire with colour, air with touch.77 Of the five
other “non-elemental” substances, a¯ka¯s´a, direction, time and self are considered to
be all-pervasive, eternal and partless or non-atomic. The mind (manas) is also eter-
nal though of atomic dimension, and thus of finite extension. It is important to note
that though a¯ka¯s´a is non-atomic, it is also considered a maha¯bhu¯ta for it serves as
substratum for the quality of sound (see below).
As noticed by Bhaduri, the main function of a¯ka¯s´a in Vai´ses.ika is to afford a
substantial basis for the phenomena of sound and hearing.78 It is through a¯ka¯s´a that
sound is transmitted from one point to another. The role of a¯ka¯s´a as a bearer of sound
(s´abda) is inferred on the following basis: 1. A quality can only inhere in a substance;
2. Sound is a quality; 3. The quality of sound cannot belong to any other recognized
substance, therefore it belongs to a¯ka¯s´a. The first argument derives naturally from the
definition given to substance in Vai´ses.ika and its introduction of inherence as relating
76According to Vai´ses.ika, things can be broken into smaller parts down to their primary con-
stituents, that is, atoms. Atoms are imperceptible and their existence is inferred from the process
of division, which cannot be carried on indefinitely without eliminating the differences of magnitude
between bodies. Atom, the most fundamental constituent of matter, is considered to be indestruc-
tible and eternal. Objects experienced in daily life result from the aggregation and combination of
atoms of earth, water, fire and air. Unlike atoms, objects are temporary and finite and ultimately
disintegrate into their primary constituents.
77Like in the Upanis.ads, the correlation between the five elements and the five qualities perceived
by sense-organs is accepted. Beside its specific quality, an element may partake the qualities of other
elements: a¯ka¯s´a is associated with sound only; air with touch only; fire with colour but also with
touch; water with taste, colour and touch; earth with smell, taste, colour and touch. Since a¯ka¯s´a is
all-pervasive, it does not mix with other elements and thus, other elements cannot be attributed the
quality of sound. See: Fowler, op.cit., 101.
78Bhaduri, Studies in Nya¯ya-Vai´ses. ika Metaphysics, 165.
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substance and quality. As to the nature of sound, i.e., whether it is a quality, a
substance, etc., a number of arguments are advanced by Vai´ses.ikas to show that sound
is a quality and not a substance or a form of motion.79 According to Pras´astapa¯da
and his commentators, only a¯ka¯s´a can be the bearer of sound. Sound cannot be a
quality of earth, water, fire or air because the specific qualities (vi´ses.agun. as) related
to these substances — smell, taste, form and touch, respectively — are not perceived
by the ear, while sound is so perceived. In fact, the nature of sound largely differs
from that of tangible qualities. As an example, if these qualities never exist apart
from their substratum, sound is always found “outside” its originating substance and
continues to exist once this substance disappears. For these reasons, sound must be
the quality of an intangible substance. Since sound cannot be a quality of direction,
time, soul or mind — for these substances either have no specific qualities or cannot be
perceived by an external organ —, the only substance remaining is a¯ka¯s´a. The claim
that a¯ka¯s´a is the bearer of the quality of sound is made on the sole basis that other
substances cannot be endowed with this quality. No positive arguments are offered
by Vai´ses.ikas to explain how a¯ka¯s´a itself, as an all-pervasive substance akin to space,
is connected to sound.80 In that sense, it seems reasonable to agree with Halbfass
79First, sound cannot be identified with motion because the latter is only perceived visually,
while perception of sound is never visual. Second, if sound were a substance, it would either be
composed of parts or be incomposite. However, as experience reveals, nobody perceives sound to
be composed of parts. Also, it cannot be an incomposite substance because such a substance (like
atoms, direction, time or self) cannot be perceived by an external sense-organ, while sound can.
Hence, if sound is neither a form of motion nor a substance, it can only be a quality inhering in
a substance. It is to be noted that not all dars´anas accept sound as a quality. For instance, the
Mı¯ma¯m˙sakas of the Bhat.t.a school consider sound as a substance. It is stated by them that sound
cannot be a quality for it is perceived independently of the substratum and that a quality cannot
be perceived so. Another reason is that sound possesses qualities, such as number, velocity, etc.,
as does a substance. Finally, it is argued that sound is all-pervasive and eternal, two qualities that
can only belong to a substance. Other schools, such as the school of Madhva and the Grammar
school, maintain a similar view. The Vai´ses.ika philosophers reject this view. See: Bhaduri, ibid.,
166; Mishra, Conception of Matter According to Nya¯ya-Vai´ses. ika, 163-64.
80According to Halbfass, the arguments provided by Vai´ses.ikas to demonstrate that a¯ka¯s´a is the
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when he says that “the main function of a¯ka¯s´a in Vai´ses.ika seems to be to complete
the concordance and symmetry of sense qualities and elemental substances.”81
Metaphysical status of a¯ka¯s´a
Since it is devoid of colour, taste, touch and smell, a¯ka¯s´a is imperceptible.82 Apart
from being imperceptible and the medium of sound, a¯ka¯s´a possesses some other at-
tributes like all-pervasiveness (vibhu, sarvagata), eternity (nityatva), unity (ekatva),
non-activity (nis.kriya¯tattva), number (sam. khya¯), separateness (pr. thaktva), conjunc-
tion (sam. yoga) and disjunction (vibha¯ga).
83 In the PDS, most of these qualities are
inferred on the basis that a¯ka¯s´a is the bearer of sound, as it appears from the following
verse:
Because there is no difference as to the mark [of a¯ka¯s´a], [namely] sound,
it is established that [it] is one [by number]. From this follows its sepa-
rateness as one. Because [the Vai´ses. ikasu¯tra] states [its] all-pervasiveness,
bearer of sound are very much ad hoc and “will hardly appeal to anybody who has not already
accepted the basic premises and definitions of the Vai´ses.ika system.” He adds: “No reference is
made to the potentially deeper dimensions of the association between a¯ka¯s´a and sound, as they may
be found in ancient Vedic, as well as later, in Tantric texts. Here, sound (especially its prototype,
the om) and ether [a¯ka¯s´a] may appear as equally primeval cosmic occurences, the first exhalations of
the absolute, as the very beginning of creation itself, closer to the roots of our world than anything
else that may be found in it.” Since Vai´ses.ika does not offer an evolutionary account of the world,
the idea of a priority in evolution is not discussed and a potential association between a¯ka¯s´a and
sound is simply not envisaged. See: Halbfass, “Space or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian
Thought,” 91.
81Halbfass, ibid.
82Most philosophers agree that a¯ka¯s´a cannot itself be perceived but some other thinkers, like
the Bha¯t.t.a Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯kas and the Grammarian philosophers, maintain that a¯ka¯s´a can be directly
perceived on the basis of its being the locus of everything we perceive around us. See: Bhaduri,
op.cit., 163.
83Other minor qualities are also accepted, such as the “absence of lower genera” (aparaja¯tyabha¯va)
and size (parima¯n. a). See: Lysenko, op.cit., 417.
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[its] extension is [established as] the greatest. As [it is] said to be the
cause of sound, conjunction and disjunction [are established for it].84
Because sound may be perceived universally, a¯ka¯s´a, being the bearer of this quality,
is said to be one in number: there are not many a¯ka¯s´as but only one, which is the
same everywhere. The indefinite number and variety of sounds are not traced back to
a¯ka¯s´a but to the diversity of “auxiliaries,” (sahaka¯ris) such as stuff, size, configuration
of the sounding bodies, etc.85 Since sound is considered to be transmitted by a
series of conjunctions and disjunctions in this school, a¯ka¯s´a is also endowed with
these two qualities.86 It is also all-pervasive and extended throughout space, which
means that it is in contact with all the movable substances of finite size (sarva-mu¯rta-
dravya-sam. yogitva).
87 Being all-pervasive, a¯ka¯s´a does not admit any movement or
divisibility. Because it has no parts, a¯ka¯s´a cannot essentially change and become
many and so, it is non-active; not subject to any change, it is not subject to decay,
and so it is eternal.
The fact that most attributes of a¯ka¯s´a are inferred from its bearing the quality of
sound clearly shows that a¯ka¯s´a is viewed predominantly as a material element in this
school. However, as noticed earlier, the peculiar position of this element among the
Vai´ses.ika substances suggests an additional kind of understanding. Though it shares
84PDhS, p.58. Translation taken from: Lysenko, ibid., 430.
85Bhaduri, op.cit., 173.
86In addition to samava¯ya, Vai´ses.ika accepts another kind of relation, namely conjunction
(sam. yoga). Sam. yoga consists in the conjunction of two terms that were previously unrelated or
unconnected, such as a table and the floor on which it stands or the coming together of atoms to
form a molecule. While samava¯ya is counted as one of the six pada¯rthas, sam. yoga is considered to
be a quality (gun. a) of the terms related. As to disjunction (vibha¯ga), it is the quality by virtue of
which the connection or contact of things is destroyed. According to Vai´ses.ikas, the movement of
sound in space is only apparent and consists in reality of a series of acoustic events in which each
momentary sound produces its immediate successor. The sounding is either initiated by a conjunc-
tion (sam. yoga) or a disjunction (vibha¯ga), i.e., either by a contact or a rupture between things, and
then it travels through a series of conjunctions and disjunctions until it reaches the hearer.
87Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic According to Annambhat.t.a’s Tarkasam˙graha, 69.
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 149
with other elements the coordination with a specific quality and sense-organ, a¯ka¯s´a
does not consist of any parts and so cannot form aggregates as other elements do,
neither can it be mixed with them. Whereas elements can be broken into indivisible
atoms, a¯ka¯s´a cannot be disintegrated in any way. On the other hand, this element
presents a few similarities with immaterial substances such as direction (di´s), time
(ka¯la) and self (a¯tman). Like direction and time, it is all-pervasive and eternal, and
like the self it possesses specific qualities which last only for a single moment and
exist only in certain parts of the substance (pleasure, pain, etc., in the case of the
self and sound in the case of a¯ka¯s´a).88 Therefore, even though this school mostly
dwells upon the material aspect of a¯ka¯s´a, it is also concerned with its metaphysical
status as an all-pervasive and eternal substance on par with immaterial substances.89
But we must keep in mind that if a¯ka¯s´a can be perceived via the quality of sound,
other immaterial substances cannot be perceived through any specific quality. In that
sense, we could reasonably say that the position of a¯ka¯s´a in Vai´sesika metaphysics is
intermediary between material and immaterial substances.
A¯ka¯s´a and di´s
It is particularly important to notice the difference between a¯ka¯s´a and di´s in classical
Vai´ses.ika because both refer, though in different ways, to the idea of space. In line
88PDS, p.25.
89The position of a¯ka¯s´a with respect to immaterial substances has been subject to some revision
in the course of time in Vai´ses.ika. It is worth noting the view formulated in the Saptapada¯rth¯ı of
S´iva¯ditya, a Vai´ses.ika text composed in the twelfth century. In contrast with Pras´astapa¯da, who
clearly makes a distinction between direction, time and a¯ka¯s´a, S´iva¯ditya claims that they constitute
in reality the same substance and appear to be different because of their different functions and
properties. Centuries later, Raghuna¯tha S´iroman. i proposed a more radical view, stating that direc-
tion, time and a¯ka¯s´a are not only the same substance but are not different from God himself. See:
Gurumurti (trans.), Saptapada¯rth¯ı of S´iva¯ditya, section 18; Potter, The Pada¯rthatattavaniru¯pan. a of
Raghuna¯tha S´iroman. i, 23; Halbfass, op.cit., 104-05.
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with the Upanis.ads, the Vai´ses.ika notion of di´s is connected with the sense of direc-
tion. Pras´astapa¯da defines it as “that from which there arise the ten notions of east,
southeast, south, southwest, west, northwest, north, northeast, below and above, with
regard to a corporeal substance after one has made another corporeal substance the
point of reference.”90 Hence, di´s serves primarily as a spatial framework in which
things and phenomena are located with reference to each other, and whose structure
is defined by the things and the observers who perceive them. In contrast, a¯ka¯s´a is
associated with the idea of a “mere undifferentiated reservoir” that contains all things
and their relations as they are, without being affected by them.91 Yet, as all conjunc-
tions and disjunctions, and not only those related to sound transmission, take place
in a¯ka¯s´a, the latter has an important role in “connecting” things together. Not only is
it the receptacle of things but it is also a “communicating space” providing room for
all sorts of interconnections between finite things. Vai´ses.ikas do not associate a¯ka¯s´a
with the possibility of free movement or with the absence of bodies. In their view,
a¯ka¯s´a is not pure emptiness but a “fullness” filling all space and bodies.92
90PDS, p.66.
91Lysenko, op.cit., 437.
92One may ask how the all-pervasive nature of a¯ka¯s´a is reconciled with the notion of indivisible
atoms distinct from each other. This issue is discussed in the Nya¯yasu¯tras of Gautama. If a¯ka¯s´a is
all-pervasive, it must penetrate the atom and then the atom must have parts (then, it is no more an
atom). On the other hand, if the atom has no parts and is indivisible, a¯ka¯s´a cannot be all-pervasive.
Gautama’s reply to this objection is that there is no “interior” nor “exterior” with reference to atoms:
the atom is a cause-substance and as such has no parts (NS IV.2.20). Ubiquity or all-pervasiveness
is defined as the conjunction with all substances of limited magnitude and not with something which
is non-existent, such as the “inside” of an atom. Still, the role of a¯ka¯s´a with regard to atoms is quite
obscure. As Lysenko notices: “The relationship between a¯ka¯s´a and the atoms is a rather elusive
subject [in Vai´ses.ika]. This is indicative of a somewhat weak point in Vai´ses.ika physics. . . There is
no indication in the available sources that a¯ka¯s´a, like the void [in Democritus’ physics], assists the
motion of the atoms and their combinations as their common milieu or free space.” See: Lysenko,
op.cit., 433.
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4.2.2 The Sa¯m. khya dars´ana
Sa¯m. khya is one of the oldest and most influential schools of systematic philosophy to
have emerged in the Hindu tradition. Several doctrines and ideas developed by this
school have had a remarkable influence on Indian culture in general, not only in the
field of philosophy but also in medicine, arts, law, theology and mythology.93 The
term sa¯m. khya, which means “enumeration” or “calculation,” refers to the school’s
enumeration and categorization of the elements and principles of existence. It may
also denote the activity of analysing and discriminating in a reflective manner.94 As a
matter of fact, the notion of discrimination (viveka) plays a crucial role in Sa¯m. khya,
insofar as its main purpose is to distinguish the realm of consciousness (purus.a) from
the various activities pertaining to nature (prakr. ti) so that the real individual or
purus.a may be released from the cycle of rebirth (sam. sa¯ra). The origin of Sa¯m. khya
is a matter of debate among scholars. Although there is no evidence in Vedic and
Upanis.adic literature as to the existence of a systematized school called Sa¯m. khya,
some scholars have argued that there are references to Sa¯m. khya ideas and concepts
in the Upanis.ads. There are those who believe that this school grew independently
of the Upanis.ads but during the same period, thus explaining the similarity of ideas
and concepts, while others are of the view that it grew directly from the Upanis.ads ;
there is no final agreement on this point.
The earliest book of authority on classical Sa¯m. khya is the Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯ (SK),
composed by I¯s´varakr.s.n. a around the fifth century CE.
95 The text discusses the dif-
ferent kinds of sufferings in life and knowledge as a means of release from these
sufferings; it also offers a detailed description of the several existents of the world,
the nature of causality and the threefold nature of the world in terms of gun. as.
Important commentaries were written on this ka¯rika¯, among which are Gaud.apa¯da’s
93Larson and Bhattacharya (eds.), Sa¯m. khya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy, xi.
94Fowler, op.cit., 160.
95Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy, 269.
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Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯bha¯s.ya (c. 6th century CE), Va¯caspati Mi´sra’s Tattvakaumud¯ı (c. 10th
century CE) and Vijn˜a¯nabhiks.u’s Sa¯m. khyapravacanabha¯s.ya and Sa¯m. khyasa¯ra (16th
century CE). We may also mention the Yuktid¯ıpika¯, another important commentary
on the Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯, but its origin and author are unknown.
The Sa¯m. khya worldview
Before explaining how Sa¯m. khya philosophers look upon a¯ka¯s´a, it is useful to briefly
introduce the main metaphysical tenets of this school. This can also serve as an in-
troduction to the philosophy of Advaita as Sa¯m. khya and Advaita metaphysics share
some common ideas. The metaphysical framework of this school can be divided into
three main realms: the tattvas or ontological principles, the bha¯vas or epistemolog-
ical and ethical principles, and the bhu¯tas or constituents of the empirical world.96
The Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯ lists twenty-five categories of existence in the tattva realm, with
purus.a (or spirit) and prakr. ti (or the principle of energy and matter) as the two
fundamental principles of being:
1. purus.a - self, pure consciousness;
2. prakr. ti - nature, energy, matter;
3. buddhi or mahat - non-individualized or cosmicized intellect;
4. aham. ka¯ra - egoity, principle of individuality;
5. manas - mind;
6-10. jn˜a¯nendriyas - five organs of perception (hearing, touching, seeing, tasting,
smelling);
11-15. karmendriyas - five organs of action (speaking, grasping, movement, excreting,
procreating);
16-20. five tanma¯tras or subtle elements - sound, touch, form, taste, smell;
21-25. five maha¯bhu¯tas or gross elements - a¯ka¯s´a, wind, fire, water, earth.
96Mohanty, Classical Indian Philosophy, 51.
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These categories comprise the whole universe of experience. Except for purus.a, which
stands apart from the empirical world, all tattvas (including mind and sense-organs)
are considered phenomenal evolutes of prakr. ti. According to Sa¯m. khya, these evolutes
are constituted by three qualities called gun. as : sattva (light), rajas (passion, energy)
and tamas (inertia, darkness).97 Everything in the world, ranging from natural ob-
jects to psychological states of mind, are constituted in different proportions by these
three factors, which form the basis constitution of prakr. ti.
98 Prakr. ti evolves or trans-
forms from an unmanifested state (pralaya) into a manifested state through a series
of stages or levels in which the different categories appear. In the state of pralaya,
the three gun. as are balancing each other. When prakr. ti is disturbed, the equilibrium
is broken and then starts the process of evolution. This process goes on until all
existents become latent again and reintroduce the state of pralaya. Evolution, like
dissolution, is cyclical, having neither a beginning nor an end. Thus, prakr. ti is nei-
ther created nor destroyed; it is the fundamental and eternal matrix out of which all
things — natural beings, objects, thoughts, emotions, volitions, and even space and
time — emerge and into which they return. It reminds us of the Upanis.adic concept
of Brahman, the major difference here being that prakr. ti is insentient and devoid of
consciousness.
97The concept of gun. a in Vai´ses.ika is quite different from that found in Sa¯m. khya. In Vai´ses.ika,
the gun. a stands as a general quality inhering in a substance, both quality and substance being
independent pada¯rthas related to each other through inherence. In Sa¯m. khya, the gun. as constitute
the three principles of all material beings.
98The three gun. as are not qualities of prakr. ti but “component factors” or intrinsic “constituents”
of prakr. ti. They are not parts of prakr. ti for they depend on it as much as prakr. ti depends on them. As
Hiriyanna says: “These three constituents [gun. as ] again, though essentially distinct in their nature,
are conceived as interdependent, so that they can never be separated from one another. It means
that they are not mechanically placed together, but reciprocally involve one another and form a unity
in trinity. In other words, they not only coexist but also cohere. This intrinsic interdependence of
the gun. as excludes the possibility of the breaking up of prakr. ti by their separation.” See: Hiriyanna,
The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, 108.
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The first evolute to emerge from prakr. ti is the non-individualized intellect (called
mahat in its cosmic aspect and buddhi in its psychological aspect), the capacity for
awareness, from which then emerges the principle of individuality or the sense of
ego (aham. ka¯ra) (see Fig. 4.1). According to Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯, two distinct groups of
principles emerge from aham. ka¯ra. The first, corresponding to the sa¯ttvika aspect of
aham. ka¯ra, relates to our subjective apprehension of the world and is constituted by
the mind (manas), the five organs of perception (hearing, touch, sight, taste, smell)
and the five organs of action (speech, hands, feet, reproduction, excretory). The
second group, corresponding to the ta¯masa aspect of aham. ka¯ra, corresponds to the
objective world (i.e., seen from our viewpoint) and is constituted by the five gross
elements and their subtle counterparts, called tanma¯tras.99 As to the ra¯jasa aspect
of aham. ka¯ra, it provides energy to the whole process by sharing in both sa¯ttvika and
ta¯masa aspects.100 The last step of evolution consists in the combination of the five
elements together, giving rise to the common things we observe in the world. The
whole process of evolution proceeds from subtle to gross evolutes, each of which has a
finite existence. This conception being opposite to that of eternal substances (dravya)
in Vai´ses.ika, it is not surprising that both schools have a very different understanding
of a¯ka¯s´a.
99Unlike elements in Vai´ses.ika, the Sa¯m. khya elements are conceived to have two phases: a generic
and simple phase in which elements are not yet concretized and specified, and a specific phase where
those “subtle” elements combine together to form “gross” elements. The first phase refers to what
are called tanma¯tras. The role of tanma¯tras is to bridge the gap between subjective and objective
aspects of reality, in particular between the ego and the gross physical world. All sensations (hearing,
seeing, etc.) first exist in a potential or generic form in the experiencer before being apprehended by
sense-organs. For instance, for hearing to take place, there must be some sort of generic receptivity
to sound in the individual for specific sounds to be perceived. The tanma¯tras are the material
and imperceptible essences corresponding to those sensations in the experiencer, that allow for the
perception of gross elements in the external world. Cosmologically, they exist prior to gross elements
and “generate” them. See: Larson and Bhattacharya (eds.), Sa¯m. khya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian
Philosophy, 50.
100Larson, Classical Sa¯m. khya: An Interpretation of its History and Meaning, 185.
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Figure 4.1: The evolution process in Sa¯m. khya.
Purus.a does not participate in the evolution of the world; it is described in the
Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯ as a witness and spectator of the world, free, alone, indifferent, in-
active (SK XIX). It is the conscious principle, the real enjoyer and knower of the
world. In contrast, prakr. ti and its emerging tattvas are unconscious and insentient.
101
Through right discrimination as to the nature of prakr. ti and purus.a, one attains true
knowledge of one’s own self (purus.a) and becomes free from the entanglements of
the world. However, the dualism of prakr. ti and purus.a raises an important problem.
How are we to explain the manifestation of the world to consciousness if both prakr. ti
and purus.a remain essentially independent principles? In fact, prakr.ti cannot by it-
101One may point out that the emergence of psychical entities (buddhi, manas, etc.) in the course
of evolution contradicts the fact that prakrti is unconscious. However, it must be understood that
what appears to be psychical and conscious in the empirical world owes this character to the presence
of purus.a. As the properties of the moon, which is reflected in the water, should not be attributed
to water itself, so are the attributes of purus.a, which are only “reflected” in prakr. ti and are not
part of it. Thoughts and things, matter and intellectual processes are essentially the same as all are
constituted by the same three gun. as, yet in different proportions. If certain evolutes can “reveal”
objects in a “subjective” manner, it is purely because of their sattvic quality and not because of any
connection with human subjectivity. See: Hiriyanna, op.cit., 112.
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self give impetus to the world, provide it with meaning and purpose. In order for
things to be intelligible, the presence of purus.a is essential. On the other hand, by
providing a world and the possibility of objective knowledge, prakr. ti enables purus.a
to eventually realize its true state as a free enjoyer and conscious knower. There-
fore, the Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯ describes the relation between purus.a and prakr. ti as that
between a blind man and a lame man who co-operate together to get out of a forest
(SK XXI). But the analogy is not very appropriate. Unlike the two men, who are
both conscious and thus able to make a plan in order to get out of the forest, prakr. ti
is unconscious and purus.a is indifferent. The exact manner in which both princi-
ples interact constitutes a rather complex, if not ambiguous, aspect of the Sa¯m. khya
philosophy.102
In Sa¯m. khya, the status of elements is quite different from that given in Vai´ses.ika.
The five elements form the material world as we know it, but they are not the ul-
timate reals since all of them trace back to a common source, i.e., prakr. ti. They
are not eternal but finite for they emerge from the evolution process taking place in
prakr. ti. The five elements are associated with a specific quality (vi´ses.agun. a): a¯ka¯s´a
with sound (s´abda), air with touch (spars´a), fire with colour (ru¯pa), water with taste
(rasa) and earth with smell (gandha). Here also, elements share qualities with other
elements: air has touch as a dominant quality but also sound; fire is related to colour
but also to touch and sound; and so forth, ending with earth which possesses all the
five qualities. In sharp contrast with Vai´ses.ika, sound is here a quality of all elements
and not only of a¯ka¯s´a. For each gross element there is a corresponding tanma¯tra,
termed in accordance with the associated specific quality: s´abdatanma¯tra for sub-
tle a¯ka¯s´a, spars´atanma¯tra for air, ru¯patanma¯tra for fire, rasatanma¯tra for water and
102Fowler summarizes this problematic: “These are difficult aspects of Sa¯m. khya philosophy, partic-
ularly the attempt to assign some kind of blind purpose to unconscious matter on the one hand, and
to suggest that something that is already separate and pure consciousness can be trapped in such un-
conscious matter on the other. It seems futile for prakr. ti to be purposefully (and yet unconsciously)
operating for the freedom of that which is already free.” See: Fowler, op.cit., 189.
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 157
gandhatanma¯tra for earth. But the qualities possessed by tanma¯tras exist only in
a potential or “rudimentary” form, so that tanma¯tras basically remain impercepti-
ble. Unlike the gross elements they generate, subtle elements are inferred and not
perceived.103
Metaphysical status of a¯ka¯s´a
In Sa¯m. khya, as in Vai´ses.ika and other orthodox dars´anas, a¯ka¯s´a is one of the five
elements and is associated with the quality of sound. Unlike Vai´ses.ika, a¯ka¯s´a is the
first element (maha¯bhu¯ta) to appear in the process of evolution in Sa¯m. khya, a feature
which it shares with Veda¯nta. It is possible that the mention of a¯ka¯s´a as the first
103The views differ in Sa¯m. khya literature as to the number of qualities per tanma¯tra. We find
two different views expounded in the Yuktid¯ıpika¯. In the first view, each tanma¯tra has one and
only one quality: s´abdatanma¯tra is endowed with sound, spars´atanma¯tra with touch, etc. According
to the second view, there is an accumulation of qualities in the process of evolution. For instance,
spars´atanma¯tra not only has touch for quality but also retains that of the previous tanma¯tra, namely
sound. This implies that the tanma¯tras evolve from each other, starting from s´abdatanma¯tra with
sound as its quality and ending with gandhatanma¯tra, which possesses the five qualities. This
ambiguity is also reflected in the process by which gross elements are derived from subtle elements.
According to Halbfass, “the most conspicuous and problematic aspect of the Sa¯m. khya conception of
elements is the distinction and dichotomy between the subtle elements and their gross counterparts,”
and seemingly, “neither traditional Indian commentators nor modern Western scholars have been
able to come to a complete and definitive agreement concerning the precise nature of the relation
between the two types of elements.” The Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯ (SK XXII, XXXVIII) simply states that the
five gross elements derive from the five subtle elements without providing any further explanation for
the mechanism of derivation itself. The most common view is the so-called “accumulation theory,”
according to which each successive subtle element combines with the previous one in order to give
rise to a gross element. For instance, the gross element of air, which is endowed with both touch
and sound, would result from the combination of the subtle element of a¯ka¯s´a (which has the quality
of sound) and the subtle element of air (which has the quality of touch). This view, adopted by
Va¯caspati Mi´sra in his commentary, supposes that each tanma¯tra has one and only one quality. See:
Chakravarti, op.cit., 243; Halbfass, op.cit., 88.
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element to emerge from Brahman in TU II.1.1, played a role in the emergence of such
a conception. However, there is no direct evidence in the Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯, nor in the
subsequent commentaries, as to why a¯ka¯s´a obtains this status. It may be argued that
this follows naturally from the principle that evolution proceeds from the subtle to
the gross, a¯ka¯s´a being more subtle in nature than earth for instance. Moreover, in
contrast with Vai´ses.ika, there is no detailed analysis in this school as to the correlation
made between a¯ka¯s´a and sound. Its major contribution lies rather in the distinction
made between subtle and gross elements, on the basis of which it offers its own specific
understanding of a¯ka¯s´a. As already mentioned, a gross element in Sa¯m. khya is the
substratum in which the subtle quality of the related tanma¯tra manifests itself. Thus,
the role of the gross a¯ka¯s´a is to manifest the subtle quality of sound (latent in the
subtle a¯ka¯s´a) to the individual’s consciousness. The presence of the gross a¯ka¯s´a in
the world allows the various kinds of specific sounds to be experienced subjectively
and manifested objectively in the empirical world.
In addition to being correlated with sound, a¯ka¯s´a is said to possess three other
physical properties: all-pervasiveness or ubiquity, penetrability and unobstructive-
ness.104 Like in Vai´ses.ika, the property of ubiquity is accepted on the account that
sound is heard from all directions. But while Vai´ses.ika insists on the distinction
between a¯ka¯s´a and space, the same cannot be said of Sa¯m. khya. According to the
Yuktid¯ıpika¯, the property of unobstructiveness is attributed to a¯ka¯s´a because the lat-
ter provides space for all.105 Bhaduri describes a¯ka¯s´a as “the universal medium in
104The properties of elements are mentioned in the Yuktid¯ıpika¯ but the source of information is
not mentioned in this text. Earth is said to have form, weight, aridity, resistance, stability, position,
divisibility, sustenance, dark shade and usefulness to all; water has liquidity, thinness, brilliance,
whiteness, softness, weight, coldness, protectiveness, purification and cohesion; fire has upward
movement, purification, burning, cooking, lightness, brilliance, destruction, power and lustre; air
has horizontal motion, purification, pushing, impulsion, power, dryness, no shadow and coolness.
See: Chakravarti, op.cit., 246-47.
105Ka¯rika¯ 38. See: Kumar and Bhargava (trans.), Yuktid¯ıpika¯ (Vol.2), 287.
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which all finite things exist as separate entities and move freely.”106 For these rea-
sons, this element appears to be almost indistinguishable from empty space itself in
Sa¯m. khya. The view according to which a¯ka¯s´a is identical with empty space is also
adopted by some other schools of Indian philosophy. In Jainism, for instance, a¯ka¯s´a
is essentially empty space (avaka¯s´a) because it offers no resistance to the passage
of bodies. Similarly, the Vaibha¯s.ika Buddhists consider a¯ka¯s´a as a positive entity
(dharma) which neither obstructs objects nor is obstructed by them. Both schools
seem to envisage a¯ka¯s´a as a condition of free movement. This view is however refuted
by Kan. a¯da, the author of the Vai´ses.ikasu¯tra, on the basis that a¯ka¯s´a is ubiquitous and
thus incapable of movement. Consequently, it cannot be the cause or the substratum
of movement of objects.107
Another important difference with Vai´ses.ika is that a¯ka¯s´a is not an eternal element
here. In Sa¯m. khya metaphysics, there are only two eternal entities, prakr. ti and purus.a.
All other tattvas are considered to have a finite existence. As an evolute of prakr. ti,
a¯ka¯s´a has a cause and is subject to decay. At least in classical Sa¯m. khya, there is
no indication of a¯ka¯s´a being endowed with a higher ontological status than other
elements. In the Sa¯m. khyaka¯rika¯ and the subsequent commentaries, there is no trace
of a transcendental type of a¯ka¯s´a as described in the Upanis.ads. In other words, there
is no ontological gap here between a¯ka¯s´a and the other four elements: connected
with the quality of sound and possessing certain physical attributes, a¯ka¯s´a does not
display any resemblance with either prakr. ti or purus.a. However, it must be noted
that Vijn˜a¯nabhiks.u, one of the most important exponents of later Sa¯m. khya and Yoga
philosophy, eventually introduced the notion of a “causal” a¯ka¯s´a, a kind of a¯ka¯s´a
associated with prakr. ti. In his view, there exist two kinds of a¯ka¯s´a: 1. ka¯rya¯ka¯s´a: an
elemental or gross a¯ka¯s´a, which is derived from s´abdatanma¯tra and thus an evolute;
and 2. ka¯ran. a¯ka¯s´a: an original or causal a¯ka¯s´a, associated with prakr. ti. With this
revision, we get a new type of a¯ka¯s´a: causal, all-pervasive and associated with prakr. ti.
106Bhaduri, op.cit., 164.
107Bhaduri, ibid.
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In that sense, we seem to return to the Upanis.ads, where a¯ka¯s´a finds a place nearer
the origin of things.108
4.3 The Advaita Veda¯nta dars´ana
The most influential school of theology and philosophy in India has certainly been
the Veda¯nta. It has exerted an enormous influence on all Indian religious traditions
throughout history and continues to attract a significant following to the present day.
The term “Veda¯nta” refers to the Upanis.ads and their teachings as well as to the
traditions inspired by them, and thus the Veda¯nta tradition is concerned with the
exegetical interpretation of these texts.109 The various schools of Veda¯nta accept
Ba¯dara¯yan.a’s Brahmasu¯tra (c. 200 BCE), also called the Veda¯ntasu¯tra, as their foun-
dational text. The latter summarizes the teachings of the Upanis.ads by investigating
the nature of Brahman.110 Besides this text and the Upanis.ads, the Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯
108However, the exact nature of this causal a¯ka¯s´a as well as its relation with prakr. ti, remains
ambiguous. Vijn˜a¯nabhiks.u’s distinction between two a¯ka¯s´as is alluded to in Jhaveri (1956), but
the passage which he refers to, namely SPB II.12, is rather difficult to understand. Radhakrishnan
makes the following translation: “Eternal space and time are of the form of prakr. ti, or the root-cause
of a¯ka¯s´a, and are only the specific modifications of prakr. ti. Hence the universality of space and time
is established. . . But these, space and time, which are limited, are produced from a¯ka¯s´a through the
conjunction of this or that limiting object (upa¯dhi).” (Indian Philosophy, Vol.2, 277) From this
passage, which is the only reference we have, the nature of the causal a¯ka¯s´a and its relation with
prakr. ti remain unclear.
109There is a general tendency to refer to the Upanis.ads collectively as the “Veda¯nta” (i.e., the
“end of the Veda,” Veda + antah. (end)). The word Veda itself means “knowledge” or “wisdom”
whereas the word “end” has here a chronological and teleological sense. This suggests that the
Upanis.ads form the concluding portions of the Vedas and also reveal the final and supreme goal of
Vedic knowledge. However, this stance belongs to Veda¯nta schools and is by no means representative
of all traditions of Hinduism.
110Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, 239. It has been held in general in India that the author of
the Brahmasu¯tra is Ba¯dara¯yan.a. The celebrated Advaita teacher S´an˙kara also maintained this view.
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was also the subject of exegetical interpretations, and together these texts form the
“triple basis” (prastha¯natray¯ı) of the Veda¯nta commentarial tradition. Under Veda¯nta
there are a number of well-known schools, among which the most important are Ad-
vaita Veda¯nta (“non-dualism”), Vi´sis. ta¯dvaita (“qualified non-dualism”) and Dvaita
(“dualism”), primarily associated with the names of S´an˙kara (8th century), Ra¯ma¯nuja
(11-12th century) and Madhva (13th century), respectively. Of the three, the non-
dualistic school of Advaita Veda¯nta has arguably been the most influential.
Despite its clear exegetical nature, the school of Advaita Veda¯nta also addresses
questions of philosophical interest in the fields of epistemology and ontology.111 As
appears from its numerous debates with schools like Sa¯m. khya, Nya¯ya, Vai´ses.ika, Yoga,
Buddhism, Jainism and Ca¯rva¯ka, the Advaita school is deeply concerned with the
nature of reality, knowledge and various other epistemological issues. In this regard,
one cannot overlook the detailed theory of knowledge developed by the Advaitin
Dharmara¯ja in his Veda¯ntaparibha¯s. a¯ (17th century). Like other dars´anas, the purpose
of Advaita Veda¯nta is to point the way to liberation (moks.a) from one’s bondage to
the world (sam. sa¯ra), the cause for sufferings and rebirth. Bondage is here conceived
as the product of ignorance (avidya¯) about the true nature of reality. The term
advaita means “non-dual” and refers to the absolute monist stance of the school,
which posits the unique reality of Brahman and its identity with one’s inner self,
a¯tman. Its purpose, both as a philosophy and a spiritual discipline, is to lead to the
knowledge (vidya¯) that all distinctions are ultimately false and that Brahman-a¯tman
is the only Reality.112
The most famous Advaita philosopher, and probably one among the greatest
But according to Nakamura, who wrote an extensive history of pre-S´an˙kara Veda¯nta, the author (or
authors) of the su¯tra would have lived after Ba¯dara¯yan.a because the latter is mentioned as authority
in the su¯tra itself. See: Nakamura, A History of Early Veda¯nta Philosophy (Vol.1), 406.
111Flood, op.cit., 238.
112For more details on the religious and philosophical facets of Advaita, see: Mohanty, “Advaita
Veda¯nta as Philosophy and as Religion.” In: Mohanty, Explorations in Philosophy.
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philosophers of India, is S´an˙kara or S´an˙kara¯ca¯rya (c. 788-820 CE). Yet, if S´an˙kara
is indeed one of the most important exponents of Advaita, it would be wrong to
identify early Advaita solely with his philosophy. There were at least a few other
Advaitins before him, as he himself indicates by referring to his own “tradition,”
(samprada¯ya) though there is hardly any trace of an Advaita tradition before the
time of the Brahmasu¯tras.113 Gaud.apa¯da (c. 7th century), known to be the teacher
of S´an˙kara’s teacher, is one of the main figures of Advaita before S´an˙kara. His main
work, the Gaud. apa¯daka¯rika¯ (GK), a commentary on the Ma¯n. du¯kya Upanis.ad, has
probably been commented upon by S´an˙kara. It is worth noting that Gaud.apa¯da
was probably influenced by Buddhist philosophy, especially Madhyamaka Buddhism.
For instance, some scholars have pointed out that the GK quotes either fully or
partially from Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Madhyamakaka¯rika¯, and that there is a clear historical
connection between the doctrine of a¯ka¯s´a formulated in GK and a chapter from
Bha¯vaviveka’s Madhyamakahrdayaka¯rika¯.114 As for S´an˙kara, his most important work
is the Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya (BSB), an extensive commentary on the Brahmasu¯tras
which is still recognized as a seminal work of the Advaita tradition. Three other the-
ological works are positively accepted to be authored by S´an˙kara: the commentaries
on the Br.hada¯ran. yaka and Taittir¯ıya Upanis.ads and the independent work entitled
“Thousand teachings.” (Upades´asa¯hasr¯ı)115
According to the tradition, S´an˙kara had four disciples. One of them, Padmapa¯da
(8th century), composed an important commentary on the Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya, called
Pan˜capa¯dika¯. Later, Praka¯s´a¯tman (c. 10th century) commented upon this text in
what is called the Pan˜capa¯dika¯-Vivaran. a, or simply Vivaran. a. Va¯capasti Mi´sra (c.
10th century) also wrote a commentary on the Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya, called Bha¯mat¯ı.
113Potter (ed.), Advaita Veda¯nta up to S´am. kara and his Pupils, 9-10.
114For more details on this issue, see: Bhattacharya, The A¯gamas´a¯stra of Gaud. apa¯da; King,
Early Advaita Veda¯nta and Buddhism: The Maha¯ya¯na Context of the Gaud. apa¯d¯ıya-Ka¯rika¯;
Qvarnstro¨m, Hindu Philosophy in Buddhist Perspective: The Veda¯ntatattvavini´scaya Chapter of
Bhavya’s Madhyamakahr. dayaka¯rika¯.
115Flood, op.cit., 240.
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The schools of Bha¯mat¯ı and Vivaran. a assumed so much importance in the course
of time that they came to be known as independent schools of thought. Several
other major works were composed in the next centuries, among which are numerous
commentaries on the Bha¯mat¯ı and the Vivaran. a and independent treatises such as the
Advaitasiddhi of Madhusu¯dana Sarasvat¯ı (16th century). The tradition of Advaita
Veda¯nta continues to attract eminent thinkers right to the present day. The following
section focuses on S´an˙kara’s teachings as they are accepted as authoritative in the
Advaita tradition.
4.3.1 Nature and Knowledge of Brahman
Before examining in detail the concept of a¯ka¯s´a from the perspective of Advaita
Veda¯nta, it is first essential to discuss some key features of this school. The main
contribution of S´an˙kara has been to emphasize knowlege of Brahman as the only way
to achieve liberation. Liberation is not achieved through ritual action (karma) but
through knowledge of one’s own identity with Brahman, which can only take place
by dismissing the false notion of a distinction between the knower and the known,
the subject and the object. The concept of Brahman is a central feature of the Ad-
vaita worldview. In BSB II.2.1-10, S´an˙kara argues against the view, maintained in
Sa¯m. khya, that the unconscious prakr. ti is the ultimate cause of the universe. Though
he contends that the design in the universe seems to presuppose a single cause, eter-
nal and unlimited, he refutes the idea of a cause unconscious in nature. How can an
unintelligent and insentient principle like prakr. ti account for the beauty, symmetry,
order and harmony at work in the universe? Moreover, the dualism erected between
prakr. ti and purus.a raises problems. Without a third spiritual principle linking prakr. ti
to purus.a, it is hardly possible to explain how this world comes into existence and
continuously maintains its existence. The chasm between these two entities can only
be bridged if a higher conscious principle is the cause of the world, namely Brah-
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man, which transcends and yet preserves at the empirical level the subject-object (or
purus.a-prakr. ti) duality.
It is often said that the entire system of Advaita Veda¯nta can be summed up in
the following statement: Brahman is real, the world is unreal and the individual self
is none other than Brahman (brahma satyam. jagan mithya¯ j¯ıvo brahmaiva na¯parah. ).
The first half of the statement gives the answer to one of the most basic questions
taken up in the Upanis.ads, i.e., what is the relation between Brahman and the world?
The Upanis.ads provide different answers to this question. In those passages describing
the creation and evolution of the world, the Upanis.ads seem to affirm the reality of
diversity; in other passages, the existence of multiplicity is taken to be subsidiary to
that of Brahman, the ultimate reality, one without a second. According to S´an˙kara,
the view emphasizing the manifold and changing character of the world must be
considered only as a “concession” to empirical modes of thought. The only teaching
of the Upanis.ads, in his view, is that of non-duality.
116 Though quite real at the
empirical level, the world has no reality in the non-dual viewpoint. The world we
experience, with all its distinctions and transformations, is unreal (mithya¯) because
it is ultimately obliterated by something more real: the non-dual Brahman.
In Advaita, Brahman is the one, all-pervasive, unchanging and underlying princi-
ple of all being and reality. It is the common essence or substratum that runs through
all things but remains beyond them, not affected by them. Yet, it is not an objective
principle of existence, neither a creation of the mind, nor a subjective state of being.
As Deutsch says: “It is not a ‘He’, a personal being; nor is it an ‘It’, an imper-
sonal concept. Brahman is that state which is when all subject/object distinctions
are obliterated.”117 Brahman is beyond the subject-object duality and cannot be
116It is worth noting that S´an˙kara does not teach “unity” but “non-duality” for unity cannot exist
apart from variety and diversity. In his Bha¯mat¯ı (II.1.14), Va¯caspati Mi´sra describes S´an˙kara’s
teaching as only denying the many and not affirming the one: na tu khalu ananyatvamiti abhedam
bru¯mah. , kim tu bhedam vya¯sedha¯mah. . See: Hiriyanna, The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, 154.
117Deutsch, Advaita Veda¯nta: A Philosophical Reconstruction, 9.
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 165
predicated with any quality. No positive language can describe adequately Brahman
because it would limit or reduce its indescribable (anirvacan¯ıya) reality to conceptual
and linguistic categories, and make it an object of knowledge.118 Still, Advaitins often
describe Brahman to be saccida¯nanda, i.e., existence (sat), consciousness (cit) and
bliss (a¯nanda).119 As sat, Brahman refers to a state of pure being, undifferentiated,
not subject to origination, change, destructions, or relations.120 As cit, it refers to the
principle of pure awareness that informs our real self (a¯tman), a state which is not
an object of thought but which illumines every thought. Brahman is the conscious
witness (sa¯ks.in) behind the knower, the known and the knowledge. As to the word
a¯nanda, it refers to Brahman as the source of all forms of bliss, whether born of
sensory experience or from spiritual practices.121 Brahman is thus described as the
118This nirgun. a Brahman, without qualities, must be distinguished in Advaita from the sagun. a
Brahman, which is endowed with qualities. If nothing can ultimately be stated of the former, the
latter can be affirmed from the empirical standpoint as that which creates, sustains and destroys
everything that exists. According to Advaitins, it is the knowledge of nirgun. a Brahman alone that
constitutes liberation.
119This triad can be related to a passage from the Taittir¯ıya Upanis.ad (II.1.1): satyam jn˜a¯nam
anantam brahma, Brahman is truth, knowledge, infinite. Commenting on this passage, S´an˙kara
explains that these three terms do not positively describe Brahman but only serve to “differentiate
Brahman from other entities that possess opposite qualities.” According to Padmapa¯da, these
three words, or each of them singly, are not intended to be attributes superadded to Brahman
(tat.asthalaks.an. a) but only expressions of its essence (svaru¯palaks.an. a). See: Potter (ed.), op.cit., 75;
Deutsch, op.cit., 9.
120See: BSB I.4.14-15 and S´an˙kara’s commentary on ChU III.19. One can also find a short but
valuable discussion on sat in Halbfass’s On Being and What There Is (25-29).
121In Advaita, the use of the word a¯nanda to characterize Brahman has often been a source of
confusion. Although the Upanis.ads frequently describe Brahman as such, S´an˙kara hesitates to use
this word in his own works. Indeed, bliss seems to refer to a temporary pleasant state, having a
beginning and an end. As such, it cannot characterize the unchangeable Brahman. Sures´vara points
out, however, that the bliss referred to is not an object of consciousness that can be experienced
in any empirical way. This bliss, of which our joys and pleasures are only feeble expressions, arises
from Brahman being infinite and all-pervasive in nature. According to Swami Dayananda, the word
a¯nanda cannot refer to the “experience” of bliss if it refers to the nature (svaru¯pa) of Brahman.
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one reality persisting through both external and internal states of being, the pure
existence behind and beyond this world.
It is important to understand that because it is neither an object of thought nor
of perception, the existence of Brahman cannot be ascertained through reason nor by
any means based upon perception. But this does not entail that we should either take
its existence for granted or simply refute it on the basis of a lack of evidence. The ex-
istence of Brahman is not the outcome of belief for Advaitins, neither can it be proved
through reasoning. Though different from any empirical knowledge (apara¯vidya¯), the
knowledge of Brahman (para¯vidya¯) can be achieved through the proper understand-
ing of sacred texts (s´ruti). But the sacred texts are only a means of knowledge, a
tool for helping the seeker to understand that this truth about Brahman is not to be
“attained” in any way because it already resides within us. What is needed is not
a “new” knowledge but the removal of a false notion about the self and the world.
Now, if the non-dual Brahman is the only real existent in the view of Advaita, what
about the world we daily experience and feel to be quite real? The answer given by
Advaitins is that the world we experience is fundamentally unreal (mithya¯). Several
Western, and Indian scholars as well, have interpreted this statement as meaning that
the world has no reality at all, it is a mere illusion. However, Advaitins make a clear
distinction between the real (sat), the unreal (mithya¯) and the illusory or non-existent
(asat).
The necessity for using the experiential word a¯nanda serves two purposes: 1. it shows that the
knowledge of Brahman is desirable because it is a¯nanda-svaru¯pa; 2. it shows that the source of all
forms of a¯nanda is nothing but the limitlessness (anantam) of Brahman. See: Potter (ed.), op.cit.,
76; Swami Dayananda Sarasvati, The Teaching Tradition of Advaita Veda¯nta, 8.
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 167
Brahman and the world
By definition, what is real is that which cannot be sublated by any other experi-
ence, at any time (trika¯la¯ba¯dhyam); what is unreal is that which can be sublated
by another experience; what is non-existent is that which neither can nor cannot
be sublated by another experience.122 Brahman is the only existent which cannot
be sublated because of its nature as pure awareness, and one cannot deny aware-
ness without having recourse to awareness itself; it is thus the only “real,” and so
it is denoted as sat.123 The horns of a hare, a square circle, etc., are non-existent
or ontological impossibilities that neither can nor cannot be sublated by any other
experience. The phenomenal world falls into the category of being neither real nor
non-existent (sadasadvilaks.an. a): it is not real because it is eventually sublated by
the knowledge of Brahman, neither non-existent because it clearly presents itself to
our sense-organs. What is unreal (mithya¯) is not illusory but something that depends
upon some higher reality, or substratum, for its own existence. As in the illusion of
the rope as a snake, wherein the snake cannot appear without the rope being present,
the world cannot be perceived unless it has the non-dual Brahman as its substratum.
But, and this is crucial, Brahman does not depend upon the world for its own ex-
istence: it remains as it is, changeless and eternal, behind and beyond the manifold
122According to Deutsch, sublation (which he reconstructs as “subration”) is the “mental process
whereby one disvalues some previously appraised object or content of consciousness because of its
being contradicted by a new experience.” See: Deutsch, op.cit., 15.
123By “awareness” or “pure consciousness,” the Advaitin does not refer to an act of any sort
because it is by definition beyond the distinction between act and doer. Also, consciousness is not
adventitious, i.e., it is not imposed extrinsically on the one who is conscious. In contrast with
Buddhism, Nya¯ya and Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯, which take consciousness as being dependent on some internal
instruments (sense organs, mind, etc.), Advaitins consider that it persists eternally by itself, not
being dependent upon anything. Since pure consciousness is not the object of any knowledge, it
cannot be sublated.
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activities of the world.124
The world is real as long as the process of sublation has not taken place, i.e., as long
as Brahman remains unknown. Once it is known, all distinctions and multiplicities are
obliterated, sublated, transcended. However, how is the projection of the unreal upon
the real, of the world upon Brahman, taking place? Such mechanism of projection
is referred to as “superimposition” (adhya¯sa, adhya¯ropa) by S´an˙kara. At the very
beginning of his commentary on the Brahmasu¯tras, he defines adhya¯sa as smr. tiru¯pah.
paratra pu¯rvadr.s. t.a¯vabha¯sah. , i.e., as the “appearance elsewhere, with a nature like
that of recollection, of what was seen before.”125 Superimposition occurs when the
attributes of a thing seen elsewhere are projected upon another thing present to
consciousness and then identified with it. Just as we project the attributes of the
snake upon the rope and then take the rope to be a snake, we superimpose upon
Brahman various names (na¯ma) and forms (ru¯pa), and then misidentify the world
with Brahman. Since Brahman is identified with the self (a¯tman) in Advaita, we can
also superimpose what does not belong to the self, say the size of the physical body,
upon the self, and then say “I am small.” In both cases, properties of the external
world are falsely superimposed upon the non-dual Brahman or a¯tman. But why does
this mechanism take place? Why are we taking the unreal for the real and the real
for the unreal? Why is there a world at all?
124Likewise, if the snake depends upon the rope for its existence, the rope does not depend upon
the snake for its own existence. Of course, this is only an analogy because the rope itself, as an
object of the empirical world, is also sublated by the knowledge of Brahman while Brahman can
never be.
125Translation taken from: Sastri and Raja (trans.), Bha¯mat¯ı of Va¯caspati on S´an˙kara’s Brah-
masu¯trabha¯s.ya.
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Ma¯ya
The answer to this question finds its most common expression in the concept of ma¯ya¯.
The word ma¯ya accounts for each experience involving a distinction between subject
and object, between the self and the non-self. Ma¯ya¯ is thus closely connected to
avidya¯, or ignorance, insofar as ignorance is responsible for our sense of duality.126
According to Sharma, the concept of ma¯ya¯ in S´an˙kara’s thought is endowed with the
following characteristics:127
1. It has two aspects: negatively, it conceals (a¯varan. a) Brahman and positively, it
projects (viks.epa) the world of plurality upon Brahman;
2. It is without any beginning (ana¯di);
3. It is indescribable and indefinable (anirvacan¯ıya) for it is neither real nor unreal. It
is not real for it is dependent upon Brahman for its existence, neither unreal because
it projects the world and lasts as long as we do not have the knowledge of Brahman.
As a power (s´akti) of Brahman, power by which multiplicity comes into existence,
126In the writings of S´an˙kara, ma¯ya¯ and avidya¯ are used more or less synonymously. According
to Hacker, avidya¯ is the same as “superimposition” (adhya¯sa) in S´an˙kara’s thought. It denotes the
mutual superimposition of subject and object, of self and non-self, the confusion between the true and
the false. With later Advaitins, however, avidya¯ acquires an ontological connotation as it refers to
the “causal conditions of all error insofar as it is, so to speak, the stuff out of which every false idea is
formed.” Man.d.ana Mi´sra divides avidya¯ into a “covering” (a¯ccha¯dika) and “projective” (viks.epika)
one, the former referring to nonapprehension and the latter to false apprehension. In line with this,
Va¯caspati Mi´sra introduces the distinction between a primeval or causal ignorance (mu¯la¯vidya¯) and a
secondary or derivative ignorance (tula¯vidya¯). The followers of Mi´sra seem to explain the “apparent”
existence of the empirical world in terms ofmu¯la¯vidya¯ and the individual world of temporary illusions
in terms of tula¯vidya¯. See: Hacker, P., “Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology
of S´an˙kara: avidya¯, na¯maru¯pa, ma¯ya¯, I¯s´vara.” In: Halbfass (ed.), Philology and Confrontation:
Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Veda¯nta, 58-59; Gupta, Perceiving in Advaita Veda¯nta:
Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation, 97; Potter (ed.), op.cit., 79.
127Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, 274-75.
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ma¯ya¯ is fully dependent upon and non-different from Brahman. It is the principle
which at once conceals Brahman and projects upon it the manifold world we actually
perceive. The empirical world is ma¯ya¯, and is also created, or projected, by ma¯ya¯.
But this does not mean that the world is an illusion. Though it is not ultimately real,
the world must be taken to be real from an empirical standpoint. Yet, the source
of ma¯ya¯ cannot be known with certainty. It cannot be proved through reasoning,
which is itself a product of ma¯ya¯. Hence, the question — how did ma¯ya¯ appear? —
cannot be logically raised since ma¯ya¯ has no beginning and is indescribable. Ma¯ya¯
is not created deliberately but simply exists where truth and knowledge are not. For
many, the fact that ma¯ya¯ defies all logical treatment is a problem. There seems to
be no way to explain how the world is related to Brahman because ma¯ya¯ cannot be
interpreted as a cause of the world; it simply “is” where non-dual knowledge “is not.”
In any case, Advaita does not aim to provide a definite solution to the problem
of the relationship between Brahman and the world. What it claims is however
significant: since the problem in itself assumes a duality between Brahman and the
world, it cannot be given an ultimate and final solution. From a non-dual viewpoint,
seeking to determine the relation between Brahman and the world is illegitimate. As
Deutsch remarks: “The world cannot be explained in itself, for the mind that would
explain it is part of, and is conditioned by, that which is to be explained; it cannot
be explained with reference to Brahman, for no relations can be established between
them. . . The ultimate “why” of the world cannot then be grasped.”128 Ma¯ya¯ is not
a theory for the explanation of the world, its creation and manifestation, nor is it
invoked to explain away the world as a feeble illusion; it is rather a statement of
facts as they exist for humans trapped in duality and ignorance. In the framework
of Advaita, it serves as a “provisional recovery of the world so that its ultimate non-
being, along with Brahman’s being may be spoken. . .Brahman stands over against
the world, and ma¯ya¯ is the ground of this provisional distinction between the world
and Brahman, all distinctions being provisional.”129
128Deutsch, op.cit., 42-43.
129Arapura, J.G., “Ma¯ya¯ and the Discourse about Brahman.” In: Sprung (ed.), The Problem of
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Para¯vidya¯ and apara¯vidya¯
As noticed earlier, Advaita Veda¯nta stresses the importance of knowledge in achieving
liberation. What is to be sought for, however, is not knowledge of the totality of the
empirical world but that of Brahman, the underlying ground of being. In theMun. d. aka
Upanis.ad (I.1.4), two kinds of knowledge are enunciated: “Two types of knowledge
[vidya¯] a man should learn — those who know brahman tell us — the higher (para¯)
and the lower (apara¯).” While para¯vidya¯ is solely concerned with the knowledge of
the non-dual Reality, apara¯vidya¯ has the empirical world — objects, events, means,
ends, etc. — as its content. These two forms of knowledge are incommensurable with
each other for the higher knowledge is sui generis, acquired without the mediation of
any means of knowledge (prama¯n. as), such as perception, inference, etc. In contrast,
apara¯vidya requires the mediation of certain means of knowledge and is always subject
to negation.
Nonetheless, the supreme value given to knowledge of Brahman does not entail
that apara¯vidya¯ is without any truth value. Prior to the knowledge of Brahman, all
transactions of the empirical world are real and true as far as they go and one cannot
deny the reality of their content. As Deutsch notices:
. . . there is no way open to the mind to deny logically the results of its own
functioning; that is, to deny the reality of its own contents. Any attempt
to demonstrate the falsity of all knowledge without reference to an eternal
Absolute is doomed to failure, for the mind that would deny say, its own
logic, without reference to Brahman, must be committed in advance to
the use of that logic and any denial would thus be self-contradictory.130
Thus, empirical knowledge is justified as long as it does not claim ultimacy. Even
though prama¯n. as are themselves unreal (mithya¯), as well as the objects they seek to
reveal, they still remain essential in their own sphere. For instance, the teacher must
Two Truths in Veda¯nta and Buddhism, 119-20.
130Deutsch, op.cit., 83.
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use arguments in accordance with prama¯n. as in the process of teaching the pupil. If
prama¯n. as do not tell truth, the teacher is unable to give the pupil proper and helpful
instructions towards liberation. The lower forms of knowledge have thus a crucial
role to play in the gradual unfolding of higher knowledge.
Knowledge of Brahman
It has been noticed earlier that knowledge of Brahman — also referred to as self-
knowledge for the self is essentially identical with Brahman — can be achieved only
through proper understanding of sacred texts (s´ruti), in particular the Upanis.ads.
In S´an˙kara’s view, only s´ruti can convey knowledge of “supersensuous” truths about
reality, i.e., truths that lie beyond the reach of sense-organs and logical reasoning,
like Brahman or the self (a¯tman). The s´ruti is infallible, not to be doubted and the
right means of acquiring self-knowledge. Among the prama¯n. as accepted by S´an˙kara,
verbal testimony (s´abda) thus stands apart or is unique because it is the only one
that provides s´ruti with authority and meaning.131 However, though s´abda has a
primary role in the attainment of para¯vidya¯, it does not provide a direct access to self-
knowledge. As S´an˙kara notices, even sacred texts are unreal (mithya¯) because they
presuppose a duality in the same manner as other prama¯n. as do.
132 In the Taittir¯ıya
131In his writings, S´an˙kara refers to three means of knowledge, namely perception (pratyaks.a), infer-
ence (anuma¯na) and verbal testimony (s´abda). S´abda refers to authoritative words (s´ruti), especially
in sacred texts, or trustworthy speakers (a¯pta). Later, in the tenth century, Praka¯s´a¯tman added
postulation (artha¯patti). It is only in the seventeenth century, with Dharmara¯ja’s Veda¯ntaparibha¯s. a¯,
that a list of six means of knowledge was established, including: perception (pratyaks.a), inference
(anuma¯na), verbal testimony (s´abda), postulation (artha¯patti), comparison (upama¯na) and non-
apprehension (abha¯va). See: Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings: The Upades´asa¯hasr¯ı of S´an˙kara,
18.
132Since all prama¯n. as, including s´abda-prama¯n. a, presuppose a knower and an object to be known,
they only operate in the domain of avidya¯, that is, where the sense of duality remains. In his bha¯s.ya
on the Bhagavad-Gı¯ta¯ (XIII.2), S´an˙kara maintains that sacred texts are meaningful only in the
state of bondage, and not in the liberated state (bandha¯vastha¯ya¯m eva s´a¯stra¯dyarthavattvam, na
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Upanis.ad, Brahman is described as that “wherefrom words along with ideas turn
back without reaching It.” (TU II.4.1) Then, how does s´ruti convey knowledge of
Brahman, which is beyond thought and speech?
S´an˙kara replies that the aim of s´ruti is not to describe Brahman as an object but
solely to dispel our ignorance about it. In fact, most Upanis.ads refer to Brahman
by stating what it is not (ex: “neither short, nor long,” (BrU III.8.8) “other than
cause and effect,” (KaU I.2.14) “without an inner and an outer.” (BrU II.5.19), etc.)
In passages where Brahman is described positively, such as in “Brahman is truth,
knowledge and infinite,” (TU II.1.1) etc., we must understand that attributes do not
qualify Brahman as such but express its intrinsic characteristics (svaru¯palaks.an. a). In
short, s´ruti is not intended to define Brahman; it refers to its transcendental and
indescribable reality by implication only. Murty explains:
While no description is possible of Brahman, the task of the Veda¯nta is
to teach about it, and so logically speaking it is an impropriety; but only
in this way can the Veda¯nta emphasize the mystery of Brahman, which
eludes all objective language; and yet it can be dealt with only in that
way if Brahman has to be talked about intelligibly. While thus to talk of
Brahman is a verbal impropriety, this impropriety is mitigated by means
of qualifying epithets, which attempt to reduce or remove the spatio-
temporal elements in experience, by either enlarging our conception or
narrowing it down.133
The various Upanis.adic statements stressing Brahman’s identity with the individual
self are significant to the highest degree. The most famous passage in this regard is
probably the instruction given by Udda¯laka to his son S´vetaketu in the sixth chapter
of the Cha¯ndogya Upanis.ad. The passage starts with “In the beginning, son, this
world was simply what is existent (sat) — one only, without a second,” ending with
this most important statement: “. . . that [i.e., the existent] constitutes the self of this
whole world; that is the truth; that is the self (a¯tman). And that’s how you are,
S´vetaketu.” Here, the identity between Brahman, the existent, and a¯tman, the self,
mukta¯vastha¯ya¯m).
133Murty, Revelation and Reason in Advaita Veda¯nta, 57.
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is stated. According to Advaitins, there is no other direct nor better approach to
Brahman than knowing Him as the very self of all. These statements are referred to
as maha¯va¯kyas, or “great sayings,” in the later Advaita tradition.134
The path leading to knowledge of Brahman is not purely intellectual but requires
that the aspirant has also certain mental and moral prerequisites for it.135 After
listening (s´ravan. a) to the teachings, one is asked to reflect (manana) on their true
meaning and to meditate (nididhya¯sana) upon the truths accepted in the light of
reflection. In this manner, one can gradually get rid of the delusion about one’s own
true nature and realize one’s own self to be identical with the non-dual Brahman. In
the process of interpreting s´ruti, the usage of reasoning is also most important, as
explained by Satprakashananda:
The truths declared by the s´ruti have to be known by reasoning on the
texts and not by arguments independent of them. The function of reason is
not to judge the truth of the Vedic statements, but to determine their true
import, free from inconsistencies and in conformity with established facts.
They are not to be accepted dogmatically, but through intelligent inter-
pretation compatible with perceptual and inferential knowledge. . . Thus,
the acceptance of scriptural authority in Advaita Veda¯nta is by no means
denial of reason. Truth is not irrational. Reason is inherent in revela-
tion. . . Reason is the key that unlocks the scriptural truths and paves the
way to their intuitive perception.136
Thus, there is an intimate relationship between enquiry into sacred texts and reason-
ing in Advaita Veda¯nta. Provided both enterprises are given their right place, they
are not mutually contradictory. On the one hand, reasoning is essential to understand
134The maha¯va¯kyas are usually numbered four: 1. Brahman is consciousness (prajn˜a¯nam brahma)
(AU III.1.3); 2. I am Brahman (aham brahma¯smi) (BrU I.4.10); 3. Thou art That (tat tvam asi)
(ChU VI.8.7); 4. This a¯tman is Brahman (ayam a¯tma¯ brahma) (BrU II.5.19).
135These four requisites (sa¯dhana-catus. t.aya) are: 1. discrimination between what is eternal and
non-eternal; 2. giving up desires for enjoyment of fruits of actions both here on earth and post-
mortem; 3. acquisition of self-control; 4. ardent desire for liberation. See: Datta, The Six Ways of
Knowing: A Critical Study of the Advaita Theory of Knowledge, 295.
136Satprakashananda, Methods of Knowledge According to Advaita Veda¯nta, 215-16.
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and assimilate the meaning of s´ruti, as well as to establish its validity. On the other
hand, s´ruti has no authority in the empirical realm; here reasoning has a more im-
portant role.137 But in no way can the transcendental truth of Brahman be equated
with the phenomenal truth of the world.
4.3.2 Cosmological Insights into Advaita Veda¯nta
In Advaita Veda¯nta, a¯ka¯s´a is, like in the other dars´anas, one of the five elements
constituting the physical world. We have seen how knowledge of Brahman (or self-
knowledge) is approached by relying upon s´ruti. However, other lines of approach
have been explored by Advaitins. One is the cosmological approach where there is
an attempt to explain how the universe was created and how elements combined
together to form the world.138 In the Advaita perspective, cosmology deals with the
creation and evolution of the world based on the acceptance that Brahman is the
unique cause of the world, and with the provisional assumption that the world is an
effect of Brahman. In line with the Upanis.ads, Advaitins look upon a¯ka¯s´a as the first
phenomenal existent to evolve from Brahman, the first effect in the chain of causation.
It is thus important to examine the theory of causation accepted by Advaitins, as well
as the formation of the different physical constituents in this philosophy.
137Commenting on BhG XVIII.66, S´an˙kara says: “Surely, even a hundred Vedic texts cannot
become valid if they assert that fire is cold or non-luminous! Should a Vedic text say that fire is cold
or non-luminous, even then one has to assume that the intended meaning of the text is different, for
otherwise (its) validity cannot be maintained; but one should not assume its meaning in a way that
might contradict some other valid means of knowledge or contradict its own statement.” Translation
taken from: Gambh¯ıra¯nanda (trans.), Bhagavadg¯ıta.
138Another approach, more psychological in nature, starts from an analysis of the different states
of consciousness experienced by the individual to arrive at the knowledge that a¯tman is identical
with Brahman
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Vivartava¯da and manifestation of the world
From a cosmological standpoint, the question as to the relation between Brahman
and the world is set forth in terms of two closely related theories of causation in
Advaita: satka¯ryava¯da (the theory of the pre-existent effect), and a specific applica-
tion of it, called vivartava¯da (the theory of apparent change). In line with Sa¯m. khya
philosophers, S´an˙kara contends that the effect must pre-exist in its material cause
(satka¯ryava¯da).139 Otherwise, it is difficult to explain how a particular effect suc-
ceeds a unique and particular cause.140 Still, there is a major difference in the way
Advaita understands causation in comparison with Sa¯m. khya. If the latter school as-
sumes that the effect is a real transformation (parin. a¯mava¯da) of the cause, Advaita
considers the effect as an apparent transformation (vivartava¯da) of the cause. The
one Brahman cannot in reality become many; it only appears to do so.141 In BSB
139Sa¯m. khya philosophers also believe in the “theory of the pre-existent effect” or satka¯ryava¯da,
which means that every effect (or product) exists in a latent state in the cause prior to its manifes-
tation. When something is created, nothing new is produced. The process of causation only makes
patent, through transformation and evolution, the effect that was latent in the cause. This theory
of causation contrasts radically with that of Vai´ses.ikas (asatka¯ryava¯da) who believe that the effect
is something different and independent from the cause. For S´an˙kara, the asatka¯ryava¯da faces an
important problem: by positing that cause and effect are two distinct and independent realities, it
is difficult to explain how they get linked to each other through inherence (samava¯ya). Assuming
that such a third entity is needed to link them, we will need a fourth entity to relate this linking
principle to the cause on the one hand and the effect on the other hand, and so forth. This is a clear
case of infinite regress (anavastha¯).
140“In the world it is seen that people wanting curds, pots, necklaces, etc., take up their well-
established respective (material) causes - milk, clay, gold, etc. Not that a man wanting curds takes
up earth, or a man wanting a pot takes up milk. This fact does not fit in with the theory of the non-
existence of the effect before origination. If everything be equally non-existent everywhere before
creation, why should curds be produced from milk alone and not from clay; and why should a pot
come out of clay and not out of milk?” (BSB II.1.18) Unless otherwise indicated, translations from
this text are taken from: Gambh¯ıra¯nanda (trans.), Brahma-su¯tra-bha¯s.ya of S´r¯ı S´an˙kara¯ca¯rya.
141It must be noted that though we find in S´an˙kara’s literature a variety of analogies to illustrate
the vivarta relationship between Brahman and the world, such as the rope and the snake, the crystal
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II.3.1-7, for instance, a¯ka¯s´a is mentioned as the first element to evolve from Brah-
man. If one accepts parin. a¯ma here, one faces the problem of how a material element
like a¯ka¯s´a can evolve from Brahman, which is pure consciousness. In order to solve
this problem, S´an˙kara brings in an additional principle in his cosmological scheme,
a principle called “unevolved name-and-form,” (avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe) from which the
material world emerges.142 First evolving from Brahman, the “unevolved name-and-
form” takes the name and form of a¯ka¯s´a, air, etc. In other words, a¯ka¯s´a and other
elements — and by extension, the whole created world — are merely names and
forms superimposed upon Brahman: they have no absolute reality by themselves for
they are ultimately Brahman itself. By introducing this principle, S´an˙kara is able to
explain how the manifold and material world emerges from the non-dual and spiritual
Brahman: it is not directly from Brahman but from the material avya¯kr.te na¯maru¯pe
that the transformations of the world proceed. Hence, this term embodies the idea
found in satka¯ryava¯da that everything already exists in a potential form prior to its
manifestation.
and the red object, the foam and the waves, etc., the word vivarta is not used in the “illusionistic”
usage later given by Advaitins. For this reason, Hacker denotes S´an˙kara’s cosmological view as
a “kind of illusionistic parin. a¯mava¯da.” Nonetheless, S´an˙kara is probably the first Advaitin who
proposed a theory of causation in line with a vivarta theory. See: Hacker, Vivarta, 208-13.
142The term na¯maru¯pa can be traced back to two passages from the Cha¯ndogya Upanis.ad : 1. ChU
VI.3.2: na¯maru¯pe vya¯karava¯n. i (discussed in BSB II.4.20); 2. ChU VIII.14.1: na¯maru¯payor nirvahita¯
(discussed in BSB I.3.41). Na¯ma, the name, can be taken as that which distinguishes a particular
manifestation from another one in the linguistic usage. It denotes individuality in the human realm
and individual things in the case of external entities. Ru¯pa, the form, may be understood as the
shape or appearance associated with a particular manifestation that is known to senses and mind.
The complex na¯ma-ru¯pa, by specifying the content of every individual manifestation, accounts for
the variety and diversity found in the phenomenal world. See: Hacker, P., “Distinctive Features
of the Doctrine and Terminology of S´an˙kara: avidya¯, na¯maru¯pa, ma¯ya¯, I¯´svara. In: Halbfass (ed.),
Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Veda¯nta; Wayman, A., “A
Study of the Veda¯ntic and Buddhist Theory of Na¯ma-Ru¯pa.” In: Hercus et al. (eds.), Indological
and Buddhist Studies.
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From an empirical standpoint, S´an˙kara conceives creation as a transition from
avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe to vya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe, from a state in which names and forms
are not yet differentiated to a state in which they are fully manifest. This is clearly
expressed in S´an˙kara’s commentary on ChU VI.2.2, in which Udda¯laka teaches his son
S´vetaketu about creation: “In the beginning this world was simply what is existent
(sat) — one only, without a second.” S´an˙kara here interprets the expression “in the
beginning” (agre) as a state where names and forms are not yet manifest.143 In this
primordial situation, there was only sat — which is another name for Brahman here
— and nothing else. But sat is neither limited to this latent state, nor identical with
it: if it underlies the emergence of names and forms, sat remains beyond the realm of
names and forms. Essentially, then, there is no “real” creation for S´an˙kara: the whole
world is nothing but the eternal and immutable Brahman itself. Names and forms
are not absolutely real but appearances of Brahman that conceal its non-dual and
eternal nature. Hence, the term na¯maru¯pe gets related to the concept of ignorance
(avidya¯) in many places in S´an˙kara’s works. It is avidya¯ that is responsible for falsely
taking names and forms to be real instead of Brahman.144
143In ChU III.19.1, a seemingly different cosmological account is given: “In the beginning this
world was simply what is nonexisting (asat); and what is existing was that. It then developed. . . ”
We also find similar accounts in BrU I.2.1, TU II.7.1 and in earlier passages of the Vedas such as
RV X.72, RV X.129.4, etc. While in ChU VI.2.2 the universe comes into being from the existent
(sat), it is said to emerge from the non-existent (asat) in ChU III.19.1. This apparent contradiction
is solved by S´an˙kara by taking the word asat not in the sense of pure non-existence, for the manifest
universe cannot come out of nothing, but in the sense of something unevolved, undifferentiated or
unmanifest. Thus, in both cosmological accounts, creation is not understood as a particular event
in time, a creatio ex nihilo, but as the passage from an unmanifest to a manifest state of being.
144In BSB, for instance, S´an˙kara describes names and forms as “made of avidya¯,” “falsely imagined
by avidya¯,” “superimposed through avidya¯” and as “consisting of avidya¯.” But unlike his followers,
S´an˙kara clearly distinguishes between avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe and avidya¯. In his view, the primal state
of the universe is not identical with avidya¯, the latter’s role being to act as a “kind of potency
which. . . “posits” the illusion of the material seed of the cosmos that stands opposite the Creator.”
See: Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings: The Upades´asa¯hasr¯ı of S´an˙kara, 24-25.; Hacker, op.cit., 75-76.
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Nature and formation of elements
A second important feature of Advaita cosmology is its conception of elements (bhu¯tas).
We have mentioned earlier that there are two different accounts for the creation of
elements in the Upanis.ads. In ChU VI.2.3, sat is said to give rise to fire, water and
earth, successively whereas in TU II.1.1, a fivefold conception is presented where
a¯ka¯s´a, air, fire, water and earth are said to successively originate from a¯tman. These
two statements seemingly contradict each other with regard to the number of created
elements as well as to their order of appearance in the process of creation. But for
S´an˙kara there is no essential contradiction involved. In BSB II.3.1-7, he maintains
that a¯ka¯s´a and air are implicitly preceding fire in the account of creation given in
ChU VI.2.3, so that ChU and TU both agree as to their conception of elements.145
According to S´an˙kara and later Advaitins, the creation of the world begins with the
formation of five elements (a¯ka¯s´a, air, fire, water and earth, respectively) from which
the whole material world is then produced. It is worth noting that Advaita and
Sa¯m. khya both adopt a fivefold classification of elements but only the former gives
precedence to the five elements in the process of evolution whereas in Sa¯m. khya, gross
and subtle elements are preceded by mahat, aham. ka¯ra and manas.
S´an˙kara introduced a new principle, called avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe, to protect Brah-
145The argumentation proceeds as follows. If TU II.1.1 is rejected on the basis that a¯ka¯s´a and
air are not mentioned in ChU VI.2.3, these two elements cannot be considered as elements at all,
which goes against experience. On the other hand, if TU II.1.1 is accepted, the creation of fire is not
affected because it is also mentioned there. The only difference consists in the attribution of the first
place to a¯ka¯s´a instead of fire. However, it is more important to include a¯ka¯s´a and air and dismiss
fire from its first place, than to reject the existence of these two elements while keeping fire in the
first place. Moreover, if a¯ka¯s´a and air are not accepted as created elements, two problems come up:
1. not being effects of Brahman, these elements cannot be known when Brahman is known, thus
contradicting the s´ruti claiming that when Brahman is known everything else becomes known; 2.
if not created, these elements could be considered as eternal, which is not acceptable as Brahman
alone has an eternal nature in Advaita.
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man from the changes occuring in the world. In later Advaita, this function is mainly
assumed by ma¯ya¯. It is the indescribable ma¯ya¯ that is responsible for the manifes-
tation of the objective world, i.e., the elements and the different physical objects we
perceive in the world. In his Siddha¯ntabindhu (SB 138), for instance, Madhusu¯dana
Sarasvat¯ı (16-17th century CE) says that nescience in the form of ma¯ya¯ first took the
form of a¯ka¯s´a, and a¯ka¯s´a then took the form of air, etc., so that the five elements are
the direct products of ma¯ya¯. In Pan˜cadas´¯ı (PD), a major Advaita treatise of the 14th
century, a similar model is presented except thatma¯ya¯ here emerges from prakr. ti, and
not directly from Brahman.146 We are told that prakr. ti is endowed with three gun. as
— sattva, rajas and tamas — and is called ma¯ya¯ when the sattva aspect predominates
and avidya¯ when rajas and tamas predominate (PD I.16). The process of evolution
unfolds according to these three tendencies. From this account, it is clear that the
cosmological framework proposed in Advaita has affinities with that of Sa¯m. khya as
notions like prakr. ti and gun. as primarily belong to the latter system. However, these
notions are not found in early S´an˙kara’s Advaita so that it can be assumed that if
Sa¯m. khya played a decisive role in the development of Advaita cosmology, it occured
only later in the history of Advaita.
Another feature peculiar to later Advaita cosmology, probably also inherited from
Sa¯m. khya, is the notion of tanma¯tra. In Pan˜cadas´¯ı, we are told that the tamas aspect
of prakr.ti first gives rise to the five tanma¯tras, out of which then emerge the five
gross elements. Like other existents, tanma¯tras are endowed with three gun. as. From
the sattva aspect of tanma¯tras taken separately arise the five organs of perception
(jn˜a¯nendriyas): ear from subtle a¯ka¯s´a, skin from subtle air, eyes from subtle fire,
tongue from subtle water and nose from subtle earth (PD I.19). Like in Sa¯m. khya,
each tanma¯tra is associated with a specific quality and qualities of preceding elements:
subtle a¯ka¯s´a is associated with sound only, subtle air with touch and sound, subtle fire
146It is to be noted that this prakr. ti is dependent upon Brahman for its own existence whereas in
Sa¯m. khya prakr. ti is an independent entity.
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with form, sound and touch, etc.147 The sattva aspect of tanma¯tras, taken collectively,
gives rise to the organ of inner perception, called antah. karan. a, which is constituted by
intellect (buddhi) and mind (manas) (PD I.20).148 From the rajas aspect of tanma¯tras
are created the five organs of action (karmendriyas), i.e., speech, hands, legs, anus
and organs of procreation, respectively, and also the five pra¯n. as, which supply energy
to all functions of the body (PD I.21-22). From the tamas aspect of subtle elements,
finally, the five gross elements are created. Through the latter process, referred to as
pan˜c¯ıkaran. a, the unperceived tanma¯tras are brought to the cognition of the individual
as objects of perceptual knowledge (PD I.18).
The oldest reference to the pan˜c¯ıkaran. a cosmological theory perhaps is in the
Maha¯bha¯rata.149 But among the orthodox dars´anas, only Advaita takes recourse to
this mechanism to explain the formation of gross elements. It is mentioned in several
independent works (prakaran. a), such as the Pan˜c¯ıkaran. ava¯rttika (7-10), Pan˜cadas´¯ı
(I.27), Veda¯ntaparibha¯s.a¯ (VIII.30), Veda¯ntasa¯ra (XV.123-128) and Siddha¯ntabindhu
(144). The mechanism is simple and is described in Fig. 4.2. In the first stage (i),
147It must be noted that unlike Vai´ses.ika, which considers that sound inheres only in a¯ka¯s´a because
the latter does not mix with other elements, in Advaita sound is a quality of each and every element.
One should also notice that the relation between substance and quality in Advaita is not one of
inherence (samava¯ya) like in Vai´ses.ika but one of identity-in-difference (ta¯da¯tmya), i.e., of a non-
difference that “tolerates” difference (bhedasahis. n. uh. abhedah. ). An example that may be given is that
of a pot made of clay. The pot and the clay are essentially non-different because the pot is nothing
but clay with a particular shape, but they are also different because they are denoted by different
names and have different functions. The pot is thus in ta¯da¯tmya relation with the clay. Similarly,
qualities like sound, touch, etc., are in ta¯da¯tmya relation with their related subtle elements: a¯ka¯s´a,
air, etc.
148It is the antah. karan. a which coordinates the information coming from organs of perception, and
commands the organs of perception to respond. The mind (manas) is defined to be of the nature of
indecision (manah. vimars´a ru¯pam sya¯t), and the intellect (buddhi) to be of the nature of decision
(buddhih. sya¯t ni´scaya¯tmika¯). The Tattvabodha, Pan˜c¯ıkaran. am and Veda¯ntaparibha¯s. a¯ all include ego
(aham. ka¯ra) and memory (citta) also in the antah. karan. a.
149Mayeda, op.cit., 60 (note 26).
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Figure 4.2: The pan˜c¯ıkaran. a model.
each subtle element stands alone. In the second stage (ii and iii), each is divided into
two equal parts. In the next stage (iv), one half remains intact while the other half is
divided into four equal parts (each of these parts is thus equal to one-eight of the initial
element). The last stage (v) consists in the combination of the unchanged half with
one-eight of each other element. Each resulting element, a “gross” element, consists
in the admixture of the five subtle elements, and gets its name from the element that
is predominant in it. This mechanism of quintuplication constitutes an extension
of the trivr. tkaran. a process described in ChU VI.2-4, in which fire, water and earth
are first divided into three parts and reconstituted by a process of intermixing. But
though a fivefold classification of elements is clearly recognized by later Advaitins, we
find no mention of the pan˜c¯ıkaran. a model in the Upanis.ads or in other early Veda¯ntic
texts. In Brahmasu¯tras, only the trivr. tkaran. a mechanism is explicitly discussed (BS
II.4.20).
A question that can be raised in this context is whether S´an˙kara held a theory
of trivr. tkaran. a or pan˜c¯ıkaran. a because in some works, such as Pan˜c¯ıkaran. am and
Tattvabodha for instance, S´an˙kara maintains the pan˜c¯ıkaran. a model whereas he only
comments upon trivr. tkaran. a in his most important work, the Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya
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(BSB II.4.20).150 Mayeda argues that S´an˙kara implicitly held a theory of pan˜c¯ıkaran. a
and disregarded the trivr. tkaran. a model. He bases his argumentation on the fact that
trivr. tkaran. a is mentioned in only two of S´an˙kara’s works regarded as authentic (in
his view), namely his commentaries on BS (BS II.4.20) and ChU (ChU VI.2-4). The
trivr. tkaran. a model was mentioned in these works only because the context demanded
it according to Mayeda. The fact that S´an˙kara clearly recognizes the existence of
five elements in BS II.3.1-7, and seems to hold a theory similar to pan˜c¯ıkaran. a in
the Upades´asa¯hasr¯ı, another work considered to be authentic by Mayeda, make him
conclude that S´an˙kara “paved the way for the later establishment of the theory of
pan˜c¯ıkaran. a.”
151 Unlike Mayeda, for whom the two theories of intermixing are in
opposition to each other, Sundaresan does not see any contradiction in the fact that
S´an˙kara commented upon trivr. tkaran. a while accepting five elements. He points out
that the absence of an explicit reference to pan˜c¯ıkaran. a in BSB should be read along
with S´an˙kara’s commentary on ChU VI.4.4, where he mentions pan˜c¯ıkaran. a besides
trivr. tkaran. a.
152 What is fundamental for S´an˙kara, Sundaresan argues, is not the
150One can question S´an˙kara’s authorship of independent works such as Pan˜c¯ıkaran. am and Tattv-
abodha as some have done, but one can also assume these to be his works as well. For our purposes
we can accept these as being the works of S´an˙kara until conclusive evidence becomes available to
question that.
151Mayeda refers here to Upad II.1.19-20: “This name-and-form...[originally unevolved], took the
name-and-form of “ether” [a¯ka¯s´a] in the course of its evolution. Becoming grosser in the course
of evolution, the name-and-form from ether becomes air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from
water, earth. In this order each preceding [element] has entered each succeeding one and the five
gross elements, [ether, air, fire, water, and earth], have come into existence. Consequently earth is
characterized by the qualities of the five gross elements. . . ” See: Mayeda, op.cit., 26-27.
152In ChU VI.4.4, after commenting upon trivr. tkaran. a, S´an˙kara says that a similar argument
(sama¯na nya¯ya) applies to pan˜c¯ıkaran. a as well: “But as in the process of making three-fold, what
are real are the three colours alone, the same logic (sama¯na nya¯ya) applies in the case of becoming
five-fold also. Therefore, all things being modifications of Existence, when Existence becomes known
all this becomes known. Hence it becomes surely established that Existence alone, which is one
without a second, is Real.” Here the translation is taken from: Gambh¯ıra¯nanda (trans.), Cha¯ndogya
Upanis.ad.
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difference between both models of intermixing but their essential equivalence as far
as their purpose is concerned:
This equivalence lies not in the details of the two accounts of intermixing,
but in what both theories imply, in an Advaita Veda¯ntic sense. S´an˙kara
holds that in either case, one knows everything there is to be known,
simply by knowing Being (sat), which is One without a second. Thus,
S´an˙kara’s purpose in mentioning pan˜c¯ıkaran. a along with trivr. tkaran. a is
not to uphold one or the other theory as the only process by means of
which the universe of duality comes into existence. Rather, both accounts
are treated equally, and the emphasis is shifted back to non-dual Being.153
One can agree with Sundaresan’s position for different reasons. First, it takes into
account the general purpose of Advaita cosmology, which is to help obtain knowledge
of Brahman. According to Veda¯ntaparibha¯s. a¯, the purport of creational texts is not
to provide details on creation per se but to point towards the non-dual Brahman
(VP VIII.53). Certainly, S´an˙kara was much more concerned with the teaching of
non-duality than with the establishment of a particular creation theory. Hacker is
also clear on this point:
We know further that for S´an˙kara cosmogony was only of very minor
importance. For him it was not much a matter of concern exactly how the
events of creation are presented or conceived nor, certainly, which terms
are used. The account of creation in his system has only the propaedeutic
function of drawing attention to the unity of being.154
Since the world and its creation have no absolute reality, there is no harm in accepting
different accounts of creation as far as they help attain knowledge of Brahman. The
pan˜c¯ıkaran. a mechanism must then be understood as a model, a theoretical tool and
not a final explanation, since the purpose of the cosmological model in Advaita is
153Sundaresan, “What Determines S´an˙kara’s Authorship: The Case of the Pan˜c¯ıkaran.a,” 4.
154Hacker, “Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology of S´an˙kara: avidya¯, na¯maru¯pa,
ma¯ya¯, I¯s´vara,” 84-85.
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simply to further and deepen the understanding of Brahman.155 Another argument
in favour of Sundaresan’s interpretation is that S´an˙kara never refutes a creation theory
in preference to another. In fact, unlike some of his followers, S´an˙kara remains quite
neutral on the issue. As to the “conflicting” BS statements about the creation of
the universe, the main purpose of the su¯tras is to pinpoint and resolve some unclear
issues in the Upanis.ads. Thus, each section (adhikaran. a) has a different subject
matter (vis.aya) and serves a particular purpose (prayojanam) of its own. That a
particular section discusses trivr. tkaran. a without the mention of pan˜c¯ıkaran. a does
not necessarily entail contradiction, as long as the purpose of this section may be to
establish non-duality and not a particular creation theory.
The theory of pan˜c¯ıkaran. a is not accepted by all followers of S´an˙kara. In fact, the
two main sub-schools of Advaita, Bha¯mat¯ı and Vivaran. a, diverge in this regard. Fol-
lowers of Vivaran. a accept pan˜c¯ıkaran. a, but Va¯caspati Mi´sra, the author of Bha¯mat¯ı,
a commentary on S´an˙kara’s Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya, does not. Va¯caspati refutes this
model on the basis that only trivr. tkaran. a is mentioned in s´ruti.
156 The same position
is held by Amala¯nanda, the author of Kalpataru, a commentary on Bha¯mat¯ı. The
fact that Va¯caspati says that s´ruti does not mention pan˜c¯ıkaran. a despite S´an˙kara’s
commentary on ChU VI.4.4, perhaps implies that he was not aware of this commen-
tary or that he differed from S´an˙kara on this issue. Sundaresan tends to believe that
S´an˙kara’s commentary should have been known to Va¯caspati Mi´sra, if not at least to
155For instance, an analysis of the five elements as a means to better understand Brahman is done
in the second chapter of the Pan˜cadas´¯ı, called pan˜cabhu¯ta viveka prakaran. a. The purpose of this
chapter is precisely to discriminate (viveka) between the external universe composed of the five
elements and pure Existence (sat), as stated in PD II.1: “That existent secondless entity which is
heard (from the Veda) is possible of being known by separation of the five elements. The five elements
are therefore clearly separated (here).” Translation taken from: Svaminah (trans.), Pan˜cadas´¯ı.
156Another argument advanced by Va¯caspati is that only fire, water and earth are actually perceived
combined together in nature. A¯ka¯s´a and air have no form and cannot be perceived at all. See: Sastri
(trans.), Siddha¯ntabindu of Madhusu¯dana Sarasvat¯ı, 120-21.
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 186
Amala¯nanda.157 In his opinion, it is more reasonable to assume that Va¯caspati sim-
ply disagreed with the pan˜c¯ıkaran. a model, even though he was in agreement with the
existence of five elements. In all cases, Va¯caspati’s viewpoint did not receive much
support within the Advaita tradition, since the pan˜c¯ıkaran. a is recognized in most
major works of Advaita such as Veda¯ntaparibha¯s.a¯, Pan˜c¯ıkaran. am, Veda¯ntasa¯ra and
Pan˜cadas´¯ı. Madhusu¯dana Sarasvat¯ı himself raises the issue in the Siddha¯ntabindu
and argues in favour of the pan˜c¯ıkaran. a model.
4.3.3 A¯ka¯s´a in Advaita Veda¯nta
The previous discussion has provided us with some insights into the concept of a¯ka¯s´a.
Like Sa¯m. khya, with which it shares many cosmological features, the school of Ad-
vaita Veda¯nta accepts five elements, five tanma¯tras as well as their respective qualities
(sound, touch, etc.). Here also, a¯ka¯s´a is connected to the quality of sound and is the
first among the elements to emerge in the evolution process. An important differ-
ence, however, is that while elements evolve directly from the originating principle
(Brahman) in Advaita, so that a¯ka¯s´a becomes the first phenomenal existent to be
created, they follow mahat and aham. ka¯ra in Sa¯m. khya. In addition to its pan˜c¯ıkaran. a
model, the vivarta theory of causation is another contribution of Advaita. According
to this theory, the various worldly objects and phenomena are only names (na¯ma)
and forms (ru¯pa) superimposed upon Brahman. Therefore, a¯ka¯s´a and other elements
have a finite (i.e., non-eternal) existence as well as a relative (i.e., not absolutely
real) ontological status in Advaita. Furthermore, given its close relationship with the
“unevolved name-and-form,” the indescribable and potential state preceding physical
manifestation, a¯ka¯s´a is surrounded by a certain ontological ambiguity in this school.
As we shall see, in certain instances it simply denotes a kind of physical space asso-
ciated with the quality of sound while in others it seems to play the same role as the
157Sundaresan, op.cit., 4-5.
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the non-dual and transcendental Brahman.
In its effort to reconcile the seemingly incompatible statements made in the
Upanis.ads, the school of Advaita also engages with the various meanings these texts
attach to the word a¯ka¯s´a. Detailed discussions on this element are found in S´an˙kara’s
commentary on the Brahmasu¯tras, the Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya (BSB), and his commen-
taries on the Upanis.ads, namely the Cha¯ndogya, Taittir¯ıya and Br.hada¯ran. yaka, and
his commentary on Gaud.apa¯da’s Ma¯n. d. u¯kyaka¯rika¯. The first topic under discussion
in this section is that of the origin of a¯ka¯s´a: is a¯ka¯s´a an eternal entity on par with
Brahman or one of the created elements? The Advaitins have their own reasons to
consider a¯ka¯s´a as a created element. A detailed analysis of these reasons based on
S´an˙kara’s BSB and his other important commentaries will provide us with an un-
derstanding of the position of a¯ka¯s´a in the metaphysics of Advaita Veda¯nta. In the
following part, we will investigate the relationship between this element and Brah-
man and shortly address its epistemological status. Then, we will analyse different
passages where a¯ka¯s´a appears in relation with the self (a¯tman).
A¯ka¯s´a: a created element (BSB II.3.1-7)
The Brahmasu¯tra adhikaran. a discussed here, called viyadadhikaran. a, is the one where
a¯ka¯s´a is discussed extensively by S´an˙kara in his Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya (BSB).
158 Its
main purport is to clarify and resolve the issue of the origin of a¯ka¯s´a in the Upanis.ads.
Indeed, as noted earlier, we find different accounts of creation in these texts. In the
Taittir¯ıya (TU), a¯ka¯s´a is considered to be the first created element and fire the third,
while in the Cha¯ndogya (ChU) fire is envisaged as the first created element. ChU
158The Brahmasu¯tra is divided into four main chapters (adhya¯yas): 1. samanvaya (“Reconcili-
ation through proper interpretation”); 2. avirodha (“Non-contradiction”); 3. sa¯dhana (“Spiritual
practice”); 4. phala (“Result”). Each chapter consists of four parts (pa¯das); each part has a certain
number of sections (adhikaran. as) and each section has many aphorisms (su¯tras).
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makes no mention of a¯ka¯s´a so that we may conclude that a¯ka¯s´a does not originate
and is therefore eternal. But if we follow TU, a¯ka¯s´a must be considered a created
element. Thus, the s´ruti itself seems to differ as to the origin of a¯ka¯s´a. S´an˙kara
analyses this question in the adhikaran. a BSB II.3.1-7 and tries to provide a solution
that is both in agreement with logical reasoning and s´ruti.
To start with, in BSB II.3.1-2, these two different accounts of creation and their
implication as to the origin of a¯ka¯s´a are stated. The position taken by the pu¯rvapaks.in
(opponent)159 is that it is impossible to arrive at a definite conclusion regarding the
creation of elements because the two theories of creation in the two Upanis.adss are
fundamentally irreconcilable with each other. We therefore cannot reasonably claim
that both fire and a¯ka¯s´a have the primary position in the scheme of creation. Neither
can we conceive that they are created simultaneously, since in TU fire is said to be
created only after a¯ka¯s´a and air are created. Moreover, in ChU, fire is said to be
created from sat while it is created from air in TU. For all these reasons, both s´rutis
must be considered as invalid (aprama¯n. am) as regards the creation of elements.
In BSB II.3.3-5, a different stand is taken. The validity of both s´rutis is main-
tained by giving a figurative meaning (gaun. a¯rtha) to TU and a primary meaning
(mukhya¯rtha) to ChU, thereby taking that a¯ka¯s´a has no origin (i.e., eternal). The
proponent here — the opponent of the siddha¯ntin, referred to as siddha¯ntaikades´in
— mainly resorts to the Vai´ses.ika theory of causation to defend his point, and also
mentions some Upanis.adic statements and other sacred texts. The arguments are as
follows:
1. According to Vai´ses.ika, the cause of an effect is of three types: inherent (samava¯-
yi), non-inherent (asamava¯yi) and efficient (nimitta).160 In no case can such
causes account for the creation of a¯ka¯s´a since, as S´an˙kara says, “an inherent
159Each section (adhikaran. a) contains five main elements: a subject-matter (vis.aya), a doubt
(sam. s´aya), the initial thesis (pu¯rvapaks.a) raised by the opponent, the conclusion (siddha¯nta) estab-
lished by the Advaitin, and the transition (sam. gatih. ) to the following section.
160In the example of the production of a cloth, the inherent cause (samava¯yi) consists in the
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cause of an object is constituted by an abundance of substance of the same class.
But for space [a¯ka¯s´a] there can be no such abundance of any substance of the
same class, which can constitute its inherent cause; nor is there any conjunction
of such substances which can be accepted as the non-inherent causes from which
space can emerge. And since these two causes are absent, any efficient cause
for space, which functions when these are favourable, becomes a far cry.”161
2. Normally, there is a clear distinction between the state preceding creation of
an entity, and the state following. But there is no such distinction in the case
of a¯ka¯s´a, which cannot be conceived “as existing without space, interstices, or
cavities.”
3. Since created elements are not all-pervasive, and a¯ka¯s´a is all-pervasive (vibhu),
the latter cannot be created.
4. The s´ruti itself declares the eternal nature of a¯ka¯s´a in passages such as “Now the
subtle - it is air and space. It is immortal,” (BrU II.3.3) “It is all-pervasive and
eternal like space,” (no reference available) “Brahman has space as Its body,”
(TU I.6.2) “Space is the self,” (TU I.7.1) etc.
In the commentary on the fifth su¯tra (BSB II.3.5), an objection is advanced against
the eternal nature of a¯ka¯s´a: if a¯ka¯s´a is on par with the eternal Brahman (or a¯tman)
before creation, how do we account for the s´ruti : “In the beginning. . . this world was
simply what is existent — one only, without a second.” (ChU VI.2.1) Responding to
this objection, the siddha¯ntaikades´in tries to show how this s´ruti remains meaningful
even if a¯ka¯s´a is accepted to exist with Brahman before creation. He remarks that
“one only” should be understood as the absence of effects of Brahman, and not with
reference to a¯ka¯s´a, which is eternal and not an effect.162 As for the phrase “without
a second,” it means that there is no other efficient cause than Brahman for creation.
He goes on to explain that this is not a problem since there is no essential difference
threads, the non-inherent cause (asamava¯yi) is the union (sam. yoga) of the threads, and the efficient
cause (nimitta) is the weaver, etc.
161This quotation and the following are taken from: Gambh¯ıra¯nanda (trans.), Brahma-su¯tra-bha¯s.ya
of S´r¯ı S´an˙kara¯ca¯rya.
162The example cited in this context is that of someone going to a potter’s house on a specific day,
and sees that there is clay, potter’s wheel, etc. The next day, he notices many vessels made of clay
and says: “There was clay only the other day.” By saying that, he means that the products of clay
alone were not present the previous day, and not the potter’s wheel, etc. Similarly, the expression
“one only” refers only to the products or effects of Brahman, and not to the uncreated a¯ka¯s´a.
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between a¯ka¯s´a and Brahman: both possess the same characteristics, such as all-
pervasiveness, partlessness, formlessness, etc., so that it is impossible to perceive
them separately. Like milk and water in a mixture, there is no way to distinguish
them as two different entities: just as milk alone is perceived to exist in this mixture,
though water is also present, only Brahman is perceived to exist though a¯ka¯s´a is also
present.
Another question that comes up is: if a¯ka¯s´a is not created, how can we justify
the statement in the s´ruti that describes Brahman as “[That] through which the
unknown becomes known.” (ChU VI.1.3) In this statement, “the unknown” denotes
the various things belonging to the phenomenal world. If Brahman is known, how
can we know the eternal a¯ka¯s´a, which does not belong to the phenomenal world? The
siddha¯ntaikades´in again uses the milk-water analogy to prove his point. He argues
that by knowing Brahman, which is non-separate from a¯ka¯s´a as water in milk, one
knows everything including a¯ka¯s´a itself. Just as a few drops of water in milk are taken
up when the milk is taken up, so also when Brahman is known, a¯ka¯s´a is known. These
are the broad arguments advanced by the siddha¯ntaikades´in.
In the commentaries on the last two su¯tras of the adhikaran. a (BSB II.3.6-7), these
arguments are successively refuted by the siddha¯ntin, S´an˙kara, who concludes that
a¯ka¯s´a must be considered a created element. In BSB II.3.6, S´an˙kara defends his po-
sition with s´ruti and maintains that the real import of: “[That] through which the
unknown becomes known,” is that all things to be known must originate from Brah-
man. For example, only those things made of clay become known when clay is known
and not the potter, neither the different tools in the production of vessels, etc. The
“all-knowingness” resulting from the knowledge of Brahman must be understood in
conformity with the import of the s´ruti, which speaks of the non-difference between
Brahman and the entities originating from Brahman. Thus, if a¯ka¯s´a is not considered
a product of Brahman, it will remain unknown even when Brahman is known. The
metaphor of the milk and water is also not tenable. The knowledge of water acquired
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 191
through the knowledge of milk is not complete knowledge, for water is known only in-
directly. The water may be there, but there is no way to be sure. The all-knowingness
referred to in s´ruti entails that all existents are creations of Brahman, and so a¯ka¯s´a
must be taken to be created.
In BSB II.3.7, S´an˙kara takes recourse to logical arguments to show that a¯ka¯s´a is
a creation of Brahman. The su¯tra — ya¯vadvika¯ram. tu vibha¯go lokavat — states that
wherever there is distinction there is modification, implying that since all products
in this world (pot, pitcher, jar, etc.) are seen distinct from each other, they must
be created. S´an˙kara simply extends this statement to a¯ka¯s´a. Since a¯ka¯s´a can be
separate (at least conceptually) from earth and other elements, it must be taken as
a modification (vika¯ra) of Brahman. This argument brings much clarity about the
way a¯ka¯s´a, as a physical element, is understood by S´an˙kara. Since it is contrasted
with other elements (being separate from them), a¯ka¯s´a is somehow considered on a
par with other physical entities. Hence, like in Vai´ses.ika and Sa¯m. khya, a¯ka¯s´a has a
tangible and physical reality in Advaita Veda¯nta.
In the last part of the su¯tra, S´an˙kara refutes the arguments raised earlier by the
siddha¯ntaikades´in. He first disputes the Vai´ses.ika claim that the nature of a¯ka¯s´a is
by definition incompatible with any causal dependence. According to Vai´ses.ikas, any
inherent cause (samava¯yi) leading to the production of an effect consists in a variety
of materials of the same class (ex: many cotton threads produce a cotton fabric).
Such an inherent cause does not exist for a¯ka¯s´a. Again the rule is not universally
true since, in certain instances, an effect can be produced from materials belonging
to different classes (ex: a rope made of cotton yarn and cow’s hair). Moreover, it is
possible that an effect can be produced from a cause consisting of a single material,
such as curd produced from milk alone. Hence, there is nothing which prevents the
emergence of a¯ka¯s´a from Brahman alone, which is at once the efficient and material
cause of the world.
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 192
S´an˙kara also refutes the claim that since there can be no distinction between the
nature of a¯ka¯s´a before and after its creation, a¯ka¯s´a cannot be created. He points
out that in the Vai´ses.ika philosophy itself, sound is considered to be the specific
quality (vi´ses.agun. a) of a¯ka¯s´a. Since sound did not exist before creation, the nature
of a¯ka¯s´a after its creation necessarily differs from its previous nature. This is also
reinforced by the s´ruti which declares Brahman to be ana¯ka¯s´am (BrU III.8.8), i.e.,
free from the characteristic of space. S´an˙kara then dismisses the view that a¯ka¯s´a
has no origin because it is all-pervasive while other created elements are not. For
Advaitins, Brahman is the only all-pervasive entity, not because it is in physical
contact with all entities — which is impossible for it is relationless — but because it
is the cause and essential nature of every existent entity. In this specific sense, a¯ka¯s´a
cannot be all-pervasive although it is so in a purely spatial sense.163 Finally, a¯ka¯s´a is
impermanent because it possesses impermanent qualities, such as sound. Let’s recall
that for Advaitins the relation between substance and quality is that of “identity-in-
difference.” (ta¯da¯tmya) Sound is essentially non-different from its substratum, a¯ka¯s´a,
and therefore one must accept that a¯ka¯s´a is impermanent as sound is.
Relationship between a¯ka¯s´a, Brahman and the world
In the last su¯tra of the viyadadhikaran. a II.3, a¯ka¯s´a is treated as an entity separate
from other physical entities, which implies that in some sense a¯ka¯s´a is ontologically
akin to other physical entities. In addition, a¯ka¯s´a may be interpreted in this su¯tra as
the spatial locus of material objects. But to speak of a¯ka¯s´a as pure “empty space” has
no real meaning here. In fact, the idea of empty space does not appeal to Advaitins
for they take pure existence (sat) as the ultimate substratum of the world. In the
Pan˜cadas´¯ı (PD II.28-29), Vidya¯ran. ya explicitly rejects the notion of void (s´u¯nya)
163In his commentary on TU II.1.1, S´an˙kara explains that a¯ka¯s´a is infinite in space but not with
reference to time and things for, being an effect (ka¯rya), it has a finite existence and is separate
from other things. Unlike a¯ka¯s´a, Brahman is unlimited with respect to space, time and things.
CHAPTER 4. A¯KA¯S´A IN HINDU SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 193
advanced by Ma¯dhyamika Buddhists. The existence of the void presupposes the
existent, sat, a positive entity. Sat pervades the whole world and cannot be denied
because its very denial would imply the existence of some ground for negation. In BSB
II.2.24, Advaitins refute the Sautra¯ntika Buddhist theory that a¯ka¯s´a consists only
in the “absence of resistant matter [or obstruction],” (sapratighadravya¯bha¯vama¯tra)
thus without objective reality. For Advaitins, a¯ka¯s´a is a positive entity, cognizable
through proper prama¯n. as like other elements, and not a mere mental construction.
Thus, a¯ka¯s´a has no similarity at all with empty space in Advaita. Rather, it is a
substance pervading all bodies, subtle in nature, and in some sense dependent upon
the objects it “contains.”
BSB II.3.1-7 also gives us another understanding of a¯ka¯s´a. We are told that a¯ka¯s´a
is one of the five great elements (maha¯bhu¯tas), together with earth, water, fire and
air. Like them, it possesses a specific quality (sound) and is correlated to a particular
sense-organ (organ of hearing), and as such definitely acquires a special place among
the various physical entities of the world. It is no more regarded as some portion
of space associated with bodies but as an extended and subtle form of materiality,
on a par with other great elements. Moreover, TU II.1.1 gives prominence to a¯ka¯s´a
by ranking it first in the scheme of creation as mentioned earlier. As such, it plays
an active role in the world by giving rise to elements and the rest of creation. Here,
a¯ka¯s´a seems to present itself as a reality ontologically superior to the material world,
closer to the Absolute, sometimes identified with it.164
164Unlike other elements, a¯ka¯s´a cannot be touched, tasted, etc. It is considered to be the finest
among all elements, subtler than air, fire, water and earth. Since, in the development of things,
the gross (sthu¯la) always proceeds from the subtle (su¯ks.ma), Advaitins take a¯ka¯s´a to be the first
created element in their cosmological model. Such an idea seems logically tenable given that our
perception of air, fire, etc., always presupposes the existence of a space in which they are located.
Also, nothing material can be conceived to precede a¯ka¯s´a, for a peculiar feature of space is that it
exceeds what it contains without itself being exceeded. In this sense, a¯ka¯s´a’s reality is ontologically
superior to that of the material world. Among all dars´anas, Advaita is the only one that gives such
a prominent place to a¯ka¯s´a in its cosmology.
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The purport of BSB II.3.1-7 was to demonstrate that a¯ka¯s´a is a created element,
and not an eternal entity as it is in Vai´ses.ika. For this reason, the intimate rela-
tion between this element and Brahman, in terms of their common characteristics, is
not thoroughly discussed. We must look at other commentaries and adhikaran. as to
better understand this aspect of a¯ka¯s´a. Gaud.apa¯da’s ka¯rika¯ on Ma¯n. d. u¯kya Upanis.ad
(III.3-12) uses the analogy of space located in a jar (ghata¯ka¯s´a) and the space outside
it (maha¯ka¯s´a) to illustrate the non-dual nature of a¯tman in relation with individual
selves (j¯ıvas). It is explained that both spaces are essentially the same but appear
to be distinct due to the limitations (upa¯dhis) imposed by the body of the jar on
maha¯ka¯s´a. When the jar is broken, the primary unity of a¯ka¯s´a is restored. Hence,
the multiplicity of names, forms, functions, etc., given to a¯ka¯s´a are not real for it is
essentially non-dual and undifferentiated. Likewise, j¯ıvas are essentially non-different
from a¯tman; they appear to be different on account of the apparent limitations im-
posed by the body-mind complex.165 A¯ka¯s´a is described here as a space perfectly ho-
mogeneous, non-dual, free from inner differences and thus independent of the things
it contains. Rather than being defined in relation to other bodies, it appears here as a
condition for the manifestation of these bodies. Though the common container of all
things, a¯ka¯s´a remains free from them and unaffected by the various changes occuring
in the physical world. Clearly, such a conception is analogous to that of Brahman,
which is also defined as non-dual and unaffected by what takes place in the world.
In several places, a¯ka¯s´a is brought closer to Brahman because of its capacity for
creating or manifesting the various existents of the world. In TU II.1.1, for instance,
165“Though forms, actions, and names differ in respect of the difference (in the spaces created by
jars, etc.), yet there is no multiplicity in space. So also is the definite conclusion with regard to
the individual beings.” (MaU III.6) S´an˙kara comments: “. . . but all these differences are not surely
real that are implied in conventional dealings involving dimensions, etc., created in space; in reality,
space has no difference (a¯ka¯s´asya na bhedah. asti), nor can there be any empirical dealing based on
the multiplicity of space unless there be the instrumentality of the limiting adjuncts.” Translation
taken from: Gambh¯ıra¯nanda (trans.), Eight Upanis.ads.
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we are told that “from space, air [came into being]; from air, fire; from fire, the
waters; etc.,” indicating that a¯ka¯s´a has the potential to give rise to other elements.
The creative character of a¯ka¯s´a also appears clearly from its natural capacity to
“give room” for objects to exist. In his commentary on TU II.1.1, S´an˙kara defines
a¯ka¯s´a as “that which is possessed of the attribute of sound and provides space for all
things that have forms.” (a¯ka¯s´o na¯ma s´abdagun. ah. avaka¯s´akarah. mu¯rtadravya¯n. a¯m)
166
Affording space for things to exist, a¯ka¯s´a contributes positively to their creation and
manifestation. Sures´vara, a disciple of S´an˙kara, describes a¯ka¯s´a as “the prakr. ti or
material cause of all that exists in space.”167 We also find several passages in Veda¯nta
literature where a¯ka¯s´a is used as a synonym for avyakta, avya¯kr.ta, ma¯ya¯, prakr. ti,
etc., all words suggesting the idea of potentiality for creation and manifestation. For
instance, in BrU III.8.11, the “unmanifest” (avyakta) is referred to by the word a¯ka¯s´a.
According to Hacker, a¯ka¯s´a is one of the preferred expressions used by S´an˙kara to
denote the primal state of creation itself, avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe.
168 Given that a¯ka¯s´a is
the first evolute arising from this state, such an equation is not surprising.
In the Cha¯ndogya Upanis.ad, two statements also bring to light the potential nature
of this element. In ChU VIII.14.1, we are told “Now, what is called space is that which
brings forth name and visible appearance.” (a¯ka¯s´o vai na¯ma na¯maru¯payornirvahita¯).
In ChU I.9.1, in answer to the question — “Where does this world lead to?” — it is
replied: “Clearly, it is from space that all these beings arise, and into space that they
are finally absorbed; for space indeed existed before them and in space they ultimately
end.” In the opinion of some scholars, these statements bring to the fore the potential
nature of a¯ka¯s´a. Referring to ChU VIII.14.1, Kramrisch describes a¯ka¯s´a as “the name
of the possibility of coming into existence of the perceptible world.”169 According to
166Translation taken from: Gambh¯ıra¯nanda (trans.), Taittir¯ıya Upanis.ad.
167Translation taken from: Sastry (trans.), Taittir¯ıya Upanis.ad with the commentaries of S´ri
S´an˙kara¯ca¯rya, S´ri Sures´vara¯ca¯rya and S´ri Vidya¯ran. ya, 294.
168Hacker, “Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology of S´an˙kara: avidya¯, na¯maru¯pa,
ma¯ya¯, I¯s´vara,” 84. For more details, refer to section 5.1.2 of this dissertation.
169Kramrisch, “Space in Indian Cosmogony and in Architecture.” In: Vatsyayan (ed.), Concepts
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Coomaraswamy, a passage such as ChU I.9.1 seems to indicate that a¯ka¯s´a “represents
primarily a concept not of physical space, but of a purely principial space without
dimension, though the matrix of dimension.”170 The passage “. . . and into space that
they are finally absorbed” indicates that a¯ka¯s´a is also the locus towards which all
elements return at the end of their existence. In all of these passages, a¯ka¯s´a appears
almost identical with Brahman, the principle at the origin of the world and to which
the world ultimately returns.
Yet, it is not clear whether the potentiality for creation must be ascribed to a¯ka¯s´a
only or to Brahman, which is ontologically prior to a¯ka¯s´a. When we say that a¯ka¯s´a
creates, do we mean that it creates from its own inner power or due to some other
cause or influence? Does a¯ka¯s´a have the capacity to create at all or is it only a passive
intermediary in the process of creation by Brahman? In BSB I.3.41, the doubt is raised
as to whether the word a¯ka¯s´a, denoting that “which brings forth name and visible
appearance” in ChU VIII.14.1, corresponds to the material space with which we are
familiar or to Brahman. S´an˙kara argues that since Brahman is by definition the only
entity that has no name and form (neti neti), only Brahman can manifest every name
and form. A¯ka¯s´a being created from Brahman, it has name and form, and it would be
illogical to believe that it manifests its own name and form. It is only on account of
its similarities with Brahman, such as its great extension, formlessness, subtle nature,
etc., that the word a¯ka¯s´a is used in this context.171 Similarly, in BSB I.1.22, S´an˙kara
contends that since there is a mark (lin˙ga) pointing to Brahman in ChU I.9.1, the
word a¯ka¯s´a must be understood in that context as a synonym of Brahman. The mark
is that a¯ka¯s´a is said to be the cause of all things, which can be true of Brahman only.
of Space: Ancient and Modern, 103.
170Coomaraswamy, “Kha and Other Words Denoting “Zero” in Connection with the Metaphysics
of Space,” 493.
171In his commentary on ChU VIII.14.1, S´an˙kara says that this s´ruti is “meant to set forth the
characteristics of Brahman for the sake of meditation. . . That which is indeed called space, is the
self [i.e., Brahman] well-known in the Upanis.ads. [It is called space] because It is bodiless and subtle
like space.” Translation taken from: Gambh¯ıra¯nanda (trans.), Cha¯ndogya Upanis.ad.
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S´an˙kara corroborates this statement with passages from s´ruti that describe Brahman
(or a¯tman) as the primordial cause.172 Such a symbolic usage of a¯ka¯s´a is noticed by
Deussen also, who considers this concept to be, besides pra¯n. a, manas and a¯ditya, a
“most important symbol under which the worship of Brahman is enjoined.”173
However, if a¯ka¯s´a is sometimes used as an appropriate symbol for Brahman, under
no circumstances can it be identified with it. In fact, despite their similarities, a¯ka¯s´a
and Brahman differ considerably as to their essential nature. Unlike Brahman, whose
nature is saccida¯nanda — pure existence, consciousness and bliss — a¯ka¯s´a has only
a relative existence, is insentient and devoid of bliss. Like every other existent, a¯ka¯s´a
is mithya¯, or sadasadvilaks.an. a: it is neither sat because it is ultimately sublated by
the knowledge of Brahman, neither asat because it is actually perceived to be real. It
depends upon Brahman for its own existence. From an Advaita perspective, in those
instances where a¯ka¯s´a is identified with the prime matter of the universe (avyakta,
ma¯ya¯, etc.), it is verily Brahman which is referred to, but Brahman envisaged as
the unevolved potential of the world.174 Brahman is the only creator of the uni-
verse. In any case, we must recall that creation for Advaitins — whether mediated
through ma¯ya¯, a¯ka¯s´a or any other primary principle — stands as a valid explana-
tion of the universe from a transactional or conventional standpoint only. From a
non-dual standpoint, neither the universe nor the elements do really exist: Brahman
alone exists.
172For instance, we are told in TU III.1.1: “That from which these beings are born; on which, once
born, they live; and into which they pass upon death — seek to perceive that! That is Brahman!”
Similarly, in ChU III.14.1: “All this is Brahman. (This) is born from, dissolves in, and exists in
That.”
173Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, 115. According to Divanji, the etymology of the
word a¯ka¯s´a justifies that it has often been equated with Brahman in Vedic literature. He derives
the word as a¯samanta¯t ka¯s´ata iti, which denotes an “entity shining all-round by its own effulgence.”
Such an entity can be “none other than Brahman which is self-resplendent and the source of light of
the celestial luminaries. . . ” See: Divanji, “Brahman-A¯ka¯s´a Equation: Its Origin and Development,”
158-59.
174Though ma¯ya¯ is invoked in Advaita to explain the creation of the manifold world, yet Brahman
alone is the creator because ma¯ya¯, being a power (s´akti) of Brahman, is non-different from Brahman.
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But if a¯ka¯s´a cannot be looked upon as the creator of the universe, is it the creator
of other elements such as air, fire, etc.? At first sight, this is what TU II.1.1 seems
to convey. But in his commentary, Vidya¯ran. ya clearly states that a¯ka¯s´a is not itself
the creator of elements but only an agent in the process: “From Brahman associated
with ma¯ya¯ and having put on the form (upa¯dhi) of a¯ka¯s´a which was first evolved,
the air was born. . . and therefore it is on account of the special relation of the air
to Brahman’s upa¯dhi of a¯ka¯s´a as its proximate invariable antecedent, that the air is
declared to be born of a¯ka¯s´a.”175 In the process of creation, a¯ka¯s´a is only an upa¯dhi
to Brahman, which alone has the potential to create. In BSB II.3.10, in order to
reconcile the creation of fire from air (TU) with its creation from sat (ChU), it is said
that Brahman assumed the form of air in order to produce fire. Thus, not air but
Brahman is the creator of fire. In BSB II.3.13, S´an˙kara says that it is I¯s´vara himself,
abiding in the elements as their self, that creates every element in succession.176
Strictly speaking, then, a¯ka¯s´a is neither the creator of the universe — this role being
attributed to Brahman as I¯s´vara only — nor the real creator of air, fire, etc — for
it is only an upa¯dhi to Brahman. We can only talk of a creation “as if it were” by
a¯ka¯s´a. The same is true with respect to the dissolution of the universe, which ends
into Brahman and not into a¯ka¯s´a.
Nevertheless, it is significant that the word a¯ka¯s´a, and not any other word, is
used to denote Brahman in many instances. Notwithstanding its different ontological
status, a¯ka¯s´a possesses enough similarities with Brahman to be equated with it. Like
Brahman, it is of great extension, omnipresent, formless, changeless, etc. As the first
created element, space or a¯ka¯s´a enables every physical thing to be and to become.
Without space, it is hardly possible to imagine that physical bodies could exist, evolve
175Sastry (trans.), op.cit., 308.
176The concept of I¯s´vara, the Lord and Creator of the world, is identified with sagun. a Brahman in
Advaita, that is, Brahman with qualities. Such Brahman “is interpreted and affirmed by the mind
from its necessarily limited standpoint; it is that about which something can be said.” See: Deutsch,
Advaita Veda¯nta: A Philosophical Reconstruction, 12.
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and interact with other things. Already in the Upanis.ads, space appears as a bridge
between the unmanifest Brahman and the manifest world. In the Br.hada¯ran. yaka
Upanis.ad (III.8.7), Ga¯rgi asks on what entity is space “woven back and forth.” The
great teacher Ya¯jn˜avalkya replies:
That, Ga¯rgi, is the imperishable (aks.ara), and Brahmins refer to it like
this — it is neither coarse nor fine; it is neither short nor long; it is neither
blood nor fat; it is without shadow or darkness; it is without air or space;
it is without contact; it has no taste or smell; it is without sight or hearing;
it is without speech or mind; it is without energy, breath, or mouth; it is
beyond measure; it has nothing within it or outside of it; it does not eat
anything; and no one eats it.
The transcendental dimension of a¯ka¯s´a is clearly evident in this passage. The entity
on which space is “woven back and forth” is the imperishable that lies beyond any
phenomenal category. From an empirical viewpoint, space appears to be the most
appropriate symbol of the unmanifest (Brahman) in the material world. Or, to ex-
press it differently, space is the very appearance of the unmanifest as an externalized
phenomenon in a sense-perceived world.
Epistemological status of a¯ka¯s´a
Before examining the inner meaning given to this element in Advaita, we must address
its epistemological status. For Advaitins, a¯ka¯s´a is an object of knowledge in the strict
sense, i.e., something that can be apprehended through proper means of knowledge
(prama¯n. as). However, in sharp contrast with other elements, a¯ka¯s´a lies beyond the
range of direct perception. It is colourless, odourless, tasteless, etc., and therefore
cannot be grasped or understood through sense-organs. Ca¯rva¯ka philosophers did not
accept this element in their own classification of elements precisely for this reason.
Since perception is an essential prama¯n. a in the Ca¯rva¯ka school, the existence of a¯ka¯s´a
cannot be ascertained in any way. As noted earlier, a similar view is maintained in
the various schools of Buddhism. For the great Buddhist thinker Naga¯rjuna, “space is
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mere name (na¯mama¯traka), because it is nothing but the absence of form (ru¯pa).”177
We also recall the Sautra¯ntika definition of a¯ka¯s´a as mere “absence of resistant matter
[or obstruction],” (sapratighadravya¯bhavama¯tra) which amounts to say that a¯ka¯s´a has
no objectified reality. Similarly, in a Therava¯da text such as Milindapan˜ha, a¯ka¯s´a is
said to be incomprehensible, boundless and immeasurable, and thus beyond the range
of direct perception.178 In this context, one wonders how the existence of this element
is ascertained by Advaitins.
For S´an˙kara also, a¯ka¯s´a lies beyond the range of direct perception, as it appears in
his introduction to the Brahmasu¯trabha¯s.ya: “Nor is there any rule that something has
to be superimposed on something else that is directly perceived through the senses; for
boys superimpose the ideas of surface and dirt on space [a¯ka¯s´a] that is not an object
of sense-perception.” Colours, forms, etc., do not belong to a¯ka¯s´a but are falsely
superimposed upon it. However, according to the author of the Paribha¯s. a¯ Praka¯s´ika¯,
a commentary on Dharmara¯ja’sVeda¯ntaparibha¯s.a¯, this very superimposition can serve
as a means of knowing a¯ka¯s´a. In his view, when S´an˙kara states that a¯ka¯s´a cannot be
known through sense-organs, it is meant that a¯ka¯s´a as such cannot be perceived. Yet
nothing prevents from inferring its existence through false association with certain
qualities.179 When I perceive sky as blue, for instance, I can infer the presence of the
colourless space in the same way as the rope can be inferred from the illusory snake
that is superimposed upon it. The existence of a¯ka¯s´a can also be inferred from its
quality of sound. In BSB II.2.24, S´an˙kara says that a¯ka¯s´a can be inferred from sound,
in the same way as qualities such as smell and the rest enable to infer the existence
of substances like earth, etc.
For a later Advaitin like Madhusu¯dana Sarasvat¯ı, a¯ka¯s´a can neither be known
through perception nor inference. It is perceived through what is called “witness-
177Quotation taken from: Halbfass, “Space or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Thought,”
103.
178Trenckner (trans.), The Milindapan˜ha, 388. See: Halbfass, op.cit., 102-03.
179Gupta, Perceiving in Advaita Veda¯nta: Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation, 124.
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consciousness” (sa¯ks.in): “Similarly, since space has no form, etc., it is not perceived
by any of the sense organs such as the eye; nor is it known by inference. So the knowl-
edge of space is not due to a mental modification, because a mental modification arises
only when a sense organ functions. So space is also directly perceived by the witness-
consciousness.”180 The existence of a¯ka¯s´a can only be revealed through consciousness
qua consciousness, i.e., through the entity standing behind what is known and un-
known, as well as behind the knower.181 This provides a¯ka¯s´a with a peculiar status
in Advaita as far as epistemology is concerned. While some philosophers deny its ex-
istence because it is devoid of qualities and relations, Advaitins evoke the possibility
of knowing a¯ka¯s´a though it is free from names and forms. Something without any
name and form is not necessarily non-existent since beyond names and forms, there
is existence, sat, which is self-revealing and sustains every other existence. In the
Pan˜cadas´¯ı (PD II.42), we are told: “Just as a¯ka¯s´a absolutely free from the universe
(of names and forms) is comprehended by your intellect, in the same manner why is
it not the Existent free of a¯ka¯s´a also comprehended by you?”
However, if a¯ka¯s´a is devoid of name and form, are we not simply referring to
Brahman itself? Again, the gap between a¯ka¯s´a and Brahman appears quite narrow.
There is a close relationship — conceptual as well as logical — between a¯ka¯s´a and the
unmanifest (Brahman) that lies beyond the reach of any means of knowledge. As the
first phenomenal existent to evolve from Brahman, a¯ka¯s´a somehow expresses in the
categories of the phenomenal world the Brahman which would be inexpressible and
unthinkable (anirvacan¯ıya) otherwise. It is the “ultimate knowable” beyond which
epistemology halts and gives place to the ontos, to the Absolute as it is. It has the
ability to reveal the modalities of the unmanifest in this world but to do so, one
180Sastri (trans.), Siddha¯ntabindu of Madhusu¯dana Sarasvat¯ı, 128.
181Like internal mental states and illusory existents, and other entities like time, a¯ka¯s´a is known
through the ever-present sa¯ks. in, the witness of all knowledge. Witness-consciousness is not pure
consciousness but consciousness identified with the cognizing subject. For an informative discussion
on this concept, see: Gupta, op.cit., 54-72.
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should neither try to grasp nor understand it as an object of knowledge. The way
in which a¯ka¯s´a is conceived to lead to the apprehension of the unmanifest, without
itself becoming an object of knowledge, can be better appreciated through an esoteric
interpretation in the Upanis.ads.
A portal into the unmanifest : a¯ka¯s´a in the heart
We have seen above how a¯ka¯s´a, despite being a physical element, is also considered
as a proper vehicle to achieve an understanding of Brahman in Advaita. In fact, in
several instances, the Upanis.ads enjoin students to meditate upon a¯ka¯s´a as Brahman.
In ChU III.18.1, for example, a¯ka¯s´a, besides the mind (manas), is said to be especially
fit for meditating upon Brahman. In his commentary, S´an˙kara says: “Since space and
mind are subtle, and since Brahman is realised by the mind, and also since space is
all-pervasive, subtle and without any limiting adjunct, therefore, mind and space
are fit for being meditated upon as Brahman.” Later in the same Upanis.ad, we are
told: “If someone venerates Brahman as space — well, a man wins worlds that are
spacious, worlds that are wide open, unconfined, and far-flung. . . ” (ChU VII.12.2) In
those passages, we find the idea that a¯ka¯s´a is an appropriate symbol for meditating
upon Brahman, because it is infinite, subtle, all-pervasive, changeless, formless, etc.,
like Brahman. The Upanis.ad in this context points to the totality of external space,
which encompasses everything that exists.
But there are also a number of passages where the a¯ka¯s´a to be meditated upon
is internal to the individual, located in the “space within the heart,” (antah. hr.daya
a¯ka¯s´ah. ) wherein abides the supreme reality, Brahman or a¯tman.
182 One of those
passages from the Cha¯ndogya Upanis.ad is significant:
182We find mention of a¯ka¯s´a being located in the heart at several places in Upanis.ads : BrU II.1.17,
II.5.10, IV.2.3, IV.4.22; TU I.6.1; ChU VIII.1. In other passages, the heart is depicted as the abode
of the self or Brahman: KaU I.2.20, I.3.1, II.1.6-7, II.1.12.
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Now, here in this fort of Brahman there is a small lotus, a dwelling place,
and within it, a small space. In that space there is something — and
that’s what you should try to discover, that’s what you should seek to
perceive. . . As vast as this space here all around us, is that space within the
heart; and in it are contained both earth and sky, both fire and wind, both
the sun and the moon (both lightning and the stars); both what belongs
to it and what does not, in it is contained all that. (ChU VIII.1.1-3)
According to S´an˙kara, the expression “fort of Brahman” (brahmapura) in the above
passage refers to the complex of human subtle and gross bodies together. The analogy
is that of a fort with a king and many officers fulfilling the orders of the king. Similarly,
in the body, the different organs, mind and intellect fulfill the needs of Brahman,
which is said to abide in a lotus-like dwelling (pun. d. ar¯ıkam ves´ma). Later in the
passage, this dwelling is identified with the heart. According to Ba¨umer, both the
“fort of Brahman” (brahmapura) and the lotus (pun. d. ar¯ıka) are commonly used in
the Upanis.ads as symbols for the inner space of being.
183 Another symbol that is
often invoked similar to the heart is the “cave” or “cavity,” (guha¯) in which Brahman
is said to be “lodged,” “placed,” “hidden.” (nihitam) The “cave of the heart” does
not refer to the physical heart according to S´an˙kara but to the intellect (buddhi),
the higher discriminative faculty through which knowledge of ultimate reality can be
achieved.184 The withdrawal within the “cave of the heart” thus corresponds to a
process of interiorization, in which one progressively becomes detached from external
things and meditates, with the help of the intellect, upon a more subtle reality.
In the passage above, a small space (daharah. a¯ka¯s´ah. ) is said to pervade the lotus-
183Ba¨umer, “From guha¯ to a¯ka¯s´a: The Mystical Cave in the Vedic and S´aiva traditions,” 107.
184For instance, in TU II.1.1: “Brahman is truth, knowledge, and infinite. He who knows that
Brahman as existing in the intellect which is lodged in the supreme space in the heart (nihitam.
guha¯ya¯m. parame vyoman), enjoys, in identification with the all-knowing Brahman, all desirable
things simultaneously.” According to S´an˙kara, the word guha¯, which is derived from the root guh
meaning “hiding” or “covering,” here means “intellect,” (buddhi) because in the intellect are hidden
the categories of knowledge, knowable and knower, or the two main human objectives, i.e., worldly
experience and liberation.
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like dwelling, or heart. Since the Upanis.ads refer to a¯ka¯s´a in various ways, it is
important for Advaitins to determine what the word a¯ka¯s´a exactly refers to in these
different contexts. Should we understand that what lies within the heart is the familiar
material space, or the supreme self (a¯tman)? This question is examined by S´an˙kara
in BSB I.3.14, which in brief is as follows.185 Firstly, the opponent pu¯rvapaks.in takes
a¯ka¯s´a to mean material space, and provides three main reasons in this regard: 1. It is
the conventional meaning of the word a¯ka¯s´a. Such meaning is also suggested by the
adjective “small” (dahara) attached to the word a¯ka¯s´a, for the place where it subsists
is small; 2. In ChU VIII.1.3, we are told that the space within the heart is as vast as
the space outside. Such statements can only be valid with reference to the material
space, which is known to be one; 3. The word a¯ka¯s´a cannot denote the supreme
self since we are not told that the knowledge of a¯ka¯s´a should be sought for. Rather,
what must be known exists within that space (“In that space there is something —
and that’s what you should try to discover. . . ”). The material space is therefore the
abode of the supreme self, which dwells inside a¯ka¯s´a.
Against this position of the opponent, S´an˙kara maintains that a¯ka¯s´a denotes the
supreme reality, a¯tman itself. It cannot refer to the material space because in this
passage the teacher denies a¯ka¯s´a any physical sense. In his commentary on ChU
VIII.1.2-3, he explains:
When I [the teacher] said: ‘Within that is a small space’, I did not say
so with the idea that the space which exists in the lotus-like dwelling
is smaller than the lotus. . . The lotus is small, and the internal organ
corresponding to that and contained in it is limited by the space within
the lotus [. . . ] Since there is the internal organ acting as the limiting
adjunct, I said ‘Within that is a small space’. By itself however, antah. -
hr.daya-a¯ka¯s´ah. , the space within the heart. . . is as vast as this physical
space.
One could however argue, against the position that what lies in the heart refers to
185For the sake of simplicity, we do not present here the arguments as to why a¯ka¯s´a cannot mean
the individual soul in this context.
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the self, that the self cannot be “as vast as this space here all around us.” Indeed, the
s´ruti (S´atapatha Bra¯hman. a X.6.3.2) declares the self to be “greater than space.” But
according to S´an˙kara (BSB I.3.14), the expression “as vast” does not imply that the
self has the same expanse as a¯ka¯s´a (in the sense of external space). Rather, it serves
to illustrate its infinity. S´an˙kara also holds that the space within the heart is precisely
“what should be sought for.” Otherwise the claim that the “space within the heart is
as vast as the space outside,” meant to bring in some contemplative state, would have
no purpose. Following BSB I.3.14, S´an˙kara resorts to s´ruti and also invokes those
passages where a¯ka¯s´a refers to Brahman, namely ChU I.9.1 and ChU VIII.14.1, to
defend his position.
Just as the external a¯ka¯s´a is used sometimes as a symbol for the infinite nature of
Brahman, the a¯ka¯s´a within the heart is used to denote the ineffable supreme reality
dwelling inside us. It is clear that locating the supreme reality within the heart, in
the form of space, serves to facilitate meditation upon the self, or Brahman. The
symbolic role of the lotus-like heart in this regard is clearly mentioned by S´an˙kara at
the beginning of ChU VIII:
Although. . . it has been known that Brahman is free from direction, lo-
cation, time, etc., still, since the intellect of dull people, which conceives
that all things are possessed of the differences of direction, location, etc.,
cannot be suddenly turned towards the supreme Reality, and since the
supreme Goal of life cannot be attained without realization of Brahman,
hence the location of the lotus of the heart has to be here instructed for
Its realization. Although the reality of the self which is Existence, is the
only object of fullest knowledge and is devoid of any quality, still, it is
necessary to speak of It as possessed of such qualities. . . since people of
dull intellect seek an entity with qualification.
BSB I.2.11 raises the question of how the supreme self, which is omnipresent, can
be cognized in the small cavity of the heart. S´an˙kara replies that it is so precisely
because the cavity is its dwelling.186 For him, the internal a¯ka¯s´a dwelling in the heart
is an appropriate means for the realization of Brahman, the supreme self. As Ba¨umer
186“The supreme self is to be cognized from the very fact of remaining in the cavity; for the fact of
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notices, it is significant that though he most often insists on s´ruti as the only means
for knowing Brahman, he still recognizes the possibility of its realization through a
certain kind of mystical experience.187
Progressive interiorization and detachment from the external world make the inter-
nal a¯ka¯s´a an effective means in helping the seeker to obtain knowledge of the supreme
reality. By withdrawing its attention from the mind objects (thoughts, emotions, and
objects of the senses), the seeker enters into contact with pure consciousness itself.
In ChU VIII.1.1-3, we are told to first concentrate on the “fort of Brahman,” then on
the heart and finally on the small space within the heart. In this inner space, there
is a silence that enables one to perceive his real self, free from desires and attach-
ments to the world. In his commentary on TU II.1.1, S´an˙kara states that Brahman
is “perceived clearly through the function of that intellect (buddhi),” which dwells
within the space in the heart. The unmanifest Brahman dwells there as a witness and
can be directly perceived as such. In BrU IV.4.22, he describes a¯ka¯s´a as the seat of
the intellect, and maintains that a¯tman “lives in that ether containing the intellect.”
Similarly, in ChU VIII.2-3, he maintains that it is through a purified internal organ,
namely the intellect, that Brahman can be realized, “like an image appearing in clear
water or in a mirror.”
Hence, a¯ka¯s´a not only accounts for the openness, infinity and homogeneity of
the external space but also for the experience of infinity and openness characterizing
inner awareness. The space-as-consciousness experienced within oneself is the inner
equivalent of external space: just as external space allows all physical objects to be,
the inner space enables mind objects to be. By becoming aware of what lies beyond
space — that is, beyond physical or mind objects — without trying to grasp it as an
remaining within the cavity is very often declared in the Vedas and the Smr.tis with regard to the
supreme self Itself [. . . ] And we stated earlier that it involves no contradiction to teach about any
place as suitable for the realization of Brahman, omnipresent though It is.” (BSB I.2.11)
187Ba¨umer, op.cit., 109.
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object of knowledge, one enters into contact with the unmanifest in the form of pure
consciousness. By bridging the inner and outer space, the Veda¯ntic concept of a¯ka¯s´a
thus serves as a means for realization of the identity between Brahman and a¯tman.
As one Upanis.ad says:
That indeed which is Brahman, is surely this which is the space outside
a person. That space indeed which is outside a person, is surely this
which is the space within the person. That indeed which is the space
within a person, is surely the space that is within the heart. That which
is this (space within the heart) is all-pervading and without movement.
He who knows thus, attains a glory which is full and indestructible. (ChU
III.12.7-9)
But, like any symbol, a¯ka¯s´a simply points towards the Absolute, and should ulti-
mately be transcended. In the end, a¯ka¯s´a is only a portal into the unmanifest, a
means to the path of self-discovery, a realization that is also part of what Advaita
teaches. In sharp contrast with other dars´anas, it is significant that this physical
element has soteriological implications in Advaita.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
In our study, we have seen that Upanis.adic literature endows the word a¯ka¯s´a with
various meanings. In some passages, a¯ka¯s´a is stated to be one of the five elements
(maha¯bhu¯tas), connected with hearing and sound. Elsewhere, it acquires a metaphys-
ical meaning while being closely equated to the eternal Brahman and the innermost
a¯tman. We also saw that later dars´anas like Vai´ses.ika and Sa¯m. khya more or less
retained these different meanings, even though each of them emphasized a particular
aspect of a¯ka¯s´a in consonance with its metaphysical view of the world. In Vai´ses.ika,
a¯ka¯s´a is mainly envisaged as a physical element responsible for the transmission of
sound, but also as an all-pervasive and eternal substance on par with immaterial
substances. In classical Sa¯m. khya, a¯ka¯s´a is looked upon as a mere product of prakr. ti.
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With Vijn˜a¯nabhiks.u, however, another kind of a¯ka¯s´a is introduced, causal and thus
closer to the origin of things. In both schools, the physical or cosmological aspect of
a¯ka¯s´a is emphasized, the metaphysical aspect being present but mostly hidden in the
cosmological. In Advaita, however, there is an emphasis on a¯ka¯s´a as an entity with
affinities to Brahman-a¯tman, as opposed to its familiar meaning of physical space.
Halbfass traces the variety of meanings of a¯ka¯s´a to the interaction between two dif-
ferent ontologies in Indian philosophy, which he refers to as a “substantialist ontology”
and as an “ontology of openness” respectively.188 According to the “substantialist on-
tology,” of which the sixth chapter of the Cha¯ndogya Upanis.ad is a good example,
sat is the irreducible substance underlying every entity that exists. In this view, the
whole world and its multiplicity is nothing but Being, which seemingly unfolds in
different names and forms at the moment of creation. The phenomenal world is not
really created but is only a manifestation of the same eternal Being that exists “be-
fore” creation. According to Halbfass, this ontology was preceded by an “ontology of
openness” in old Vedic texts. Here, the primary concern “is not the substance or ma-
terial out of which entities are made, but the open space — the void — in which they
appear and which is the very condition of their appearance.”189 Things and events
appear in an extended and primordial openness: they become visible, measurable,
projected. As such, they cannot be described as mere modifications of an underly-
ing substance. While there is no room for creation in a substantialist ontology, the
ontology of openness implies a “beginning,” or a primeval event of separation and
opening.190
188Halbfass, “Space or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Thought,” 93; 98ff.; Halbfass, On
Being and What There Is: Classical Vai´ses. ika and the History of Indian Ontology, 25ff.
189Halbfass, “Space or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Thought,” 100.
190Halbfass explains: “The distinct entities that appear in the Vedic openness cannot be described
as mere modifications of a primeval substance or substrate. Rather, their appearance implies the
negation of such substantiality. It implies novelty and contingency. The Vedic “creation,” the
primeval opening may not be a “creation from nothing.” Yet, it implies a first beginning, an event
that remains unique in spite of all the ritual repetitions by which it is followed. See: On Being and
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Halbfass argues that the semantic richness associated with the concept of a¯ka¯s´a
derives from the historical tension between these two ontologies. The description of
a¯ka¯s´a as a reified substance on par with other elements — found in Vai´ses.ika, Sa¯m. khya
and at some places in Advaita — seem indicative of an ontology of substance. Yet,
when a¯ka¯s´a, especially in Advaita, is looked upon as an entity connected to the
creation and the visible manifestation of the world, the Vedic ontology of openness
seems more prominent. Of course, this hermeneutic issue is not very relevant as far
as S´an˙kara and other Advaitins are concerned. In their view, the various meanings
of a¯ka¯s´a in Upanis.ads simply correspond to different levels of discourse within the
revealed text. Since s´ruti is assumed to be coherent as a whole, no meaning can
essentially come into contradiction with others. Whether a¯ka¯s´a is addressed in its
cosmological or metaphysical aspect, the purpose remains the same for Advaitins, i.e.,
the attainment of ultimate knowledge (para¯vidya¯, brahmavidya¯). In the end, each
meaning must be interpreted along this line. We have seen how S´an˙kara constantly
tries to fulfill this objective in his interpretation of Veda¯nta texts in general, and
a¯ka¯s´a in particular.
Unlike other dars´anas, the school of Advaita Veda¯nta offers a reflection on a¯ka¯s´a
that takes into consideration both external and internal aspects of space. A close
relationship is established between inner space and pure inner awareness (a¯tman), and
between external space and the unmanifest Brahman. Because of its many affinities
with Brahman, a¯ka¯s´a is interpreted as its most appropriate symbol, a form of its
presence in the material world. Similarly, it is used as a symbol of the ineffable and
spiritual self (a¯tman) dwelling inside us. Furthermore, given the homology between
Brahman and a¯tman in Upanis.adic literature, a homology is also traced between
the inner and outer space. In the form of a¯ka¯s´a, the unmanifest pervades the entire
universe — from within and without. Though it can neither be perceived nor inferred,
a¯ka¯s´a can be meditated upon to grasp the Beyond, the Unknowable, the Infinite. It
What There Is: Classical Vai´ses. ika and the History of Indian Ontology, 31.
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expresses, in the modalities of rational thinking, That, which by definition resists any
kind of description, or any conceptualization in terms of this or that (anirvacan¯ıya).
Chapter 5
Analysis and Proposal for Dialogue
In Chapter 2, we discussed extensively the issue of “parallelism” as applied to two
major systems of thought and practices, namely quantum physics and the age-old
Indian tradition of Advaita Veda¯nta. The purpose of this discussion was to introduce
and critically examine the kinds of parallels made in literature between these systems.
Special attention has been paid to the parallels and analogies involving concepts
of quantum field theory, namely the quantum field and its correlate the quantum
vacuum. A number of authors, ranging from Capra and La´szlo´ in the West to Panda
and Chandrasekharayya in India, have recently traced relationships between these
concepts and others found in the Advaita Veda¯nta tradition such as Brahman, a¯ka¯s´a
and avyakta. Such suggestions are not new since similar claims relating a¯ka¯s´a to
the luminiferous ether of classical physics were made by the Hindu reformer Swami
Vivekananda more than a century ago. In order to understand the relevance of such
parallels and also to see how far they are pertinent for the current dialogue between
modern physics and Veda¯nta, a thorough examination of the concepts of quantum
vacuum and Hindu a¯ka¯s´a was attempted in Chapters 3 and 4.
In this chapter, we bring together the lessons learnt in Chapters 3 and 4 and ex-
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plore further the question as to how Advaita Veda¯nta could relate to modern physics.
In the first part of the chapter, a detailed comparative analysis of the concepts of
quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a is provided. We start with a discussion as to what ex-
tent the parallels made in literature are exact and relevant, and then an attempt is
made to identify those aspects that deserve more attention than others. The conclu-
sion we arrive at is that: 1. most parallels are in fact inappropriate and represent in
general just conceptual analogies with no direct bearing on the systems compared;
and 2. a stronger correspondence may be established at the epistemological level by
recognizing that both concepts disclose the existence of an unmanifest state of being
that is unavailable to sense-perception and reasoning. On this basis, we will be in a
better position to work towards the reconstruction of a consistent model integrating
modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. This model will be formulated in the second
part of the chapter.
5.1 Comparative Analysis: Quantum vacuum and
a¯ka¯s´a
As noted earlier, the practice of parallelism — that is, of drawing parallels between
claims of different disciplines — may exhibit different kinds of problems: lack of con-
textuality, translation problem, language fallacy, over-simplification, ideological bias,
etc. Needless to say, any comparative study must take care of these methodolog-
ical difficulties. In Interpreting Across Boundaries, Larson mentions some general
presuppositions or biases that are common in comparative philosophy, among oth-
ers the tendency to favor similarities between concepts and ideas while ignoring or
glossing over their differences.1 This bias is indeed found in works comparing modern
1Larson, G.J., “Introduction.” In: Larson and Deutsch (eds.), Interpreting Across Boundaries:
New Essays in Comparative Philosophy, 16.
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physics with Eastern spiritual traditions. However, from a comparative perspective,
emphasizing differences is also conducive to rich and fertile exchanges. It is useful
when, Krishna mentions, these differences “are articulated not in terms of the doc-
trines held, but in terms of the problems perceived and the solutions attempted.”2
What often matters in comparative philosophy is to identify the philosophical prob-
lems that various cultures and systems of thought have perceived as valuable, and to
search for distinctiveness in the solutions offered to similar problems. Following this
trend of thought, we will analyze how a¯ka¯s´a and quantum vacuum reveal, though in
distinctive ways, a similar epistemological problem — that of specifying the content
of reality as a whole by the means of sense-perception and reasoning alone.
A second methodological problem commonly found in comparative philosophy is
the tendency to ground comparisons in terms of Western concepts and categories.
The themes for comparative philosophizing are most often centered on the Western
tradition and anchored in Western academic disciplines such as ethics, metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of language, etc.3 However, the Western perspective is not
universal and there exist alternative conceptual structures and worldviews in other
traditions as well. Thus, it is important to question the use of Western style categories
of epistemology and ontology in our comparative analysis, and to inquire whether
there are comparable categories in the Indian philosophical tradition. As far as epis-
temology is concerned, Matilal contends that the doctrine of means of knowledge
(prama¯n. a-s´a¯stra) in Indian philosophy coincides to a great extent with epistemology
in the West.4 Both are concerned with the nature of knowledge, and with methods of
reasoning and criteria upon which knowledge-claims are based. As to ontology, Halb-
fass notices that though the Indian tradition contains no “science of being qua being”
in the Aristotelian sense nor does it have any systematic monographs on ontology per
2Krishna, D., “Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be.” In: Larson and
Deutsch (eds.), ibid., 82.
3Larson, op.cit., 11-12.
4Matilal, Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge, 22.
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se, “being is one of the central and pervasive themes of Indian thought.”5 In light of
these remarks, it is reasonable to assume that Indian philosophy also developed its
own distinctive forms of epistemology and ontology.
5.1.1 Analogies and Parallels: A Critical Analysis
The objects under comparison are, on the one hand, the concept of a¯ka¯s´a as assessed
in the classical Hindu dars´anas and particularly in S´an˙kara’s Advaita Veda¯nta; and,
on the other hand, the concept of quantum vacuum as interpreted by physicists and
philosophers of physics. A first and obvious feature pertaining to both concepts is
their richness in terms of meanings and interpretations. As we have seen, both vac-
uum and a¯ka¯s´a have a long history reaching back to Antiquity. In the Upanis.ads,
a¯ka¯s´a is already endowed with various meanings, from one of the five great elements
(maha¯bhu¯tas) constituting the universe to a symbol of the absolute reality (Brah-
man, a¯tman). In the classical period, the dars´anas appropriated and adapted these
meanings to various degrees in accordance with their own metaphysical views. While
Vai´ses.ika and Sa¯m. khya mostly regard a¯ka¯s´a as a physical element, the school of
Veda¯nta correlates it with the all-comprehensive Brahman and the innermost self of
beings, a¯tman. Such semantic variations are also available for the concept of vacuum
in physics. As empty space, vacuum has been refuted by Aristotle and others as an
ontological impossibility, and affirmed in the systems of atomists and Newton. As
an all-filling substance, it has been interpreted by Young and Fresnel as an etheric
medium connected with light transmission. In Einstein’s general relativity, it is re-
garded as a structural quality of the gravitational field, and in quantum field theory
(QFT) as the fundamental or ground state of quantum fields. In most of the parallel
studies, however, the various meanings of a¯ka¯s´a and vacuum are not taken into ac-
count. Some meanings are emphasized while others are simply overlooked, and most
5Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vai´ses. ika and the History of Indian Ontology,
21.
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often no clear justification is provided for the conclusions arrived at. Needless to say
that if we are to compare carefully the Veda¯ntic a¯ka¯s´a and quantum vacuum, these
various aspects must be taken into consideration.
As discussed in Chapter 4, a¯ka¯s´a receives a number of meanings in S´an˙kara’s
thought. When envisaged as a maha¯bhu¯ta, S´an˙kara’s a¯ka¯s´a presents affinities with
Aristotle’s aither. It has been noted that like aither, a¯ka¯s´a is the fifth element of
an extant list of four elements (earth, water, fire and air), is changeless, subtle or
rarefied, and connected to higher regions of the cosmos.6 We recall that Aristotle
was strongly against the existence of empty space, and thus his aither is an all-filling
substance similar to a¯ka¯s´a, which is envisaged as an extended and subtle form of
materiality in the Veda¯nta tradition. However, one also notices several dissimilarities
between both these concepts. Firstly, the nature of a¯ka¯s´a as a created and creative
element in the Upanis.adic-Veda¯ntic tradition is not shared by Aristotle’s aither. In
BSB II.3.1-7, a¯ka¯s´a ranks first in S´an˙kara’s scheme of creation and is responsible for
the emergence of all other created entities. Furthermore, in line with TU II.1.1, a¯ka¯s´a
is itself considered a created element, that is, an emanation of the absolute Brahman.
Such a view is inimical to Aristotle’s conception because for him the world is not
created but has always existed as it is. Thus, his aither is eternal, neither creative
nor created. In fact, as far as the Greek tradition is concerned, the Veda¯ntic a¯ka¯s´a
conceived as the first emanation of the one Being and Consciousness Brahman, seems
6McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philoso-
phies, 308. It is remarkable that the fivefold list of elements advanced by Aristotle (and others) is
identical with that of the Indian tradition, and even more significant that in both traditions a fifth
element is added to the extant list of four elements, which are already adequate to account for all
phenomena. On this basis, McEvilley refutes the claim of Deussen (and others) according to which
both lists of five elements were probably construed independently based on the “simple observation
of nature.” In the view of McEvilley, the early doctrine of four elements arose in India — “where the
developmental sequence is clearer than in Greece” — and then found its way to Greece in different
versions. The concept of a fifth element was probably imported later during the Upanis.adic period.
See: Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, 189; McEvilley, op.cit., 300-09.
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embedded in a worldview more akin to neo-Platonism. Like Veda¯ntins, neo-Platonists
such as Plotinus (c. 205-270 CE) and Proclus (c. 412-485 CE) primarily conceive the
world in terms of a graduated series of emanations deriving from the One Being, or
World-Soul. But they do not recognize the existence of a subtle element like aither
and they affirm like Plato that only four elements exist whose origin and arrangement
is explained through Being.7
In Aristotle’s system aither is set in a category apart from other elements. In
Aristotle’s view, aither is the substance of which the heavenly bodies (inhabiting the
superlunar realm) are made; it is eternal and unchangeable unlike other elements
which are temporary and inhabit the sublunar realm. In S´an˙kara’s thought, although
7See: Cantor and Hodge (eds.), Conceptions of Ether: Studies in the History of Ether Theories
(1740-1900), 7. There have been serious academic works exploring the relationship between neo-
Platonic and Upanis.adic-Veda¯ntic traditions. Many scholars have argued that Plotinus’ philosophy
is so close to that of the Upanis.ads and Veda¯nta that it must have been influenced by those sources,
or that both traditions share a common origin. According to McEvilley, Plotinus was “philosophizing
in an Indianized tradition” and may “have received the Indian influence from Gymnosophists [the
“naked philosophers,” i.e., Jaina monks, Indian yogis, etc.] in Alexandria, or from the works of
Plato, or both. . . ” There is no doubt that many passages in Plotinus’ and later neo-Platonists’
works, present deep affinities with Veda¯ntic monistic thought. Both traditions have questioned the
relationship of Being with non-Being, or the One with the Many, and come up with similar answers
and metaphors. The thesis that only the One is real and the Many (or the world) is unreal has been
maintained on the Indian side by S´an˙kara, and on the Greek side by Plotinus (in some passages) and
his student Porphyry. According to Bhatt, “both Plotinus and Veda¯nta philosophers regard the One
negatively as unknown and undefined and positively as unity of Being, Thought and Bliss. Both
ascribe freedom and volition to the One. Both insist that the One is immanent and transcendent in
many.” Others, like Nayak, have compared the concept of “sage” in Plotinus’s thought and that of
“liberated while alive” (j¯ıvanmukta) in S´an˙kara’s philosophy. However, despite doctrinal similarities,
one should not overlook their distinctions as to the setting and conceptual framework in which
these philosophies have operated throughout history. See: McEvilley, op.cit., 549-64; Bhatt, S.R.,
“Plotinus and Veda¯nta.” In: Gregorios (ed.), Neoplatonism and Indian Philosophy, 211; Nayak,
G.C., “Plotinus and Sankara: Some Significant Affinities and Divergences.” In: Gregorios (ed.),
ibid., 219.
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a¯ka¯s´a is emphatically presented as an entity akin to Brahman and a¯tman, it is at the
same time envisaged on a par with other elements. Like water, fire, air and earth,
a¯ka¯s´a possesses a specific quality (i.e., sound) and is correlated to a specific sense-
organ (i.e., hearing). Also, S´an˙kara argues at length in BSB II.3.1-7 that a¯ka¯s´a is
not eternal but a created element like all other physical existents. It is worth noting
that this argument is directed against Vai´ses.ikas who believe in the eternal nature of
a¯ka¯s´a. Thus, if certain parallels are to be made with Aristotle’s conception on this
point it should be with the Vai´ses.ika system and not with Veda¯nta. Such parallels
are indeed drawn by McEvilley, who writes:
In both systems the fifth element is kept carefully separate from the others,
in the Vai´ses.ika view by the doctrine that it does not combine with the
other elements, in Aristotle’s by secluding it in the superlunary realm
where the four elements and the process of change they are involved in do
not exist.8
The meaning of a¯ka¯s´a in Vai´ses.ika is mostly associated with physical connotations.
Vai´ses.ikas explicitly stress the correlation of a¯ka¯s´a with the sense of hearing by making
it the substratum of sound. But even if it shares a similarity with other elements by
having a specific quality and sense-organ, a¯ka¯s´a is different for some other reasons:
1. it has no parts or atoms and thus it cannot form aggregates like other elements
and mix with them; and 2. it is all-pervasive and eternal like immaterial substances
such as direction (di´s) and time (ka¯la). Since a¯ka¯s´a involves extended continuity, the
things that reside in it “are therefore not absolutely distinct essences. . . but part and
parcel of one continuum.”9 In this sense, the Vai´ses.ika conception of space contrasts
with that of atomists for whom space is an empty and infinite receptacle in which
individual and distinct atoms reside. It is interesting to note that the all-pervasive
nature of a¯ka¯s´a in Vai´ses.ika has been criticized for displaying a lack of consistency
8McEvilley, op.cit., 525.
9Lysenko, V., “The Vai´ses.ika Notions of a¯ka¯s´a and di´s from the Perspective of Indian Ideas of
Space.” In: Franco and Preisendanz (eds.), Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass
and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, 432.
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with its claim that atoms are indivisible. A similar problem arises in the Greek
context with the debates between the atomists and Aristotle, since Aristotle firmly
believes in the continuity of the world at all times and rejects the existence of atoms.10
This shows how two distinct traditions embedded in different historical settings and
conceptual structures can encounter similar philosophical problems.
Now coming to modern science, several parallels have been drawn between a¯ka¯s´a
and the luminiferous ether of classical physics. Perhaps the first to establish such
a correlation was the Hindu monk and reformer Swami Vivekananda. Vivekananda
probably became familiar with ether as a physical concept during his stay in the
West (1893-96) where he met well-known scientists like Lord Kelvin, Hermann von
Helmholtz, Sir William Thompson and Nikola Tesla, and perhaps even earlier during
his college education when he studied Western philosophy, science and history. In
1895, he published in the New York Medical Times a short anonymous article entitled
“The Ether,” in which he clearly equates the “a¯ka¯s´a of the Hindus” with the “ether
of the Greeks” and the luminiferous ether of physics. In his Jnana-Yoga, he claims
that “[a¯ka¯s´a] is somewhat similar to the modern notion of ether though the similarity
is not complete.”11 Around the same period, the inventor and engineer Nikola Tesla
10In Greece, the doctrine of atomism was formulated by Leucippus around the 5th century
BCE and then systematized by his student Democritus, and later Epicurus and Lucretius. Be-
side Vai´ses.ika, several Indian schools of thought (Nya¯ya, Buddhist, Ca¯rva¯ka, Jaina and A¯j¯ıvika)
have also developed their own versions of atomic theory. Despite important affinities between In-
dian and Greek atomic systems, scholars like Bailey and Keith have argued that no relationship ever
existed between them and that they developed independently. McEvilley, however, believes that if
the Buddhist and Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika conceptions were probably formulated after the Greek conquest
of northwest India, Ca¯rva¯ka, Jaina and A¯j¯ıvika — which were already in existence by the 6th century
BCE — may well have influenced the thought of Leucippus and Democritus. See: Bailey, The Greek
Atomists and Epicurus, 65; Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism; McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient
Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies, 311.
11Vivekananda, Jnana-Yoga, 233. Though this work was initially published in English, I have
used the French translation by Jean Herbert. The passage here is my own translation from French
to English.
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also drew clear parallels between Hindu a¯ka¯s´a and luminiferous ether. As early as
1891, he started to use Sanskrit words such as a¯ka¯s´a and pra¯n. a in his attempts to
describe the nature and functioning of matter. One biographer cites the following
excerpt from an unpublished article of Tesla called Man’s Greatest Achievement :
Long ago he [Man] recognized that all perceptible matter comes from
a primary substance, or tenuity beyond conception, filling all space, the
Akasha or luminiferous ether, which is acted upon by the life giving Prana
or creative force, calling into existence, in never ending cycles all things
and phenomena. The primary substance, thrown into infinitesimal whirls
of prodigious velocity, becomes gross matter; the force subsiding, the mo-
tion ceases and matter disappears, reverting to the primary substance.12
It is quite probable that Tesla came into contact with Sanskrit terminology and
philosophy through his association with Vivekananda. Both of them would have met
during the first visit of Vivekananda to America when he delivered his famous lecture
at the Chicago’s Parliament of Religions in 1893. The parallel with Vivekananda’s
conception of a¯ka¯s´a is clear as shown by this passage from Vivekananda’s Raja-Yoga:
According to the philosophers of India, the whole universe is composed
of two materials, one of which they call Akasha. It is the omnipresent,
all-penetrating existence. Everything that has form, everything that is
the result of combination, is evolved out of this Akasha. . . It cannot be
perceived; it is so subtle that it is beyond all ordinary perception; it can
only be seen when it has become gross, has taken form. At the beginning
of creation there is only this Akasha. At the end of the cycle the solids, the
liquids, and the gases all melt into the Akasha again, and the next creation
similarly proceeds out of this Akasha. . . The sum total of all forces in the
universe, mental or physical, when resolved back to their original state,
is called Prana. . . At the end of a cycle the energies now displayed in the
universe quiet down and become potential. At the beginning of the next
cycle they start up, strike upon the Akasha, and out of the Akasha evolve
these various forms, and as the Akasha changes, this Prana changes also
into all these manifestations of energy.13
In both passages, a¯ka¯s´a is brought into close relationship with pra¯n. a, which are
said to interact mutually in a self-renewing fashion to create the material universe.
12O’Neill, Prodigal Genius: The Life of Nikola Tesla, 251.
13Translation found on Wikisource: Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda.
In: Raja-Yoga, Vol.1, Chap.3.
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At this point, it is interesting to examine to what extent Vivekananda’s a¯ka¯s´a is
representative of the so-called “Hindu” conception of a¯ka¯s´a. No doubt, Vivekananda
was one of the key figures in introducing Advaita Veda¯nta to Europe and America, but
it remains unclear whether his appraisal of a¯ka¯s´a is interpreted along the lines of the
Veda¯nta tradition or not. Some scholars have argued that Vivekananda’s teachings
deviate in important ways from the Advaita tradition. For Hacker, for instance, it is
questionable whether there is “a straight prolongation of the lines traced out by the
ancient masters of the monistic Veda¯nta, or whether there is a break between the ideas
of the old school and Vivekananda’s presentation of the Veda¯nta.”14 In his opinion
— as participant in the Hindu reform movement of which he was an important leader
— Vivekananda would have adapted traditional teachings of Veda¯nta to make them
accessible to each and everyone. But in doing so, Hacker says, “he did not notice that
his adaptation altered the nature of the tradition to the extent of almost turning it
into its opposite.”15
From the passage above, there is no doubt that Vivekananda’s description of a¯ka¯s´a
is embedded, at least partly, in Veda¯nta cosmology. His characterization of a¯ka¯s´a as
a subtle, omnipresent and all-penetrating element from which all existents evolve in
a self-renewing fashion is indeed in agreement with basic Veda¯nta texts. However,
the notion that a¯ka¯s´a and pra¯n. a are the two main components of the universe is
not found as such in traditional Advaita texts. Furthermore, in his article “The
Ether,” Vivekananda mentions that “a¯ka¯s´a was, after the mind, the first material
manifestation. . . and out of this a¯ka¯s´a all this has been evolved.”16 This conception
is more typical of Sa¯m. khya — in which the formation of elements (bhu¯tas) follows
the emergence of cosmic mind (mahat) — than of Veda¯nta cosmology, according to
14Hacker, “Aspects of Neo-Hinduism.” In: Halbfass (ed.), Philology and Confrontation: Paul
Hacker on Traditional and Modern Veda¯nta, 240.
15ibid., 241.
16Translation found on Wikisource: Vivekananda, The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda.
In: Prose and Poems, Vol.9.
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which a¯ka¯s´a and other elements emerge first from Brahman to be then followed by
intellect (buddhi), mind (manas), etc. Therefore, we cannot refer to Vivekananda’s
a¯ka¯s´a as Advaitic in the traditional sense nor representative of the Hindu tradition
as a whole.
In the decades after Vivekananda’s travels to the West, many authors continued
to associate a¯ka¯s´a with the luminiferous ether in physics. For instance, the Bengali
scholar of Sanskrit and Indian philosophy Surendranath Dasgupta (1887-1952), in
his celebrated five-volume A History of Indian Philosophy, writes that “a¯ka¯s´a corre-
sponds in some respects to the ether of the physicists. . . ”17 More recently, in The
Shambala Encyclopedia of Yoga, Georg Feuerstein claims that a¯ka¯s´a “regarded as
the finest of the five material elements of the manifest cosmos. . . is similar to. . . the
luminiferous ether of nineteenth-century physics.”18 We could quote several other
parallels of that sort from popular science and “mysticism” books. In almost all
cases, however, the parallels drawn are superficial if not simply inaccurate. In many
respects, the luminiferous ether of physics diverges from the Veda¯ntic a¯ka¯s´a. First,
the ether possesses mechanical properties such as the ability to vibrate, viscosity, in-
compressibility, etc., whereas no such properties are ascribed to a¯ka¯s´a. Second, it is a
medium for the step-by-step transmission of light, which was believed before Einstein
to be impossible in empty space. The idea of a transmitting medium is essential here.
Though Upanis.ads relate a¯ka¯s´a to sound and the sense of hearing in some passages
(cf. ChU VII.12.1), the concept of a¯ka¯s´a as a medium for sound transmission is put
forward only in Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika. Thus, if we have to make a parallel it should be
with the Vai´ses.ika a¯ka¯s´a and not with the Upanis.adic a¯ka¯s´a — as Feuerstein and
others seem to do. Lysenko seems to agree in this sense when she says that “in its
role as the sound-substratum [in Nya¯ya-Vai´ses.ika], a¯ka¯s´a may well be translated as
“ether,” for the same reason that the light-substratum was thus called in nineteenth
century physics.”19
17Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Vol.1), 253.
18Feuerstein, The Shambala Encyclopedia of Yoga, under the word a¯ka¯s´a.
19Lysenko, op.cit., 423.
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This brings us to the parallels drawn between a¯ka¯s´a and quantum vacuum. It
is worth noting that conceptually the concept of quantum vacuum is somewhat in
continuity with that of ether. The notion of vacuum in quantum physics appears with
Dirac for whom the vacuum is not empty but filled with a “sea” of negative energy
electrons. Though it may not be productive to use the old notion of ether in this
context, it seems fair to say that his vacuum — as an all-pervading, material and
subtle substratum — played a similar role in quantum physics as ether in classical
physics. As one knows, in his later years, Dirac even ventured to posit the existence
of a “non-mechanical ether” in quantum physics. In a paper submitted to Nature in
1951, he says:
Physical knowledge has advanced very much since 1905 [the year when
Einstein published his paper on special relativity], notably by the arrival of
quantum mechanics, and the situation has again changed. If one examines
the question in the light of present-day knowledge, one finds that the
aether is no longer ruled out by relativity, and good reasons can now be
advanced for postulating an aether.20
In line with Dirac, Cantor and Hodge notice that “quantum theory has led to new
conceptions of ether, and not a few physicists have urged the necessity of some form
of ether theory.”21 Therefore, it must be borne in mind that even though Einstein’s
relativity put an end to the concept of ether in its pre-relativistic sense, ether has
continued to be invoked by scientists in various contexts till today. Given this rela-
tionship between vacuum and ether, it is no surprise that several conceptual parallels
have also been drawn between quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a.
Among the many claims comparing notions of Eastern spiritual traditions with
20Dirac, “Is there an aether?” Nature, 168 (1951): 906-07. According to Einstein, the existence
of ether is incompatible with the principle of relativity. There cannot exist an absolute frame of
reference like ether and one must accept that in principle a “perfect vacuum” exists. But in quantum
mechanics, says Dirac, the various properties of an hypothetical ether are subject to uncertainty
relations. It means, for instance, that the velocity of ether for a particular state at a certain point of
spacetime can be distributed over possible values according to probability laws. According to Dirac,
it is not impossible to “set up a wave function which makes all values for the velocity of the aether
equally probable. Such a wave function may well represent the perfect vacuum state in accordance
with the principle of relativity.” See: ibid., 906.
21Cantor and Hodge (eds.), op.cit., 53.
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concepts of quantum physics, some highlight the affinities between quantum vacuum
and a¯ka¯s´a in Hinduism. In Science and the Reenchantment of the Cosmos, published
in 2006, the Hungarian systems theorist Ervin La´szlo´ makes the following remark:
The latest cosmologies re-discover the cyclically self-renewing universe,
a cosmos that takes off from, and returns to, an enduring fundamental
medium. The ancient Hindu cosmology can be restated in contemporary
scientific terms simply by substituting “quantum vacuum” for a¯ka¯s´a.22
In La´szlo´’s opinion, the emerging idea in cosmology of a self-renewing universe out of
which matter and forces arise and return to cyclically is not new. It was foreseen a
long time ago in the Hindu concept of a¯ka¯s´a. According to ancient Hindu cosmology,
indeed, there is something that remains when all matter and forces in the world have
returned to their source: a¯ka¯s´a without any motion, or pra¯n. a. When pra¯n. a becomes
active again, the whole mental and physical universe evolves once more in various
forms. In the light of latest cosmologies, says La´szlo´, the quantum vacuum plays
exactly the same role as a¯ka¯s´a in Hindu cosmology: it is the substratum that remains
“alive” when the whole universe enters into a latent state, and it is the medium
through which this universe eventually takes existence again. This correlation is
explicitly established in the following excerpt of another paper:
[The quantum vacuum] is both the beginning and the end, the cradle
and the deathbed of universes. But, although they die, universes do not
stay dead: they come back to life as the vacuum re-energizes itself. The
vacuum is a¯ka¯s´a and pra¯n. a rolled into one: the dynamic virtual-energy
substratum that endures through all of time and fills all of space.23
Clearly, what is at stake here is vacuum as a “cosmic substratum” that is dynamic
in nature and all-pervading in space. La´szlo´ stresses the fact that vacuum endures
through all of time, and survives multiple births and deaths of universes. However,
22La´szlo´, Science and the Reenchantment of the Cosmos: The Rise of the Integral Vision of Reality,
89-90.
23La´szlo´, “The Old and the New Concept of a Self-Renewing Universe,” 3. This
article was found on Internet and does not seem to be part of any book (Source:
http://www.adebate.com/descargas/Saber/Selfrenewinguniverse.pdf).
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this is far from a commonly accepted view in the field. In fact, La´szlo´ grounds his
idea of the existence of many universes in some recent cosmological observations still
unexplained by the standard Big Bang model.24 To mention only two of them: 1. the
flatness problem: it is difficult to explain the (spatial) quasi-flatness of the present
universe without assuming there was an extreme “fine-tuning” of the conditions pre-
vailing in the early universe; and 2. the horizon problem: though in all probability
different regions of the universe have never “contacted” each other due to the great
distances between them, they still show similar physical properties.25 In order to
explain why the universe appears so fine-tuned cosmologically, La´szlo´ suggests that
the present universe might have emerged from a more fundamental “meta-universe”
existing beyond the observable universe.26
It is true that the abovementioned problems represent important shortcomings of
the standard Big Bang model. However, solutions have been proposed that should
reasonably be put to test before invoking the existence of “multiverses” — that is
of an ensemble of universes or universe domains — as an explanation of fine-tuning.
As of now, “cosmological inflation” provides an attractive and coherent framework to
account for the structure of the present universe. Though many inflationary models
exist that can satisfy the present observational data, there is hope that future ob-
servations will allow scientists to discriminate between these various models.27 Also,
the hypothesis of many universes is observationally and experimentally untestable. If
science is taken to involve testability, such a claim becomes problematic as a scientific
explanation.28 Further, the multiverse hypothesis represents “a regress of causation”
24As of now, the Big Bang model is the most accurate and comprehensive cosmological model
stating the initial conditions and subsequent development of the universe. It asserts that the universe
had its origin in a primordial dense and hot state around 13 billion years ago. Gradually, the universe
expanded and became colder giving birth to the various forces and forms of matter currently known.
25La´szlo´, Science et champ akashique: Une the´orie inte´grale du Tout, 34-35.
26ibid., 36.
27Langlois, D., “Lectures on Inflation and Cosmological Perturbations” (2010), 52-53 (Physics
Archives: http://arxiv1.library.cornell.edu/abs/1001.5259).
28Ellis, G.F.R., “Issues in the Philosophy of Cosmology” (2006) (Physics Archives:
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because the question remains as to how the multiverse originally came by the right
properties at the beginning to create that of our universe, and so forth.29 This does
not mean that the hypothesis is unreasonable philosophically speaking but only that
its scientific status is difficult to assess.
In La´szlo´’s view, quantum vacuum is substantial insofar as it carries light, energy,
pressure, sound and arguably information itself.30 In Science and the Akashic Field,
he takes resort to recent discoveries in quantum physics, post-darwinian biology and
consciousness studies to posit the existence of an all-pervading “field of information”:
the akashic field. This field, which he eventually locates in quantum vacuum, corre-
lates beyond space and time all the entities in the universe from atoms and galaxies to
cells and minds. In his view, quantum vacuum acts as a kind of “hologram” carrying
information on everything that exists and evolves in space and time. This is a feature
also shared, he says, by the so-called “akashic chronicle” that “conserves the trace of
all there is in the world, and all that ever was.”31 The point here is that even though
several facts seem to suggest a substantialist interpretation of vacuum, other view-
points can also be taken into consideration. For instance, the Casimir effect, usually
invoked to support the view that vacuum is filled with energy and fluctuations, can
be explained without relying on the notion of a fluctuating vacuum. As we have seen,
there is also ambiguity as to the ontological status of vacuum in virtue of the various
ontologies that can fit the QFT formalism. Moreover, from the general standpoint
of quantum physics, ascribing an objective status to a quantum entity has no signifi-
cance independently of the act of measurement. Recalling arguments by Bitbol and
d’Espagnat, is it even meaningful to talk of vacuum as an objective substratum filled
with energy and matter?
http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0602280).
29Stoeger, W.R. et al., “Multiverses and Cosmology: Philosophical Issues” (2008), 34 (Physics
Archives: http://arxiv.org/abs/astro-ph/0407329).
30La´szlo´, Science et champ akashique: Une the´orie inte´grale du Tout, 61.
31La´szlo´, “The Old and the New Concept of a Self-Renewing Universe,” 5.
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Furthermore, what La´szlo´ really means in the first quotation above when he refers
to a¯ka¯s´a in “ancient Hindu cosmology” is unclear. Hinduism does not possess a
uniform and commonly accepted cosmology. Reflections of a cosmological nature are
found in a multitude of texts and genres, from mythical and metaphysical speculations
in the Vedas and Pura¯n. as to more elaborate and systematic reflections of the classical
dars´anas. Given that La´szlo´ seems familiar with Vivekananda’s writings (he quotes
him in some of his books) and also that he often mentions a¯ka¯s´a in conjunction
with pra¯n. a, he probably has Vivekananda’s interpretation in mind when discussing
a¯ka¯s´a.32 When correlating vacuum with the “akashic chronicle,” La´szlo´ deviates in
important ways from the meanings given to a¯ka¯s´a in the Indian tradition. Neither
in the Upanis.ads nor in dars´ana literature do we find the idea that a¯ka¯s´a contains
and carries information about physical and mental facts of existence. The notion of
“akashic chronicle” (or “akashic records”) which he refers to originates in the Western
Theosophical movement during the late 19th century, and designates a non-physical
place wherein all knowledge and history — past and future, individual and collective
— would be stored since the beginning of time. Since its inception this notion has
remained in circulation in a number of forms in New Age literature, and La´szlo´ may
possibly be referring to some such prevalent idea.
In La´szlo´’s writings, we find an honest effort to build a synthetic view of the
world on the basis of insights coming from all fields of science. In line with “integral
thinkers” like Jean Gebser and Ken Wilber, he believes in an “authentic theory of
everything” that would integrate not only the physical world but also life, spirit and
culture on a scientific basis.33 However, as we have seen, a major problem with
La´szlo´’s approach is that some of the “scientific” facts invoked in support of his views
are either not unanimously accepted by the scientific community or simply beyond the
32As an example, La´szlo´ quotes the description of a¯ka¯s´a given by Vivekananda in his Raja-Yoga
(quoted above) in the introduction of his paper “The Old and the New Concept of a Self-Renewing
Universe.”
33La´szlo´, Science et champ akashique: Une the´orie inte´grale du Tout, 2.
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scope of scientific investigation. His comparison between a¯ka¯s´a (or “akashic field”)
and quantum vacuum is subject to the same fallacies. His notion of “akashic field”
as an all-pervading and interconnecting field of information is as hypothetical as his
description of quantum vacuum as a substantial medium at the origin and end of
multiple universes. Methodologically, he overlooks the multi-faceted nature of these
concepts and the fact that they also pertain to traditions of knowledge that are
diverse in terms of aims and methods. While reading La´szlo´, we also sometimes get
the impression that he uses the ancient Hindu a¯ka¯s´a to justify his own views about
quantum vacuum and more generally science itself.
A similar though less ambitious attempt has been made by Dr. Nrusingh Charan
Panda in his book Ma¯ya¯ in Physics, first published in 1991. Panda seems to share
with La´szlo´ the idea that a¯ka¯s´a and quantum vacuum both connote potentiality of
some kind. In several passages, he describes a¯ka¯s´a as the locus out of which particles
(and antiparticles) emerge and to which they return at the end of their existence.
Here are some examples:
. . . particles and antiparticles appear from a¯ka¯s´a (space). . . They originate
from space; they are dissolved into space (p.160).
The particle-pairs were formed out of a¯ka¯s´a and were again re-united to
be merged into a¯ka¯s´a (p.275).
Particles and antiparticles are produced from it [a¯ka¯s´a] and again they
are merged into it (p.277).
It is to be noted that Panda never explicitly identifies a¯ka¯s´a with quantum vacuum
per se. But there is good reason to believe that this is what he means since the
function of generating and taking back particles is generally ascribed to vacuum in
QFT. Strictly speaking, however, this can also be a property of the quantum field (of
which the vacuum is a specific state) and thus Panda identifies a¯ka¯s´a with field in
some passages:
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With the “field” concept in modern physics, a¯ka¯s´a is being considered
as field. The so-called void of a¯ka¯s´a is really full; from it micro-particles
jump out to appear and they dip into to disappear (p.5).
What we call “field” in quantum physics is described by three words in
the Vedic literature, viz., apa¯m˙-napa¯t or a¯pah. , pra¯n. a and a¯ka¯s´a. All
these three words represent three sub-states of a single state known as
“field”. . . A¯ka¯s´a or space is less subtle than pra¯n. a, but subtler than energy
and matter particles (pp.275-76).
In Panda’s view, then, a¯ka¯s´a is a latent or potential state “subtler than energy and
matter.” Though it looks like void or emptiness (s´u¯nya), it is not “nothing”: it is a
positive entity, a plenum full of potentiality but too subtle to be perceptible to our
senses. And yet, Panda considers a¯ka¯s´a on par with other physical existents insofar
as it is a created element. In line with S´an˙kara and other Advaitins, he believes that
a¯ka¯s´a “has no existence after the dissolution and before the creation and hence is
not ever present. It has been created in the process of cosmogony and it will be
dissolved in the process of dissolution.”34 In support of his claim, he takes his cue
from Veda¯ntic literature such as the Brahmasu¯tra (BS I.1.22; II.2.24) and Upanis.ads
(ChU I.9.1, TU II.1.1). On this point, he thus stands closer to the Indian tradition (in
particular, Advaita Veda¯nta) than La´szlo´ who considers a¯ka¯s´a to “endure through all
of time,” that is, beyond the dissolution or “death” of the universe. For that matter,
this is another aspect on which La´szlo´ deviates from traditional Veda¯nta teachings.
As far as his conception of vacuum is concerned, Panda seemingly follows La´szlo´
in taking vacuum as something substantial. As noted earlier, such an interpretation
is subject to criticism. Though there have been interesting developments in recent
years in favour of a field ontology (in which field/vacuum is substantial), the onto-
logical status of vacuum in QFT is still a much debated issue among physicists and
philosophers of physics. Furthermore, since the introduction of fermionic fields by
Jordan and Wigner in 1928, the definition and role of “substance” as a philosophical
category in physics has been deeply questioned. Overall, there is a lack of nuance in
34Panda, Ma¯ya¯ in Physics, 277.
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this regard in Panda’s study. In spite of this, one special feature draws our attention:
the rapprochement he makes with the concept of “unmanifest.” (avyakta) Panda
considers a¯ka¯s´a (and implicitly vacuum, which he also refers to as “space”) as a sub-
tle form of matter out of which particles are “created” and to which they inevitably
return when “destroyed.” But what is the meaning of “creation” and “destruction”
here? Here is Panda’s explanation:
. . . particles and antiparticles appear from a¯ka¯s´a (space). . . suddenly they
appear, transiently they live, for a billionth or a trillionth part of a sec-
ond they dance, and then they disappear. When they disappear, they
apparently vanish but they don’t become nothing. They originate from
space; they are dissolved into space. In the beginning they were unman-
ifested (avyakta); in the middle they became manifested (vyakta); and
in the end they became again unmanifested (avyakta). There is no gain
and no loss in this whole process. Really there is neither generation nor
annihilation.35
What is called “creation” consists in fact in a transformation from an unmanifest
(avyakta) to a manifest (vyakta) state of being. Conversely, “destruction” consists
in a transition from a manifest to an unmanifest state of being. In Panda’s view,
a¯ka¯s´a is the locus where the unmanifest becomes manifest by evolving from subtler
to grosser states, and vice-versa. In the process of evolution, gross and perceptible
matter in the form of particles and antiparticles emerges from a¯ka¯s´a, which is subtle
and non-perceptible; in the process of involution, what is gross returns to a subtle and
unmanifest state. There is no reason to believe, says Panda, that space, matter and
energy are created ex nihilo. The appearance of particles and antiparticles in vacuum
is not a phenomenon of nothing becoming something but one of transformation of
something into something else.36 Eventually, being subject to dissolution, a¯ka¯s´a will
also return to a subtler state of being, namely ma¯ya¯. In turn, ma¯ya¯ itself, the source
and final recipient of the whole universe, must also return to its unmanifested source:
Brahman, the “unbroken whole” that is also “pure consciousness.” Brahman is the
35Panda, op.cit., 160.
36ibid., 397-98.
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only Reality, the substratum underlying and supporting the apparent and ephemeral
phenomenal world.
No doubt, Panda’s explanations agree in detail with Advaita Veda¯nta teachings.
For instance, the correlation between a¯ka¯s´a, avyakta and Brahman is a recurrent
theme in S´an˙kara’s writings. The significant point here, however, is Panda’s use of
the concept of “unmanifest” (avyakta) as a way to link Advaita Veda¯nta conception
of a¯ka¯s´a with quantum vacuum in physics. A similar attempt has been made by
Dr. U. Chandrasekharayya in his book Veda¯nta and Modern Physics, published in
2006. Here, the author equates quantum field with S´an˙kara’s unmanifested avyakta:
both field and avyakta have the potential to manifest something — particles and
antiparticles on the one hand, and names and forms (na¯ma-ru¯pa) on the other hand
— and may be said to be in a state of readiness to do so.37 Unlike Chandrasekharayya,
however, it is not clear whether Panda identifies avyakta with vacuum (or field) itself
or with some other state of existence beyond vacuum. In any case, it seems pertinent
to ask whether physicists and philosophers of physics have really come to similar
conclusions in their approach to vacuum. Does quantum physics look upon vacuum
(or quantum field) as an “unmanifest” state of being, that is, a positive though non-
perceptible entity out of which the phenomenal world manifests itself? We shall
examine this question in more detail in the next section.
From our comparative analysis, it appears that Veda¯ntic a¯ka¯s´a and quantum
vacuum indeed share some conceptual affinities. Before proceeding further, it is useful
to summarize and comment upon them:
1. Substantiality : Quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a can hardly be equated with void
or pure nothingness; both seem to be endowed with a certain form of substan-
tiality. A¯ka¯s´a is one of the five maha¯bhu¯tas (from bhu¯, “to exist”), and is the
medium for the quality of sound; it pervades all bodies and is subtle (su¯ks.ma)
in nature. As to vacuum, it is widely recognized that pure empty space does not
exist in quantum physics: the fluctuations in the vacuum state strongly suggest
that the vacuum must be something substantial (though not in the classical
37Chandrasekharayya, Veda¯nta and Modern Physics, 408-09.
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sense of some “stuff” endowed with objective properties). The field ontology
in QFT, which is accepted by a large number of scientists and philosophers,
supports such an interpretation. However, there exist other possible ontologies
for QFT like particle, event, tropes, etc., in which vacuum does not obtain such
a status. In any case, we cannot equate a¯ka¯s´a and vacuum on the basis of their
“substantiality” given that the concept of substance obtains different meanings
in Advaita Veda¯nta and QFT;
2. Potentiality : Quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a denote the media from which the
manifest world comes into existence. A¯ka¯s´a gives rise to other elements —
air, fire, water and earth — and incidentally to all created things; in texts,
it is identified or correlated with concepts like avyakta, prakr. ti, ma¯ya¯, i.e., all
terms suggesting ideas of potentiality for creation and manifestation. Yet, for
S´an˙kara a¯ka¯s´a is only a passive intermediary in the process of creation initi-
ated by Brahman. From Dirac onwards, quantum vacuum has been described
as a reservoir containing particles and antiparticles that continuously pop into
and out of existence. Some philosophers (viz., Cao) have recently interpreted
vacuum as a “pre-substance, an underlying substratum having a potential sub-
stantiality.” Despite the fact that QFT can be understood without the notion
of a fluctuating and potential vacuum, the latter remains a consistent means to
explain/understand phenomena like Casimir and Unruh effects;
3. Cosmogonic primacy : Both Advaita Veda¯nta and modern physics admit that
the present universe is the outcome of an evolution process. A¯ka¯s´a is the first
material element to appear in S´an˙kara’s view and in most Advaita texts. Yet,
it has its ultimate source in the non-dual Brahman, with avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe
(or ma¯ya¯ in later Advaita) as an intermediary principle of creation. Quantum
vacuum stands as the “entity” (if entity there is) from which cosmogenesis takes
place insofar as it is at the origin of all elementary particles and carriers of field
interactions in QFT. This is also supported by cosmological inflation models
which argue that vacuum fluctuations played a crucial role in the early develop-
ment of the universe. However, inflation remains hypothetical, and given that
we have no consistent theory of quantum gravity, we are still unable to under-
stand spacetime and quantum dynamics of the vacuum state at the beginning
of the universe. Thus, the real implications of vacuum in cosmogenesis remain
currently unknown;
4. Non-perceptibility : Quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a are both non-perceptible as
such though their existence can be inferred in other ways. A¯ka¯s´a lies outside
the range of direct perception: it has no taste, no colour, no smell, etc. Yet, if
it cannot be perceived as it is, its existence can be inferred from its association
with certain qualities (sky colour, sound, etc.). Some later Advaitins, however,
argued that a¯ka¯s´a can only be known through “witness-consciousness” and not
through perception or inference. Strictly speaking, quantum vacuum equally lies
outside the range of direct perception: it has zero energy, zero momentum, zero
charge, etc., and as such cannot be detected with instruments. Nevertheless,
its existence can be inferred through vacuum fluctuations in the form of virtual
particles (predicted by Heisenberg’s principle). These virtual particles may
not be directly observable, yet they arguably have measurable effects on the
“real” world (ex: Casimir and Unruh effects). However, we must again bear in
mind: 1. these effects do not necessarily entail the physical existence of vacuum
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fluctuations; 2. because it is a quantum entity, it cannot be claimed that the
observed properties of vacuum are “objective,” i.e., present in the absence of
measurement;
5. All-pervasiveness: Quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a are both all-pervasive. Many
texts assert the all-pervasiveness (vibhutvam) of a¯ka¯s´a. But S´an˙kara explains
that it is all-pervasive only in a spatial sense, not with reference to things and
time: it is separate from other things and has a finite existence. Only Brahman
is all-pervasive with respect to space, time and things. Quantum field (of which
quantum vacuum is a state) can be said to be all-pervasive with respect to space
(it is embedded in the whole spacetime) and things (insofar as particles and
forces are a manifestation of quantum fields). Yet, it remains true that without
a proper theory of quantum gravity, the relation between quantum vacuum
and gravitational field remains unknown: the all-pervasiveness of vacuum is
not complete. Moreover, we must be aware that since quantum vacuum is a
quantum object, its properties are defined in the microscopic realm; no such
distinction exists in the cosmology in which a¯ka¯s´a is defined.
Given these affinities, it seems at first sight understandable that parallels would be
drawn between these concepts. However, a closer scrutiny reveals that mere concep-
tual affinities do not entail any kind of genuine correspondence between a¯ka¯s´a and
quantum vacuum. It is in no way possible to equate or identify these concepts as
referring to the same reality — an enduring, subtle and all-pervading physical sub-
stratum out of which the constituents of the world come into existence and to which
they ultimately return. Deep down, the attributes mentioned differ both in content
and in form. Thus, conceptual parallels of that sort cannot lead to a productive
exchange between modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. Each system has its own
conceptual and epistemological framework, its own aims and methods as well as its
own hermeneutical and historical issues. In almost all cases, however, this complexity
is either not taken into account or not properly addressed. Sometimes affinities noted
between a¯ka¯s´a and quantum vacuum seem to have an apologetic bias. The intention
is not to critically examine how both concepts relate to each other in terms of their
similarities and differences, but to associate them in a way to promote certain views
(such as the superiority of Veda¯nta over science, the “scientific” character of Veda¯nta
or the “mystical” nature of science). For these reasons, we believe that conceptual
affinities generally fall short of establishing a productive dialogue between modern
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physics and Veda¯nta.38 A more significant line of approach might be to compare how
these systems respond differently to similar philosophical problems. Such an approach
necessarily involves considering the various differences between the systems, therefore
leading to a deeper and more authentic exchange.
In the present context, we note that the conceptual affinities mentioned above
point to a remarkable epistemological fact arguably common to both Advaita Veda¯nta
and quantum physics: both Veda¯ntic a¯ka¯s´a and quantum vacuum would disclose the
existence of an unmanifest state preceding worldly manifestation. By “unmanifest”
we understand here a positive yet non-perceptible state of existence that is beyond
the scope of reasoning as well. It can be understood in a cosmological sense as that
latent state of existence preceding manifestation, and yet which constantly “supports”
manifestation. It can also be understood more generally in terms of the limits of
empirical knowledge, i.e., as “that” which remains inaccessible to sense-perception
and reasoning when enquiring into the nature of the world. Such considerations
invite deeper reflection as to how the broader concept of “reality” is assessed in
modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. As we shall see, in their attempt to define
the nature of reality both systems face a similar epistemological problem, namely the
impossibility to specify the whole content of reality by the means of sense-perception
and reasoning alone. Thus it is possible to argue that a¯ka¯s´a and quantum vacuum
function as such “epistemic boundaries” within their respective framework. Shifting
the comparative outlook from the conceptual to the epistemological level, we can try
to provide a more consistent basis for reconstructing the dialogue between modern
38That is not to say that conceptual rapprochements have no epistemological value whatsoever.
For instance, it might be worth noting that the idea of an oscillating universe emerging in modern
cosmology finds more resonance with the Hindu cosmological cyclical doctrine of creation than with
Western religious cosmologies. This shows how non-Western paradigms can also have relevance
in discourses at the intersection of science, philosophy and religion. What should be avoided is
the tendency to see in conceptual affinities “meaningful identities,” or the indication of a significant
relationship between the disciplines compared. Analogies might be tempting but upon closer scrutiny
they reveal nothing substantial, and do not seem to entail any constructive dialogue either.
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physics and Advaita Veda¯nta.
5.1.2 Epistemological Boundary
In Chapter 4, we looked into the diverse interpretations of a¯ka¯s´a in the main Hindu
dars´anas or schools of thought. Our analysis revealed the ambiguous character of
a¯ka¯s´a as both an element on par with other elements and an entity transcending
the very notion of element. In his short study on a¯ka¯s´a in Indian thought, Halbfass
depicts this ambiguity as follows:
. . . [a¯ka¯s´a] is not simply one element among others. It is something far
more elusive and ambiguous, something floating and oscillating between
being and nonbeing, something appearing as an entity in space, sometimes
as the openness and emptiness of space itself.39
In his view, the ambiguity characterizing a¯ka¯s´a reflects the disparity between two
interacting ontologies in Indian philosophy: a substantialist ontology and an ontology
of openness. In Advaita Veda¯nta more than in the other schools, the second ontology
obtains a prominent status. This ontology does not focus on the substance which
gives birth to entities, but on the “open space” in which they appear. Here allowance
is made for creation understood as a primeval event of separation and opening.40
Hence, a¯ka¯s´a in Advaita Veda¯nta is often emphasized not as a substance on par with
others but as an entity akin to (and sometimes synonymous with) the creator and
support of the world, Brahman. Further, a¯ka¯s´a is associated with the inner self,
a¯tman, and stands as its symbol in the “inner space of the heart.” (antah. hr.daya
a¯ka¯s´ah. ) No other element comes closer to the Absolute than a¯ka¯s´a, and so it has been
39Halbfass, “Space or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Thought.” In: Nair (ed.), Mind,
Matter and Mystery: Questions in Science and Philosophy, 85.
40Halbfass, On Being and What There Is: Classical Vai´ses. ika and the History of Indian Ontology,
31.
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described as “the first exhalation of the absolute. . . closer to the roots of our world
than anything else that may be found in it.”41
In Advaita Veda¯nta, the Absolute is the non-dual Brahman, which is beyond all
kinds of distinctions and non-different from pure awareness (a¯tman). As discussed
earlier, a most pressing question for Advaitins is: if Brahman is non-dual and beyond
distinctions, what can explain our experience of a plural world? How can Brahman,
which stands for pure awareness, give rise to this material world? Why should the
One become many, the self other-than-the-self? On the authority of TU II.1.1, the
Brahmasu¯tra (II.3.1-7) considers a¯ka¯s´a as the first evolute to emerge from Brahman
and as noted already, S´an˙kara agrees with it. But in order to solve the questions
above, S´an˙kara introduces a principle in between Brahman and a¯ka¯s´a so to say,
namely the “unevolved name-and-form.” (avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe) We already explained
the central role played by this principle within S´an˙kara’s cosmological scheme of
creation. Here we would like to emphasize in what sense it stands as an “unmanifest”
state of being in his Advaita philosophy. In the Veda¯ntic texts, unevolved name-and-
form is a state prior to the manifestation of the world, in which state names and
forms (na¯maru¯pe) — which specify the content of every individual manifestation —
are still unfolded (avya¯kr. ta) and not manifested (abhivyakta). BSB I.2.22 denotes
this state as b¯ıjas´akti, which means “seed potency” or “seed power,” indicating its
inherent power or capacity for manifestation. In S´an˙kara’s Upades´asa¯hasr¯ı (II.1.18),
it is described as the “seed of the world.” (jagadb¯ıjabhu¯ta) Similarly, in BSB II.1.14 it
is called the “seed of sam. sa¯ra and the phenomenal world.” (sam. sa¯ra-prapan˜ca-b¯ıja)
42
In all these passages, unevolved name-and-form is clearly understood as a latent
state from which the world comes into being. Insofar as it is potential and preceding
41Halbfass, “Space or Matter? The Concept of a¯ka¯s´a in Indian Thought,” 91.
42Hacker, “Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology of S´an˙kara: avidya¯, na¯maru¯pa,
ma¯ya¯, I¯s´vara.” In: Halbfass (ed.), Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and
Modern Veda¯nta, 68.
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world manifestation, it denotes an unmanifest (avyakta) state of being. But it is an
unmanifest ready to be manifest and transformed into something else. In S´an˙kara’s
view, the primal state of the universe is thus characterized by instability and in-
determinacy. In several instances, S´an˙kara uses the expression tattva¯nyatva¯bhya¯m
anirvacan¯ıya as an adjective qualifying the principle of “unevolved name-and-form.”
The term anirvacan¯ıya itself conveys the sense of something indescribable, inde-
finable, indeterminable, unspeakable; and thus, the whole expression means that
avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe is “indescribable as this or something else.”
43 In the words of
Hacker, the expression denotes:
. . . the instability of the primal state, which is not yet something but
desires to be made into something (vya¯cik¯ırs. ita). In a broad sense the
expression describes the unsteadiness of that about which one can never
say, “It is that” or “It is something else,” for just as it wanted to unfold
itself in the primal state, so now it always want to transform itself and is
never anything constant [sic].44
According to Hacker, the expression tattva¯nyatva¯bhya¯m anirvacan¯ıya, when juxta-
posed to unevolved name-and-form, carries important epistemological implications
for S´an˙kara. Because the primal state of the world is unstable — for it always wants
to be transformed into something else — it is indeterminate and unknowable as a
category of thought. Thus, in his Upades´asa¯hasr¯ı (II.1.18), S´an˙kara states that un-
evolved name-and-form is “known only to Brahman itself.” (svayam. vedya) In other
words, what is unmanifest cannot be known using the categories of the phenomenal
world, that is, what is manifest. In later Advaita, however, the term anirvacan¯ıya
is used in conjunction with sadasadbhya¯m instead of tattva¯nyatva¯bhya¯m, the former
implying an ontological judgement. For Advaitins following S´an˙kara, the expression
sadasadbhya¯m anirvacan¯ıya suggests the impossibility to prove that avidya¯ or ma¯ya¯
(or its product, the world) is or is not.45
43Mayeda, A Thousand Teachings: The Upades´asa¯hasr¯ı of S´an˙kara, 22.
44Hacker, op.cit., 73.
45Hacker, op.cit., 73.
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In post-S´an˙kara Advaita, ma¯ya¯ mainly assumes the role played by avya¯kr. te–
na¯maru¯pe in S´an˙kara’s cosmology. Like unevolved name-and-form, ma¯ya¯ explains
why the One becomes the many, the real the unreal, the self the other-than-the self.
It is the power (s´akti) of Brahman that at once conceals the non-dual and spiritual
Brahman and projects upon it the manifold material world. Preceding a¯ka¯s´a in the
evolution process, ma¯ya¯ obtains the same status as avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe in the hierar-
chical scheme of creation. As an example, in Upad II.1.19 it is said that “originally
unevolved, this name-and-form (na¯maru¯pe) took the name-and-form of a¯ka¯s´a in the
course of its evolution. . . ” Similarly, the much later text Siddha¯ntabindhu (138) says
that ignorance in the form of ma¯ya¯ first took the form of a¯ka¯s´a, which took the form
of air, etc. Already in S´an˙kara’s BSB, ma¯ya¯ is identified with avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe or
given a similar meaning. In BSB I.4.3, for instance, we are told: “That ma¯ya¯ is surely
unmanifest (avyakta), for it can neither be ascertained as real nor as unreal.” (avyakta¯
hi sa¯ ma¯ya¯ tattva¯nyatva niru¯pan. asya¯s´akyatva¯t) Though the term anirvacan¯ıya is not
used here, the same meaning is conveyed. Like unevolved name-and-form, ma¯ya¯ is
unmanifest as well as indeterminate. Perception and logical reasoning cannot disclose
the nature of ma¯ya¯, which is neither real nor unreal: “not real” because it is eventu-
ally sublated by the knowledge of Brahman, and “not unreal” because it manifests,
or projects, the world as something real until Brahman is known.
There is a correlation between avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe andma¯ya¯ as it is by the power of
ma¯ya¯ that the world of names and forms comes into being. There is also a correlation
between avidya¯ (ignorance) and both na¯maru¯pe and ma¯ya¯ in several instances. It is
because of avidya¯ that the complex na¯maru¯pe, which is manifested through the power
of ma¯ya¯, appears to be real. The three concepts differently explain or account for
the transition from the real Brahman to the “unreal” material world. Thus, in BSB
I.4.3 avyakta is equated with ma¯ya¯ but also with avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe, avidya¯, aks.ara
(“imperishable”) and a¯ka¯s´a. The series of identification suggests that these terms
are all interchangeable for S´an˙kara, at least in reference to the prime matter of the
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universe.46 But in contrast with S´an˙kara’s avya¯kr.te na¯maru¯pe, which has cosmological
connotations, ma¯ya¯ is a purely epistemological entity. Functionally, it is “that which
measures” (mı¯yate anena iti ma¯ya¯) our own unknowability of Brahman. In the realm
of ma¯ya¯, individuals and the world have a seemingly separate and objective existence
of their own. In this perspective, Brahman can only be approached as an “object” of
thought, different from the world and individuals. But Brahman is by definition pure
subject sui generis, and beyond the scope of perception and reasoning. In a certain
sense, then, ma¯ya¯ has the ability to awaken us to the understanding that through
perception and reasoning (which pertain to ma¯ya¯), Brahman cannot be known.47
In literature, a¯ka¯s´a is closely related to avya¯kr.te na¯maru¯pe. According to Hacker,
both a¯ka¯s´a and avya¯kr.te na¯maru¯pe are among the preferred expressions used by
S´an˙kara to denote the primal state of creation itself.48 In several places, a¯ka¯s´a is
described as the first material element to emerge from avya¯kr.te na¯maru¯pe or ma¯ya¯.
As a consequence, it can be said that the immediate cause of a¯ka¯s´a in Advaita Veda¯nta
is: ontologically, a potential and unmanifest state of being; and epistemologically, an
indeterminate state unknowable through perception and reasoning. In other words,
a¯ka¯s´a represents a boundary delimiting two domains: on the one hand, the unmanifest
and the unknowable (in a rational-empirical sense), and on the other, the manifest and
the knowable. However, it is crucial to understand that what is ultimately unknown,
indescribable, unmanifest and potential can only be Brahman according to Advaita.
In fact, neither ma¯ya¯ nor avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe have a reality independent of Brahman.
In Upad II.1.19, the relation between unevolved name-and-form and a¯tman, which is
identical with Brahman, is explained as follows:
[Originally] unevolved, this name-and-form took the name-and-form of
46Hacker makes the following remark: “But one should note that the equation of avidya¯ and ma¯ya¯
with na¯maru¯pa and avyakta occurs only in series of identifications. When they stand alone they
have their specific function. . . ” See: Hacker, ibid., 84-85.
47Ramakrishna Rao, Ontology of Advaita with Special Reference to Ma¯ya¯, 12-13.
48Hacker, op.cit., 84.
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ether [a¯ka¯s´a] in the course of its evolution from this very a¯tman [= Brah-
man]. And in this manner this element named “ether” arose from the
highest a¯tman, as dirty foam from clear water. Neither is foam [identi-
cal with] water, nor absolutely different from water, since it is not seen
without water. But water is clear and different from foam, which is of the
nature of dirt. Likewise, the highest a¯tman is different from name-and-
form which corresponds to foam. . . 49
The simile of dirty foam and clear water indicates that unevolved name-and-form is
neither identical with nor absolutely different from Brahman. Moreover, S´an˙kara’s
characterization seems to ascribe a lower reality to the unevolved name-and-form
as foam — which is of “the nature of dirt” (malaru¯pa) — comparing to Brahman
which is “clear,” (prasanna svaccha) and “pure.” (s´uddha) “Dirt” is unreal and
characterized by avidya¯, and thus na¯maru¯pe has been variously denoted as “made of
avidya¯,” (avidya¯kr.ta) “falsely constructed by avidya¯,” (avidyopastha¯pita) “consisting
of avidya¯,” (avidya¯tmaka) etc.50 Ultimately, avya¯kr.te na¯maru¯pe has no reality in-
dependently of Brahman and insofar as it has reality, it is a lower or transactional
kind of reality. Similarly, ma¯ya¯ has its foundation in Brahman as its inherent power
(s´akti). Though it has its own existence in appearance — the world appearing as in-
dependent and self-contained — it is fundamentally dependent upon, coeval with and
non-different from Brahman. The relation of ma¯ya¯ and Brahman is said to be one of
ta¯da¯tmya: it is neither identity nor difference nor both.51 In BSB I.4.3, the “unman-
ifest” (avyakta) itself — equated with ma¯ya¯ and avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe — is said to be
“subject to the supreme Lord, but not as an independent thing” (parames´vara¯dh¯ına¯
tv iyam asma¯bhih. pra¯g-avastha¯ jagato ’bhyupagamyate, na svatantra¯).
We might want to recall the controversy in BSB (I.1.22, I.3.41) as to whether the
word a¯ka¯s´a — featuring in passages like ChU I.9.1 and ChU VIII.14.1 — corresponds
to ordinary space or to the absolute Brahman. As we have seen, S´an˙kara concludes in
such instances that a¯ka¯s´a can only mean Brahman and not the usual space. The same
49Mayeda, op.cit., 23.
50ibid., 23-25.
51Sharma, A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, 274.
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idea applies here. As far as the prime matter of the universe is concerned, terms like
avyakta, avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe, ma¯ya¯, a¯ka¯s´a, etc., all point towards Brahman. From
the standpoint of the Brahman-experience, which is the viewpoint par excellence
in Advaita, there is no such thing as creation or creator. In this system, it must be
emphasized that the purpose of cosmological inquiry is only to draw one’s attention to
the unity of being, i.e., Brahman. Brahman itself is non-relational, neither an object of
thought nor a knower nor a witness. Because it is pure ontos, it is unknowable through
means of knowledge like perception and reasoning. And yet, Advaita Veda¯nta teaches
that Brahman can be known through a direct and non-epistemic kind of knowledge.
Through contemplation and a process of internalization, it is possible to intuitively
realize our deep identity and that of the world, with the Absolute Brahman.
It is significant that a¯ka¯s´a has been invoked in the Upanis.ads and later Veda¯nta
texts as an appropriate means for this realization. We have already shown how
a¯ka¯s´a — understood as the totality of external space — is an appropriate symbol
for the Absolute, with whom it shares several affinities: it is infinite, subtle, all-
pervasive, changeless, formless, etc. In the same manner, the a¯ka¯s´a within the heart
(hr.daya¯ka¯s´ah. ) is a symbol of the ineffable self (a¯tman) dwelling inside us. In our
inner “space,” the self — which is identical with Brahman — dwells as an unmanifest
and unknown witness. It cannot be perceived through sense-perception or inferred
logically; it can only be revealed through insight when freed of attachment to sense and
mind objects. Therefore, if a¯ka¯s´a arguably embodies a boundary between Brahman
and the manifest world, it can also be a portal, by means of inner contemplation, to
the nature of the unmanifest and unknown Absolute. However, it is important to
understand that notions like “boundary” and “portal” are meaningful only from the
standpoint of rational-empirical consciousness; they lose their significance once the
Absolute is self-revealed.
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Quantum Vacuum as an Epistemological Boundary
In Chapter 3, our analysis made it clear that vacuum is also subject to ambiguity in
quantum physics. Whether vacuum is endowed with substantiality or not is a hotly
debated issue among scientists and philosophers of physics as we have seen. Particle
ontology, for instance, gives prominence to particles and makes quantum field (and
vacuum) a mere mathematical device for generating particles and their interactions.
In contrast, field ontology features particles as epiphenomena of the primitive quan-
tum field; here, field and vacuum are real and autonomous substantial states of being
of which particles are manifestations. Conceptually, field ontology has the advantage
of being able to solve the wave-particle problem in quantum physics. Wave and cor-
puscular aspects of matter are no more exclusive to each other but different aspects
of the same reality — the quantum field. In this picture, the substantial vacuum
appears as a truly unifying concept accounting for the creation and annihilation of
particles and physical effects like Casimir and Unruh effects. The dilemma here is
that, according to Einstein’s special relativity — which has proved right since its
formulation in 1905 — vacuum must be a state of nothingness. We recall here Cao’s
statement of the problem:
On the one hand, according to special relativity, the vacuum must be
a Lorentz invariant state of zero energy, zero momentum, zero angular
momentum, zero charge, zero whatever, that is, a state of nothingness.
Considering that energy and momentum have been thought to be the
essential properties of substance in modern physics and modern meta-
physics, the vacuum definitely cannot be regarded as a substance. On
the other hand, the fluctuations existing in the vacuum strongly indicated
that the vacuum must be something substantial, certainly not empty.52
There is some ambiguity as to whether vacuum has substantiality or not. According to
relativity, it cannot be a substance whereas quantum physics depicts it as something
far from empty. The parallel with Halbfass’ description of the ambiguous nature of
52Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 176.
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a¯ka¯s´a in Indian thought is remarkable. Insofar as it is looked upon as a substance as
well as a state of pure nothingness, vacuum also is “floating and oscillating between
being and nonbeing, sometimes appearing as an entity in space, sometimes as the
openness and emptiness of space itself.” The parallel with a¯ka¯s´a is not so much
conceptual as epistemological: both concepts are elusive and ambiguous in ontological
terms, an indication that their object is also difficult to assess epistemologically.
Earlier, we raised the question whether vacuum can be reasonably interpreted as
an unmanifest state of being in quantum physics. As noted, Panda relates both a¯ka¯s´a
and quantum vacuum in terms of the locus where the unmanifest (avyakta) becomes
manifest (vyakta) in the process of creation of particles. Similarly, Chandrasekharayya
equates quantum field with the avyakta of S´an˙kara’s philosophy, and draws an analogy
between the “manifest” in both cases — that is, the virtual particles and the “names
and forms” respectively — which are both characterized by indeterminacy. In the
West, cosmologist Brian Swimme also raised similar ideas. In a 2001 interview, he
was asked whether modern science also accepts the existence of an “unmanifest”
realm besides the manifest realm characterized by space, time and and change. In
Swimme’s opinion, the unmanifest realm may well be represented by quantum vacuum
in physics. In contrast with Newtonian vacuum, which is broadly understood as a
place empty of things, quantum vacuum is full of things and events; it is dynamic
and pure generativity. However, he says, vacuum itself is not manifest and cannot
be an object of study:
You can’t go anywhere with this [quantum vacuum] in science because
you can’t study it. There’s nothing to study. But it’s there. It’s real. So
what we do is study its effects or manifestations, which we began to do in
the ’40s. There’s no question now for a physicist about the reality of the
quantum vacuum. Right now in this room, there are all kinds of particles
that are foaming into existence and foaming back out of existence. That’s
what we mean by the unmanifest. So you could say that at the root of
reality is space, time, and foam. It breaks with the Newtonian tradition
of thinking of the universe as a place in which things are happening. It’s
actually this fountain of generativity; every moment of our existence is
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another flaring forth from the quantum vacuum.53
Coming from a renowned scientist, this statement has far-reaching implications.
Insofar as vacuum is “pure generativity,” we can only observe its effects or manifes-
tations in the physical world. As discussed earlier, quantum fluctuations in vacuum
are responsible for the sudden appearance of virtual particle-antiparticle pairs that
usually last for a very short period of time. These “virtual” particles are not directly
observable, and their existence can only be inferred from their effects on the “real”
world. There exist a whole range of observable physical phenomena resulting from
the interactions of virtual particles: the Coulomb force is caused by the exchange of
virtual photons; the strong nuclear force between quarks is the result of interactions
between virtual gluons; the spontaneous emission of a photon results from the decay
of an excited atom; the Casimir effect and Lamb shift; etc. Though unobservable,
virtual particles are omnipresent. According to QFT, there is a “cloud” of virtual par-
ticles surrounding each elementary particle in the universe. For instance, the electric
field surrounding an electron has the ability to generate virtual photons of different
energies. Close to the electron, photons have a high energy; apart and extending
to infinity, photons have a low or null energy. If enough energy is available, virtual
photons can themselves create other virtual photons, and so forth. The same picture
is applicable to all particles in the universe.54
The vacuum is constantly subject to the frenetic activity associated with these
unobservable virtual particles. Therefore, it is fair to say that at a fundamental
level the vacuum is itself unmanifest : it remains beyond the scope of any kind of
perception, however precise it may be. Incidentally, no inference or logical reasoning
53This excerpt was taken from an interview conducted in Issue 19 of EnlightenNext
(Spring/Summer 2001). It can be found on: http://blog.enlightennext.org/2009/07/21/brian-
swimme-on-emptiness-and-the-quantum-vacuum/
54It must be noted, however, that the view of vacuum as “pure generativity” does not imply a
substantialist interpretation of vacuum as something “filled” with energy and matter. As “quantum
objects,” virtual particles cannot be envisaged as objective entities independently of the act of
measurement. Moreover, though their effects on the “real” world are measurable, it does not mean
that virtual particles themselves have a physical existence. What generates these effects — whether
we call it “virtual particles” or something else — is simply beyond the scope of perception.
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can really elucidate the nature of vacuum due to the lack of perceptual knowledge. As
Swimme says, there is “nothing to study. But it’s there.” This is exactly the paradox
Cao is referring to. On the one hand, because it is by definition devoid of any particle,
vacuum cannot be regarded as a substance; it is pure nothingness and thus “not there”
to be studied. On the other hand, vacuum fluctuations seem to point to something
substantial, certainly not empty. In this context, Cao has proposed that perhaps it
would be best to describe vacuum as a “pre-substance with a potential substantiality.”
Such pre-substance, says Cao, “can be excited to become substance by energy and
momentum, and become physical reality if some other properties are also injected
into it.”55 In other words, vacuum is an unmanifest and unobservable state that
can become manifest if rightly excited. It is revealing that human beings have a
central role to play in uncovering the deep nature of vacuum. In furnishing energy to
quantum vacuum, we can help materialize its unmanifest and infinite potentialities.
As physicist Basarab Nicolescu observes:
The full quantum vacuum contains in itself potentially all particles, whether
they have already been observed or not. It is we who have drawn most
existing particles from nothingness in building our accelerators and other
experimental apparatuses, whereas the “natural” world is much more
“economical”: the proton, the neutron, and the electron are sufficient
for constructing almost the whole of our “visible” universe. We are, in
this sense also, participants in a reality which embraces us, our particles,
and our universe.56
We noted earlier that the quantum vacuum also serves an important purpose in
the current understanding of the origin and evolution of the universe. Firstly, vacuum
has deep implications in the cosmological constant problem. Vacuum fluctuations give
rise to an enormous vacuum energy density that is believed to contribute significantly
to the cosmological constant. In turn, the cosmological constant plays an important
role in the physics underlying the acceleration of cosmic expansion. Secondly, in in-
flationary models vacuum fluctuations account for the formation of larger structures
55Cao, Conceptual Developments of 20th Century Field Theories, 176.
56Nicolescu, B., “Gurdjieff’s Philosophy of Nature.” (Source: http://www.gurdjieff-
bibliography.com/Current/index.html).
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in the universe such as galaxies. It has also been suggested that a vacuum fluctu-
ation could be responsible for the creation of the whole universe. Should we then
understand the vacuum to be the “medium” in which the Big Bang took place nearly
13 billion years ago? In fact, current theories are quite inadequate for the period
preceding 10−43 seconds after the Big Bang. At that time, called Planck time, the
universe was the size of an atom and had an extremely high temperature. At such
temperature, it is believed that the four fundamental forces of nature (weak, strong,
electromagnetic and gravity) were united together. At present, physicists are still
struggling to bring together these forces into a single theory. But at such a small
scale Heisenberg uncertainties become very significant, implying a very complicated
spacetime dynamics, and the energies involved are extremely high, which makes in-
vestigation in laboratories very difficult.
Despite theoretical difficulties and lack of experimental evidence, the best specula-
tion currently remains that the Big Bang occurred in the quantum vacuum. Current
cosmological theories regard vacuum as the primary material reality generating all
physical existents and interactions during cosmogenesis. The vacuum thus plays a
crucial role in the creation and early evolution of the universe, at least from a theo-
retical point of view. But the physics governing cosmogenesis is not understood well
enough to predict the exact implications of vacuum in the process. Beyond Planck
time, notions of space, time, matter and energy lose their common meaning. Concep-
tual and even mathematical language prove insufficient to properly describe physical
reality. The situation at the time t = 0 is even more complex. The Big Bang model
predicts a spacetime singularity at that time, which means that all matter and en-
ergy of the universe is compressed in a single point of space. Since all the known
laws of physics fall apart at the singularity point, the conditions at that time are
inherently unpredictable from the standpoint of physics. Given our inability to assess
the first moments of the universe, the profound nature of the cosmological vacuum
thus remains a mystery. Once again, though in another sense, the vacuum embodies
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an epistemic boundary beyond which we have no access conceptually, theoretically
and empirically.
It is worth noting that this conceptual failure is not only peculiar to modern cos-
mology but is a feature of most theories in modern physics. In special relativity, the
classical notions of absolute space and time are abandoned and replaced by the more
complex concept of a four-dimensional spacetime continuum. Conceptually speaking,
the latter cannot be visualized as such but only represented in highly abstract mathe-
matical terms. In quantum physics, physical reality becomes totally non-visualizable
as we enter the realm of the infinitely small. Several features of this theory — from
wave-particle dualism and indeterminacy to nonseparability — are simply not com-
prehensible within the logical framework of classical physics. In QFT, an extension of
quantum physics, particles and fields are no more independent entities but different
manifestations of a rather complex mathematical entity — the quantum field. Fur-
ther, as previously noted, quantum theories, in sharp contrast with classical physics,
do not ascribe the atomic world and its objects with objectivity in the classical sense.
In no case can we suppose that a physical system exists with definite properties prior
to measurement. This is a radical epistemological shift compared to classical physics.
As far as the vacuum is concerned, it means that its various properties are intrinsically
related to the measurement process. In a different manner, we revert to Swimme’s
claim that the vacuum itself cannot be a pure “object” of scientific investigation.
Having said this, the most appropriate ground to compare quantum vacuum and
a¯ka¯s´a appears to be epistemological rather than conceptual. In their respective frame-
work, both concepts disclose an unmanifest state of existence beyond the reach of
sense-perception and reasoning. In physics, the relation (or adequation) between vac-
uum and the “unmanifest” shows itself in various ways: 1. the unmanifest nature
of vacuum as “pure generator” of particles that are not directly observable; 2. its
unobservable character as a primary material reality in cosmology; 3. the impossibil-
ity of ascribing vacuum an objective and independent existence in quantum physics.
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In the current state of physics, taking QFT as the standard worldview, no other
deeper reality has been posited to underlie the vacuum or to explain its unmanifest
nature. However, in Advaita Veda¯nta S´an˙kara traces the origins of a¯ka¯s´a to the
unmanifest “unevolved name-and-form” (avya¯kr. te na¯maru¯pe) which in turn depends
upon Brahman for its existence. In Advaita Veda¯nta, Brahman ultimately stands
alone as unmanifest and unknowable: unevolved name-and-form, a¯ka¯s´a and the rest
of creation all derive from it. Not surprising then that several authors have equated
quantum vacuum with Brahman and other versions of the Absolute such as Spirit,
Consciousness, the Tao, the Void of Buddhism, and so on. But as Ken Wilber ob-
serves, the result of such an equation “has been calamitous” and “perhaps the single
biggest theoretical confusion in the entire field.”57
The problem here is clearly one of ontological categories: we cannot equate a
material reality with the non-dual Absolute. Firstly, insofar as it has properties and
qualities (ex: energy) and is theoretically embedded in space and time, the vacuum
cannot be identified with the qualityless (nirgun. a) Brahman of Advaita Veda¯nta; it
is part of the manifest realm like other physical entities. This is a point that has also
been noticed by Wilber:
. . . once you (mis)identify spirit with the quantum potential, there is no
other way to go. Precisely because the quantum potential is not actually
a radically formless or non-dual domain, it cannot serve as anything re-
sembling a genuine spiritual reality, but rather is simply one aspect of a
manifest realm that itself has qualities and quantities, and hence is not
the radically Unqualifiable.58
Secondly, vacuum has no spiritual or esoteric connotation in contrast with Brahman,
which is identified with a¯tman, pure awareness. Thirdly, to identify Brahman with
whatever concept is to bring the non-dual into the domain of duality. The non-dual
Brahman is not an “object” of perception and cannot be categorized as an object
57Quoted from: “Toward a Comprehensive Theory of Subtle Energies.” (Source:
http://wilber.shambhala.com/html/books/kosmos/excerptG/part2.cfm)
58ibid.
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of thinking either. It can only be known with direct insight and not through means
of knowledge pertaining to the manifest realm of ma¯ya¯. Expressed differently, we
cannot confuse absolute or non-dual truth (para¯vidya¯) with conventional or relative
truth (apara¯vidya¯). Both truths belong to distinct ontological realms. Relative truth
is concerned with the mundane world and its manifestations; it can be described in
logical and conceptual terms. Absolute truth cannot be categorized in any way; any
statement, by nature finite and relative, would reduce non-dual reality to something
it is not. Insofar as it has a precise role and definition in physical theories, the vacuum
is part of the relative, finite and manifest realm of ma¯ya¯; it belongs to the domain of
relative truth and as such can be studied through scientific means.
Nonetheless, vacuum has been described as “pure generativity” and something
that cannot be studied (Swimme), as a “pre-substance” (Cao) and as something with
no “pretention to an ontological status.” (Bitbol) As such, the vacuum is envisaged
as an unmanifest state of being which is not subject to scientific inquiry. Hence, what
vacuum might share with Brahman is not so much its creative or potential nature —
after all, from a non-dual standpoint there is nothing like “creation” — as the fact
that it embodies, like Brahman, the restriction of our investigation of reality through
rational-empirical means. Could we go further and take the unmanifest vacuum as
a “pointer” to a more fundamental reality? In the same way that a¯ka¯s´a is a means
to know Brahman, could we envisage vacuum in physics as an invitation to contem-
plate a higher and transcendental reality? Since physics is not particularly concerned
with esoterical or transcendental matters, this hypothesis seems hardly convincing.
However, a physicist could consider vacuum as a theme for personal contemplation.
The relationship established by Bitbol between vacuum and Na¯ga¯rjuna’s emptiness
(s´u¯nyata¯) points in that direction.59
59Bitbol notes that insofar as vacuum eludes any ontological characterization, it has a “thera-
peutic” function in that it contributes to overthrow mere “essentialist claims” about reality. We
could go further and say that following Na¯ga¯rjuna’s philosophy, such understanding could lead to
the direct realization that all phenomena — including our own body, senses and mind — are devoid
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL FOR DIALOGUE 249
5.2 Modern Physics and Advaita Veda¯nta
Our previous discussion has shown that conceptual affinities between a¯ka¯s´a and quan-
tum vacuum are not really productive. More relevant for us is that both concepts
disclose a similar epistemological situation within their respective system: the exis-
tence of an unmanifest state of being inaccessible to perception and reasoning. The
Advaita Veda¯nta tradition refers to this state as Brahman — described in the sacred
texts as non-dual, and of the nature of being (sat) and consciousness (cit). Though
Brahman gives rise and sustains the physical and mental realms of existence, it also
transcends them and is said to be qualityless (nirgun. a). It is unknowable through
perception and reasoning but it can be approached in a non-epistemic manner, i.e.,
through direct self-knowledge (a¯tmavidya¯). From a different perspective, modern
physics arguably envisages quantum vacuum as an unmanifest state of being out of
which the physical world (particles, radiation, forces, etc.) originates and on the
basis of which it maintains its existence. Though partly knowable through its ef-
fects on the “real” world, vacuum is not directly accessible through sense-perception
(and its extension in measuring devices) and reasoning. Hence, despite their obvious
differences — in terms of historical context, metaphysical framework and epistemo-
logical premises — both systems recognize the limits of perception and reasoning when
enquiring into the nature of reality.
In order to elaborate this point, two specific issues have to be tackled: 1. we must
first enquire further into the epistemology of quantum physics and compare it with
that of Advaita Veda¯nta. It is usually taken for granted that the scientific worldview
is strongly realistic in the sense that the world and its objects are independent “reals”
that we can study objectively. This stance would contrast radically with the abso-
lute idealism of Advaita Veda¯nta that takes Brahman, which is pure consciousness
of “self-nature” and “own-being.” See: Bitbol, L’aveuglante proximite´ du re´el: anti-re´alisme et
quasi-re´alisme en physique, 272.
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(a¯tman), as the foundation of reality.60 However, the question of realism in physics
has been debated by physicists and philosophers of physics on the basis of recent
insights into quantum physics. Realism has either been completely rejected or has
taken weaker forms to make room for some form of transcendence; 2. we must explore
the philosophical implications of an astonishing phenomenon predicted by quantum
physics, namely nonseparability. According to some scientists and philosophers, non-
separability might imply the existence of a “whole” underlying physical reality which
is not embedded in space and time. The relationship of consciousness with this whole
has also raised the attention of some philosophers of physics. These two philosophical
issues of contemporary physics deserve attention and will be discussed in the next
two sections. In the last section, we will provide what we consider useful guidelines
for a constructive dialogue between modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta.
5.2.1 Scientific Realism and Limits of Knowledge
In Chapter 2, we noted that one of the main implications of quantum physics was that
it is inherently impossible to know reality “as it is.” First, because the observer and
more specifically the measuring device, inevitably interacts with the observed system.
An atomic system is so tiny that no observation can be made without considerably
60As far as the external physical world is concerned, Advaita Veda¯nta adopts a naive realism. The
physical objects are concrete entities existing independently of the individual mind and the senses,
which apprehend them directly as they are. On its own level, the world is taken as real and thus
Advaita refutes the thesis of subjective idealism, which denies any reality to the external world by
reducing objects to collections of sense data in the perceiver. However, Advaita does not give ultimate
reality to the physical world and upholds the primacy of the spiritual reality, Brahman. According to
Satprakashananda, “Veda¯nta may be characterized as metaphysical or absolute idealism, inasmuch as
it maintains the ultimate reality of one undifferentiated supreme Consciousness and views everything
as identical with It in essence. . .Mental ideas and physical objects are both appearances from the
standpoint of fundamental reality.” Thus, the Advaita worldview should not be confused with
objective realism. See: Satprakashananda,Methods of Knowledge According to Advaita Veda¯nta, 66.
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affecting the system’s behavior. In quantum physics nothing can be said about the
properties of a system prior to measurement. The theory only provides probabilities
for measuring specific values corresponding to physical properties in an experiment.
Thus, we cannot construe “quantum objects” as entities endowed with fixed and
objective properties independently of measurement. Second, and more generally, what
the physicist is looking at is never “reality-in-itself” or “things-in-themselves,” but a
mediated reality in the form of concepts, models and abstract mathematical symbols.
As British physicist Sir James Jeans explains, discussing the study of modern physics:
. . . we can never understand what events are, but must limit ourselves to
describing the patterns of events in mathematical terms; no other aim is
possible. . . Physicists who are trying to understand nature may work in
many different fields and by many different methods; one may dig, one
may sow, one may reap. But the final harvest will always be a sheaf of
mathematical formulae. These will never describe nature itself, but only
our observations on nature. Our studies can never put us into contact
with reality; we can never penetrate beyond the impressions that reality
implants in our minds.61
Virtually all the great physicists in the last century, from Planck and Bohr to Heisen-
berg and Schro¨dinger, did agree with this. They also believed that to equate insights
from physics with mystical truths amounted to a profound confusion. If physics deals
with symbols and constructions of reality, mysticism is rather concerned with a direct
and nonmediated approach to reality. It is worth asking then, why these same physi-
cists (and not those of the previous era) took interest in Eastern thought, as noted in
Chapter 2. What features of the “new physics” (i.e., quantum and relativistic) were
conducive to appreciate Eastern mysticism and philosophy? In Quantum Questions:
Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists, Ken Wilber examines this ques-
tion in the light of the writings of several important physicists. In their view, Wilber
notices, there is a crucial difference between the “new” and the “old” physics: if both
“physics” deal with symbols of reality, the “new physics was forced to be aware of
that fact — forced to be aware that it was dealing with shadows and illusions, not re-
61Jeans, Physics and Philosophy, 15.
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ality.”62 In the 1920s, when quantum physics was being created, the British physicist
Arthur Eddington said that“the frank realization that physical science is concerned
with a world of shadows is one of the most significant of recent advances.”63 The
father of wave mechanics, Erwin Schro¨dinger, commented on this important result:
Please note that the very recent advance [of quantum and relativistic
physics] does not lie in the world of physics itself having acquired this
shadowy character; it had ever since Democritus and Abdera and even
before, but we were not aware of it; we thought we were dealing with the
world itself.64
In other words, this “shadowy character” is not peculiar to quantum physics; it is
characterizing every scientific enterprise yet it shows itself more clearly in the light of
the epistemological changes entailed by quantum theory. In the same line of thinking,
Sir James Jeans said:
Many would hold that, from the broad philosophical standpoint, the out-
standing achievement of twentieth-century physics is not the theory of
relativity with its welding together of space and time, or the theory of
quanta with its present apparent negation of the laws of causation, or the
dissection of the atom with the resultant discovery that things are not
what they seem; it is the general recognition that we are not yet in con-
tact with ultimate reality. We are still imprisoned in our cave, with our
backs to the light, and can only watch the shadows on the wall.65
The deep understanding that we have no access to ultimate reality in the “new
physics” but only to “shadows on the wall,” had a significant impact on the great
physicists of the last century: it led the most sensitive among them to look “outside
the cave,” i.e., beyond physics, to know more about this reality. Their interest for
the doctrines, ideas and concepts of Eastern philosophies corroborates this. It is not,
as many authors believe, that there are particular affinities between the worldviews
62Wilber (ed.), Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists, 9.
63Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, 282.
64Schro¨dinger, Mind and Matter, 42.
65Jeans, The Mysterious Universe, 111.
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of physics and mysticism. As Wilber rightly points out, it was the “radical failure
of physics, and not its supposed similarities to mysticism, that paradoxically led so
many physicists to a mystical view of the world.”66
In the decades to come, physicists and philosophers of physics would question
more deeply the pertinence of realism in physics. In the philosophical sense of the
word, realism involves the notion of reality-per-se, i.e., a reality conceived of as to-
tally independent of our possible means of knowing it. Every realist conception also
involves the belief that we can build a representation of independent reality on the
basis of our experience. This representation is of a varied nature, and thus we find
different versions of realism in science.67 In his important book On Physics and Phi-
losophy (2006), theoretical physicist Bernard d’Espagnat discusses whether or not
physical realism still has relevance in contemporary physics. As we shall see later, on
the basis of nonseparability d’Espagnat is led to distinguish between two concepts of
reality: empirical and ontological reality. Empirical reality refers to the set of phe-
nomena that the totality of human experience has access to; ontological reality is the
notion referred to when “what exists independently of our existence” is thought of or
alluded to.68 D’Espagnat defines the statements made by quantum physics as weakly
objective, as opposed to strongly objective statements made in classical physics. If the
latter statements refer to things-in-themselves without reference to human agency
66Wilber (ed.), op.cit., 10.
67Several forms of scientific realism are described by Bernard d’Espagnat in his book On Physics
and Philosophy (pp.24-31), among which: 1. objectivist realism: reality consists of a familiar group of
impressions such as properties of objects, quantities, values of quantities, forms, and more specifically
objects themselves; 2. Einsteinian or mathematical realism: reality consists of notions borrowed from
mathematical physics (ex: four-dimensional spacetime, curvature of spacetime, etc.); 3. ontological
realism: reality is Being, that is, ultimate reality and it can be reached by means of science; 4. open
realism: it says that there is “something” real the existence of which does not hinge on thought;
5. near realism: reality consists of clear and distinct notions like figures, sizes and motions, and
thus this form of realism is a restricted version of objectivist realism; 6. structural realism: only
“structures” present in the mathematical or conceptual content of theories are real.
68d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, 4.
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(i.e., to ontological reality), the former involve the notion of an observer but in such a
form that they implicitly claim to be true for any observer whatsoever.69 Because it
involves human interaction in a fundamental way, quantum physics is not concerned
with reality-per-se but only with empirical reality. As d’Espagnat says about the
implications of quantum physics:
I think that our scientific knowledge finally bears, not on reality-in-itself —
alias “the Real,” alias “the ground of everything” – but just on empirical
reality, that is, on the picture that, in virtue of its structure and finite
intellectual capacities, the human mind is induced to form of reality-in-
itself.70
What this means is that quantum physics is not concerned with “objects-per-se”
but only with our representation of these objects. Electrons, quarks and their com-
posite objects cannot be thought of as self-existent.71 That is not to say that reality is
69The central focus of quantum physics is to provide rules that yield the probabilities that if such
or such measurement is made on a system prepared in such and such a way, such and such a result
is obtained. Insofar as they yield results valid for everybody, the statements of quantum physics
are objective; but insofar as these statements necessarily require human agency, they are weakly
objective and not strongly objective. See: d’Espagnat, op.cit., 93-94.
70Quoted from an article by Mathew Iredale in TPM (The Philosopher’s Magazine) in June 2009
(Source: http://www.philosophypress.co.uk/?p=283).
71The question might arise here whether quantum physics is a universal theory or not, i.e., whether
its results also apply at the macroscopic level or not. If not, then quantum physics is only a theory
of the atomic world and has no bearing on the broader problem of reality as experienced by human
beings in their daily life. But the fact is that quantum physics seems to be such a universal theory.
First, the laws of quantum physics apply in practically all fields of physics, from solid-state physics to
elementary particle physics. Second, it is quite a precise theory insofar as its observational predictions
have most of the time agreed with observed facts. Third, there is evidence that we can express the
laws of classical (macroscopic) physics in terms of a set of predictive rules, and that these rules
follow from those of quantum physics. Moreover, with the recent insights into the phenomenon of
“decoherence,” a great step forward towards understanding the “classical appearance” of a quantum
world has been achieved. In particular, decoherence might explain why macroscopic objects are
always seen to be localized in space while at the microscopic level objects are “entangled” together.
For more details, see: d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, Chapter 8; 459.
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a purely mind-made construct as radical idealism would believe, and that there is no
place in d’Espagnat’s thought for reality-in-itself. In On Physics and Philosophy, he
puts aside arguments of antirealists and idealists and argues in favour of “open real-
ism.” Firstly, in his view the fact that some laws of physics persist to be valid in spite
of the changes in the theoretical framework of physics suggests “something of which
the existence does not proceed from human mind.” Physics relies on descriptive and
predictive laws that were arguably not invented, but discovered. Though it is true,
as d’Espagnat says, that human beings impart to laws a certain form, they cannot
be arbitrarily different. In other words, the physical laws do not totally depend on
us, which means that they depend on “something else.”72 Secondly, intersubjective
agreement between different observers about specific experimental results is hardly
explainable without reference to some human-independent reality. In view of Bell’s
theorem and experiments on nonseparability, d’Espagnat is led to admit the existence
of an independent reality (“Real” or “reality-in-itself”) that is neither multitudinist
(i.e., composed of parts) nor embedded in spacetime. As such, its nature remains
beyond the scope of perception and reasoning, that is, beyond the scope of scientific
inquiry. D’Espagnat still concedes that we can get glimpses of the general structure
of reality-in-itself through the great laws of mathematics and physics, and thus he
refers to the latter as veiled reality.
D’Espagnat’s thesis has been criticized by two other French philosophers of sci-
ence, Michel Bitbol and Herve´ Zwirn. In Chapter 3, we briefly discussed Bitbol’s
pragmatic-transcendental interpretation of quantum physics. In contrast with the
kind of realism advocated by d’Espagnat, Bitbol believes that quantum physics does
not deal with a pre-structured and independent reality. In his view, one of the main
problems with d’Espagnat’s realism is the epistemological accessibility of reality-in-
itself. If it is possible, like d’Espagnat says, to get glimpses of reality-in-itself, it means
that the latter is describable and knowable in some way. All knowledge being a priori
72ibid., 117-18.
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relative to something, it must be admitted that scientific inquiry is in some relation
with reality-in-itself, which amounts to say that the latter is identical with empirical
reality.73 In response to this criticism, d’Espagnat explains that if we cannot indeed
have a discursive and precise knowledge of reality-in-itself (which would make it a
mere object of knowledge), a vague “grasping” of its general features is possible. But
this implies that ultimate reality should be structured in some way, and this is indeed
d’Espagnat’s conception:
The Veiled Reality conception. . . involves the conjecture that our great
mathematical laws are highly distorted reflections — or traces impossible
to decipher with certainty — of the great structures of “the Real.”74
Such structural characterization of reality-in-itself, however vague it is, remains a
descriptive statement for Bitbol. Since the very concept of description is always
relative to some perceptual, instrumental and intellectual context, reality-in-itself
must be empirical and not transcendental.75 On this point, d’Espagnat contends
that if observational predictive rules and empirical laws of physics are indeed relative
to some context, they arguably do not depend exclusively on it.76 This is why specific
experiments can reveal if a theory is adequate or not: reality-in-itself “resists” in a
certain way our attempts to understand it. Nevertheless, d’Espagnat is clear about
the fact that nothing positive can be said about the “Real” or its properties: it is by
understanding what it is not that we can have a glimpse of reality-in-itself.
Notwithstanding these arguments, Bitbol has strong reservations regarding the
idea that scientific facts can provide us with information about the “Real” or its
structure. In a paper entitled Le re´el-en-soi, l’inconnaissable et l’ineffable, Bitbol
gives five reasons against the possibility of knowing reality-in-itself on a scientific
basis: 1. its infinite complexity; 2. the “blinding proximity” of the knowing subject
73Bitbol, L’aveuglante proximite´ du re´el: anti-re´alisme et quasi-re´alisme en physique, 101.
74d’Espagnat, op.cit., 455.
75Bitbol, op.cit., 123.
76d’Espagnat, op.cit., 387.
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(which makes impossible to treat reality-in-itself as a proper object of knowledge); 3.
the limited nature of scientific methods; 4. the irrelevance of applying epistemological
notions of knowledge to something of a radically different ontological order; 5. the
inevitable limits of the concept of reality-in-itself.77 He conludes his paper with the
following remark:
. . . the question of a relation between our scientific knowledge and reality-
in-itself is not decidable, and by construction doomed to be so. No scien-
tific result. . . offers an irrefutable guarantee of its isomorphism with any
aspect of reality-in-itself.
In Les Limites de la Connaissance, philosopher of science Herve´ Zwirn also criticizes
d’Espagnat’s conception but on a different ground. Against d’Espagnat’s argument
that “something says no” and that this “something” cannot be us but only an in-
dependent reality, Zwirn argues that it implicitly assumes that a mind construction
cannot generate contradiction; but this is not logically necessary. In a conception
in which everything is assumed to be mind created, chances are that what we call
“reality” could well be an unconscious “perceptual construction.” Given that even
in formal and explicit constructions consistency is sometimes difficult to ascertain, it
could be possible that “from time to time, we should discover contradictions revealed
by discrepancies between our theoretical constructs and the particular construct that
we call the Real.”78 But, d’Espagnat argues, if theoretical and perceptual constructs
are exclusively constructions, how is it that when testing our theories we always choose
to believe the information yielded by the corresponding perceptual constructs rather
than the one yielded by the theory? Why not proceed the other way around? Since
this procedure seems absurd, Zwirn’s hypothesis cannot reasonably be maintained.79
77Bitbol, M., “Le re´el-en-soi, l’inconnaissable, et l’ineffable.” Annales d’Histoire
et de Philosophie du Vivant (Vol.1) (1998): 143-152. (Source: http://pagesperso-
orange.fr/michel.bitbol/Reelensoi.html)
78Zwirn, Les limites de la connaissance, 336.
79d’Espagnat, op.cit., 391.
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In fact, both Bitbol and Zwirn seem reluctant to forsake the notion of reality-in-
itself. As noted by d’Espagnat, in Bitbol’s thesis the concept of reality remains as a
kind of “limiting concept.” For instance, Bitbol writes: “What remains screened from
criticism. . . is the abstract concept of a reality conceived of as setting limits to the
determining power and factual and symbolic activity of the experimentalist.”80 As
for Zwirn, he recognizes the need for “something” along the lines of open realism but
refuses to give it explicit “existence.” Like d’Espagnat, he also distinguishes different
levels of reality — amounting to three — in his conception:81
1. Phenomenal reality : This level of reality corresponds more or less to d’Espagnat’s
concept of empirical reality. It is the form taken by empirical reality (in Zwirn’s
sense; see below) for each individual. As such, it is plural. It is what is known
through the conceptual filters of language, culture, education and through the
filters of our sense organs. It is repre´sentable, which means that we can form a
clear mental image of it (ex: a table, records of data on computer screens);
2. Empirical reality : In contrast with phenomenal reality, empirical reality is not
repre´sentable but only conceptualizable, which means that we can talk about
it and describe its effects but cannot have a mental representation of it (ex:
entangled states in quantum physics, spacetime continuum). Empirical reality
is one and yet it can be actualized in different ways by individual consciousness.
In other words, phenomenal realities are the different viewpoints from which
we can represent to ourselves empirical reality. It is the unknown that can be
known and in this sense, it does not exist independently of human beings;
3. “Something”: Zwirn considers naive to assume that what is conceptualizable
“exhausts the world.” On the other hand, we cannot say that something non-
conceptualizable exists because to say so is to associate it with the concept of
“existence.” This “something” is neither repre´sentable nor conceptualizable: it
is the unknowable. At most, it can only be characterized negatively or described
indirectly through analogy.
In line with early quantum physicists, contemporary philosophers of physics also con-
tend that there are inherent limits to scientific knowledge. The three philosophers
studied here — who are considered important philosophers in today’s scientific com-
munity — unanimously reject the idea that physics deals with a mind-independent
80Quoted from: d’Espagnat, op.cit., 452.
81Zwirn, op.cit., 357-65.
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reality (or things-in-themselves). They depart from each other on whether reality-
in-itself still has relevance or not, and whether it can be known in some way or
not. If Bitbol tends to dismiss the very notion of reality-in-itself, d’Espagnat and
Zwirn both accept the idea of “something” lying beyond empirical reality. But there
are differences between d’Espagnat’s and Zwirn’s conceptions. Whereas d’Espagnat
concedes “reality” and “existence” to this “something” (which he terms “reality-in-
itself,” “Real,” “veiled reality” or “Being”), Zwirn denies any such characterization
except that it is unknown. For Zwirn, this “something” is totally inaccessible while
d’Espagnat holds that the “Real” is structured and that some of its structure passes
into the laws of physics. Unlike d’Espagnat, Zwirn does not believe that there is
“something” beyond empirical reality based on “resistance” to our theories. In his
view, “something” is inferred from the fact that we cannot reasonably accept that
conceptualization exhausts the world.
5.2.2 Nonseparability and d’Espagnat’s Ontological Reality
In the last decades, an astonishing discovery in the field of quantum physics has shed
new light on the problem of realism in physics: nonseparability. Perhaps no previous
discovery in the history of science has posed more challenges to our understanding
of physical reality than this phenomenon. Nonseparability was revealed in a series
of rigorous experiments testing predictions based on a theorem formulated by John
Bell in 1964. This theorem was a response to questions raised by the so-called EPR
thought experiment proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in 1935 (see section
2.1.2). This experiment aimed to challenge the view, central to Bohr’s Copenhagen
interpretation, that we can never report the state of an atomic system before measure-
ment. In the view of Einstein and his colleagues, every element in a physical theory
should have a counterpart in physical reality, a view often referred to as classical
realism. As a consequence, it should be possible to define with certainty the value
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of all physical properties of a system (position, momentum, etc.) prior to measure-
ment and if quantum physics does not allow this, it is because it is an “incomplete”
theory.82 Bell’s theorem was predicting that certain kinds of measurement involving
correlations between pairs of particles could prove whether quantum theory is com-
plete or not. The theorem was tested for the first time in Alain Aspect’s experiments
(1980-82) in France and has been tested a number of times since then.
In Chapter 2, we discussed one version of the EPR experiment in which the infor-
mation about one particle (ex: a spin component) is used to deduce complementary
properties (ex: another spin component) of another particle. Most experiments test-
ing Bell’s theorem involve pairs of particles that originate in a single quantum state
like that featured in the EPR experiment. In most cases, experiments are conducted
with pairs of photons and the property measured is their polarization state.83 Given
Heisenberg’s indeterminacy, we cannot predict with certainty what will be the polar-
ization state of a single photon in any given measurement. What we have is only a
random series of measurements of polarization. But since the polarizations of paired
photons are equal and opposite (like spin components in EPR experiment), the ran-
dom series corresponding to one photon should correlate precisely with that of the
other photon if the experiment is conducted a sufficient number of times. We will
not describe in detail here the nature of experiments testing Bell’s theorem. What is
important to understand is that those experiments have undoubtedly shown that pho-
tons are correlated instantaneously over any distance. Moreover, this phenomenon
82Incompleteness in quantum physics is the claim that the quantum state of a physical system does
not give a complete description of the system. For a minority of physicists, the statistical nature of
quantum physics indicates the incompleteness of this theory; for a theory to be complete, it must
be deterministic. A “complete” or “right” theory must account for all observable behaviour and
not leave anything to chance. This belief gave rise to “hidden-variable theories,” in which variables
not currently known are posited that would make the theory understandable in deterministic terms.
The currently best-known hidden-variable theory has been formulated by David Bohm in the 1950s.
83The polarization of a wave is described by specifying the direction of its electric field at a point
in space.
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holds for every pair of quanta having interacted together and grows exponentially
with the number of particles involved in the original quantum state.84 Since virtually
all particles in the history of the cosmos have interacted with other particles from
the Big Bang to the present, nonseparability may be said to be a general property of
nature.85
The scientific and philosophical implications of nonseparability are far-reaching.
According to Einstein and other supporters of classical realism, to explain correlation
we must accept that properties of both particles are already well-defined before mea-
surement. Otherwise, the properties of one particle would depend upon the process of
measurement carried out on the other particle. Given that both particles are located
far away from each other, this would imply that they can instantaneously influence
each other without direct mediation, thus violating the sacrosanct principle of local-
ity. But experiments on Bell’s theorem prove precisely what the quantum formalism
predicts: that correlations exist regardless of the distance between the two particles.
Two explanations are possible here. If we hold the view that physical reality has an
independent existence (classical realism), we must accept that this reality supports
direct influences at a distance between objects (nonlocality); this is the view held in
Bohm’s hidden-variable theory (1952).86 The second explanation, in line with Bohr’s
84Mermin, “Extreme Quantum Entanglement in a Superposition of Macroscopically Distinct
States.”
85d’Espagnat, In Search of Reality, 43-48. It is also important to understand that Bell’s theorem
is valid independently of any theory. The theorem is based on the violation of locality, which is a
direct consequence of experimental data. Even if quantum physics is replaced by some other theory
based on different concepts in the future, the consequences of Bell’s theorem will remain valid.
86In this approach, nonseparability is envisaged as a real attribute of the physical system con-
stituted of the two particles. This means that the measurement on a particle has an immediate
long-distance effect on the other distant particle. Technically, the distant particle gets a wavefunc-
tion — here understood as an element of reality — that it did not previously have. However, the
principle of locality formulated in special relativity, according to which no influence can travel faster
than light, is not violated here. In Bohm’s theory, no superluminal transfer of information is in-
volved since no event actually interacts with another event in the “explicate realm”: all events are
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Copenhagen interpretation, upholds locality and gives up the views of classical real-
ism. Most physicists today tend to favour this view. It maintains that we cannot
define the properties of a particle independently of the measurement process. Prior
to measurement, the “two” particles constitute in fact a single correlated whole: they
are nonseparable from each other and remain so until measurement “separates” them.
With measurement each particle “acquires” individuality but this is not separate from
the act of measurement itself. In other words, individuality is not an objective feature
of reality but only a manifestation of the observer’s knowledge of reality.87
What is the impact of nonseparability on the problem of realism in physics? Ac-
cording to the standard view, nonseparability implies that prior to measurement it
is impossible to ascribe individual properties and independent existence to systems
that have interacted together. Ontologically speaking, this means that we can no
more consider the universe as constituted of separate entities endowed with definite
objective properties and interacting only locally with each other. What d’Espagnat
calls the multitudinist view, i.e., that the whole universe is a composition of parts,
no more holds in quantum physics. One consequence of this is that we must come
up with the concept of empirical reality. If we hold only to the view of classical real-
ism, according to which what we apprehend is reality-in-itself, we can hardly explain
why at the level of observable phenomena everything occurs as if the universe was
constituted of parts isolated from each other. For this reason, we must accept the
existence of an empirical reality, that is, of a reality envisaged as a set of phenomena
deeply interconnected within what he calls the “implicate order.” The term “nonlocal” applies to
this theory because it admits a direct influence of one object on another distant object, but not
because it violates the principle of locality defined in relativity.
87In a more technical form, it means that before measurement we cannot treat each particle as
describable by a wavefunction of its own. In cases where particles originate in the same quantum
state, such individual wavefunctions simply do not exist. Only the wavefunction characterizing the
pair of particles can be introduced. Thus, one speaks of nonseparable wavefunctions or, alternatively,
of the entanglement of particle wavefunctions. It must be noted that in this conception no faster-
than-light influence explicitly appears. See: d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, 53.
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perceived and acted upon by human beings. In contrast with classical physics, quan-
tum physics thus implies a turning away from any version of naive realism. However,
most of the phenomena that compose empirical reality exhibit no features that could
be called “nonseparable.” According to d’Espagnat, this forces us to accept also the
notion of a human-independent reality — an ontological reality — that is not consti-
tuted of distinct parts. As he says, nonseparability “confirms the necessity of at least
distinguishing between the two notions of mind-independent and empirical reality.”88
As noted above, d’Espagnat is nonetheless reluctant to ascribe properties to
human-independent or ontological reality. As he explains, the implications of Bell’s
theorem about ontological reality are basically negative:
. . . Bell’s theorem does not infer from the phenomena the existence of some
property that, transcending the said phenomena, would be ascribable to
mind-independent reality. It merely shows that if we build up too naive
a representation of the latter (the one corresponding to locality) we get
results that experiment falsifies. Aiming at changing this essentially neg-
ative statement into a positive one might well result in a description of
some alleged property of mind-independent reality. For the above stated
reasons, such a move would not be justifiable.89
Fundamentally, science cannot describe positively reality-in-itself because its domain
of inquiry is strictly restricted to empirical reality. Like Kant, d’Espagnat admits
that the aim of science is not knowledge of reality-in-itself but that of phenomena.
But he does not believe, like Kant, that reality-in-itself is totally unknowable. In
his view, reality is “veiled,” not hidden, and science can get glimpses of its structure
through the great physical laws it discovers to be valid.90 When reality-in-itself
88d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, 4.
89ibid., 78-79.
90Kant thought that science was concerned only with phenomena and not noumenon (thing-in-
itself). Because science makes use of descriptive concepts — like Euclidean space, absolute time,
determinism, etc. — that are close to common sense, Kant argued that scientific concepts were
in fact a priori elements of human knowledge, and thus not referring to reality-in-itself. However,
with the advent of notions like non-Euclidean geometries, curved spacetime, indeterminism, etc.,
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“resists” by falsifying certain of our theories, we acquire some knowledge about this
reality in a negative manner. For d’Espagnat, nonseparability refers to this kind of
knowledge. Relying on Bell’s theorem and experiments on nonseparability, he argues
that reality-in-itself can neither be multitudinist nor embedded in space and time. We
have already seen why nonseparability implies that reality cannot be multitudinist.
Now, if reality-in-itself were embedded in space and time it would amount to accept
classical realism, which in turn implies nonlocality according to Bell’s theorem. Like
most physicists, d’Espagnat is inclined to think that physical reality is local and
thus he concludes, in the manner of Kant, that the nature of space and time is not
“noumenal” but phenomenal, i.e., a “reality-for-us.”91 Therefore, what really exists
for d’Espagnat is some sort of indivisible Whole that is not embedded in spacetime,
and whose “parts” are only empirically perceived, that is, “molded” through human
understanding.92
In section 5.1.2, we argued that quantum vacuum shares affinities with Brahman
which contradict common sense, this argument cannot hold anymore. As d’Espagnat notices, it is
indeed difficult to believe that pure a priori concepts can evolve in time with the development of
scientific knowledge. It seems more meaningful to assume that these concepts have their source (at
least partly) in reality-in-itself. In order to allow an “influence” from reality-in-itself on phenomena,
d’Espagnat introduces the concept of “extended causality” beside the Kantian notion of causality.
If the latter takes place solely between phenomena alone, the former consists of influences that are
exerted by reality-in-itself on phenomena. See: d’Espagnat, op.cit., 239-41; 454.
91d’Espagnat, op.cit., 239.
92According to d’Espagnat, “the, perceived, locality of the macroscopic objects [experienced in
daily life] is a feature that not only is not obvious but even cannot be imparted to them as elements
of human-independent reality. Presumably it must be considered a universal appearance.” As to why
macroscopic objects appear localized in space rather than entangled together, decoherence might
be a good explanation. It tells how the wavefunction of atomic systems apparently collapses during
measurement. The idea here is that the superposed nature of a quantum state is “leaked” into the
macroscopic environment so that the superposition exists but is no more measurable. This results
from the fact that macroscopic systems always appreciably interact with their environment. In other
words, decoherence would explain how empirical reality arises and why we apprehend the world of
objects to be different from the quantum world. See: d’Espagnat, op.cit., 183.
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insofar as both concepts refer to unmanifest as well as unknowable states of being.
However, vacuum is a theoretical entity endowed with different physical meanings
and as such, it can also be considered as an object of scientific investigation. In
contrast, Brahman is of the nature of pure consciousness, partless, changeless, devoid
of any quality and beyond any form of conceptualization; it is not an object but
the subject sui generis. In this regard, d’Espagnat’s notion of ontological reality
comes closer to the Brahman of Advaita than vacuum. The transcendental nature
of Brahman seems to find an echo in d’Espagnat’s claim that “underlying empirical
reality is a mysterious, non-conceptualisable ‘ultimate reality,’ not embedded in space
and presumably not in time either.”93 The fact that ontological reality is not endowed
with parts, which are only empirically perceived, also agrees with the partless nature
of Brahman. Nevertheless, it remains that Brahman is basically a spiritual principle,
the foundational basis of self-awareness. It is then interesting to examine what place
consciousness has in d’Espagnat’s philosophical considerations. How does it relate to
his concept of ontological reality?
D’Espagnat develops in several books the idea of a “coemergence” of consciousness
and empirical reality from reality-in-itself.94 As far as the origin of consciousness is
concerned, he rejects the “identity theory,” which identifies consciousness with some
material structure internal to or involving neurons. He also rejects the “eﬄorescence
theory” according to which consciousness is a derived product of neuronal activity.
His argument is based on implications of quantum physics: all parts of our bodies,
including neurons, are essentially elements of the empirical reality. Since empirical
reality, as a representation of reality-in-itself, is a priori relative to consciousness, it
is difficult to imagine how it might possibly generate the latter or be identified with
93Quoted from an article by d’Espagnat in Guardian in March 2009, entitled
“‘Quantum weirdness: What we call ‘reality’ is just a state of mind.” (Source:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/blog/2009/mar/17/templeton-quantum-entanglement)
94D’Espagnat uses interchangeably the terms “thought,” “mind” and “consciousness” to denote
the mere fact of “being or becoming aware.”
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it.95 Does it mean that consciousness constitutes some sort of an absolute, as stated
in radical versions of idealism? According to d’Espagnat, the answer is no. States of
consciousness involved in quantum measurements are also relative in the sense that
they refer to “points of view” adopted by different observers in different contexts.96
Neither the things or phenomena observed nor the states of consciousness involved
in measurement are absolute. Both seem to exist in relation to each other, or to
generate reciprocally one another, and this is why d’Espagnat brings in the notion
of a coemergence of consciousness and empirical reality. This coemergence arises —
atemporally, because time is part of empirical reality — out of the mind-independent
reality that is conceptually prior to both consciousness and empirical reality. What
is really “veiled” in d’Espagnat’s conception is not empirical reality but ontological
reality, which is identified with Being itself (Fig. 5.1).97
The conception of d’Espagnat — that individual consciousness has only access
to representations of reality, and is somehow co-equal with things and phenomena
— comes close to the views of Advaita Veda¯nta. His concept of reality-in-itself or
Being, out of which both thought and phenomena emerge, has clear affinities with
95d’Espagnat, op.cit., 418.
96The potential implications of consciousness in quantum physics are complicated and still widely
discussed today. For the sake of brevity, we shall only summarize d’Espagnat’s argument here. He
asks us to imagine two observers participating in a quantum measurement: Peter who is conducting
the measurement, and Paul who is looking at an instrument pointer and registering what information
he reads on the dial. When Paul observes the dial, this induces a specific and seemingly “absolute”
state of consciousness in him: either the pointer is at place A or not. But for Peter, Paul’s state of
consciousness is unknown and undefined. For him, the system is in a state of quantum superposition
because it is not yet measured: it is both in the state “at place A” and in the state “not at place A.”
Not being measured, the system is in a potentially predictive state. Consequently, Paul’s state of
consciousness is also in such a superposed state for Peter, and it will become definite for Peter only
after interaction of some kind with Paul. If Paul’s observation creates in his own mind a definite
state of consciousness, this is not the case from Peter’s angle so that states of consciousness involved
in quantum measurements cannot be considered absolute. See: d’Espagnat, op.cit., 420-21.
97d’Espagnat, op.cit., 388.
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Figure 5.1: D’Espagnat’s scheme of (atemporal) coemergence of thought and empirical reality out
of ontological reality.
Brahman, the pure Being and fundamental reality underlying both physical and psy-
chical realms in Advaita. The whole world of phenomena is grounded in Brahman
and what is regarded as a conscious state is but an expression of Brahman through
a certain modification of the mind. However, although both certainly have a lot in
common, d’Espagnat’s Being is not as explicitly of the nature of consciousness as
Brahman. When d’Espagnat discusses consciousness, he means the individual con-
sciousness facing empirical reality and not the pure and undifferentiated consciousness
characterizing Brahman.98 It is worth noting that d’Espagnat himself notices that
the similarities between his conception of veiled reality and “the great eastern philo-
sophical systems should be considered. . . ” But because modern science is mostly
embedded in the Western tradition, he prefers to confine himself to comparisons with
98However, d’Espagnat seems to believe in the unicity of individual consciousnesses. In Mind
and Matter and in My View of the World, Schro¨dinger had raised the problem of the existence of
a plurality of conscious minds, which he refers to as the arithmetical paradox : how to explain the
existence of a plurality of conscious minds while the world described by science is only one? In
Schro¨dinger’s view, a consistent solution was to adopt the thesis of the unicity of minds: there is
only one mind shining differently in each of us which makes it appear to be many. D’Espagnat faces
the same problem as many minds seem to take part in the emergence of the one empirical reality. In
many respects, he seems to agree with Schro¨dinger’s thesis. Needless to say, this conception comes
close to Veda¯ntic-Upanis.adic monistic idealism as Schro¨dinger himself noticed. Despite this tendency
towards a form of spiritual monism, we might recall that consciousness is in no way transcendental
for d’Espagnat but remains co-equal with empirical reality. This is a major difference with the
absolute idealism of Advaita Veda¯nta. See: d’Espagnat, op.cit., 426-27.
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Western philosophical systems like Platonism and Aristotelism.99
Though, like Kant, d’Espagnat believes that there are inherent limits to scientific
knowledge, he still leaves room for some form of spirituality in science.100 Science
might not be in a position to comprehend ultimate reality, but it can reveal the pro-
found mystery at the core of our existence. This mystery is what d’Espagnat calls
the “veiled reality”: the “ground of things,” or Being, existent yet not accessible to
discursive knowledge. By means of science, man gravitates with wonder and expecta-
tion towards the knowledge of the hidden structures of reality. And yet, he knows this
knowledge exceeds his understanding. In this sense, the Real, like a distant horizon,
partakes of transcendence. D’Espagnat believes we can get rare and precious glimpses
of this Real, or get a “little closer” to it, not only through the great physical and
mathematical laws but also through intuitions like the art, music and spirituality.101
In some respect, the views of d’Espagnat are quite akin to those of Einstein who also
considered that the Real can be approached through the channel of the great laws
of physics. That there is an orderly harmony in the universe that science can reveal
was the source for Einstein of an unbounded, quasi-divine, admiration for the world.
In his view, every profound scientific mind was endowed with a kind of “cosmic re-
ligious feeling” that takes the form “of a rapturous amazement at the harmony of
natural law, which reveals an intelligence of such superiority that, compared with
it, all the systematic thinking and acting of human beings is an utterly insignificant
reflection.”102
99d’Espagnat, op.cit., 458 (footnote 25).
100See this article about d’Espagnat’s views: “The scientist who leaves room for spirituality,” pub-
lished in Reuters on March 17, 2009. (Source: http://blogs.reuters.com/faithworld/2009/03/17/the-
scientist-who-leaves-room-for-spirituality)
101d’Espagnat, op.cit., 455.
102Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, 40.
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5.2.3 An Integral Perspective to Dialogue
With these insights from contemporary philosophy of science, there seems to be a basis
for a more consistent dialogue between modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta.103 Our
comparative analysis of quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a provided us with two key ideas
in this regard: 1. that there are inherent problems with conceptual comparisons
involving systems with different aims, methods and theoretical frameworks; 2. that
physics and Advaita Veda¯nta share a common epistemological truth, which is that
sense-perception and reasoning provide only a limited knowledge of what is. On
the side of science, this amounts to a denial of scientific knowledge as an ultimate
explanation of reality-in-itself. In the process, some philosophers and scientists —
along the lines of instrumentalism — have rejected the very concept of reality-in-
itself while others — along the lines of open realism — have located reality-in-itself
beyond the scope of scientific inquiry. We tend to lean towards this second stand
for two reasons. Firstly, as d’Espagnat and Zwirn argue, “something” that does not
hinge on thought and perception is deducible from a rigorous philosophical analysis
of quantum physics. Secondly, open realism allows an exchange between science and
other traditions of knowledge in terms of how “reality” as a whole can be alternatively
approached and understood. In a philosophical sense, this exchange of views seems
meaningful. In this context, the views of Zwirn and especially those of d’Espagnat
are relevant.
Both modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta are cognizant of the inherent limits
of empirical knowledge. As noted earlier, that empirical knowledge cannot convey
knowledge of ultimate reality is also a central claim of Advaita Veda¯nta epistemol-
ogy. Empirical knowledge, or “lower knowledge,” (apara¯vidya¯) is concerned with the
103As noted earlier, the reconstruction proposed focuses on philosophical aspects of both systems.
We leave aside mathematical/experimental and religious features of physics and Advaita Veda¯nta,
respectively. In the following, we take for granted with d’Espagnat the “universal” character of
quantum physics and thus extend our considerations to modern physics in general.
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empirical world — objects, events, causes, means, ends, etc., — and is mediated
through means of knowledge (prama¯n. as) such as perception and inference. In con-
trast, “higher knowledge” (para¯vidya¯) has the non-dual Brahman as its content and
is “acquired” (or more precisely, realized) without any mediation of such means of
knowledge. Empirical world has lower reality than the timeless and all-comprehensive
reality referred to as Brahman. In his various works, S´an˙kara describes three levels of
reality or being : 1. pa¯rama¯rthika: the “real,” absolute or non-dual Reality, Brahman;
2. vya¯vaha¯rika: the “empirically real,” transactional reality, including all existents
except Brahman and “illusory existents”; 3. pra¯tibha¯sika: the “unreal,” including
illusory existents like hare’s horns, son of a barren woman, etc. The empirical world
belongs to the vya¯vaha¯rika level of reality, which is also the level of ma¯ya¯. It has no
absolute reality because it is neither permanent, eternal nor infinite and because it is
ultimately sublated by the knowledge of Brahman; it is not unreal because it appears
as an objective datum of experience until it is sublated. The world has an apparent
or practical reality (mithya¯) and as such its nature is indeterminable and indefinable
(anirvacan¯ıya).
This categorization in terms of levels of reality reminds us of how d’Espagnat
and Zwirn describe ontological reality, and distinguish it from empirical reality.104
This ontological reality presents affinities with the Advaita pa¯rama¯rthika level of
reality insofar as both refer to that aspect of “reality” that is independent of human
conceptions, unknowable and non-conceptualizable. As to empirical reality, it can
be roughly identified with the vya¯vaha¯rika level as both refer to the empirical world
104D’Espagnat and Zwirn both use the concept of “orders” or “levels of reality” (“niveaux de
re´alite´” in French) to differentiate aspects of reality that are incommensurable with each other and
that cannot be equated in any ontological sense. D’Espagnat refers variously to ontological reality
as the “Real,” “Being,” etc., while Zwirn denotes it as “something.” For the sake of simplicity,
we use the term “ontological reality” to denote both d’Espagnat and Zwirn’s notions of what lies
beyond empirical reality. However, Zwirn would probably disagree with this term as it involves the
characterization of the non-conceptualizable as something “real.”
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composed of objects, events, etc., i.e., the world as it appears. In this regard, it is
interesting to note that d’Espagnat takes care to differentiate empirical reality from
“mere appearance” as well. It is true, he says, that empirical reality is “built up” but
it cannot be considered as a pure appearance without reality. Empirical phenomena,
though not absolutely real in the sense of being mind-independent, are still subject to
intersubjective agreement between those who apprehend them. Because it is endowed
with some degree of reality “the proper domain of scientific knowledge, empirical
reality, is far from being a mere mirage.”105 Similarly, though Brahman alone is
real, the empirical world is not devoid of truth value in Advaita Veda¯nta. Prior to
Brahman-knowledge, transactions of the empirical world are real and not illusory.
But when considered independently of Brahman, the world lacks absolute reality.106
D’Espagnat in a similar way considers empirical reality dependent or subordinate to
ontological reality, out of which it coemerges atemporally with consciousness. There is
no strict separation between ontological reality and phenomena: the empirical world
is but a reflection of the “veiled reality.”
According to d’Espagnat, empirical knowledge has no direct access to reality-in-
itself. He mentions that reality-in-itself cannot be described positively as endowed
with any property. At most, he has recourse to negative expressions like “not mul-
titudinist,” “not embedded in space and time,” etc.107 Zwirn holds that there is
“something” beyond empirical reality which is neither repre´sentable nor conceptualiz-
able and therefore, which cannot be disclosed through empirical knowledge. He also
contends that the nature of this “something” can only be characterized negatively
or described indirectly through analogy. According to Advaita Veda¯nta, empirical
knowledge cannot reveal the nature of Brahman. In its nirgun. a or unqualified as-
105d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, 5.
106S´an˙kara says: “Brahman, the Cause, does not lack existence at any of the three periods of time,
neither does the world, its effect. Since there is only one Existence pure and simple, the effect is
non-different from the cause.” (BS II.1.16)
107Though d’Espagnat denotes reality-in-itself as “Being,” “Real,” etc., these terms remain for him
labels to describe a reality that otherwise would be inexpressible.
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pect, Brahman defies all description of characterization and can at best be described
through negative statements like “not this, not this.” (neti neti) Non-dual reality is
necessarily without any internal difference, and is thus unrelated to the content of any
form of experience — it is unthinkable, indeterminate and indeterminable. Hence,
physics and Advaita Veda¯nta both recognize that empirical reality does not exhaust
the whole of Reality and that there is “something more real” that does not hinge on
thought, perception or any other phenomenal experience. It is also remarkable that
via negativa is promoted in both cases as the only valid way to describe ultimate re-
ality.108 This is a crucial point on which both systems meet and agree in their inquiry
about the nature of reality.109
Towards Another Model
Based on what has been said so far, it is relevant to ask in what way physics (i.e.
philosophy of physics) could interact meaningfully with Advaita Veda¯nta. In sec-
tion 2.2.2, we discussed four different ways of relating science and religion: conflict,
108The via negativa is often associated with Christianity and in particular with the apophatic
or negative theology. In this theology, there is an attempt to achieve unity with God by gaining
knowledge of what it is not rather than what it is. Though God is not an issue in philosophy of
physics, the term via negativa suits well the attempts of some philosophers of physics to describe
reality-in-itself by having recourse to negative statements.
109Most of the time, the Upanis.ads only describe Brahman with negative expressions but in some
places, Brahman is referred to as pure being (sat), pure consciousness (cit) and pure bliss (a¯nanda).
We could interpret such statements as positive descriptions of indescribable Brahman and make
it a major point of contention with the scientific approach that avoids characterizing ontological
reality (at least in d’Espagnat’s and Zwirn’s conceptions). But this would be to misunderstand the
import of Upanis.adic passages. S´an˙kara and other Advaitins emphatically assert that the above
attributes are not intended to describe Brahman positively; they only refer to it by implication.
Positive expressions like sat, cit and a¯nanda are used to exclude ideas of non-being, materiality and
imperfection with regard to Brahman. See: Satprakashananda, Methods of Knowledge According to
Advaita Veda¯nta, 199.
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independence, complementarity and convergence. Considering that physics and Ad-
vaita both share the realization that there are limits to empirical knowledge and that
“something” might exist which is beyond the reach of perception and reasoning, we
can neither affirm that these systems conflict with each other, nor that they are com-
pletely independent. On the contrary, they meet and agree in their recognition of
some kind of unmanifest and unknowable state of being. Another possibility is to
consider, like Fritjof Capra and others, physics and Advaita Veda¯nta as two com-
plementary approaches to the same reality. One argument against complementarity,
however, is that physics has the physical world as its object whereas the purpose of
Advaita’s teachings is to draw attention to the unity of being in providing correct
knowledge about the self. Advaita’s emphasis on the knowing subject presupposes
and implies a worldview that contrasts sharply with that advocated in physics. It
is therefore difficult, and in a sense simplistic, to hold that both systems approach
the same reality. Another point worth mentioning is that complementarity implies
mutually exclusive approaches of the real and thus, by implication, the idea that
each system has access to one — and only one — aspect of reality. As we shall see,
this seems too constraining as well. For these reasons, both systems can hardly be
considered complementary to each other. As for convergence, it mainly relies on the
observation that science and religion exhibit concepts that are identical, similar or
that function in a similar manner. But we have shown how conceptual parallels are
generally superficial and fail to establish a deep correspondence between systems with
different aims, methods and metaphysical premises.
It is also important to understand that both systems depart from each other
when it comes to defining the nature and epistemic accessibility of reality-in-itself.
Thus, Brahman is essentially a spiritual principle: it is the principle of awareness
(cit) underlying all beings, the unchanging witness (sa¯ks. in) underlying phenomenal
existence. Though ontological reality in d’Espagnat’s conception, for instance, shares
affinities with the Brahman of Advaita — both referring to something partless, beyond
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space and time and not conceptualizable — nothing is said of its spiritual nature.
Ontological reality is responsible for the atemporal emergence of consciousness but is
not identified with consciousness. Moreover, consciousness in d’Espagnat’s thought
is essentially individual and not extended to the whole of reality like in Advaita.
Another difference is that by definition, what “really is” strictly remains beyond
the scope of scientific inquiry. In contrast, Advaita Veda¯nta avers that ultimate
reality is something “reachable” through a proper spiritual practice. Though not
conceptualizable, Brahman can be realized through the immediate, intuitive and non-
conceptual experience of the innermost self.110 Hence, Advaita Veda¯nta has been
considered a more “encompassing” system than physics insofar as it provides the
means through which one can realize the nature of ultimate reality. If we are to
take this view seriously, we cannot place Advaita Veda¯nta and physics on the same
epistemological level.
This is the position taken by Richard H. Jones and others against the comple-
mentary model upheld by Capra and others: complementary viewpoints are assumed
to have an equal epistemological value (each viewpoint requires the other for com-
plementarity to emerge) but this is obviously not the case here. For the most part,
Veda¯ntins consider that Brahman-knowledge has more cognitive value than the em-
pirical knowledge disclosed by science. As the S´veta¯s´vatara Upanis.ad (I.12) put it:
“Higher than that [Brahman-knowledge] there is nothing to be known.” In Science
and Mysticism, Jones holds that from the viewpoint of mystical systems like Advaita
Veda¯nta for instance,
the most important problem is that science takes seriously the realm of
ma¯ya¯: nescience (avidya¯) precisely is taking diversity as real: its relation
to a reality beyond what is revealed by dualistic awareness is ignored.111
110If the study of sacred texts (s´ravan. a) and individual reflection (manana) are certainly part of
the spiritual path, the last stage consists in meditation (nididhya¯sana) on one’s own real nature.
Ultimately, sacred texts (s´ruti) and all kinds of reasoning are only subsidiary means to Brahman-
realization.
111Jones, Science and Mysticism: A Comparative Study of Western Natural Science, Therava¯da
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Figure 5.2: Two ways of relating physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. The complementary approach,
advocated by Fritjof Capra and others, and the approach advocated by Richard H. Jones in Science
and Mysticism.
Scientific inquiry is fundamentally limited: it starts from and is akin to the realm of
change, and as such it cannot realize the changeless, the eternal. This is an epistemo-
logical fact that has been overlooked by Capra and others who have been almost
exclusively concerned with conceptual similarities between mystical and scientific
worldviews. In response to that, Jones has come up with a model in which nei-
ther science nor mysticism provides an exclusive way of knowing reality and where no
complementarity is involved. In his model, science and mysticism are not conceived
as two different ways of experiencing one reality, like in the complementary approach,
but as ways of apprehending two equally fundamental components of reality. While
mysticism deals with the unstructured and non-objectifiable “being” beneath mul-
tiplicity, science has authority concerning the structures and regularities within the
realm of becoming and change.112 Both world structures and being are given equal
importance and yet are considered as different and separate realms of existence. Thus,
each system is concerned exclusively with its own domain: the scientific approach re-
veals nothing of beingness and mysticism nothing of structures. In this scheme, then,
the empirical knowledge disclosed by science and the knowledge of being disclosed by
mysticism are both necessary though incommensurable with each other (Fig. 5.2).
Buddhism and Advaita Veda¯nta, 178.
112ibid., 214.
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The distinction between being and structures in Jones’ model avoids the prob-
lems of complementarity. Jones defends the cognitive value of each system on its own
level so that each type of claim has its own context. There can be conflict over the
nature of being or structures only if the context of the claims is ignored.113 In such a
model, Advaita Veda¯nta cannot be said to “encompass” physics insofar as structures
are given as much cognitive value as being. The fact that Advaita clearly deals with
a different realm of reality than physics is not overlooked like in the complementary
approach. The strength of this model is to avoid two extremes: the devaluation of the
realm of becoming in favour of being, that is prevalent in some mystical traditions,
and the devaluation of being in favour of becoming, characteristic of natural sciences.
Nevertheless, Jones’ model has been criticized for drawing “too sharp a line” be-
tween science and mysticism.114 Jones clearly subscribes to the independence thesis,
according to which science and mysticism are totally independent and autonomous
enterprises. However, as noted earlier, the independence stance fails to account for
the commonalities between physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. That both systems agree
on the limits of rational-empirical knowledge in disclosing the nature of reality is a
meeting point that deserves attention in the context of understanding how physics
and Advaita Veda¯nta relate to each other. A consistent dialogical model should take
this fact into account.
Indeed, since Jones’ publication of Science and Mysticism in 1986 there has been
considerable progress in the fields of physics and philosophy of physics. In the above-
mentioned quotation, Jones observes that science’s most crucial problem from a mys-
tical standpoint is that it takes diversity (i.e., the realm of ma¯ya¯, or the empirical
realm) as fundamentally real. But we have seen that this view is no more held by con-
temporary physicists and philosophers of physics. The analysis of quantum physics,
in particular nonseparability (first tested in 1981), has revealed that scientific inquiry
is only concerned with empirical reality, which is a representation of reality-in-itself
113ibid., 215.
114Barbour, When Science Meets Religion, 86.
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and not the real itself. In other words, ma¯ya¯ has been recognized for what it is
— a conditioned representation and nothing more. A second important fact to be
noted is that most philosophers of physics contend that there is something “beyond”
ma¯ya¯. From Zwirn’s non-conceptualizable “something” to d’Espagnat’s atemporal
and “veiled reality,” most agree that empirical reality does not exhaust the whole
content of reality. In a broad sense, there is room for reflection about the unstruc-
tured and the non-objectifiable in contemporary philosophy of physics. It is therefore
hard to believe that physics has nothing to do whatsoever with what Jones has de-
scribed as “being.” The facts rather suggest that the boundaries between Advaita
Veda¯nta and physics are more porous than supposed in Jones’ model. Therefore, an-
other approach is required that could integrate the differences and similarities between
these two systems.
An Integral Model
The integral stance holds that science and religion (or mysticism) are both part of
a “big picture” that fully integrates their respective contributions.115 It is distinct
from complementarity because the disciplines compared deal with different realms,
like in Jones’ model; it is also distinct from independence, for these realms are not
incommensurable with each other but rather interpenetrate each other. In his book
Religion and Science, Ian Barbour convincingly argues that integration is a more
115An important representative of this stance is Ken Wilber. Since the late 1990s, Wilber has been
using the term “integral” to refer to his own philosophy, called integral theory. This theory claims
to be an all-inclusive framework that draws on the key insights of the world’s greatest knowledge
traditions. It aims to synthesize in a comprehensive worldview the imports from various disciplines,
ranging from natural and human sciences to humanities and mysticism. However, the use of the
term would go back to the writings of the Indian Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950), who used it to describe
his own conception of a more comprehensive form of yoga called “integral yoga.” In the following
decades, Aurobindo’s writings have influenced others who have used the term “integral” (or referred
to this kind of view) in more philosophical or psychological contexts.
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promising way to bring scientific and religious insights together than the independence
or complementary thesis. But given that Barbour’s argumentation relies mainly on
the Christian tradition, we shall consider Ken Wilber’s integrative approach which
puts more emphasis on non-Western spiritual traditions. At the basis of Wilber’s
approach is what he calls epistemological pluralism — the idea that reality consists
in several interwoven realms shading into each other, each of which is associated with
a specific mode of knowing. Reality is not dichotomized in terms of being and world
structures like in Jones’ model but organized as a series of nests within nests reaching
from gross to subtle levels — from matter to organic life to mind to soul to Absolute.
Each higher realm at once transcends and includes its lower realm, so that every
thing in the world is interwoven with every other. The lowest realm is that of matter
and the highest is the non-dual Absolute, which is also considered the ground of all
other realms. Here Wilber largely takes inspiration from what he calls the traditional
“Great Chain of Being.” (Fig. 5.3)116
As Wilber explains, according to the traditional view, science (physics, biology
and psychology) deals mostly with the lower realms of the Great Chain while religion
(theology, mysticism) deals with the higher realms. At first sight, then, this model
looks like a more complex version of Jones’ model where instead of having two single
realms relating to science and religion, we have two groups of realms — the lower
and higher realms. But it must be noted that the realms in Wilber’s model shade
into each other (i.e., are not incommensurable) and more important, that each realm
116A number of important thinkers — Huston Smith, Arthur Lovejoy, Ananda Coomaraswamy,
Rene´ Gue´non, Fritjof Schuon, et al. — have affirmed that virtually all of the world’s great wisdom
traditions have subscribed to the Great Chain of Being. According to Lovejoy, the Great Chain
would have “been the dominant official philosophy of the larger part of civilized humankind through
most of its history.” Quoted in: Wilber, The Marriage of Sense and Soul: Integrating Science and
Religion, 6-9. The names and number of realms may have differed from tradition to another one but
the basic idea remains: reality consists in a series of nests within nests reaching from matter to the
Absolute (Spirit, God, Goddess, Tao, Brahman, etc.), each higher level transcending and integrating
the lower one.
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Figure 5.3: The traditional Great Chain of Being. In this picture, life transcends and includes matter:
it includes matter in its makeup but adds qualities to it like sensations, feelings, etc. Similarly, mind
transcends life because it is endowed with qualities that life does not have such as reason and logic;
but it also includes life because for rationality to develop there is need of an organic body. It is to
be noted that the highest level is the Absolute, which transcends all realms but is also their common
ground. The present diagram is a simplified version of Wilber’s own version in: Wilber, A Theory
of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spirituality, 69.
contributes to the broader understanding of reality and not only to a specific domain
of reality. For instance, mystical experiences are not the sole object of mysticism or
theology; neurosciences also contribute to understanding this phenomenon in describ-
ing how the brain behaves in these conditions. In an integrative approach, an event
or thing is never reduced to a single realm or another; rather, it is addressed from a
plurality of perspectives or dimensions of experience that include subjective as well
as objective modes of experience.117
One important feature of Wilber’s model is to bring in the concept of “exper-
imentation” as a meeting point of science and religion. In Wilber’s view, the one
characteristic feature of any kind of science — whether it is a “hard science” such as
physics, chemistry or biology, or a “human science” such as psychology, linguistics
or semiotics — is its correlation with a form of experimentation. Science, he says,
117Wilber, A Theory of Everything: An Integral Vision for Business, Politics, Science and Spiri-
tuality, 65-66.
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL FOR DIALOGUE 280
broadly consists in “a certain attitude of experimentation, honesty, and collaborative
inquiry, and it grounds its knowledge, wherever it can, in evidence.”118 In a broad
sense, science is not only concerned with the exterior and physical world: it also
has something to do with interior states as in psychology for instance. His views
find some resonance in several works on Indian religion and philosophy. For leading
spokesmen of modern Hinduism like Radhakrishnan, Vivekananda and Aurobindo,
Indian philosophy and religion (particularly the Advaita Veda¯nta tradition) starts
from and returns to an experiential basis. It emphasizes “inner experimentation”
with modes of awareness in the same way Western science experiments with the ex-
ternal world, yet it has its own rules and standards. The notion of experimentation
understood in this broad sense might have a role to play in the encounter between
physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. Knowledge of Brahman has an experiential component
insofar as ultimate reality is not known in a discursive manner but reached directly,
without any mediation. D’Espagnat holds similar views when he says that artistic
and mystical intuitions might provide “glimpses” at the structures of reality-in-itself,
or what he calls “veiled reality.”
Wilber’s model presents some key features for an integral perspective to the dia-
logue between physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. Some of those relevant for our purposes
are mentioned below. One can consider the application of these features to both
physics and Advaita Veda¯nta as follows:
1. The Absolute: Perhaps the most interesting and fruitful meeting ground be-
tween physics and Advaita Veda¯nta lies in the recognition that empirical reality
does not exhaust the whole content of reality, and that there exists something
“beyond” empirical reality which does not hinge on thought and perception. In
Wilber’s model, this comes under the broad category of “Absolute.” The Abso-
lute stands as the highest realm in the Great Chain; it is non-conceptualizable
and as such transcends all other realms. In our model, we leave open the ques-
tion whether the Absolute is the ground of everything or not, or whether it
is the culminating stage of an evolutive process like in Wilber’s model. The
mere consensus that “something” is not reachable through rational-empirical
knowledge is taken as a sufficient starting point for dialogue;
118ibid., 74-75.
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2. A broader understanding of “experimentation”: In line with Wilber, it seems
important to widen the meaning of “experimentation” to include under the do-
main of scientific inquiry not only objective but subjective “facts of existence”
as well. In the present context, it is particularly relevant to afford the possibil-
ity of “experiencing” Being (“Real”, Brahman, etc.) in an immediate, intuitive
manner as advocated in Advaita Veda¯nta. On the side of philosophy of physics,
d’Espagnat has conjectured that our “affective percepts” (which amount to a
form of pure emotional experience) might sometimes provide us with genuine el-
ements of information concerning Being.119 Beside the universal laws of physics,
he mentions mysticism, poetry and other arts as domains where such elements
can be found. Of course, not all philosophers and physicists agree with the
views of d’Espagnat. If some simply deny the existence of “something” else
than empirical reality, others, in line with Kant, accept its existence but deny
that its nature can be known. However, leaving the possibility open for a gen-
uine experience of Being is a step towards a better understanding of the Advaita
position. Thus, a dialogue can be pursued and pertinent questions can be asked;
3. Several interwoven realms: Unlike Jones’ model, which admits of only two
realms — being and world structures — Wilber’s model posits several realms:
matter, life, mind, soul and Absolute. However, this categorization is not par-
ticularly relevant here. For instance, neither Advaita nor physics is really con-
cerned with the realm of life or soul. Moreover, the “transcend/include” evolu-
tive scheme presented by Wilber hardly applies here. For instance, d’Espagnat
refers to an atemporal emergence of empirical reality from ontological reality
and not to a temporal or progressive evolution. As for Advaita, if it accepts
that Brahman is responsible for some form of cosmic evolution, still it does
not really present Brahman as the last stage of a “spiritual evolution.”120 We
believe Jones’s division in terms of being and world structures is closer to the
more static categorization in terms of “levels of reality” featuring in both sys-
tems. Nevertheless, Wilber’s idea that realms are not incommensurable but in
fact interpenetrate each other is worth considering. As noted earlier, drawing a
too sharp line between realms does not seem appropriate;
4. Multi-level epistemic accessibility : The most pertinent feature of Wilber’s model
is perhaps the multi-level epistemic accessibility ascribed to both science and
religion. In the present context, it is true to say that each system has its “dom-
inant” realm: physics deals mostly with empirical reality (strictly speaking,
it cannot go beyond it) while Advaita Veda¯nta is mainly concerned with self-
knowledge and the realization of the unity of being. However, it is also true
that both systems have something to say on other realms. Based on an anal-
ysis of quantum physics (in particular nonseparability), philosophy of physics
has come to the realization that there might be something “beyond” empirical
reality. In turn, Advaita Veda¯nta also admits empirical reality as a stepping
stone to its own cosmology and makes claims about the structural features of
the world.
119d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, 433-33.
120We refer here to S´an˙kara’s Advaita Veda¯nta and not to more recent reinterpretations of Advaita
like that offered by Sri Aurobindo for whom the central aim of life is to evolve towards a form of
“life divine” characterized by a spiritualized, truth-consciousness humanity.
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On the basis of the above discussion it is possible to propose another model that
could relate modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta. The proposal takes the form
of a simple map, which, we believe, both systems can agree to and can use as a
basis for dialogue (Fig. 5.4). The starting point of the dialogue consists in the
following epistemological consensus : both systems recognize the limits of perception
and reasoning when it comes to define the content of ultimate reality. Empirical
reality, i.e., the set of phenomena we perceive, analyze and reflect upon, is not the
totality of what is : there is “something,” mind-independent, of which the existence
does not hinge on thought and perception. This has been labelled differently in the
course of our analysis: ontological reality, Being, veiled reality, “something,” nirgun. a
Brahman, pa¯rama¯rthika, etc. In line with our comparative study of vacuum and
a¯ka¯s´a, we ourselves used the term “unmanifest.” As discussed earlier, there are clear
differences as to how each system conceives the nature of the unmanifest. But what is
significant from a dialogical perspective is that no system can possibly have the “final
word” on this issue to the extent that the unmanifest is by definition beyond any
kind of description. Nothing can be positively affirmed about it, which is consistent
with the fact that each system has recourse to negative statements (via negativa)
to describe the unmanifest: neti neti, not multitudinist, not embedded in space and
time, not conceptualizable, etc. In our view, therefore, the unmanifest embodies a
horizon of knowledge based on which both systems can meet and talk to each other
respectfully. It is in this sense that the unmanifest is looked upon as a point of
convergence between physics and Advaita Veda¯nta.121
121It is to be noted that this point of convergence differs from the conceptual rapprochements criti-
cized earlier in that the “concept” of unmanifest primarily points to “something” beyond conceptual
constructs. Using the terms of Ulrich Libbrecht in his Introduction to Comparative Philosophy,
the unmanifest might be identified as a deep structure having no particular relation with a specific
philosophical or cultural framework. That there is an unmanifest state of existence neither describ-
able nor perceivable has been posited not only in Veda¯nta but in several other religious and mystical
traditions of the world, ranging from neo-Platonism and negative theology to Taoism and Buddhism.
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL FOR DIALOGUE 283
The categorization in terms of “levels of reality” in Advaita has close affinities
with that proposed in d’Espagnat and Zwirn’s models. In our map, we simply super-
impose the levels upon each other, though we remain aware of their basic differences.
Similar to Jones’ model, we posit two fundamental realms: 1. the “unmanifest”
realm just mentioned, which is identified with Advaita’s pa¯rama¯rthika level as that
aspect of reality which is independent of human conceptions, unknowable and non-
conceptualizable; and 2. empirical reality, which is more or less identical with Ad-
vaita’s vya¯vaha¯rika level. As defined by d’Espagnat, empirical reality includes the
whole phenomenal world under the scrutiny of science, and is set in opposition to
individual consciousness (see Fig. 5.1). Empirical reality is relative to consciousness
and vice-versa because both presuppose one another and none “emerges” from the
other.122 It must be recalled that for d’Espagnat consciousness is identical with mind
or thought (thus, the term “individual consciousness”) whereas according to Advaita
consciousness (caitanya, cit) precedes all mental operations and is identified with pure
Being (Brahman). In Advaita, consciousness has a wider meaning as it underlies ob-
jective and subjective phenomena. Empirical world and individual mind are only
different manifestations of the same non-dual consciousness. But if like d’Espagnat
we equate consciousness with mind, the Advaita position roughly amounts to that of
d’Espagnat from the vya¯vaha¯rika point of view.123
In an integral perspective, the unmanifest realm is distinct but not incommensu-
rable with the realm of empirical reality. In d’Espagnat’s conception, reality-in-itself
is “veiled” and not totally unknowable: what we apprehend by rational-empirical
means, i.e., what constitutes empirical reality, is a reflection or trace of the Real.
Empirical reality is linked to its ontological ground, the Real or what we have called
the “unmanifest,” out of which it coemerges along with individual consciousness. The
unmanifest is endowed with general structures that constitute the ground not only
of our great literary, artistic and mystical inspirations but also of our great scien-
122d’Espagnat, On Physics and Philosophy, 424.
123Satprakashananda, Methods of Knowledge According to Advaita Veda¯nta, 64.
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Figure 5.4: A simple map serving as a dialogical basis for relating modern physics and Advaita
Veda¯nta.
tific laws.124 In Zwirn’s thesis, however, the unmanifest has a much more distant
relation with empirical reality. His notion of “something” includes everything that is
not possibly conceptualizable. Though we have to admit its “existence,” it is strictly
unknowable and is not “reflected” in the categories of empirical reality. Zwirn simply
remains silent as to the possible relation between his concept of “something” and
empirical reality. It is significant that in their description of the nature of nirgun. a
Brahman, Advaitins have come to similar considerations. From a non-dual standpoint
(apara¯vidya¯), ultimate reality has no relation whatsoever with empirical reality and
is incommensurable with it; only Brahman is real and there is no such thing as world,
creation, etc. If the world exists as an empirical necessity it has no transcendental
validity. Nevertheless, Advaitins must and do admit that there is a world that we
perceive, experience and act upon at a transactional level. In Advaita cosmology, for
instance, there is an attempt to relate Brahman, the ultimate cause of the world, to
the world and its different components (elements, senses, mind, etc.).
The conception proposed here, which we find consistent with both systems, takes
for granted that both empirical reality and the unmanifest, are fundamental compo-
nents of the total Reality. The unmanifest is the ontological ground of the multifarious
124d’Espagnat, op.cit., 455.
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world, the “power” that supplies or underlies its laws, structures and phenomena. In
turn, empirical reality refers to the set of laws, structures and phenomena that human
experience has access to.125 The important point is that no realm has more cognitive
value than the other. If the unmanifest indeed constitutes the ground underlying
empirical reality, the latter has an equally important role in disclosing the mystery of
the unmanifest. By its very limited nature, empirical reality suggests the existence of
something “beyond” itself and makes one wonder about the true nature of reality. Or
in Advaita terms, ma¯ya¯ itself — to the extent that it “measures” our own unknowa-
bility of the real — opens the path to the realization of the very ground of things,
Brahman. As we have seen, the recognition that we have access only to “shadows on
the wall” has led some of the founders of quantum physics as well as contemporary
philosophers of physics, to develop a strong interest and even to speculate about what
lies “outside the cave.” It is not true anymore to say that physics is only concerned
with empirical reality now that some philosophers of physics, on the basis of quantum
physics, have been invoking the existence of a non-conceptualizable realm of reality.
It is equally inadequate to envisage Advaita Veda¯nta as being only concerned with
self-knowledge and the realization of Brahman. This system also deals to some extent
with the unfolding of the empirical world from Brahman and makes specific claims
about the structural features of the world. Too often we get the wrong impression
that the world has no cognitive value for Advaitins. However, in their view, the
world is not at all “illusory” (pra¯tibha¯sika) but has an empirical or transactional
kind of reality (vya¯vaha¯rika). Knowledge of the empirical world is justified as long
as it does not claim ultimacy. It is understood that though, for instance, means of
125There is some similarity here with Jones’ conception of Reality as being composed of two dif-
ferent components: being and structures. However, our approach differs in that we do not consider
these two realms as totally independent from each other. Moreover, the realm of “structures” in
Jones’ model is purely objective in character whereas empirical reality is by definition related to our
apprehension of the world. See: Jones, Science and Mysticism: A Comparative Study of Western
Natural Science, Therava¯da Buddhism and Advaita Veda¯nta, 214.
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knowledge (prama¯n. as) are ultimately unreal (mithya¯), they are still essential for the
teacher in order to lead the pupil to the realization of Brahman. Lower knowledge
(apara¯vidya¯), including cosmology, has an important role in the gradual unfolding of
higher knowledge (para¯vidya¯).126 As we have seen, Advaita Veda¯nta proposes its own
detailed conception of the constitution and evolution of the world in terms of subtle
elements (tanma¯tras) evolving into gross elements (bhu¯tas) and other physical and
psychological evolutes.
The dialogue following the above lines results in Advaita Veda¯nta being given
authority within the realm of the “unmanifest” (top part of the map) and physics
being given authority in the empirical realm (bottom right side of the map).127 But
authority does not mean supremacy. It would be wrong to assume that the scientific
approach reveals nothing of the unmanifest, and that Advaita Veda¯nta is not con-
cerned at all with world structures. The point is that each approach is concerned to
some extent with both realms, and this is what justifies, in our view, the necessity of
a dialogue between these systems. It means that neither physics nor Advaita Veda¯nta
is confined to a single specific region of the map. In contrast with Jones’ model, each
system has access to the whole map, though in different ways and degrees.
126This is well exemplified, for instance, in the second chapter of Vidya¯ran.ya’s Pan˜cadas´¯ı where non-
dual reality is approached by differentiating it from the five elements. Here cosmology is explicitly
used as a path to self-realization.
127For reasons mentioned above, the empirical realm has been divided into two sections: subjective
and objective. Though consciousness is dealt with to some extent in quantum physics, physics is
mostly concerned with the objective part of the map, i.e., with the external world as perceived
and built by us, and more precisely with its material aspects. The proposed dialogue does not
suggest anything substantial regarding other empirical domains such as organic life, functioning
of consciousness, mind and body, etc., which fall into the domains of other sciences like biology,
psychology and neurosciences. Similarly, I do not deal with the subjective part of the map which
relates to consciousness in all its details, even though such insights are generally found in Eastern
spiritual traditions and other mystical traditions of the world.
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Conclusion
The object of this comparative study dealing with philosophical aspects of modern
physics and Advaita Veda¯nta was twofold: 1. based on an analysis of general parallels
and more specifically that between quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a, to show the inade-
quacies of a comparison relying on mere conceptual similarities; and 2. to reconstruct
the dialogue between modern/quantum physics and Advaita Veda¯nta on an epistemo-
logical level by demonstrating that the most significant point of convergence between
these systems is the recognition that reality as a whole cannot be investigated using
rational-empirical means of knowledge. It is worth noting that great physicists of the
last century — from Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger to Jeans and Eddington — recog-
nized this fact as the most important philosophical implication of quantum physics.
Perhaps more important for us is the fact that this very recognition led some of them
to explore other traditions of knowledge, such as those coming from the East. Today,
the situation remains pretty much the same. A brief survey of the views of Michel Bit-
bol, Bernard d’Espagnat and Herve´ Zwirn — three philosophers of science renowned
for their rigorous analysis of quantum physics — has shown that they agree on the
inherent limitations of a purely empirical approach to reality. It is significant that
two of them (Bitbol and d’Espagnat) have invoked other traditions of knowledge —
Platonism, Aristotelism, Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Buddhist philosophy and Veda¯nta — for com-
parison with some aspects of quantum physics. Coming from serious academics, this
is indeed a remarkable opening.
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In this dissertation, we have been mostly concerned with the views of the the-
oretical physicist and philosopher of science Bernard d’Espagnat. This is because
his interpretation of quantum physics today stands as one of the most lucid, wor-
thy of attention from both scientific and philosophical standpoints. It also presents
strong affinities with the thought of Advaita Veda¯nta. In his “veiled reality” thesis,
d’Espagnat asserts that the Real must be some sort of indivisible Whole that is nei-
ther constituted by parts nor embedded in space and time. What is endowed with
parts and subject to change is empirically perceived and “molded” through human
understanding. This conception reminds the affirmation in Advaita that Brahman
is a non-dual, spaceless and timeless Being, the one all-comprehensive reality un-
derlying the variety of empirically perceived phenomena. The non-conceptualizable
nature of Brahman, repeatedly emphasized in the Veda¯ntic tradition, finds also an
echo in d’Espagnat’s negative description of reality-in-itself. That there might ex-
ist such an “unmanifest” state of being beyond the reach of thought and perception
was also suggested by our comparative analysis of quantum vacuum and a¯ka¯s´a. For
these reasons, in our model the assumption of an “unmanifest” realm was consid-
ered an important condition for the encounter between physics and Advaita Veda¯nta.
Another feature of d’Espagnat’s thesis is the distinction between two “levels of re-
ality”: a mind-independent or ontological reality, and a transactional or empirical
reality. These levels have been brought into correspondence with the levels of reality
in Advaita Veda¯nta (vya¯vaha¯rika, pa¯rama¯rthika).
Even though there are clear differences to be taken into consideration in Advaita
Veda¯nta and modern physics, it is still possible for both to have a dialogue and reflect
deeply on these divergences. How does each system conceive the nature and epistemic
accessibility of ultimate reality? How is the “unknowable” and “unmanifest” aspect
of Reality conceived and approached in both systems? Can we compare the role of
devotion and meditation in Advaita Veda¯nta with that of concentration, imagination
and intuition in theoretical science? What about the notion of “grace” and the process
of “discovery” in science? As far as d’Espagnat’s thesis is concerned, it is interesting
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to note the relationship established between consciousness, empirical reality and the
Real. According to him, some of the structures of the Real passes into the universal
laws of physics. These laws are reflected in empirical reality and apprehended through
consciousness, and thus the structures of the Real can be “glimpsed” at through the
laws of physics. It is significant that Advaitins emphasize self-knowledge (a¯tmavidya¯)
as a way to realize the nature of the Real, which is described as pure existence (sat)
and pure consciousness (cit): the Real, Brahman, is essentially identical with our
innermost self, a¯tman. For d’Espagnat, however, the Real is neither located in the
things of the empirical world nor in “us,” and can only be grasped partially through
scientific inquiry. Now, could there be a yet unknown, and more direct, relationship
between the consciousness that gleans a few glimpses of the Real through physical
laws, and the Real underlying those laws? This is a question that might not be
subject to direct scientific inquiry but one of the directions in which contemporary
philosophy of physics and cognitive studies of religion could well be leading to.
The fact that modern physics and Advaita Veda¯nta face similar epistemological
issues even while attempting to define the content of reality as a whole is significant
from a comparative philosophical perspective. It is revealing that both systems look
upon the nature and epistemic accessibility of ultimate reality as valuable philosoph-
ical problems, and offer distinct solutions to them. To understand that a similar
problem can be approached differently in distinct traditions of knowledge is enriching
and conducive to a dialogue free from conceptual constraints. As Krishna says, to
search for
distinctiveness in the solutions offered to similar problems is not only to see
the alien tradition in a new way but to enrich oneself with the awareness
of an alternative possibility in thought, a possibility that has already
been actualized. The awareness of this alternative actualized possibility
may, one hopes, free one’s conceptual imagination from the unconscious
constraints of one’s own conceptual tradition.128
128Krishna, D., Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to Be. In: Larson and
Deutsch (eds.), ibid., 83.
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It can also stimulate philosophical and scientific reflections in unexpected ways. For
instance, the fact that Advaita Veda¯nta contends that knowledge of Brahman can be
gained by means of different spiritual practices might offer an additional perspective
from which to approach the problem of ultimate reality in philosophy of physics. In-
directly, it suggests that an increasing collaboration between philosophers of physics,
teachers of Advaita Veda¯nta, neuroscientists and scientists of cognitive religion could
be beneficial. Conversely, the fact that a physicist like d’Espagnat maintains that the
laws of physics reflect in some way the structure of reality-in-itself can lead Advaitins
to reconsider their own understanding of the nature of empirical reality and its re-
lationship with Brahman. By reconstructing the dialogue along such epistemological
issues, there might be more room for an authentic encounter between modern physics
and Advaita Veda¯nta.
The age-old Indian tradition of Advaita Veda¯nta is a philosophical system as
well as a practical guide to spiritual experience. It is an attempt to synthesize into a
comprehensive and integrated worldview both external and internal aspects of reality.
In the vision it brings forth, the world and human beings’ innermost self are both
envisaged as manifestations of a deeper Reality, unconceivable, unknowable, non-dual
and spiritual: Brahman. The fact that the very advances made in quantum physics
entail a rapprochement with some key ideas of this system is quite significant and
worthy of reflection. We do not talk here of a mere set of conceptual similarities but
of a consistent meeting at the epistemological level. What does it suggest and where
does it point to? Obviously, it does not mean that science is returning, or must return
to the tenets of this ancient spiritual philosophy. It appears inappropriate, as we have
seen, to conclude that Advaita Veda¯nta can legitimate modern science in any way.
But the very possibility of a rapprochement at the epistemological level reminds us of
the deeply philosophical character of the scientific enterprise. What is Reality, what
is consciousness, and what is our relationship with the world? Is there something
like an “ultimate reality” and if so, is it possible to gain knowledge of it? These are
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questions that occupy the minds of some philosophers of science today and to which
no definite answer has yet been offered. Naturally, this opens the door to profound
exchanges with other traditions of knowledge. The physicist Wolfgang Pauli, who
was deeply interested in the dialogue between science and religion, said:
. . . Contrary to the strict division of the activity of the human spirit into
separate departments. . . I consider the ambition of overcoming the oppo-
sites, including also a synthesis embracing both rational understanding
and the mystical experience of unity, to be the mythos, spoken and un-
spoken, of our present day and age.129
What humans really need today is a profound sense of unity. To feel part of the
whole universe, to be one with it, is the unspoken mythos Pauli is referring to. The
spoken mythos might refer to human’s explicit attempts to achieve a unified and
all-embracing conception of nature, an attempt that features in virtually every field
of contemporary science from quantum physics and cosmology to neurosciences and
genetics. In its quest for unity of the world, science looks outside and tries to arrange
the physical facts of existence into a comprehensive worldview. However, it leaves
aside the interior facts of consciousness which also demand a place in a unified and
integral conception of reality. Though insightful, an understanding of the physical
correlates of consciousness, like that provided by neurosciences, can only constitute a
partial understanding of the fact of awareness itself.130 In this context, we might profit
from a deeper understanding of spiritual insights about reality and consciousness
129Quoted from: Wilber, Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists,
163.
130Our research has indicated that it is inadequate to try to explain consciousness as a pure
epiphenomenon of matter. To envisage consciousness as a derived product of neuronal activity is to
assume the objective reality of neurons, brain, etc. However, according to d’Espagnat’s views, these
are essentially elements of empirical reality, which itself depends on the co-existence of consciousness.
A couple of decades ago, this difficulty was noted by the physicist Robert Oppenheimer: “. . . despite
our increasing knowledge of these intricate marvels both as to their structure and their functioning,
it seems rather unlikely that we shall be able to describe in physico-chemical terms the physiological
phenomena which accompany a conscious thought, or sentiment, or will. Today the outcome is
uncertain. Whatever the outcome, we know that, should an understanding of the physical correlate
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pertaining to other traditions of knowledge. As physicist Eddington said, we might
need to
return to our starting point in human consciousness — the one centre
where more might become known. There [in immediate inward conscious-
ness] we find other stirrings, other revelations than those conditioned by
the world of symbols. . . Physics most strongly insists that its methods
do not penetrate behind the symbolism. Surely then that mental and
spiritual nature of ourselves, known in our minds by an intimate contact
transcending the methods of physics, supplies just that. . . which science
is admittedly unable to give.131
Recognizing the limits of empirical knowledge inevitably involves a deeper considera-
tion of the inner world — thoughts, emotions, imagination, intuition and ultimately,
as Eddington conveys, the fact of awareness itself. Yet, a divorce with physical sci-
ence is not desirable. A right synthesis cannot be achieved by means of an idealistic
spiritual philosophy that would reduce exterior facts of physical existence to some
form of inner subjectivity. An integral approach to reality should strive to discover
the laws that govern the external world as well as those that govern one’s inner world,
and perhaps culminate in the formulation of a higher truth reconciling these facets
of reality. We believe an honest and rigorous dialogue between physics and Advaita
Veda¯nta could lead the way in this endeavour. It could open a space where intellectual
rigour and spiritual awareness work together to evolve a more embracing conception
of Reality.
of elements of consciousness indeed be available, it will not itself be the appropriate description
for the thinking man himself, for the clarification of his thoughts, the resolution of his will, or the
delight of his eye and mind at works of beauty. Indeed, an understanding of the complementary
nature of conscious life and its physical interpretation appears to me a lasting element in human
understanding. . . ” See: Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding, 80-81.
131Quoted from: Wilber, Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists,
10.
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